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ABSTRACT
Comparative data reveal that Japan consistently has had one of the highest poverty rates
among advanced industrialized nations, yet its government taxes the poor more heavily and
gives them less in public cash transfers than its peers. Why does a country, endowed with
democratic institutions, deep pockets, and a sizable social welfare system provide so little
public assistance to the poor? I identify two features of Japan's political and economic
development that gave rise to a distinctively threadbare safety net. First, the country's late-
developer status paired with state-led industrial development incentivized the primary
interest groups-namely, the agrarian landlords, industrialists, and organized labor-to
oppose redistribution. Second, the manner in which democratic institutions were
introduced in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent expansion of suffrage enabled
these groups to gain political influence and block expansion of poor relief in the Diet.
Beyond formulating redistributive policies, they locked in the minimalist pattern of
redistribution by denying the poor the right to vote (pre-1945) and adopting an electoral
system that muted their political voice after suffrage was obtained (post-1945).
Consequently, Japan's welfare state developed unevenly, featuring a heavy layer of social
insurance programs that benefit well-organized interest groups and an exceptionally
minimalist public assistance program for the poor. Thus, contrary to extant theories that
associate democracy, economic modernization, and a robust labor movement with higher
social spending for the poor, I show that these factors stifled redistribution in the case of
Japan. My findings strongly suggest that how a country built its democracy and wealth
influences whether a welfare state reinforces or ameliorates existing inequality.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Part I. The puzzle, literature review, and theory
INTRODUCTION
Just as one should not judge a book by its cover, one should not judge a country
by its general profile. Japan is often presented as a successful example of a democratic
transition and one of the most prosperous countries in the world.' It is the only Asian
country considered to be a "welfare state," a label that only a handful of countries that
substantially commit their resources to care for the economic wellbeing of its citizens
possess.2 One might expect, judging solely from its general attributes, that it dispenses
generous assistance to the poor.
This would be a reasonable supposition, given that generations of scholars have
contended that democratic institutions are better equipped to care for the poor and have
shown empirically that democracies are correlated with higher social spending than non-
democracies. 3 Most of the explanations center on the electoral process, the ensuing
' The most recent work that examines Japan's democratic transition is Mary Alice Haddad, Building
Democracy in Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
2 Countries that are committed to spending a sizable portion of their government expenditures for social
welfare programs are often referred to as the "welfare state" or "welfare regime." See Gosta Esping-
Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
3 See for example, Robert R. Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, "Globalization, Domestic Politics, and
Social Spending in Latin America," World Politics 53 no. 4 (200 1): 553-87; David Stasavage, "Democracy
and Education Spending in Africa," American Journal of Political Science 49 no. 2 (April 2005): 343-358;
David Brown and Wendy Hunter, "Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," American Political
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competition and political participation inherent in democratic governance: democracy
makes leaders address welfare concerns in order to appeal to broad constituencies and
obtain a large "winning coalition" (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002 and 2003); democracy
forces leaders to respond to public welfare issues because voters can penalize them if
social-economic conditions deteriorate (Sen, 1981, 1999); democracy makes the median
voter the decisive player in government spending decisions and, faced with inequality,
the median voter with below-average income will use the ballot box to push for greater
redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).4 Accordingly, one would expect Japanese
democratic institutions to facilitate substantial government transfers to the poor.
Japan's status as one of the richest countries in the world would also make us
believe that it shows largess to the poor. Simply put, it can afford to lift individuals out
of poverty. Studies that link economic modernization and the expansion of social welfare
programs inform us that industrialization creates both the demand for and supply of
social policies. Proponents of this view argue that the productive forces that improve
people's lives can also generate "an avalanche of social dislocation" that increases the
demand for states to provide citizens with social protection.5 Simultaneously, economic
Science Review 93 no. 4 (1999): 779-790. For an insightful literature review and assessment of whether
democracy helps or hurts the poor, see Michael Ross, "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" American
Journal of Political Science 50 no. 4 (October, 2006): 860-874.
4 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,"
British Journal of Political Science 32 no. 4 (2002): 559-590; The Logic of Political Survival (Baltimore:
MIT Press, 2003); Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981); Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf,
1999); Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of
Political Economy 89 no. 5 (October 1981): 914-927. Other scholars argue that democracy improves
welfare of citizens because it secures political stability, labor rights, higher wages, freedom of speech, and
the rule of law. See for example, Dani Rodrik, "Democracies Pay Higher Wages," The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114 no. 3 (August 1999): 707-737; David Lake and Matthew Baum, "The Invisible Hand of
Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services," Comparative Political Studies 34 no. 6
(2001): 587-621.
5 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1944), 40.
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modernization increases the state's revenue and administrative capacities needed to
develop and maintain expensive social welfare programs.6 Given Japan's remarkable
economic achievements over the last century and the ample financial and organizational
resources that the government has accumulated over time, one would imagine that it
provides care for the needy.
Moreover, Japan has a well developed social welfare system that offers a variety
of social protection schemes to protect citizens from unforeseeable risks and unavoidable
events that could lead to income losses.7 As Gregory Kasza has shown, the Japanese
welfare state is "no more unique than the other advanced welfare states but sits
comfortably within the general parameters of the species." 8 The most recent data reveal
that Japan spends nearly twenty percent of its GDP on social welfare programs.9 One
might presume that a sizable portion of social spending is used to provide adequate social
services for the poor.
Although the Japanese poor have seemingly hit the redistribution trifecta by
residing in a rich, democratic welfare state, the government has defied the odds by
choosing to maintain an exceptionally minimalist relief arrangement for the poor.
Comparatively, the Japanese government has taxed the poor at a higher rate while
delivering fewer transfers than other countries. On the one hand, the poorest of the
6 Harold Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social We/fare (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1958); Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
7 The content of Japanese "welfare state" is also analyzed in the work of John Creighton Campbell, How
Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society (Princeton, NY: Princeton University
Press, 1992); Margarita Estevez-Abe, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8 Gregory J. Kasza, One World of Welfare: Japan in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2006), 140.
9 According to the OECD, Japan spent 18.7% of GDP on social welfare in 2007 and this figure is estimated
to have increased since then.
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population in Japan contributes more taxes and social security payments than other
countries: the share of the taxes and social security contributions paid by the lowest
quintile in Japan is around 6%, twice if not three times higher than in other countries:
Germany (2.1), Finland (4.0), Canada (2.3), United States (1.6), and Britain (1.7). On the
other hand, the lowest income quintile in Japan received only 15.9% of all public cash
transfers, compared to other countries such as Germany (17.4), Finland (32.9), Canada
(25.7), United States (24.8) and Britain (31.4)."
Whereas most affluent democracies spend over 2.0% of GDP for public assistance
programs for the poor, Japan spends merely 0.2%." Its access rate to public assistance
also confirms the ultra-minimalist approach to poverty. Only 0.3% of working age-
population receives public assistance in Japan, in contrast to its peers that generally serve
over 3.0% of the population. Furthermore, it is estimated that only 10-20% of the eligible
poor actually receive assistance in Japan, compared to the take-up rate for social
assistance in other OECD countries that ranges from 40%-80%.12
Its meager spending and restrictive access to public assistance belie the fact that
the incidence of poverty has been high comparatively and historically. Available data
suggest that absolute poverty was widespread during the pre-1945 period-at times even
reaching around fifty percent-although it has improved since 1945, the post-tax and
transfer relative poverty rate has remained around ten to fourteen percent, a range that is
10 OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2008), 116.
" I explore the state of poverty and redistribution more fully in chapter one, which also contains the
relevant references. For an overview of social assistance in OECD countries that contains valuable
information such as programmatic descriptions and relevant data on access rate and spending, see Ian
Gough et al., "Social Assistance in OECD Countries," Journal of European Social Policy 7 no. 1 (1997):
17-43.
12 The average take-up rates in OECD countries is from Virginia Hernanz, Frank Malherbet, and Michele
Pellizzari, "Take-up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence," OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Papers (2004): 11-12. See chapter one for a full list of data sources.
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higher than most advanced industrialized countries.13 Despite the remarkable political,
economic, and social progress that the country has made, the Japanese safety net for the
poor-literally, a lifeline for the destitute-is so threadbare that at least one person dies
of starvation every week and nearly a dozen people commit suicide daily due to
economic hardship. 4 Why does a country, endowed with democratic institutions, deep
pockets, and a sizable social welfare system provide so little to the poor?
Argument in brief
The central contention of my dissertation is that when and how a country pursued
industrialization and democratization mattered deeply in the development of a safety net
for the poor. Ironically, what made Japan stand out-being the first non-western country
to industrialize and introduce democratic institutions at the turn of the century-gave rise
to a distinctively threadbare safety net for the poor. At critical moments in the nation
building process, the country's effort to catch up to the West in the realm of political and
economic development impeded it from converging in the realm of social assistance.
In order to illuminate the causal factors and temporal dynamics at work, I present
an analytical framework that shows how a particular pattern of democratization and
industrialization can interact to hinder the development of a robust safety net over time. I
utilize Japan's "deviant" or "outlier" outcome, which has not been fully explained by
existing models, to identify a new causal path.' 5 The model presented here, therefore,
primarily functions as a heuristic device to identify new variables and processes that are
13 Today, Japan's relative poverty rate is around sixteen percent.
14 See the appendix in chapter one for historical data on suicide and starvation deaths.
15 For an extended discussion on heuristic theory building, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett,
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 75.
11
important-such as the role of electoral safeguards and the nature of industrialization--
but have been overlooked or downplayed in the comparative literature on redistribution.
Moreover, by pinpointing the key similarities and distinctions between Japan and other
countries, my intention is to make the Japan story more accessible and ripe for a
comprehensive comparison in future studies.
My principal theoretical claim is that when and how a country built its democracy
and wealth matters in who gets what from government. Two issues determine the course
of redistribution: who has a say in the policymaking process and what are their economic
incentive to aid the poor. I argue that the process of democratization defines who has
political influence while the economic incentives to aid the poor are structured by the
process of industrialization. As major social groups (e.g., agrarian landlords,
industrialists, and working class) vie for greater economic gains and political
representation they choose the pattern of the safety net that best suits their broader
strategic economic interests.
The dominant interest groups that gain political representation (e.g., agrarian
landholders, industrialists, and organized labor), I argue, formulate not just redistributive
policies in the short-run but also the overarching electoral institutions that frame the
context in which redistribution is contested over time. In the course of shaping and
reshaping the electoral terrain, they determine whether to include or exclude the poor
from the policymaking process itself. When key social groups have little incentive to
help the poor, they are more likely to exclude them from the policymaking process. They
do so by instituting stringent voting rules that continue disenfranchising the poor or by
adopting an electoral system that mutes the poor's political voice even after they are
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granted suffrage. In other words, when major political groups oppose redistribution, they
are more likely to create an exclusionary democracy that negates the "one person, one
vote" principle in order to shut out the poor from the politics of public expenditures.
Thus, cross-country variation in the level of poverty relief today is partly attributable to a
particular institutional choice made during democratization, which in turn is based on the
very question of how much to give to the poor in the form of relief, votes, or voice. The
political structure ultimately reflects the redistributive preferences of the holders of
power and this ensures that the pattern of redistribution is locked in for the long run.
Process-tracing the origins of Japanese democracy, capitalism, and the safety net
helps us identify the two key elements of democratic reforms that determine who gets to
make redistributive choices: the varying effectiveness of electoral safeguards (e.g.,
constitutional provisions that limit the power of the elected assembly) and "carriers of
democratization" (the agents that successfully advance democratic reforms). While the
redistributive interests of key social groups (e.g., agrarian landlords, industrialists, and
working class) are mainly shaped by the varying tempo and nature of industrial
development.
In Japan, two patterns of political and economic development-first, its late
developer status paired with state-led industrial development and, second, the elite-driven
process of democratization combined with ineffective electoral safeguards--led the
government to choose a minimalist course of redistribution. The next section provides a
summary of how the development of democracy, capitalism, and social welfare policy in
Japan intersected to produce a particular pattern of the safety net for the poor.
13
The Case of Japan: An Overview
Two centuries ago, Japan was a poor, authoritarian country with a fairly robust
safety net for the poor. Its quest to build democracy and wealth, however, led to a
dramatic reduction in the level of poor relief in the short run and, in the long run, stifled
its growth, even though the country continued making enormous progress in political,
economic and social affairs. The country's late developmental state-led industrial
capitalism structured the incentives of the main social groups (e.g., agrarian landlords,
industrialists, and organized labor) in ways that hurt the prospects of building a safety
net. At the same time, the political influence of these groups was amplified because the
traditional holders of power introduced democratic institutions with ineffective electoral
safeguards and failed to curb the power of the elected assembly.
As a result, the gradual transition towards democratization hampered the
development of a robust safety net as expanding suffrage to key groups-agrarian
landholders in 1890, industrialists in 1900, and organized labor in 1925-each in turn
voiced opposition to expand poor relief in order to pursue their narrow economic
interests. Moreover, these groups eventually agreed to institute an electoral system that
enhanced the political representation of organized economic interests at the expense of
the unorganized; this shut out the poor from redistributive politics even after universal
suffrage was adopted in 1945. My four empirical chapters capture how the interplay
between democratization and industrialization restricted the flow of redistribution over
time. Below, I recount the key findings and point out the main historical turning points.
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Prior to the birth of a nation-state (Tokugawa regime 1603-1868), feudal lords
engaged in despotic redistribution by employing poor relief as a means of extraction.' 6
The economy was largely agrarian and labor mobility was restricted; this enabled each
feudal lord to administer relief with the objective of maximizing his returns from poor
laborers. In essence, rulers provided relief to the poor-whose labor represented an
indispensable source of tax revenue-to increase productivity and discourage rebellion.
Each feudal lord was responsible for the wellbeing of the poor who belonged to him and
resided in his territories.
In the 1850s, Western powers forced Japan to end its isolationist foreign and
commercial policies, which triggered an intricate domestic political struggle that
eventually led to the collapse of the Tokugawa regime. The new leaders, the Meiji
oligarchs, abolished a host of feudal practices and institutions as a part of the grand
mission to build a modern nation state. Dismantling the feudal system entailed a number
of significant changes, such as land reform, local administrative changes, and
liberalization of the labor market. In particular, increased labor mobility vitiated the
logic of despotic redistribution since the poor no longer belonged to any one person or
community. The need to socially protect citizens became visible as the wholesale
changes, especially the opening of Japan's near-autarkic domestic market, entailed large-
scale dislocation and transitional hardships for many ordinary Japanese.
16 A number of economists conceptualize redistribution as an instrument of extraction. See Dan Usher and
Merwan Engineer, "The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society," Public Choice 54 no. 3 (1987):
261-276; Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh, "Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare,"
Journal of Public Economics 53 no. 1 (1994): 187-204; Martin McGuire and Mancur Olson, "The
Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of
Economic Literature 34 no. 1 (1996): 72-96.
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Under such circumstances, the Meiji oligarchs scrambled to create the country's
first nation-wide public assistance system, the so-called 1874 Relief Regulations (Jukkyii
Kisoku). The Relief Regulations, however, virtually served no one as the Meiji
government reserved scarce government resources for the sole purpose of promoting
national industrial development. Japan's aspirations were to become rich-as quickly as
possible-but this was a daunting task given that it was a latecomer that needed to catch-
up to the more advanced economies in the West with poor factor endowments: scarce
land and capital but abundant in labor. As Rodrik (2012) notes, during the "first wave of
globalization," (1870-1914) all of the poor countries in the periphery were dictated by the
constraints imposed by geography and factor endowment.' 7 Japan was truly an exception
in that it carved out a new path of industrial growth that defied the notion of comparative
advantage. The Meiji oligarchs drafted the world's first "development plan," which
employed a capital-intensive strategy that designated the state as the key player to foster
industrial growth and nurture private entrepreneurship. 18 To address the shortage of
capital, the new Meiji government created a centralized tax system, imposed a high land
tax, which fell mostly on the agrarian class, and directed that any funds amassed were to
be used primarily to foster industrialization, not for poor relief or any other activities.
With one hand, the government channeled funds to spark industrial growth: it
implemented various forms of import substitution programs to nurture infant industries;
assisted in the borrowing of foreign technology and acquisition of machinery; invested
heavily in key industries such as steel and iron to offset the high entry costs of firms in
these sectors; and built vital infrastructure, such as roads, telecommunications, postal
" Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of World Economy (New York,
NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 142-143.
18 Ibid.
16
services, and public utilities (e.g., electricity) to help lower transaction costs. With the
other, it withheld funds for the Relief Regulations and instituted new ultra-restrictive
eligibility rules to deter individuals from applying. For the first time in history,
individuals were subjected to a stringent application process in which they were
thoroughly investigated before receiving assistance. The new eligibility rules were so
strict that they basically barred most people from relief. In essence, the funneling
imperative to meet the initial start-up costs of industrial development trimmed Relief
Regulations down to the bare bones.
The new public assistance system was so inadequate that within two decades of
its inception, the oligarchs questioned the merits of staying on course with the minimalist
policy direction. The task of catching-up to the West in the realm of social policy
increasingly gained saliency among the oligarchs but the mission was thwarted by a new
political class, comprised of agrarian elites, that were enfranchised as a part of the grand
mission to build a "democracy" in the late nineteenth century. The oligarch's initiative to
expand poverty relief in the inaugural session of the Diet largely failed because they
mistakenly made "democracy" work.
The ruling oligarchs made a crucial decision to adopt democratic institutions in
the 1880s in response to an intensifying intra-oligarchic conflict. The minority faction of
the oligarchy advocated democratization in order to gain a greater voice in the decision-
making process. They formed an alliance with the agrarian landlords who were fuming
over the exorbitantly high land tax needed to pursue a capital-intensive, state-guided
industrial development. In order to oppose the prevailing taxation without representation,
the agrarian landlords willingly supplied financial resources to create pressure for
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democratization from below. The majority faction conceded in order to keep the
oligarchy intact and preserve its political power, paving the path of democratization.'"
Although the concept of democracy was unfamiliarly "Western" to the Japanese,
the Meiji oligarchs were by no means intimidated by the perils of democracy. They were
aware that early democratization in Western nations involved implementing a number of
undemocratic rules that limited political representation (e.g., restrictive voting rules, non-
elected parliamentary chamber) and safeguards to ensure a more gradual transition and
controlled institutional change.20 The oligarchs toured Europe and the United States,
hired foreign administrative experts and learned how ruling elites abroad had coped with
the challenges of early democratization.
The oligarchs ushered in democratic reforms that established a new constitution
and an elected assembly, but they applied numerous electoral safeguards against the
domination of party politics, such as granting veto power to the House of Peers or giving
the Emperor, whom the oligarchs could persuade, the right to dissolve the Diet when
faced with an unruly elected assembly.2 1 From local to national political institutions, the
oligarchs painstakingly engineered the electoral terrain to create a "sham assembly" and
to maintain a firm grip over the decision-making process.22 Yet, to their surprise, once
the Diet floor opened, the organs of the embryonic form of democracy unmistakably
19 Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in
Imperial Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 28.
20 On this point, see Daniel Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?" World Politics, 58 no. 2 (January
2006).
21 As Amel Ahmed points out, the process of democratization prior to 1945 was often inconsistent and
contradictory where "inclusionary reforms and exclusionary safeguards" went hand-in-hand. Amel Ahmed,
Engineering Electoral Dominance: Democratization and Electoral System Choice in the Era of
Industrialization (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 1. For a historical narrative
on how the Meiji oligarchs placed a number of electoral safeguards to hedge the risk of an unruly Diet, see
John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965);
22 Fujimura Michio, Yamagata Aritomo [Yamagata Aritomo] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1961), 103.
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functioned. Despite the franchise being limited to just one percent of the population-
and mostly to the agrarian landholders--the preferences of eligible voters were filtered by
national representatives who used the assembly floor to advance their constituents'
interests and challenge the status-quo.
Early democratization prevented the country from constructing a safety net
because a band of newly-elected provincial notables-who the Minister of Agriculture
and Commerce, Mutsu Munemitsu, crudely described as the "three hundred farmers"
(sanbyaku no hyakushadomo)-ferociously attacked the oligarchs' proposal to
significantly expand poor relief in the inaugural session of the Diet.2 3 The oligarchs
prided themselves as the defenders of the public interest and denounced the politics of
private gains. Elected officials, in contrast, "learned their political lessons on local
ground and came to the Diet prepared to represent their class and the interests of their
district, much as they had in village and prefectural assemblies, where neither Bentham
nor Blackstone had been of much use."24 The rural agrarian elites, already enraged by
the high tax burden imposed by the oligarchs to spur industrialization, opposed expansion
of poor relief on the grounds that it would lead to higher taxes in the future.
The "voice" of agrarian landed elites that opposed redistribution on the national
political stage was amplified because the oligarchs made a strategic error in granting the
legislature veto power over budgetary matters and taxation. Although the oligarchs
instituted a number of safeguards to hedge against the risk of an unruly Diet, newly-
elected officials chose to oppose rather than cooperate with the oligarchy, thereby
dashing the oligarchs' expectations of how elected representatives would respond to
23 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 69.
24 Ibid., 72.
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structural constraints. The failure to capitalize on the historical opportunity to expand
poor relief reflected a much broader political change ushered in by democratic reforms:
steering the course of redistribution required the cooperation of the elected officials who
represented economic interest groups that opposed poor relief.
Compared to many Western European countries, where democratic transitions
were often gradual and stretched over a long time horizon, democratization in Japan
occurred at a much faster pace. It took only a few years from the opening of the Diet for
a new carrier of democratization and another villain in the history of poor relief to
emerge: the urban industrialists. The political ascendency of "political merchants" was
facilitated by the reluctance of agrarian elites to support the swelling government
spending to stimulate industrial growth; in addition, industrialists feared that the strong
agrarian opposition towards the land tax might lead to higher corporate taxes. The
escalating conflict between urban and rural interests created a schism among the elites
and, paired with strong pressure for suffrage expansion by the urban industrialists,
eventually induced partial democratization in 1900.
Increasing the political representation of the urban industrialists, however, was
lethal to the growth of social assistance for the poor. The industrialists successfully
obtained the government funds necessary to build key industries, infrastructure, and a
skilled workforce. Using resources to aid the poor, whether they were sick, elderly,
children, or working, generated marginal economic gains and, therefore, was a policy
industrialists would not consider. From 1890 to the early 1900s, welfare bureaucrats and
a few rogue politicians urged the national government to overhaul the 1874 Relief
Regulations and create a new comprehensive public assistance system that would protect
20
citizens from the new risks that rapid industrialization posed. The proposed expansions
were defeated without deliberation as the agrarian-industrialist dominated Diet turned a
deaf ear to the matter.
The archaic Relief Regulations continued to serve as Japan's principal poor relief
legislation until a new ultra-minimalist poor relief bill, the Relief and Protection Law
(Kyfigoh), superseded them in 1929. By then, Japan had already "taken a leap in the
dark" by adopting universal manhood suffrage in 1925, but the key interest group that
attained suffrage, the working class, turned its back on poor relief to pursue its narrow
economic interests and leverage its political position.2 5 The tempo and nature of
industrialization structure how workers are organized-along centralized or decentralized
lines-which in turn define the nature of working class actions, redistributive
preferences, and the prospects of allying with other social groups including the poor.
Japan's late developmental state-led industrial capitalism induced decentralization of the
working class movement and incentivized organized labor to withdraw from the
democratization movement and abandon efforts to demand social protection from the
state.
Late industrial development created a number of hurdles for organized labor to
form a centralized, broad-based working class organizational structure that could forge
crosscutting ties and promote encompassing interests. Trailing behind advanced
countries gave government officials and employers in late developers more room to
forestall the development of a centralized working class mobilization. The Meiji
government and employers had foreknowledge of how working class mobilization
25 Lord Derby noted that the1868 Reform Bill, which would considerably expand suffrage, was like taking
"a leap in the dark."
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emerged in Western Europe; consequently, they used repression and adopted labor
regulations that prevented the formation of a centralized working class movement more
conducive for a labor-poor alliance. In addition, massive importation of technology
under the late development approach imposed large-scale, fast-paced economic
transformation that hindered workers from controlling skill development; vice versa, it
gave Japanese employers the upper hand in monopolizing and decentralizing skill
formation.26
Most importantly, however, the dualistic structure of state-led industrial
capitalism in Japan made the strongest impact in shaping the contours of working class
organization. The "catch-up" policies created a number of giant corporations that would
lead the nation's industrial development. Mainly due to government assistance and
collusive banking networks, these pace-setting firms had ample financial resources to
provide paternalistic programs and in-company training to instill corporate loyalty and
incentivize workers to organize vertically at the firm or plant level and forgo horizontally
linked craft or industry unions. Their deep pockets also enabled major corporations to
forge close ties with political parties and ensured that the government would help
institutionalize vertically structured labor-management relations.
Given these incentives, the powerful unions that formed within the large leading
firms strategically chose brotherhood in the factory over class solidarity and withdrew
from the democratization movement. In addition, they set the trend for the working class
movement as a whole by pressuring smaller unions to follow suit. Thus, plant- or firm-
based unions encouraged workers to focus on their narrow workplace issues at the
26 Ronald Dore, British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial
Relations (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 412.
22
expense of pursuing broad-based political and social welfare reforms. The
compartmentalization of the working class limited the prospects of organized labor
forging an alliance with other social groups such as the poor and led to the creation of a
political "left" that exclusively focused on the needs of organized labor.
The decentralization of the working class movement and the resulting failed
alliance between organized labor and the poor led to the latter's exclusion from the
making of the Japanese democracy and welfare state. Weak working class pressure for
democratization and redistribution gave the ruling elites, comprised largely of agrarian
landlords and industrialists, complete autonomy over deciding which group would be
included or excluded in the democratic process and welfare expansion. On the one hand,
the ruling elites began creating an oriental version of the Bismarckian social insurance
system in the early 1920s in order to coopt emerging labor aristocracy. On the other
hand, they staunchly refused to construct a safety net for the unorganized working and
non-working poor. Likewise, the ruling elites adopted universal manhood suffrage in
1925 and extended voting rights to the working class but simultaneously instituted a
latent voting rule that disqualified individuals who were receiving aid on the account of
poverty. In addition, the residency requirement for voting was lengthened to one year in
order to prevent migratory workers, who were more likely to be unorganized working
poor, from voting.
The results of the sixteenth general election, the first after the enactment of
universal manhood suffrage in 1925, reflected workers' "compromise with capital," as
the overwhelming majority of newly enfranchised workers voted for the ruling
conservative parties instead of the socialist party. Without labor's support for greater
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redistribution, a new and restrictive poor relief bill, the Relief and Protection Law passed
in the national assembly in 1929 without an appropriation of funds. Despite the onset of
the Great Depression, its implementation was delayed for three years and it denied the
poor the right to relief and preserved the ongoing practice of minimalist approach to
poverty relief. In essence, the country's path-breaking transition towards economic
modernity and democratization gave rise to an uneven welfare state that comprised of a
heavy layer of social insurance programs at the top but with a distinctively threadbare
safety net for the poor at the bottom.
While Japan failed to build a robust safety net during the pre-war era, the
aftermath of the war in 1945 brought a new development, the U.S. Occupation, which
forced Japan to adopt the Daily Life Security Law (Seikatsu hogoh5) in 1946, which
underwent minor revision in 1950. For the first time in the country's history, the poor
were given the right to vote and seek public assistance. Article twenty-five of the
Japanese constitution drafted under the U.S. Occupation guaranteed that all citizens are
entitled to "maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" and the
state must mobilize its resources to promote social welfare protection.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the Daily Life Security Law had the institutional
capacity to function as a robust safety net for the poor, it was poorly maintained because
the representatives of agrarian landholders, industrialists, and organized labor faced
another round of post-war economic catch-up policies and agreed to limit spending for
the impoverished. Moreover, this time around, they consented to adopting and
maintaining the multi-member-district single-non-transferable-voting system
(MMD/SNTV) that was designed to enhance the political representation of organized
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economic interests at the expense of the unorganized. Agrarian, industrialist, and labor
interests dominated under the MMD/SNTV system, which enabled them to get what they
wanted: lucrative farm subsidies, industrial policies, employment protection, and a social
insurance-based "welfare state" for organized labor. As a consequence, Japan's post-war
safety net has remained threadbare and stands out as one of most minimalist and
restrictive public assistance systems found in the advanced industrialized world.
Lessons from Japan
The findings from the Japan case shed light on some of the enduring puzzles in
the study of politics and poverty in affluent democracies today: Why haven't the poor
expropriated wealth from the rich by voting for generous redistributive transfers to
themselves? Why has economic progress failed to eradicate poverty? Why do social
welfare programs in some countries reinforce rather than ameliorate existing inequalities?
An in-depth examination of the origins of Japanese political, economic, and social
welfare institutions reveals three key dimensions of the redistributive policymaking
process that help formulate answers to these puzzles. Firstly, all democracies were not
created equal and elites that oppose redistribution can impose exclusionary reforms that
can undermine the political representation of the poor in redistributive politics. Secondly,
for late developers, pursuing a state-led industrial development strategy can take a
country from rags to riches but it can also hurt the poor in a multitude of ways. Thirdly,
under certain conditions, the working class is neither pro-redistribution nor pro-
democratization, which points to the need to examine more carefully how its class
interest is defined. Let me explain each point in turn.
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From Aristotle to Alexis de Tocqueville, great minds have expressed great
concerns that the principle of political equality underpinning democracy is a desirable
feature that could also be its Achilles' heel. The seemingly benign inclusionary
democratic reforms that establish a "one person, one vote" system, skeptics argue, can
breed their own complications because they empower the poor with votes that they may
then use to expropriate the rich and drain state finances. The seminal works by T.H.
Marshall and Reinhard Bendix have also noted that democratization accompanies
conferral of political rights to the lower strata of society, which segues to their attainment
of social rights. 27
Yet, a number of recent studies have shown that democracies do not necessarily
redistribute more to the poor than nondemocracies. 28 In fact, even among a select group
of the most affluent democracies in the world, one can clearly observe variation in the
extent to which governments aid the poor; in addition, my dissertation shows that Japan's
level of redistribution is the lowest of the low among this group. 29 Some scholars have
argued that the issue is not whether a country is democratic or not but rather, which
electoral system (e.g., proportional representation versus majoritarian system) is in
place.3 0 They do not address, however, the fact that social assistance for the poor
27 T.H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992); T.H.
Marshall, Social Policy in The Twentieth Century (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1967); Reinhard Bendix,
Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).
28 Ross (2006: p. 28) contends that "[d]emocracy unquestionably produces non-economic benefits for
people in poverty, endowing them with political rights and liberties. But for those in the bottom quintiles,
these political rights produce few if any improvements in their material well-being." See also Casey B.
Mulligan, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than
Nondemocracies?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 no. I (Winter, 2004): 51-74.
29 See for example, Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A
World of Difference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Torben Iversen and David Soskice,
"Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than
Others," American Political Science Review vol.100 no. 2 (2006): 165-181.
30 For an overview of the extant literature on the link between electoral system and redistribution, see
Jonathan A. Rodden, "Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics," in
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diverged across countries prior to the introduction of universal suffrage or the adoption
of an electoral system (e.g., proportional representation) that purportedly leads to higher
social spending. 31 The English poor law, for example, dates back to the late sixteenth
century but universal manhood suffrage did not occur until 1918; similarly, Japan created
its first nation-wide public assistance system in 1874 while the poor obtained votes only
after 1945. Most European countries that adopted proportional representation did so
around 1917 to 1920, well after the expansion of modern poor relief system, which took
place around the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century. 32 For example, Denmark
introduced proportional representation in 1918. Yet, its compulsory 1803 Danish Poor
Law, deemed local parishes responsible for the poor, and the Danish constitution
guaranteed that individuals were "entitled to receive aid from the state" in 1849.
This problematic timing issue stems from the fact that the existing literature on
electoral institutions fails to appreciate the significance of redistributive concerns in
shaping electoral rules. My dissertation inspects the intersection between the evolution
of politics and markets and reveals a reverse causation: redistributive concerns are one of
the primary factors shaping electoral institutions. When the ruling elites oppose
redistribution towards the poor, they are more likely to adopt an electoral system that
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (second edition), edited by Mark Lichbach and
Alan Zuckerman (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Markus M. L. Crepaz,
"Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures," Comparative Politics 31 no.
1 (October, 1998): 61-80.
31 The fact that "welfare state" precedes "democracy" is also pointed out by Esping-Andersen (1998). He
writes: "When it holds that welfare states are more likely to develop the more democratic rights are
extended, the thesis confronts the historical oddity that the first major welfare-state initiatives occurred
prior to democracy and were powerfully motivated by the desire to arrest its realization" (Esping-Andersen,
1990: 15).
32 For a longer list on when countries adopted proportional representation, see Ahmed (forthcoming).
3 Sigrun Kahl, "Religious Doctrines and Poor Relief: A Different Causal Pathway," in Religion, Class
Coalitions, and Welfare States, edited by Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 273.
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shuts out the poor. In other words, electoral systems reinforce rather than produce
redistributive outcome.
A full exploration of the origins of democracy in Japan also confirms the causal
importance of "political mistakes, misperceptions, and unintended consequences" in the
development of political and social welfare institutions. While "mistakes" rarely appear
in the literature on democratization and redistribution as a causal factor, as Capoccia and
Ziblatt (2010) note, these unpredictable, contingent events occur frequently during the
period of institutional creation.3 5 Indeed, the failure of the Meiji oligarchs to maintain its
hegemony and build the foundations of a strong safety net highlights the importance of
examining contingent factors on the development of democratic institutions and
redistributive outcomes.
The second lesson from the case of Japan is that how a country develops
economically matters deeply in the evolution of political and social welfare institutions.
For a latecomer, pursuing economic growth through state-led industrial growth strategy
has its costs, notably, that the poor tend to get excluded from participating in or
benefiting from the country's political, economic, and social welfare achievements.
Funneling government resources to stoke industrial growth creates winners (revenue-
receiving industrialists) at the expense of losers (the tax-paying agrarian class), and the
latter is more likely to demand compensation or a reduction in taxes. Such a stark budget
tradeoff creates an intra-elite conflict where each group will attempt to minimize its tax
3 Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New
Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," Comparative Political Studies 43 no. 8/9 (2010): 931-968.
35 Ibid. See also, Paul Pierson, "Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics," American
Political Science Review 94 no.2 (2000): 251-267.
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burden and avoid incurring additional expenses, such as programmatic funding for the
poor.
Furthermore, the observation that late development hurts the prospects of a labor-
poor alliance merits closer scrutiny. Consistent with the findings from Iversen and
Soskice (2010, 2012), the Japan case reveals that the decentralized structure of working
class mobilization hinders the formation of an "encompassing" left that promotes
universalistic generous redistributive policies.36 While Iversen and Soskice attribute the
nature of working class mobilization to the presence of strong guilds that control the
supply of skills, my Japan-specific story reveals that the country's state-led industrial
development largely induced the decentralization of working class movement.
Finally, the proposition that a powerful "left" produces a strong "welfare state"
has become a staple in analyzing a wide range of social policy outcomes. Yet, the
Japanese case suggests some limits to this approach. First, the assumption that labor
unions and the poor share similar interests in greater redistribution needs to be qualified.
Japanese labor unions have historically shown little interest in expanding poverty relief,
focusing instead on promoting "workers' issues": job security, wage increases, improved
working conditions, and employment opportunities. My findings indicate that the left's
preferences toward redistribution to the poor are not as fixed as the theory purports.
This begs the broader question of when and how working class pressure impacts
redistribution toward the poor. The Japanese case demonstrates that whether or not the
poor are represented in the redistributive policymaking process is directly linked to how
36 I also find that economic interest plays an important role in facilitating democratic reforms. See Torben
Iversen and David Soskice, "Two Paths to Democracy," Open Forum, Center for European Studies,
Harvard University, 2010; see also their latest book manuscript, Politics and Capitalism (presented at the
Center for European Studies Workshop at Harvard University (December 2012).
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nascent labor unions marshaled their power resources to gain political representation.
Active state intervention in labor conflicts and decentralization of skill formation
incentivized organized workers to pursue a strategy that prevented an alliance with the
unorganized working poor. Thus, instead of pursuing broad-based working class
solidarity, labor unions chose to augment their power by focusing on narrow workplace
issues. Labor's strategic political choice to gain voice in politics and workplace created
an insider-outsider cleavage between organized workers and the working poor. The rift
continues to divide workers today and partly explains why Japan's "welfare state" is
uneven, designed to benefit well-off workers and the issue of aiding the working poor has
fallen by the wayside, despite their greater need for social protection.
Understanding the causes of Japan's uneven welfare state is critical to assessing
how Japan fits into the broader comparative literature. One of the most influential social
policy scholars of our generation, Gesta Esping-Andersen, acknowledged that Japan did
not fit neatly into his famous "three worlds of welfare capitalism" typology (e.g., liberal,
social democratic, and continental conservative regime). He observed that the Japanese
welfare state was a "hybrid"--"an amalgam of the conservative 'Bismarckian' regime and
the liberal residualism." It featured a relatively comprehensive social insurance system
(e.g., healthcare, social security, etc.) similar to those found in Europe and yet its cash
transfers for the poor were limited as in the case of the United States.37 My case study on
the origins of the working class mobilization and its impact on the development of the
welfare state addresses this issue front and center. It shows that the decentralization and
compartmentalization of working class movement prevented labor from allying with the
37 Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Hybrid or Unique?: the Japanese Welfare State Between Europe and America,"
Journal of European Social Policy 7 no. 3 (1997): 184.
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poor, which meant that the political ascendency of the working class resulted in the
expansion of social insurance programs for workers while social assistance for the poor
remained trapped in a residual form.
Dissertation organization
My dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter presents comparative
data on the level of poverty and relief efforts across advanced industrialized countries and
shows that Japan's public assistance system is distinctively threadbare by international
standards. It also evaluates what existing theories of redistribution have to say about the
Japan case and beyond.
In chapter two, I present a theoretical framework that explains when and how
safety nets evolve over time. The first section provides the nuts and bolts of social
protection and identifies the main types of safety nets. Then I discuss the challenges the
poor face in attaining social protection. The second section discusses conditions under
which safety nets are more likely to emerge and endure. It identifies the key social
actors, how their preferences towards redistribution are formed, and what institutional
conditions enable or constrain them from exercising their political voice. The third
section illustrates the divergent paths of redistribution in comparative terms. This
analytical framework is used as a guide for the subsequent case of Japan.
My four empirical chapters are divided according to the four major historical
turning points in the co-evolution of the poverty relief system, democratization, and
industrialization: from feudalism to modern nation-state (initiating industrial
development), introduction of democratic institutions, partial democratization in the age
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of industry (industrial take off), and transition towards mass democratization (advances
towards industrial maturity).
In chapter three, I examine the transition from feudal poor relief practices to the
creation of the country's first national public assistance system. I explain how the
country's late-development industrialization strategy contributed to the dramatic
reduction in poor relief from feudal times.
Chapter four analyzes how the overlap of two processes-early democratization
and late development industrial growth-gave rise to a new political class comprised of
agrarian landlords that ended up blocking the oligarchs' proposal to expand poor relief in
the latter part of Meiji period. It examines why the agrarian elites sought political
representation, how they succeeded in obtaining voting rights, and why they were able to
use their votes effectively to advance their redistributive interests in 1890. One of the
goals of this chapter is to show how the Meiji oligarchs designed and built Japan's
democratic institutions and explain how their faulty engineering eroded their hegemony
and gave rise to party politics.
Chapter five examines how the political ascendency of the urban industrialists
induced partial democratization in the age of industry and paved the path of welfare
retrenchment. The demand to stoke industrial growth intensified and the agrarian-
industrialist dominated Diet approved greater spending for infrastructural development
and public goods provision while refusing to expand poor relief. This chapter also shows
how the state mobilized civil society actors to provide a substitute for public assistance
but their activities were grossly inadequate to address mass poverty.
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The penultimate chapter is divided into two parts. The first-half examines the
evolution of working class movement from its inception in the late nineteenth century to
its subsequent maturation in the 1920s and explains how late industrial development
prevented the poor from joining or benefiting from the social movement spearheaded by
organized labor. One of the objectives of this chapter is to test the central thesis of the
power resources theory that organized labor plays the key role in expanding suffrage and
redistribution. The latter part examines the consequences of the failed alliance between
organized labor and the poor and how it led to the latter's exclusion from the makings of
Japanese democracy and welfare state.
The concluding chapter restates the puzzle, relocates it in the existing literature,
and explains the significance of the main findings in each chapter. It also offers the
implications of the study and explains how the findings from my dissertation improve our
understanding on why some democracies redistribute more than others.
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CHAPTER 1
Nickel and Diming Japanese Style:
An Overview of the Data and Review of the Literature
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present comparative data
on the level of poverty and relief efforts across advanced industrialized countries and
show that Japan's public assistance system--the "safety net" for the poor--is distinctively
threadbare by international standards and merits exploration. In the latter part, I evaluate
what existing theories of redistribution have to say about the Japan case and beyond. I
organize the competing explanations into six categories, based on: social division,
culture, economic development, civil society, power resources, and electoral system. I
discuss the main theoretical claims of each explanation in general terms, examine how it
has been deployed in comparative research, and evaluate how well it applies to the Japan
case. The five missing elements of the existing literature are: (1) the inadequate
explanation for the nexus between the origins of electoral systems and the level of
redistribution; (2) the ambiguity over the impact of working class mobilization on
redistribution; (3) the limits of deductively positing political and social actor's
preferences toward redistribution; (4) paying insufficient attention to the relationship
between how a country industrializes and how it redistributes its wealth; (5) the lack of
explanation given for why some countries have developed an intra-welfare state
inequality.
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I. The Japanese exceptionalism
Discovering the skeleton in the closet
On July 1 0 th 2007, the partially mummified corpse of a 52 year old man was
found along with his diary in Kitakyushu, Japan. 38 The diary chronicled his fight against
the pangs of an empty stomach and his grueling ordeal to obtain public assistance. He
starved to death two months after his welfare payments were terminated. The report of a
person dying of starvation who had been shunned by the country's austere public
assistance system was neither the first in Kitakyushu nor in the rest of the country. 39 At
least one person dies of starvation each week and a dozen commit suicide daily by reason
of economic hardship [table 1.1 and figure 1.1 ].40 This darker, harsher side of Japan is at
odds with the more familiar images of the country as a modern, affluent, democratic
society and merits a full investigation.
38 Sankei Shimbun Osaka Shakaibu, Seikatsu Hogo ga Abunai [The Livelihood Protection in danger]
(Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun Shuppan, 2008), 65- 68. For articles written in English on this topic, see for
example, Norimitsu Onishi, "Death Reveals Harsh Side of a 'Model' in Japan," The New York Times,
October 12, 2007.
39 The 2007 case was the fifth case of starvation death in Kitakyushu. Similarly in May of 2006, a 56 year
old unemployed man was found starved to death. He visited the public assistance office twice but was
denied application forms. For articles on this issue written in English, see The Japan Times, "Tighter
welfare driving starvation deaths," October 14, 2007; Kyodo News, "Unemployed temp worker, 49,
believed starved to death in Osaka apartment," January 17, 2009. Most recently, the Sankei (20 February
2012) reported that a family of three was found starved to death in Saitama prefecture.
40 According to the mortality statistics on "lack of food" compiled by the World Health Organization in
2004, Japan's figure (87 deaths in 2000) is significantly higher than those of other advanced industrialized
countries: Canada (9 deaths), South Korea (9 deaths), Australia (4 deaths), Spain (1 death), Germany (1
death), and Sweden (1 death). The only country that tops Japan's number is the United States (120 deaths).
According to the Japanese government, on average 71 people died each year due to "lack of food"
(shokury6 nofusoku) from 1997 to 2008 (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Jinka Datai Chosa
[Population Vital Statistics Report] various years). In regards to suicide rate, from 1980 to 2007, on
average, 4174 committed suicide per year due to socio-economic hardship (keizai seikatsu mondai). See
the National Police Agency Community Safety Bureau Regional Division, "Jisatsu no Gaiya Shiry6"
[Suicide General Materials], various years at http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm; Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare, Dai Gokai Jisatsu Shib5 T~kei [5th statistics concerning suicide deaths] (Tokyo:
K~sei T6kei Kyokai, 2005), 200-203.
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Poverty amid affluence in the world's richest countries has provoked heated
debates and generated a voluminous amount of writing in the last century.4 ' Western
democracies, most notably, the United States and Britain, are commonly portrayed as rich
countries reluctant to provide adequate social welfare services for the poor.42 Yet, in this
extensive literature, the full extent of Japan's condition is underappreciated.4 3 Indeed,
comparative data reveal that despite having poverty rates higher than its peers, Japan
spends less and limits access to poverty relief more than their wealthy counterparts. 44
For nearly three decades, the OECD has reported that Japan's relative poverty is
one of the highest among OECD countries.45 Table 1.2 shows comparative data on
relative poverty rates after taxes and transfers from the mid-i 980s to mid-2000s. Japan
ranked consistently near the bottom along with the United States. Japanese scholars'
poverty rate estimates are consistent with OECD figures. Using the Shotoku Saibunpai
Ch6sa [Income Redistribution Survey] by the Ministry of Welfare and Labour,
Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2006) estimate Japan's relative poverty rate to be around 15%
41 Some of the classical works written on this topic are: John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984); Richard Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1968); Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest (London: G. Bell & Sons
Ltd., 1965).
42 On this point, see for example, Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and
Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1975); Gosta
Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1990).
43 Garon (1998), Milly (2002), and Takahashi (1997) explore various facets of social assistance for the poor
in Japan while my dissertation focuses on why Japan's poverty relief trail in comparison. See Sheldon
Garon, Molding Japanese Minds (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1998); Deborah J. Milly, Poverty,
Equality, and Growth: The Politics of Economic Need in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2002); Mutsuko Takahashi, The Emergence of Welfare Society in Japan (Vermont,
Avebury: 1997).
44 Japan's main public assistance system here refers to the existing Seikatsu Hogo (The Daily Life Security).
45 The OECD defines relative poverty as the percentage of population living on equivalized disposable
household income less than 50% of median income. See OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution
and Poverty in OECD Countries (2008), 285.
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in 1993, steadily increasing to 17% in 2002.46 Similarly, Abe (2006) estimates Japan's
relative poverty rate to be around 10% in 1984, gradually trending upwards to
approximately 15% by 2002.47
[table 1.2]
Gathering the scarce data on Japan's poverty rate prior to the 1980s, Taira (1993)
reports that nearly 14.5% of Japanese households in 1968 lived below the poverty line.
This high level of poverty is notable because by this time Japan had achieved
membership in the prestigious OECD (joining in 1964) and gained the status of an
advanced industrial economy.4 8 In addition, an extensive 1972 household income survey
conducted in Tokyo found that the poverty rate of Nakano-ward, which was "thought to
be typical and representative of Tokyo wards," was around 26.2% of all households.49
Existing studies have also shown that poverty in Japan affects diverse groups of
individuals. Table 1.3 demonstrates that comparatively Japan exhibits higher levels of
working poverty, child poverty, lone-parents poverty, and old-age poverty. Moreover, as
Richard Katz points out, the Japanese poor are among the poorest in OECD countries.
The real disposable income of the poorest ten percent in Japan is $5,226 dollars, much
lower than the OECD average of $7,773 and even that of the United States ($5,819).50
46 The poverty rate here is defined as household income less than half of the median income. Tachibanaki
Toshiaki and Urakawa Kunio, Nihon no Hinkon Kenky [Japan's poverty research] (Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006).
47The relative poverty rate here is also defined as household income less than 50% of the median income.
See Abe Aya, "Nihon no Hinkon no Jittai to Hinkon Seisaku," [Japan's state of poverty and poverty policy]
in Seikatsu Hogo no Keizai Bunseki [Economic analysis of the Daily Life Security], edited by Abe Aya et
al. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008), 29.
48 The poverty line here refers to the standard public assistance level and income data were extracted from
the Employment Status Survey. Koji Taira, "Dialectics of Economic Growth, National Power, and
Distributive Struggle," in Postwar Japan as History, edited by Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1993), 178.49 Ibid., 179.
50 Richard Katz, "Income Equality in Japan: Culture or Economics," The Oriental Economist (December
2010), 7-9.
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[table 1.3]
Despite the country's persistent and alarming "poor problem," the fact that nearly
every advanced industrialized country has similar if not higher poverty rates prior to
transfers and taxes reveals the lack of government intervention to reduce poverty in
Japan. As table 1.4 shows, Japan's relative poverty rate before government transfers and
taxes is 26.9%, compared to Sweden (26.7%), United States (26.3%), France (30.7%),
Germany (33.6%), Britain (32.7%), and Italy (33.8%). Sweden and Japan had similar
levels of poverty prior to transfers in mid-2000, yet while government transfer payments
in Sweden reduced the poverty rate by nearly 21 percentage point (from 26.7% to 5.3%),
the reduction in the poverty rate in Japan was much less, only 12 percentage points (from
26.9% to 14.9%). The Japanese poverty reduction rate is far less than in other countries:
decrease of 23.6 percentage point in France (from 30.7% to 7.1%), 22.6 in Germany
(from 33.6% to 11%), 22.4 in Italy (from 33.8% to 11.4%), and 18 in Britain (from
26.3% to 8.3%).
[table 1.4]
Government programs are crucial to poverty alleviation and studies have shown
that targeted assistance for the poor significantly reduce poverty.5 ' Data on the net
redistributive effects of transfers confirm the view that the Japanese social welfare and
tax systems are less directed toward the poor.52 Comparatively, the Japanese government
extracts more from the poor in taxes and gives them less than in other countries. Table
51 OECD, Growing Unequal, 2008: 139-140. Michael Ross demonstrates that infant and child mortality
rates only decrease when governments target low-income households. Michael Ross, "Is Democracy Good
for the Poor?" American Journal of Political Science 50 no. 4 (October, 2006): 860-874.
5 Jones (2007, 21-25) makes a similar observation in an OECD working paper that systematically
compares Japanese social spending and poverty rates with other advanced industrialized countries. See
Randall S. Jones, "Income Inequality, Poverty and Social Spending in Japan," OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 556 (2007): 1-41.
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1.5 displays the net redistributive effect to the poorest of the population.5 3 The value of
Japan's public cash transfers to the lowest quintile in the mid-2000s was 3.1 compared to
Denmark (9.2), Sweden (8.5), France (5.3), Germany (4.9), and United Kingdom (4.6)
United States (2.3).5 On the other hand, the lowest income quintile's contribution to
taxes and social security is two or three times higher in Japan (1.2) than in Italy (0.6),
Canada (0.6), United States (0.4), and Britain (0.4). The combination of low public
transfers to the poor and moderately higher taxes and social security payments makes
Japan's net transfers to the poor (2.0) rank near the bottom along with the United States
(1.9).
[table 1.5]
Evidence of Japan's minimalist position is further supported by the smaller scale
and limited scope of poverty relief. Japan's average public assistance (seikatsu hogo)
expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2003 is around 0.2% of GDP,
compared to other advanced industrialized countries such as France (1.8%), Denmark
(1.4%), Germany (1.3%), Britain (1.8%), and the United States (0.3%). 5 Similarly,
Japan ranks at the bottom in aggregate expenditure of means-tested cash benefit
programs; it spends around 0.25% of GDP when most of its peers allocate at least 1.0%
5 Net public transfers to the lowest income quintile-which is gross public cash transfers (e.g., social and
family assistance) to the lowest income quintile minus direct taxes and social security contributions paid by
the lowest quintile households-reveals how well countries target social welfare spending for those at the
bottom of the income ladder.
5 OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (2008), 116.
5 These figures are from the Center for Economic Studies 2008 (Munich Society for the Promotion of
Economic Research), calculated based on OECD statistics on social expenditures. One of the challenges in
measuring anti-poverty relief measures is that many of the European welfare states offer two forms of
social protection for the poor: targeted social assistance programs and universal social insurance programs
(e.g., means-tested long-term unemployment insurance and pension credit). Thus, for European countries,
the level of poverty relief reported here is an underestimated figure, which makes the level of relief in
Japan relatively more minimalist. In the case of Japan, the social insurance programs do not have
minimum income guarantee schemes.
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[figure 1.2].56 Japan is also minimalist with respect to benefits other than cash assistance.
Whereas Britain and Germany spend more than 1% of GDP on in-kind benefits for low
income families (e.g., housing assistance), Japan's figure is virtually zero in GDP
terms. 57
Comparative data on demographic coverage of public assistance programs are
consistent with Japan's minimalist approach to poverty relief. As shown in table 1.6, the
beneficiaries of social assistance programs as a proportion of the working-age population
in Japan is around 0.3%, which is significantly lower than countries that have poverty
rates similar to Japan's: Ireland (4.2%), Australia (3.2%), United Kingdom (2.8%), and
United States (1.7%).5 8 The welfare benefit take-up rate-the estimated percentage of
eligible poor who actually receive assistance-which typically ranges from 40%-80% in
OECD countries is estimated to be 10-20% in Japan.59 As Sheldon Garon notes, unlike
the British government that actively sought to increase the participation rate and reach
56 A word of caution about the use of means-tested programs expenditure as a proxy for the level of poverty
relief is in order. While means-tested programs generally refer to services and transfers that cater to low
income families, some programs have an income limit (phase out range) that extends to higher income
strata. How much the means-testing exclusively targets the poor depends on each country's programmatic
design. Thus, the aggregate public assistance figure is a better proxy for the level of poverty relief as it
only includes programs that target low income families.
5 Tony Eardley et al., "Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Volume I Synthesis Report," Department of
Social Security Research Report No. 46 (London: HMSO, 1996), 35.
58 The OECD defines social assistance as cash transfers to households that are not distributed through
contribution-based social insurance schemes. Social assistance also includes benefits to lone parents.
OECD, Employment Outlook 2003: Towards More and Better Jobs (2003), 225.
59 The OECD-average range of take-up rate is from Virginia Hernanz, Frank Malherbet, and Michele
Pellizzari, "Take-up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence," OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Papers 2004 (2), 11-12. Hayashi (2008) lists most recent estimates of
take-up rates, which ranges from 9.9% in Ogawa (2000), 18.5% in Komamura (2003), 9-10% in Wada and
Kimura (1998) and 16.3-19.7% in Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2006). See Hayashi Masayoshi, "Chih6
Zaisei to Seikatsu Hogo," [Local finance and Daily Life Security] in Seikatsu Hogo no Keizai Bunseki
[Economic analysis of the Daily Life Security], edited by Abe Aya et al (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2008), 248. In addition, Karakama (2005) estimates take-up rate to be around 16% and
Sohara (1985) estimates it to be around 27% from 1972 and 1982. See Karakama Naoyoshi , "Chanen
Kazokumochi Waakingupua no Seikatsu to Shakaihosh6 Kaikaku" [The living condition of middle-age
working poor with families and social insurance reform," in Politik no. 10 (20 September 2005), 70; Sohara
Toshimitsu, "Tei-shotoku setai to seikatsu hogo," [Low income households and the Daily Life Security] in
Shakai Hosh6 Kenkytijo (ed.) Fukushi Seisaku no Kihon Mondai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
1985).
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out to the poor, the Japanese government remains "passive with regard to non-applicants"
and instead has pursued to actively inhibit "applications by administering means tests so
stringent as to deter most people."60
[table 1.6]
Limited scope of assistance in Japan stems from exceptionally restrictive
eligibility rules that must be enforced to the strictest standard to meet the limited funding
for public assistance. 6 1 Recipients must be virtually penniless, homeless, and family-less
(without parents, children, or siblings) to qualify for benefits.62 Whereas child benefits in
countries such as Britain are excluded from income-testing, there are practically no
exemptions for government payments in Japan. Additional eligibility rules-on having
physical capacity to work, residency requirement, and the rest-are enforced with gusto
to ensure a tight cap on expenditures. A case in point is a 2006 incident where a 37-year
old homeless man committed suicide by self-immolation at the parking lot of the welfare
assistance office after his application was denied yet again for failing to provide a mailing
address; ironically, he was living in his car for the last two years.6 3
As I have shown, Japan's "safety net" is distinctively threadbare by international
standards and this invites the question: What explains the nickel and diming of the poor
60 Sheldon Garon, "Japanese Policies toward Poverty and Public Assistance: A Historical Perspective,"
World Bank Institute Working Papers no. 37200 (2002): 3.
61 Comparing rules governing means-testing is a complicated task that requires more time and planning on
my part to effectively display the range of strictness. What makes eligibility rules especially difficult to
analyze is the fact that the manner and degree in which they are enforced vary by program and the locality
in which they are administered.
62 In the United States and Britain, for example, ownership of certain properties such as low-valued
automobiles and houses are not generally counted as income and savings in the four figures are also
permitted. In Japan, however, ownership of a car or a home is an automatic disqualification from public
assistance and one can possess only a few hundred dollars in savings to be eligible.
63 Reported in 25 July 2006 of Akahata, cited in Nihon Bengoshi Reng6kai, Kensh5 Nihon no Hinkon to
Kakusa Kakudai [Examining increase in Japan's poverty and inequality] (Tokyo: Nihon Hy6ronsha, 2007),
50. Findings from the Japan Federation of Bar Association's survey on prospective applicants who were
deemed ineligible and denied application to apply for assistance similarly reveals the exceptionally strict
enforcement of eligibility rules in Japan. See Nihon Bengoshi Reng6kai (2007, 74-86).
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in Japan? Existing theories of social policy point to various competing explanations: Are
the poor perceived as lazy and undeserving of public aid? Is the traditional role of
families providing care for the needy crowding out government initiatives? Are
policymakers reluctant to combat poverty when unpopular minority groups make up a
disproportionate percentage of the poor? Does politics dominated by conservatives
restrain social spending? Or do politicians, under the spell of a highly personalistic
electoral institution, see few incentives to help the poor? The list of probable causes goes
on. The following section evaluates what existing theories of redistribution have to say
about the Japan case and beyond.
I. Competing Explanations of Redistribution
Scholars across multiple disciplines and generations have extensively analyzed
the topic of redistribution. Understandably, the methods and scope of research vary
greatly. Some scholars focus on the welfare state in a "broader sense," in which a wide-
range of welfare-enhancing programs are aggregated and packaged as a unitary system;
others explore the welfare state in a "narrower sense," analyzing a particular sub-set of
the system or a specific program. 64 Many scholars utilize quantitative methods to test the
determinants of social policy spending at a specific moment in time, typically based on a
large-N study (comparing many countries).65 Others analyze variation in social welfare
64 1 borrow this distinction from Campbell (2002) in which he calls programmatic focus as "welfare state in
the narrow sense," as opposed to the "welfare state in broader sense," which encompasses an assortment of
welfare-enhancing government policies. John Creighton Campbell, "Japanese Social Policy in
Comparative Perspective," World Bank Institute Working Papers no. 37197 (2002): 2.
65 For example, Torben Iversen and David Soskice, "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions:
Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others," American Political Science Review, 100 no. 2
(May 2006): 165-181; Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A
World of Difference (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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spending over time, often through a case study approach (comparing fewer, if not
focusing on a single country).66 In addition, existing research examines various stages of
social welfare development: the origins of social welfare programs prior to 1945;67
programmatic developments after 1945 ;68 and the impact of globalization and neo-liberal
reform on social spending in the last three decades. 69 Given the rich diversity of research
on social welfare, achieving a simplified classification of the existing literature comes at
the expense of nuance and complexity. Nonetheless, I provide here a synthetic summary
of the essential logic of each approach, and extrapolate divergent hypotheses on
redistribution that can be used to evaluate developments in Japan.
The existing arguments can be broadly divided into six categories, based on:
social division, culture, economic development, civil society, power resources, and
electoral system. The causal explanations advanced by each literature can further be
grouped by the type of causal variables and processes. As figure 1.3 illustrates, some
theories focus on socio-economic variables, others on political factors. In addition,
theories vary in their view of how policy outcomes are shaped; some envision structural
forces at work whereas others maintain a more actor-centered view of social
policymaking. I briefly explain these distinctions and preview the main predictions of
each approach below.
66 For example, Gaston V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia
(New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971).
67 For example, Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in
United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Paul V. Dutton, Origins of the French
Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
68 For example, Andrea Louis Campbell, How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the
American Welfare State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Margarita Estevez-Abe, Welfare
and Capitalism in Postwar Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
69 For example, Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1994); Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare
States (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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Figure 1.3 Typology of extant literature on redistribution
Structure
Agency
Socio-economic Political
Culture
Economic Electoral System
Development
Social Division
Civil Society Power Resources
Four approaches are based on socio-economic variables. Social division theory
predicts that more ethnically-divided and heterogeneous countries are less likely to
redistribute to the poor. Individuals make strategic decisions about how much and to
whom to redistribute by factoring in the "race" card. The culture approach argues more
broadly that cultural values that place blame on individuals for falling into poverty hinder
government intervention to aid the poor as they are expected to escape poverty through
their own personal resources, which includes support from families. Government
responses, structured by the beliefs about poverty, are said to be uniform across social
policy issues and consistent over time. Similarly, the economic development approach
advances a structure-based argument and expects that social policies develop in tandem
with economic progress. It predicts that the level of social spending, including aid to the
poor, converges across advance industrialized countries as industrialization creates the
demand to protect citizens from the ills of economic transformation and simultaneously
increases the government's revenue capacity to supply welfare services for the needy.
The civil society literature, in contrast, contends that states do not automatically respond
to rising need, instead, what matters most is the ability of citizens to effectively convert
social concerns into public policies. It predicts that countries with high levels of civic
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activism have stronger safety net for the poor.
While theories based primarily on socio-economic variables downplay the
autonomous role that political actors, processes, and institutions have on policy
outcomes, two other theoretical approaches argue that politics matter most in shaping
redistributive policies.70 Power resources theory predicts that the strength of the "left"
(i.e., the labor movement and leftist parties) is positively correlated with the level of
redistribution. In contrast, the electoral system approach contends that political actors'
preferences and decisions are structured by incentives derived from electoral rules. It
predicts a positive correlation between the proportionality of electoral system and the
level of redistribution.
In what follows, I discuss the main theoretical claims of each strand of literature
in general terms, examine how each approach has been deployed in comparative research,
and evaluate how well it applies to the Japan case. Reviewing the extant literature
reveals that each has something important to say about the Japan case. Although existing
theories provide valuable insights, they fall short of providing a fuller account, which
requires probing deeper into the historical development of democratic governance,
markets and social movements. In other words, we need to pay closer attention to how
the origins of political institutions influence the construction of the safety net, clarify the
causal process of how working class mobilization impacts the poor, and analyze how
markets evolved over time to shape poverty relief policies.
70 For an introduction to the politics of redistribution, see chapter 12 (section 3) of Robin Boadway and
Michael Keen, "Redistribution," in Handbook of Income Distribution, edited by Anthony Atkinson and
Francois Bourguignon (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2000), 677-789.
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Redistribution in Divided Societies
Do ethnic divisions hamper redistribution?
The subject of why a wealthy country does not provide adequate poverty relief
surfaces most frequently with respect to the United States. Whereas European
governments are generally characterized as "generous" and "caring," American treatment
of the poor is often described as "stingy," "punitive," and even "mean." 7' Many make
reference to the "color" of social policy, where the country's unique history of racial
division (e.g., slavery and segregation) is said to be fully or partially responsible for
hampering efforts to fight poverty.
A group of scholars argue that the American hostility toward public assistance is
attributed to racism, specifically, of whites toward blacks who are perceived as the
primary recipients of welfare. Using survey-based data, Gilens (1995, 1996, 1999)
argues that "negative attitudes toward blacks" have led many whites that support social
spending at large to vigorously oppose means-tested programs aimed at the poor.72
Similarly, opposition towards public assistance programs has been shown to stem from
white resentment towards blacks for failing to work hard enough to better their own
71 Wilensky describes the American treatment of the poor: "It is true that the United States is more reluctant
than almost any other rich country to make a welfare effort appropriate to its affluence. Our support of
national welfare programs is halting; our administration of services for the less privileged is mean. We
move toward the welfare state, but we do it with ill grace, carping and complaining all the way." More
recently, Robert C. Lieberman notes that the American public assistance programs "tend to be punitive,
stingy, and politically weak." See Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press, 2005): 3.
7 Martin Gilens, "Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare," The Journal of Politics, vol. 57 no. 4
(November, 1995): 994-1014; "Race-Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare," American Political
Science Review, vol. 90 no. 3 (September, 1996): pp. 593-604; Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate
Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics ofAntipoverty Policy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1999).
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lives. Racist attitudes and discrimination against blacks are argued to have produced a
"racially-stratified" welfare state, where whites generally enjoy greater benefits and
access to social welfare services than blacks.74
Divided societies are more prone to lower support for redistribution for reasons
that are not necessarily tied to racism. Poole (2006), for example, examines the historical
origins of the Social Security Act and argues that its discriminatory practices did not stem
from racism per se but from white policymakers' intention to preserve and enhance
"white privileges" by crafting social policies that were biased in favor of white industrial
workers.75 The emphasis on the role of social policies in enhancing and perpetuating the
racial subordination of nonwhites is also found in the work of Williams (2003) and
Lieberman (1998).76
More broadly, in-group versus out-group tension in a divided society is purported
to limit social spending as human beings sympathize less with individuals who are
perceived as different from them: voters can "empathize with a poor single mother with
two children who looks like them, but if that mother has a different skin color, empathy
declines dramatically."77 Through a quantitative analysis of European countries and the
Unites States, Alesina and Glaeser (2005) and Alesina et al. (2001) find a negative
73 Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
7 On this point, see Michael K. Brown, Race, Money, and the American Welfare State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999); Jill S. Quadagno, The Color of Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
75 Mary Poole, The Segregated Origins of Social Security: African Americans and the Welfare State
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 174-175.
76 Linda Faye Williams, The Constraint of Race: The Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Robert Lieberman, Shifting the
Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
77 Alesina and Glaeser (2005), 177.
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correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and social spending.7 8 Similarly, Roemer
(1998) and Roemer and Lee (2006) predict a negative correlation between social division
and redistribution, but advance a causal mechanism that does not necessarily involve
discrimination as a vehicle to reduce support for redistribution. They argue that the
presence of a divisive non-economic issue-such as religious differences-- reduces
redistribution through a "policy-bundling effect." 79
Although not directly related to poverty relief per se, a number of scholarly work
have unraveled the pernicious effects of ethnic divisions on a whole slew of other public
policy issues, such as provision of public goods.80 Despite differences in the opinions
over the magnitude and mechanism of how race affects redistribution, the basic
hypothesis of the social division approach is that ethnically divided countries are less
likely to redistribute to the poor, especially when contested minority groups are
perceived to make up a signficant portion of welfare recipients.
78 Alesina and Glaeser (2005); Alberto Alesina, Edward L. Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, "Why Doesn't
the US Have a European-Style Welfare State," NBER Working Paper 8524 (2001).
79 To illustrate how the "policy-bundling effect" works, Roemer (1998) specifies the Leftist as a more
secular party (e.g., Labour) representing poor voters, and the Right as a more religious party (e.g., Christian
Democrats) representing rich voters. Non-economic issues such as religion "bundles" with redistribution
when, for example, the more religious poor vote for the more religious but anti-redistribution Rightist party.
Alternatively, when the more secular Leftist party appeals to the rich secular voters by reneging their full
commitment to redistribution by proposing lower tax rate. Thus, the introduction of a second, non-
economic dimension in politics produces an issue-bundling effect that helps explain why universal suffrage
has not led the poor to expropriate the rich. See John Roemer, "Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the
Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb," Journal of Public Economics, 70 (1998), pp. 399-424; John E.
Roemer and Woojin Lee, "Racism and Redistribution in the United States: A Solution to the Problem of
American Exceptionalism," Journal of Public Economics, 90 no. 6-7 (2006), pp. 1027-1052. While
Roemer's results are driven by electoral competition, Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003) attain similar
results instead through a process of legislative bargaining in David Austen-Smith and Michael Wallerstein,
"Redistribution in a Divided Society," manuscript, Northwestern University (October 2003)
http:/./www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/wallerstein.0 I 23.pdf.
80 In explaining why ethnically diverse societies face greater difficulty in providing public goods, Alesina et
al. (1999) argue that voters of one ethnic group are less enthusiastic about providing non-excludable public
goods accessed by other ethnic groups because they bear the cost of provision. See Alberto Alesina, Reza
Baqir, and William Easterly, "Public Goods and Ethnic Division," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 no.
4 (November 1999), pp. 1243-1284. For a discussion on competing explanations for why ethnically
diverse society undermine public goods provision, see chapter one of James Habyarimana et al.,
Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009).
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What do the American experience and the general theoretical insight of social
division and redistribution reveal about the state of poverty relief in Japan? And vice
versa, what does studying Japan tell us about this literature? There appears to be no
lesson one could draw given the markedly different demographic, political, economic and
social elements between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the Untied States,
which has an excuse of suffering racial divisions that is purported to deter redistribution,
Japan is a textbook example of a highly homogeneous nation-state.81 Social division
theory would expect Japan to provide higher levels of social spending than its more
heterogeneous peers; instead, as I have shown previously, Japan does very little for the
poor in comparative terms.
The puzzle of Japan's minimalist status deepens when we consider the premise of
American exceptionalism that lies at the core of race and social policy literature. It begs
the question, is Japan yet another outlier case? Or do the two countries share more
similarities beyond the minimalist poverty relief? Based on the logic of social division
theory, does Japan selectively redistribute less to the poor because of discrimination
against the ethnic minorities that make up many welfare recipients?
Throughout history, discrimination against Japan's minority groups-the main
groups being Okinawans from the Rydkyn islands, Ainu of Hokkaido, Korean and
Chinese descendants, and the Burakumin-has been well documented.82 Research has
shown that Japanese social minorities are more likely to be poor and receive public
8 Some scholars argue against the view that Japan is ethnically homogeneous and culturally unified. For
example, Lie (2001) demonstrates that the monoethnic view of Japan is overstated and the country is as
ethnically diverse as other countries. See also Ryang (1997) on North Korean lives in Japan. John Lie,
Multiethnic Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in
Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
82 For literature on racism/discrimination in Japan, see for example, Richard Mitchell, The Korean Minority
in Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967); John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race
and Power in the Pacific War (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1986).
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assistance.83 As table 1.7 indicates, prefectures that have a high percentage of minorities,
such as Hokkaido and Okinawa, rank high on the list of public welfare assistance rate
[table 1.7]. In 2004, Hokkaido prefecture had the second highest public assistance rates
(36.2 per 1000 household) and Okinawa the seventh (27.5 per 1000 household).
Contrary to the prediction of the social division theory, however, there has been
more, not less, government effort to improve the standard of living of minorities. Public
funds were poured into regions that have a high concentration of minorities to counter the
socio-economic discrimination they face. Starting from the enactment of the 1969
Special Measures for Assimilation Law (D5wa taisakuigyd tokubetsu sochi h5), the
national government designated Buraku communities as "assimilation districts" (dwa
chiku) and energetically financed projects that improved social welfare services to end
segregation.84 In addition, public funds were provided for public employment placement
and training services as well as subsidized loans for local businesses and individuals.8 5
" For example, the average income of Burakumin-identified as those now currently residing in specially
designated assimilation areas called "dowa chiku"-is around 70% of national average. This research also
reported that the Ainu population is more likely to receive public welfare assistance and face economic
hardship. The report was presented at the Prime Minister's Office for the Ainu specialist policy forum
("Ainu seisaku no arikata ni kansuru ynshikisha kondankai"). A recent survey compiled by the Hokkaido
Ainu Association reported that the average annual income of Ainu is around 356 man yen (around $35,000),
which is only 60% of the national household income of 567 man yen (around $56,000). 5.2% of the Ainu
population was reported to be on public assistance, compared to the Hokkaido-wide welfare assistance rate
of 3.5%. See "Ainu: izen hikui shotoku, 5.2% ga seikatsu hogo jukyi nenshO wa heikin no rokuwari" [The
Ainu: income remains low, 5.2% are receiving public welfare assistance, annual income is only 60% of
average] Mainichi Shimbun, May 30, 2005.
84 This was carried out through building new publicly subsidized housing areas, sanitation and water
systems, day care centers, medical centers, libraries, and recreational facilities. Over the last three decades,
the total public funding to improve the living standard of Buraku people is estimated to be thirteen trillion
yen, a period in which nearly 65,000 public housing units were renovated, 60,000 units newly constructed,
and 72,000 cases of loans for new homeowners were provided. Toshio Mizuuchi, "Private Struggles,
Public Supports: Renovating Japanese Minority Community, Buraku," D5wa Mondai Kenkyfl (Osaka City
University), 20 (1998): 32-33.
85 Deborah J. Milly, Poverty, Equality, and Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center,
1999), 13; Toshio Mizuuchi, "Private Struggles, Public Supports: Renovating Japanese Minority
Community, Buraku," Dowa Mondai Kenkyfl (Osaka City University), 20 (1998): 29-43.
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The national government has given the Ryikyn people in Okinawa and Ainu-populated
Hokkaido prefectures more funds to develop public services than any other prefecture.
Despite the strong presence of in-group (Japanese) versus out-group (non-
Japanese) tension in the country-also reflected in the restrictive immigration policies
aimed at maintaining homogeneity-welfare assistance has been distributed to foreigners
residing in Japan on humanitarian grounds for over half a century. Today, nearly 3% of
the total welfare recipients are foreigners [table 1.8].86 Thus, the Japan case hints at a
more open-ended relationship between race and social policymaking, where
redistribution can be employed as an instrument to pacify, not aggravate or accentuate the
existing racial tension. 87 The choice to politically exploit or ameliorate racial tension
suggests that political actors have more latitude over formulating social policies.
To better understand why Japan and the United States have followed a minimalist
path of poverty relief, we need to consider the puzzle from a broader perspective by
moving away from an analysis centered on the poor's social identity or racial profile. In
the United States, the majority of pubic assistance beneficiaries are whites, not blacks. If
this is the case, why did the issue of saving poor whites fell by the wayside? If the poor
in the United States are collectively nickel and dimed regardless of their skin color, why
were they unable to translate their sizable votes and voice into generous redistributive
policies?
86 The observation that outsiders have benefited from social welfare services can also be found in Apichai
Shipper's research on foreign immigrants in Japan. See Apichai W. Shipper, Fightingfor Foreigners:
Immigration and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
87 This point resonates with how racial division abetted poverty relief expansion in the United States in the
1960s. Some scholars point out that racial politics facilitated greater visibility of and urgency for poverty
relief as mounting racial tension was partially blamed on the economic gap between the two races. The
Johnson administration's war against poverty found roots in thinking that helping poor blacks escape
poverty could mend racial tensions and close the gap in living standards.
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Although my research is predominantly based on the Japanese experience,
identifying the causal factors that created the minimalist path in Japan can be a first step
towards realizing a systematic comparative analysis of the two countries, an analysis that
is conspicuously absent in the existing literature. Scholars of the American welfare state
may find it particularly useful to learn that the findings from this dissertation suggest that
the two countries share more similarities in their development of social policies than first
meets the eye. Both countries have intra-welfare state inequality that has developed over
time, in which some social welfare programs (such as social security and in-kind
benefits) have expanded more robustly than income support programs for the poor.8 8
Their historical treatment of the poor is also similar as the poor faced challenges in
exercising their political rights (e.g., stringent voting requirements, such as literacy tests
and poll taxes). Moreover, both countries have a less centralized labor movement, which
is regarded as one of the key determinants of big welfare states in Europe. 89 These
similarities suggest that social division theory alone cannot explain the root causes of a
minimalist path and highlight the need to continue exploring other theories of
redistribution.
Culture and Redistribution: The Shared Understanding of the Poor
Do governments steer away from aiding the poor when they are expected to escape
poverty through individual effort and their familial support?
88 Lieberman (2005).
89 If "race," in fact, permeates all corners of political, economic, and social life in America, is it possible
that it indirectly shaped redistributive policies through intermediating on another causal factor? For
example, research shows that racial division diluted collective identity and weakened collective actions of
labor movements and prevented them from effectively pushing for universal, income guarantee schemes.
52
While most of the literature on poverty and redistribution define the "poor"
mainly by their economic status (i.e., having low income), the culturalist perspective
stresses that what it means to be "poor" has a distinct cultural connotation. The socially-
constructed beliefs about the poor and normative beliefs about what should be done about
poverty manifest themselves in a variety of human interactions and forms: a public
assistance administrator chiding welfare applicants for their lack of effort; a policymaker
praising the virtues of self-help while disparaging those on welfare as indolent; a
passerby who scornfully looks at a homeless person, silently thinking "it's your own
fault"; a poor man, reluctant to seek welfare assistance in order to avoid the sense of
shame in receiving government assistance, not realizing that the stigma of poverty also
comes from within. These are just a few examples of how cultural values operate within
individuals' mind and emotions, surfacing concretely in how they treat the poverty of
others or their own.
The culture approach posits that the beliefs about the causes of and solutions to
poverty are central to understanding policymakers' preferences and decisions towards
redistribution. Cultural beliefs and norms translate into a concrete set of policies as
actors use "culture as a tool kit" to understand the world around them and seek solutions
to social welfare problems. 90
Finding the nexus between intangible "values" and concrete policy outcomes is a
difficult task, which culturalists have duly acknowledged. 9' Determining a coherent set
of "core values" in any society is challenging enough, forming a causal link with actors'
preferences toward redistribution adds another layer of complexity. Nevertheless,
90 Ann Swidler, Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).
91 Swidler (2001), 24.
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scholars have attempted to demonstrate how pervasive values influence redistributive
policy preferences. Survey-based studies have found that individualism and the work
ethic in American society are important determinants for social welfare support. 92 The
strong liberal values of individualism and Calvinist work ethic are purported to place
responsibility over economic well-being on the individual rather than the government. 93
According to this view, policymakers are more likely to pursue a laissez-faire policy and
seek remedies based on personal resources and networks, reinforcing and legitimating the
normative belief that individuals are responsible for their own poverty.
Investigating why European countries fight poverty more vigorously than the
United States, Alesina and Glaeser (2005) empirically demonstrate that countries that
score high in perceiving the poor as lazy or holding beliefs that poverty is due to a lack of
individual effort rather than luck correlate with less redistribution. More recently, the
transatlantic research of Kahl (2010) seeks to explain the comparative variation of poor
relief through differences in religious ethics derived from Christian denominations
(Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist/Puritan).94
Beliefs about poverty are said to create a set of stable equilibria and the solutions
that they generate tend to be consistent over time and across issues. 95 For culture-based
arguments, therefore, redistributive outcomes are more determined than contested. The
culture approach expects divergent policy responses to poverty across countries and,
92 James R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, Beliefs about Inequality: Americans' Views of What Is and What
Ought to Be (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1986); Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Jane A. Rafferty, "The
Determinants of Public Attitudes toward the Welfare State," Social Forces 67 (June 1989): pp. 1027-1048.
93 Alesina and Glaeser (2005); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
American Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955).
94 See Sigrun Kahl, Saving the Poor: Religion and Politics of Welfare in Europe and the United States
(Book manuscript) 25 March 2010.
95 Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
54
broadly speaking, predicts that countries with strong beliefs that the poor are responsible
for their own poverty are associated with less public expenditures for the poor.
Culture-based arguments directly speak to the Japanese literature known as the
"nihonjinron."96 Translated as the "theory of Japanese," it presupposes that Japan is a
culturally unique, socially homogeneous, and fundamentally different society. Various
aspects of the country-whether its economic policy or welfare policy-that seem
peculiar are explained by its idiosyncrasy. If the Protestant work ethic and individualism
form the base of American core values, the Japanese have their counterpart: a unique
combination of the culture of "shame" (haji) and Confucian emphasis on hard work and
family welfare.
Anthropological studies based on interviews and surveys of prospective recipients
and ordinary citizens show a high degree of cultural aversion towards seeking and
accepting public assistance. 97 Journalistic accounts of the poor's reluctance to apply for
welfare also describe the "shame" attached to doing so, as family members of applicants
are notified of the need for assistance.98 Tipton (2003) examines the origins of the
poverty relief system in Japan in the early twentieth century and argues that the moralistic
view of the causes and remedies for poverty (i.e., poverty is due to individual failings and
9 Some of the major "nihonjinron" literature are: Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 1998); Ezra F. Vogel, Japan As Number One: Lessonsfor America
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Tadanobu Tsunoda, The Japanese Brain: Uniqueness
and Universality (translated by Yoshinori Oiwa) (Tokyo: Taishukan, 1985); John F. Embree, The Japanese
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1943).
97 For example, see Carolyn S. Stevens, On the Margins ofJapanese Society (New York: Routledge, 1997),
74-76; Koji Taira, "Public Assistance in Japan: Development and Trends," The Journal ofAsian Studies,
27, no. 1 (November 1967).
98 For example, see NHK, Waakingupua Nihon wo Mushibamu Yamai [Working poor: The sickness
undermining Japan] (Tokyo: Populasha, 2007), 55.
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the poor are undeserving of public aid) shaped the Relief and Protection Law of 1929 and
continue to influence attitudes towards poverty relief today. 99
Moreover, culturalist theories claim that the traditional role of families in caring
for the poor has allowed the Japanese governments to play a passive role. 0 0 The
household (ie in Japanese) has traditionally provided a variety of welfare services for
family members, which include childcare, income support for the unemployed, and care
for the aged. This is reinforced by the Confucian notion of the relationship between
parent and child, in which both parties are expected to provide mutual assistance across
different stages of life.10' Jones (1996) categorizes Japan as a type of a family-based
"Confucian welfare state." 0 2 Thus, the Japanese cultural emphasis on "family" as the
provider of welfare (kazoku danomi) may have perpetuated the society's reliance on
families as the principal organ of poverty relief.
How well do culturalist arguments stand up empirically? Comparing surveys of
social values across countries leads to inconclusive results and beliefs about the poor are
not as coherent as culturalists want us to believe. 0 3 On the one hand, the World Value
Survey reports that 57% of Japanese believe that poverty is due to "laziness and lack of
will power," a level closer to that of the United States (60%) than Europe (26%).104 On
the other, Aoki (2007) shows that 14.2% of Japanese perceive "lack of will power" as a
99 Elise K. Tipton, "Defining the Poor in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," Japan Forum 20 no 3 (2008).100 For a discussion on the main characteristics of the Japanese-style welfare society (including the role of
family-welfare), see Makoto Kono, "The Welfare Regime in Japan," in East Asian Welfare Regimes in
Transition, edited by Alan Walker and Chack-kie Wong (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2005), 120-123.
101 George A. De Vos and Walter H. Slote, eds., Confucianism and the Family (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press), 1998.
102 Catherine Jones, "The Pacific Challenge" in New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe, ed.
Catherine Jones (New York, NY: Routledge, 1996).
103 This point that surveys show conflicting values is raised in Wilensky (1975), 37-38.
104 The figures for the United States and Europe are from Alesina and Glaeser (2004), 184 (calculations
from 1983-1997). The Japan figure is derived from author's calculations from 1981 to 2000 in the Values
Surveys Databank.
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cause of poverty, closer to the level in Europe (16%).105 More generally, while 47% of
Europeans blamed poverty on social injustice rather than on individuals, 51.9% of
Japanese responded similarly. 0 6
Given the conflicting reports on Japanese beliefs about poverty, verifying the
reality of the poor's circumstances provides some clues on what it means to be poor in
Japan. As table 1.9 shows, nearly 83% of Japanese poor work and the country's rate of
working poverty--those who hold employment but cannot escape poverty-is one of the
highest among advanced industrialized countries at around 11 percent (table 1.9).
Similarly, Japanese lone mothers boast one of the highest labor market participation rates
in the world and yet endure the highest poverty rate among OECD countries.1 07 The
Japanese poor certainly do not conform to the perception that they are lazy.
Regardless of how uniformed or conflicting the beliefs about the poor are, if the
Japanese poor mostly work and get virtually no help from the government, where does
the perception that they are lazy or the stigma of poverty originate? The source of values
has received more attention in recent years and several studies have shown that
perceptions about the poor are endogenous to political variables.' 08 Alesina and Glaeser
(2005), for example, argue that countries with strong leftist-party tradition are more likely
to hold beliefs that justify government spending for the poor since left-wing political
105 Figures from Europe are from Eurobarometer, Poverty and Social Exclusion (Brussels: TNS Opinion &
Social, 2010), 53-54. The electronic version of the document can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/archives/ebs/ebs 321 en.pdf (accessed: September 2010). The
Japanese survey, constructed as a point of comparison to the Eurobarometer's survey, was administered by
Aoki Osamu, "Shakai Ishiki: Gendai Nihon no Hinkonkan" [Social awareness: The current Japanese
attitudes toward poverty], in Gendai no Hinkon to Fubyad5 [Present poverty and inequality], edited by
Aoki Osamu and Sugimura Hiroshi (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2007), 204.
106 Eurobarometer (2010) and Aoki (2007).
107 The labor market participation rate of poor single mothers is estimated to be around 85% and the
poverty rate of single household with children is around 60%. See OECD, Growing Unequal? Income
Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (2008), 133.
108 See for example, chapter 7 of Alesina and Glaeser (2005) and Alberto Alesina and George-Marios
Angeletos, "Fairness and Redistribution," American Economic Review 95 no. 4 (September 2005).
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leaders indoctrinate citizens about the merits of poverty relief to build their electoral
support.109 Likewise, Prasad (2006) demonstrates that neo-liberal cuts in welfare
spending were justified by Reagan's "rhetorical invention" of the "welfare queen"
imagery that led people to believe that the poor were potential welfare chiselers
undeserving of government aid." 0 Political actors possess a wealth of resources to
produce and disseminate research reports on poverty that can then be used to support
policy decisions. The 1965 Moynihan Report that introduced the powerful concept of the
"culture of poverty" blaming individuals for perpetuating their own misfortune and which
has been used to legitimate minimalist government intervention in the United States
illustrates this point.'
Although the stigma surrounding poverty relief is observable in virtually all
societies, what governments do with it varies. Across Europe, countries have initiated
policies to de-stigmatize poverty by creating transparency and facilitating dialogue on the
issue, forging multilateral commitment to fight social exclusion of the poor, and by
changing the delivery of assistance (e.g., use of tax credits). In contrast, Garon (2002)
observes that the "sense of shame" and stigma surrounding poverty relief in Japan has
been "cultivated and strengthened" by political actors."2 Thus, in general, the cultural
approach says little about how political actors use their power and resources to create and
109 Alesina and Glaeser (2005), 206-211.
110 Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain,
France, Germany, and the United States (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 86-87.
.. Although anthropologist Oscar Lewis originally developed the concept of "culture of poverty" in 1959,
The 1965 Moynihan Report is credited to have introduced the idea to the public domain. For a recent
discussion on the "culture of poverty," see David Harding et al., eds., Reconsidering Culture and Poverty,
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Series 629 no. I (May 2010); Patricia
Cohen, "'Culture of Poverty' Makes a Comeback," The New York Times (17 October 2010).
12 Garon (2002), 3.
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shape values, which recent studies have found to be essential to our understanding of
making social policies.
Moreover, the alternative cultural explanation, the presence of the "family-
welfare" limiting the role of government in poverty relief, is not supported empirically.
While policymakers have historically highlighted the prominent role of the family as the
nucleus of the "Japanese style" welfare state, 1 3 the role of family in providing for the
poor has been more forcefully imposed than presumed. As I discuss in greater depth in
the case study, a number of Meiji government officials, scholars, and journalists voiced
concern that rapid urbanization and industrialization were destroying the traditional
familial support system. When the Home Ministry began preparing the Poor Relief Bill
of 1929 (Kynlgohdan), it justified its pursuit of modernization and expansion of the
Japanese poor relief system because it had serious doubts about families and neighbors
caring for the poor in a new urban, industrial socio-economic environment.11 4 Despite
the fact that non-governmental resources were inadequately equipped to help the poor,
political leaders at the time insisted that families and neighbors be the primary caregivers
to keep public expenditures as low as possible." 5 Thus, the fact that Japanese public
assistance continues to rely on non-governmental resources is a consequence rather than
the cause of the government's reluctance to play an active role.
Finally, it is not clear if families were ever fit to substitute public assistance given
all the findings from cohort studies and other longitudinal research that have
13 Joji Watanuki, "Is There a 'Japanese-Type Welfare Society?" International Sociology I no. 3
(September 1986): 264-265.
114 From the Social Bureau chief Nagaoka's memo, "Kylihin seido no setsubi ni tsuite" [in preparation for
the poor relief system] December 1928.
115 Terawaki Takao, Kyingoho no Seiritsu to Shiko Jotai no Kenkynl [Research on the passage and
implementation of the relief protection law] (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 2007), 198.
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demonstrated the vicious cycle of poverty." 6 Poor parents tend to produce poor children
and their offspring are likely to face poverty for a number of reasons (e.g., the long-
lasting pernicious effects of underinvestment in education and health). It may well be
that the family-welfare model only applies to families with higher income. Regardless,
even in today's world where signs of the frailty of the family-welfare are everywhere
most notably, the destruction of the traditional family system (kazoku hdkai no kiki)
caused by historically higher divorce rates, low fertility rate, urbanization, and more
people choosing careers over domestic household work-the Japanese government's
determination to be resolutely minimalist remains unsatisfactorily explained by the
family-substitution argument.'' 7
Economic Modernization and Redistribution
Does the demand and supply for public assistance increase as countries
become more industrialized?
Whereas cultural approach expects countries to have divergent policies to aid the
poor, the economic modernization theory argues the opposite. According to the
"structural functionalist" theory of welfare state development, social policies develop in
tandem with economic development.' 18 As industrialization advances, countries follow a
similar path of social change: from an agricultural to industrial economy, from rural
116 See for example, Stephen Gibbons and Jo Blanden, The Persistence of Poverty across Generations: A
Viewfrom Two British Cohorts (Bristol: Polity Press, 2006); Miles Corak (ed), Generational Income
Mobility in North America and Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); OECD, Doing
Better for Children (2009).
117 A government survey conducted in 1991 shows that, comparatively, elderly Japanese feel more anxious
about their ability to support themselves financially and support from family members (i.e., children) than
in Germany or Britain. S~much6, Life and Sense of the Aged, The Third Report of Comparative Research
(1991).
118 Giddens (1976) notes that the logic of industrialization finds roots in the structural-functionalist thinkers
such as Auguste Comte and Talcott Parsons. Anthony Giddens, "Classical Social Theory and the Origins
of Modern Sociology," American Journal of Sociology 81 no. 4 (1976).
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settlement to urbanization, and from relationships based on personal kinship to
impersonal exchanges.' 9 These seismic shifts create new problems and needs to which
states respond by providing a wide range of social welfare programs for citizens. 120 For
example, industrialization disrupts the traditional communal support systems based on
kinship on which individuals rely when falling into poverty; the resulting void is filled by
government social programs.m
Similarly, churning market conditions such as deregulation of the labor market
and trade create "social catastrophes" that increase the need for the state to protect and
compensate dislocated citizens.1 22 In The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944) argues
that industrial revolution produced substantial "economic improvement" but created a
never-before-seen "avalanche of social dislocation" that compelled states to "protect
society against the ravages of such a mechanism."1 23 From this perspective, governments
implement social welfare policies, including poverty relief programs, as a means of
damage control against destructive market forces.'2 4
Complementary to the rising demand for social welfare services, economic
development also makes social assistance programs more affordable and ripe for
119 Harold Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1958); Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
120 Some of the problems wrought by industrialization include delinquency, crime and unemployment. See
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958), 230; Clark Kerr, et al. (1960), 40-41.
121 Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958), 230.
122 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1944), 76.
123 Ibid., 40.
1 A similar type of argument can be found in theories with an international perspective. Trade
liberalization is purported to make a country more vulnerable to external shocks and social welfare
spending acts as a "risk-reducing" instrument to cushion the negative effects on national income. The
social welfare "cushion" device can, for instance, take the form of social assistance funds to support the
income of displaced workers who have ran out of unemployment benefits. For this line of argument, see
Dani Rodrik, "Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" The Journal of Political Economy,
106 no. 5 (October, 1998); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Market (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1985).
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expansion. Governments' revenue-generating and operational management capacities
expand which enable them to sufficiently meet the financial and organizational resources
to run nation-wide social welfare programs. 2 5 Under this theoretical framework,
countries follow a similar path of welfare expansion as "economic growth makes
countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy for
constructing the floor below which no one sinks."126
Evidence of the relationship between economic development and social policy is
mostly provided by large N studies. Based on a cross-sectional analysis of sixty-four
countries, Wilensky (1975) finds that economic growth is the "root cause" of the state's
greater role in providing social welfare.127 Similarly, Barro (1991) and Cashin (1995)
found a positive correlation between size of transfer and economic growth.128
The economic development approach assumes that the state plays a passive role
as social policies are "spontaneous" reactions to protect citizens from "the perils inherent
in market economies."1 29 The policymaking process is downplayed and the poor
themselves play no active role in the decision-making process; hence, apolitical,
impersonal economic forces are driving social policy developments. The historical
trajectory of social policies is cumulative and additive according to advancements in
1 Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958); Clark Kerr, et al., (1960).
126 Wilensky (1975), p. 27. See also Ramesh Mishra, "Welfare and Industrial Man: A Study of Welfare in
Western Industrial Societies in Relation to a Hypothesis of Convergence," Sociological Review 21 (1973),
553-554.
127 Wilensky (1975), xiii.
128 Robert J. Barro "A cross-country study of growth, saving, and government," in National Saving and
Performance, edited by Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press),
pp. 271-301 and Paul Cashin, "Government Spending, Taxes, and Economic Growth," Staff Papers, IMF
42 no. 2 (June 1995): 237-69.
129 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1944), 147.
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economic development. Thus, the economic development theory predicts cross-national
convergence of social welfare programs across advanced economies.
In One World of Welfare, Gregory Kasza applies convergence theory of the
welfare state to Japan. Although Japan's social welfare system was influenced by
country-specific factors such as the experience of mass war, Kasza contends that the
country's introduction of social welfare programs was stimulated by the real or
anticipated effects of economic development.13 0 All industrialized countries follow a
similar path of social welfare expansion and "Japan is no more unique than the other
advanced welfare states but sits comfortably within the general parameters of the
species." 1
Tracing the origins of the Japanese public assistance system reveals both the
explanatory strengths and limits of the economic development approach. As Gregory
Kasza correctly points out, countries experiencing industrialization face similar social
welfare concerns, which call for government intervention. Since the late nineteenth
century, the demand to create a large-scale, nation-wide public assistance system
emanated from concerns that rapid industrial advancements were creating new social
problems. By the early 1930s, all advanced industrialized countries had established some
form of national public assistance systems to address the needs of the poor, Japan
included. Thus, the economic development approach partially explains why and when
governments create public assistance systems.
Nonetheless, economic development theory has more difficulty explaining three
crucial aspects of social policies. First, it cannot explain the variation in policy content,
130 Gregory J. Kasza, One World ofWelfare: Japan in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2006), 172.
131 Ibid., 140.
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especially in the magnitude of poverty aid among advanced industrialized countries.m
This chapter began by documenting cross-country variation in the scope and scale of
public assistance, belying the convergence prediction of the logic of One World of
Welfare. Second, economic development theory cannot account for the historical
continuity of minimalism or the absence of significant expansion of poverty relief over
time as Japan has gained greater capacity and resources. Japan's impressive economic
growth did not nourish the public welfare system despite the growing demand to protect
relatively poorer families who were left behind during the economic boom. This is true
for both pre-war and post-war development of public assistance. Figure 1.4 shows that
public assistance in the post-war era continued to decline during times of economic
prosperity as well as instability. A mere one percent of the population received public
assistance during the economic volatility of the 1970s and the 1980s when relative
poverty rates were documented to be around 10%. In the pre-war era, as I discuss at
greater length in chapter four, the country's industrial growth stuck poor relief in a
retrenchment mode, not expansion. In short, Japan's poverty relief efforts have remained
remarkably consistent at a low level despite growing capacity to deliver poverty relief
and the rising demand to protect those who were adversely affected by the rapid
economic development.
[figure 1.4]
Third, proponents of the economic development approach tend to lump all social-
welfare-enhancing programs under the umbrella of "social welfare institutions" or
m The lack of support for the proposition that countries spend similar levels on social welfare is also
demonstrated in the work by Ramesh Mishra, "Welfare and Industrial Man: A Study of Welfare in Western
Industrial Societies in Relation to a Hypothesis of Convergence," Sociological Review, 21 no. 4
(November, 1973) pp. 535-60.
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"welfare states" and overlook the inter-program variations that lie beneath.m
Government intervention for old-age care, for example, illustrates my point.134 As John
Campbell points out, the Diet has passed hundreds of special programs to assist the
elderly since 1950 and the number of publicly subsidized and operated nursing homes
(rdjin h6mu) continued to grow into the 1990s. 35 For the poor, only a few legislative
measures, mostly to tighten spending, exist to this date. Convergence of social insurance
policies (mainly healthcare and social security) may well be happening, but the crucial
question--why some programs, such as public assistance for the poor, remain minimalist
despite numerous historical opportunities for expansion-remains to be answered
fully.1 3 6 This suggests that policymakers are more actively involved in how resources are
allocated to protect various segments of the population than the theory envisions.
In the case of the arrested development of public assistance system, we must
identify, first and foremost, which actors have been blocking the expansion of poverty
relief and why they have succeeded in doing so. Instead of discarding the economic
modernization approach, however, pinpointing who exactly prevented the poor from
receiving greater assistance would require a fresh look at how the process of
industrialization interacts with political contestation.
1 A point also raised by Paul Pierson in Dismantling the Welfare State? (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
1 It is important to note here that although Gregory Kasza (2006: 140) demonstrates that Japan is
comparatively situated "within the general parameters of the species," his causal inferences are drawn from
analyzing the historical development of major social insurance programs such as public pension and
healthcare, not the development of the public assistance system for the poor, which is the principal subject
of my study. Moreover, his work contains an important dimension of social policy and war, which remains
underexplored in comparative social welfare research.
135 John Creighton Campbell, How Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
136 In critiquing the widely-used concept of "welfare regimes," Kasza (2002) concludes that the "welfare
state" is less internally coherent than the concept implies and suggests future studies to focus on
comparison at the programmatic level. See Gregory J. Kasza, "The Illusion of Welfare 'Regimes," Journal
of Social Policy 31 no. 2 (2002).
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The Pressure from Below: Civil Society and Redistribution
Do governments care about the poor only when they pose a threat to domestic order
or when organized social groups rally around to fight poverty?
The civil society approach contends that the government's receptivity toward
poverty relief is influenced by the intensity of the "voice" from the grassroots level.
Unlike other theories of redistribution that we have discussed thus far, the civil society
literature views the poor as a central figure in shaping redistributive policies. The poor's
interest in greater redistribution is advanced in two ways. The poor can take matters into
their own hands and directly plea for greater public relief. Alternatively, civic groups-
such as private charity and non-profit organizations-act as a mediator, aggregating the
preferences of the poor and advocating greater poverty relief.
In the literature that focuses on direct action taken by the poor, governments
expand poverty relief to "buy off' the poor and discourage them from disturbing peace
and stability. Hammond and Hammond (1911) show that historically, poverty issues
gained political prominence when the incidence of social disturbances was rising.' 37 The
Enclosure and dawn of industrial revolution crippled the village poor and their suffering
eventually led to riots and social disturbances that prodded the government to enact the
Speenhamland Act (1795-1834) to pacify dissension.138
In the case of the United States, Piven and Cloward (1971) contend that the
history of welfare rolls is a dialectic between social unrest and government concession. 139
The creation and persistence of relief-giving is rooted in its function as a regulator of
137 John Lawrence Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer 1760-1832 (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), 122.
138 Ibid.,161.
139 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1971).
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poor workers who are disgruntled and dislocated by economic turmoil, such as massive
unemployment during the Great Depression.14 0 Relief programs are "initiated or
expanded to absorb and control enough of the unemployed to restore order; then, as
turbulence subsides, the relief system contracts, expelling those who are needed to
populate the labor market."141
More recently, the link between social unrest and redistribution has also been
examined using quantitative methods. For example, Sala-i-Martin (1997) uses statistical
techniques to explain the existence of public welfare programs and demonstrate that they
are a "means to buy social peace" and "bribe poor people out of activities that are
socially harmful, such as crimes, revolutions, riots, and other forms of social
disruption."142 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use formal methods to show that
disgruntled citizens like the poor can strike, riot, and threaten stability and order, which
force elites to make concessions as "these actions impose costs on the elite" and income
redistribution is a more viable method to "buy off the citizens" than to repress or adopt
democratic governance."14 3
Another strand of civil society literature focuses on how civic associations play a
role in advancing the poor's interests. Rooted in the philosophy of liberalism and
pluralism (e.g., Robert Dahl), diverse social groups aggregate and advance the interests of
140 This line of argument echoes structural Marxism's belief that social welfare policies are intended to
quench the thirst of revolutionary forces in order to legitimate and ensure the continuity of existing
politico-economic order. The theory of revolt and redistribution certainly has a neo-Marxist flavor but its
analytical emphasis differs in the treatment of the "poor" as an analytical unit. Marxism does not directly
address and analyze the "poor" as an independent group from the working class because they are simply
treated as the worst-off of the working class rather than a defined separate group.
141 Piven and Cloward (1971), 3.
142 Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Transfers, Social Safety Nets, and Economic Growth," Staff Papers-International
Monetary Fund, 44 no. 1 (March 1997).
143 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xii-xiii.
67
individuals in an effort to shape public policy. Since the poor lack organizational
capacity and financial resources, articulating their interests generally requires "patrons,"
such as welfare advocacy groups that finance and promote social policy change.144
In addition, civil society actors help increase the communication flow among
citizens, provide public visibility to issues and make government officials accountable for
caring for the needy. For instance, Skocpol (1992) argues that the federation of women's
local clubs and other activists joined forces to achieve social legislation that protected
mothers and children in the United States. 4 5 In addition, Putnam (1993) focuses on how
civic associations play a valuable role in increasing the accountability of public officials
in providing various social services.14 6 Thus, the civil society approach hypothesizes that
countries with weak civic activism have governments that are less responsive to the issue
ofpoverty because demand for redistribution is unlikely to materialize.
The majority of studies situate Japan as a "strong state," where policies develop
top-down.147 Throughout Japanese history, state control, whether in the form of outright
repression or excessive regulation, is thought to have staunched the growth of the
country's civil society. The "statist" view focuses on government intervention that curbs
the independence and power of civil society actors. Recent research provides evidence of
the weak state of civil society in Japan: the dearth of large, independent professional
144 Jack L. Walker Jr., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movement
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991): 49-50.
4 Skocpol (1992).
146 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
147 See for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of
Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Chalmers Johnson, MITI
and the Japanese Miracle, 1925-1975 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). The "top-down"
view of public policymaking for unorganized, resource-challenged groups is a also a common theme in the
comparative literature. See for example, Jack L. Walker Jr., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America:
Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1991), p.
49. In contrast, civic activism by well-organized groups (e.g., policies to protect mothers and children and
social security) has been shown to have an impact on policy outcomes. See for example, Skocpol (1992)
and Campbell (2005).
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organizations and policy advocacy groups (Pekkanen, 2004); the strong presence of de
facto state-run welfare organizations that promote bureaucratic interests (Estevez-Abe,
2008); the multitude of legal restrictions on forming non-profit organization prior to 1998
(Schwartz, 2008); and the "laggard development" of Japan's international
148
nongovernmental organizations (Reimann, 2006). From this perspective, Japan's
lackluster effort to combat poverty stems from its anemic civil society.
While the Japanese government has controlled many aspects of civic activism in
Japan, I argue that the top-down view of policymaking is not sufficient to explain
minimalist poverty relief in Japan for several reasons. To begin with, contrary to the
statist view, civil society in Japan is quite robust. In the context of Japan's history of
relief-giving, the poor have revolted in the past. In the pre-war era, the most notable
instance was a series of rice riots (kome ikki) in 1918 when angry citizens violently
protested in the streets throughout the country, demanding basic living conditions and
secure food sources from the government.14 9 Journalists, academics, and other social
actors chronicled the ordeal of the poor and advocated greater poverty relief by the
central government. 5 0 During the Great Depression, civic-minded citizens who were
concerned about the well-being of the poor launched a national movement that pressured
148 Robert Pekkanen, "After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan," Journal of East Asian
Studies 4 (2004). The works of Margarita Estevez-Abe "State-Society Partnerships in the Japanese Welfare
State," and Kim Reimann, "Building Global Civil Society from the Outside In? Japanese International
Development NGOs, the State, and International Norms," are from The State of Civil Society in Japan,
edited by Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Frank
Schwartz, "Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered," Japanese Journal of Political Science, 3 no. 2 (2002).
149 According to Takahashi (1997: 39), the nation-wide rice riots explicitly protested the government's non-
existent social welfare policies.
150 See for example, the work of Yokoyama Gennosuke, Nihon no Kas5 Shakai [The Japanese under class]
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985).
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the central government to take a more decisive, expansionary role in providing poor
relief. "
In the post-war era, demonstrators marched over the ruling of the Asahi court case
in the early 1960s, which challenged the government's scanty public assistance benefit
rate as unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional guarantee of the "right to
live" (seizonken) under Article 25. Discontented poor day laborers repeatedly engaged in
social disturbances in the streets of Japan's most notorious slums (e.g., Tokyo's Sanya,
Yokohama's Doyagai, and Osaka's Kamagasaki). More recently, a spike in poverty-
related crimes has occurred, including the infamous killing spree by a poor man in
Akihabara in 2008.152 The 2009 Hibiya Park anti-poverty new year's demonstrations is
indicative of the liveliness of the voice from below. These observations are consistent
with the findings from Muramatsu et al., (1986) and Garon (2006), who show that Japan'
civil society is more active than the statists portray. 53 More broadly, as Pharr (2006)
notes, state-society relations is "hardly unidirectional, and it is sorely mistaken to claim
state primacy." 54 States have resources and policy instruments at their disposal to
"enable," "constraint" or even "sponsor" civic activism, but they can decide to forgo the
151 Taira (1967), 99.
152 The killing spree in Akihabara, Tokyo's vibrant electronic district in the summer of 2008, in which a
poor, disgruntled assailant struck pedestrians with a truck and stabbed shoppers, killing 7 and injuring 10,
comes immediately to mind. See June 8, 2008 "7 killed, 10 injured in Akihabara stabbing spree," Kyodo
News.
153 Muramatsu et al. (1986) discuss the lively growth of pluralism in the first two decades of the postwar
period and Garon (2006) argues that civil society was very active and exerted social pressures throughout
pre-war and post-war Japan. See Muramatsu Michio, Ito Mitsutoshi, and Tsujinaka Yutaka, Sengo Nihon
no Atsuryoku Dantai [Pressure groups in postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Thy6 Keizai Shinposha, 1986); Sheldon
Garon, "From Meiji to Heisei: The State and Civil Society in Japan," in The State of Civil Society in Japan,
edited by Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 44.
For more discussion on the "weak state" or analysis of Japanese pluralism, see Political Dynamics in
Contemporary Japan, edited by Gary D. Allison and Yasunori Sone (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1993).
1 Susan Pharr, "Conclusion: Targeting by an Activist State: Japan as a Civil Society Model," in The State
of Civil Society in Japan, edited by Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), p. 323.
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"activist" route and instead create a "permissive" environment in which civil society
actors are given more autonomy and operational freedom. 5 5 In sum, civil society in
Japan is not weak and that the state has historically afforded a sufficient level of
autonomy for it to thrive.
Yet, the fact that Japan has robust civic activism highlights the limitations of the
civil society claim even more: if civic activism is so strong, why has it had little impact in
steering the course of redistribution away from the minimalist path? Is the pressure from
below just noise that policymakers routinely ignore? What is counterintuitive about
redistributive policymaking in Japan is that policymakers have listened and often agreed
with civil society actors that the state should do more to help the poor. For example,
when civil society groups demanded redistribution towards the poor during the Great
Depression, government officials agreed that the minimalist poor relief system had to be
revised; they acknowledged that families and civil society groups lacked the resources to
substitute poverty relief, especially during a severe nation-wide economic downturn. The
key contention among the elites, therefore, was not whether the poor should be helped but
rather, who was going to pay for it.
In order to understand the logic of public expenditures and who precisely is
refusing to pay for poverty relief in Japan, we must probe deeper into the politico-
economic calculus of the decision-makers. Whether or not the poor are in the streets
demanding assistance or are represented by interest groups promoting social welfare, the
poor have in their possession one of democracy's strongest weapon: votes. Why hasn't
ability to vote compelled Japanese politicians to attract poor voters by catering to their
needs? Do their votes even matter? In order to understand how much the poor's votes
iss Pharr (2006): 323-324.
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matter, we need to examine how the political process works and which political actors are
relevant in deciding the fate of the poor.
Power Resources and Redistribution
Does the strength of the left determine redistributive outcomes?
Unlike the pluralist notion of policymaking, which emphasizes the diffuse power
distribution among social groups, power resources theory (PRT) focuses on the
concentration of power. According to PRT, the level of social welfare spending,
including poverty relief, is a function of the strength of the working class movement and
leftist parties. The emergence of generous social welfare programs is tied to labor's
ability to tap into the "political resources" of leftist parties and mobilize their working
class constituents to push for spending aimed at improving the distributional
consequences of capitalism.156
The thesis that a powerful "left" produces a strong "welfare state" has become a
staple in analyzing a wide range of social policy outcomes.' 57 Proponents of this view
base their case on solid empirical evidence demonstrating that countries with strong
leftist parties and organized unions are correlated with greater aggregate social welfare
spending.158 They note that historically countries with a vibrant labor movement adopted
social welfare policies earlier and experienced a greater expansion over time. 159
156 Walter Korpi, "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States
and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists," World Politics 58 no.2 (January,
2006).
157 Exemplified by the work of Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1983).
158 See for example, Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State:
Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 200 1); Duane Swank,
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Under the PRT framework, the strength of labor is often measured by the extent
of unionization and the scale of union formation (e.g., industry-wide associations). 6 0
Through large N studies and case studies of the historical development of large welfare
states in Europe, studies have found that countries with strong leftist parties and
centralized labor movement have generous social welfare programs across the policy
spectrum; in contrast, countries with a weak tradition of leftist political and social
movement take the minimalist approach to all aspects of social policymaking and mostly
rely on means-tested programs.'61 Workers (including the poor) are proponents of social
welfare programs because they have fewer economic resources and less capacity to
protect themselves from life-course risks and events.' 6 2 The basic hypothesis ofPRT is
that countries with leftist political and social movements are positively correlated with
generous social welfare spending (as in the Nordic countries) whereas those with a weak
left are associated with lower social welfare spending (as in the United States and
Canada).
Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions, and
Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-1982," American Political Science Review 86 no. 3
(1992).
159 Alexander Hicks, Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). In contrast, Kasza (2006) questions this claim using the
Japanese case.
160 Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions, and Politics in Sweden
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 318.
161 For a collection of essays on the power resource theory, see Julia S. O'Conner and Gregg M. Olsen,
eds., Power Resources Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1998). See also John Stephens, The Transitionfrom Capitalism to Socialism (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1979); Walter Korpi, "Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social
Citizenship-Social Rights During Sickness in 18 OECD Countries Since 1930," American Sociological
Review, 54 no. 3 (1989): 309-28; Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare
Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86 no. 3 (1992);
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in
Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Bo Rothstein, "The Success of Swedish
Labor Market Policy: The Organizational Connection to Politics," European Journal of Political Research
13 no. 3 (1985).
162 Korpi (2006).
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Following the PRT logic, one would expect Japan to fall under the minimalist
category (along with the United States) because of the historical weakness of the "left" in
Japanese political and social movements. The nearly half-century long domination of the
Liberal Democratic Party possibly has restrained social spending. The thesis that Japan's
lack of a centralized, strong labor movement has hurt chances of greater redistribution is
compelling. Nevertheless, the Japanese case reveals facts that divert from the PRT's
main assumptions and predictions in four important ways. These limitations suggest
there is alternative mechanism at work that involves the mobilization of labor but does
not necessarily follow the causal paths outlined by PRT.
First, Japan's position in the cross-national social welfare ranking under the PRT
literature fails to take into consideration that it has a well-developed social insurance
system. Hicks and Misra, (1993), for example, rank Japan at the bottom along with the
United States in its "social welfare effort."16 3 Esping-Andersen (1990), however,
insightfully notes that Japan exhibits the features of a "hybrid," with characteristics of
welfare institutions in both the United States and Europe, and is "an amalgam of the
conservative 'Bismarckian' regime and the liberal residualism."1 64 He argues that Japan
is neither a welfare-laggard nor a welfare-champion because it has a relatively
comprehensive social insurance system (e.g., healthcare, social security, etc.) and yet
does little for the poor since its cash transfer schemes are very limited.165 Thus, PRT
does not detect nor explain why Japan's welfare state has developed quite unevenly.
163 They measure social welfare effort using data on aggregate social welfare spending as a percentage of
GDP. See Alexander Hicks and Joya Misra, "Political Resources and the Expansion of the Welfare Effort,"
American Journal of Sociology 99 no. 3 (1993).
164 Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Hybrid or Unique?: the Japanese Welfare State Between Europe and America,"
Journal of European Social Policy 7 no. 3 (1997): 184.
165 He hesitates to provide a definitive statement on Japan's status, citing that the country's welfare state
development is rather new compared to that of its European peers and is still evolving yet to be
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Furthermore, PRT's "welfare state" predictions do not comport well with the
comparative variation of poverty relief beyond Japan, which is a criticism also made by
other scholars.16 6 Countries commonly portrayed as "liberal" or "minimalist" welfare
states, because they have significantly lower aggregate social welfare spending than more
generous welfare states in Europe, greatly vary in their programmatic spending efforts on
the poor. As table 1.10 shows, Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand rank near the bottom
in total social welfare spending but they join the ranks of the more generous European
welfare states in how much they redistribute to the poor.167 [table 1.10] Moreover, the
power resources theory's "strength" factor cannot explain intra-welfare state variation. In
countries like Japan and the United States, social welfare programs developed unevenly;
cash transfers for the poor, for instance, pale in comparison to expenditures on social
insurance programs.'6 8 If "strength" were the only determinant of social policymaking,
we should observe limited social welfare programs across the board since these two
countries are categorized as having a comparatively weaker working-class tradition.
Second, the assumption that labor unions and the poor share similar interests in
greater redistribution needs to be qualified. Japanese labor unions have historically
shown little interest in expanding poverty relief, focusing instead on promoting "workers'
issues": job security, increase in wages, improving working conditions, and employment
institutionalized. This rationale is unpersuasive since Japan's poverty relief system is as old as those in
Europe and the United States, established decades prior to the Second World War. Ibid., 187.
166 See for example, Kahl (2010).
167 Vice versa, there are some European welfare states such as Switzerland that redistributes very little to
the poor despite high spending on social welfare.
168 Paul Pierson emphasizes the importance of analyzing intra-welfare state variation because the "welfare
state" includes a diverse set of disparate programs and usually has its own distinct public policymaking
process. See Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5-6.
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opportunities alike.169 The poor have diverse backgrounds: some participate in the labor
market but others do not as they may be sick, disabled, children or aged.70 Why would
organized labor unions marshal their resources to channel public funds to rescue the
poor? Why would workers push for redistribution towards the poor if it is not limited to
transfers from the rich, but also from the working class or even from low-wage workers?
Third, related to the previous point, it is misleading to simply assert that Japan's
labor movement is weak. Historically, Japan's labor movement gained enormous
strength at a time when its post-war public assistance was about to be established. The
unionization rate peaked around 50% in the years following WWII, a figure that is
comparable to the Nordic countries. Ikuo Kume's work on Japanese labor politics
directly challenges the view that Japan's labor is weak. He finds a number of cases in the
post-war era where organized labor successfully fought and achieved desirable policy
outcomes to enhance employment protection and gain higher wages.'' It is puzzling
from a solely working-class mobilization viewpoint why Japanese labor movements did
not exert positive spillover effects on redistributive policies.
169 While acknowledging that Japan's labor unions are highly decentralized, Ikuo Kume (1998) analyzes
how it has remained a key player in national policymaking in the post-war era. If Japan's labor movement
had its voice in the national policymaking arena, it is the more surprising from the PRT perspective why
labor unions did not push for expansion in social welfare programs. Kume finds a number of cases in
which labor unions succeeded in achieving policies that enhanced employment protection and concludes by
illuminate his findings from a broader comparative perspective. See Ikuo Kume, Disparaged Success:
Labor Politics in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
170 Rueda (2005) and Saint-Paul (1998) show that workers are not necessarily in favor of social welfare
programs, especially when they hold privileged positions in the labor market. The insider-outsider model
contends that 'insiders,' those with secure, "highly-protected jobs," are likely to oppose redistribution for
'outsiders,' who are unemployed or working poor because it can translate into a higher tax burden for
insiders. Japan's dualistic labor market structure does suggest a case of an insider-outsider tension, with
core workers and employers (insiders) allied against redistribution to the poor (outsiders). See David Rueda,
"Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties,"
American Political Science Review (vol. 99, no. 1 February 2005: pp. 61-74); Gilles Saint-Paul "A
Framework for Analyzing the Political Support for Active Labor Market Policy," Journal of Public
Economics 67 (February, 1998).
171 Kume (1998).
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Fourth, critics argue that a party's preferences for redistribution are less
predetermined but more open-ended and fluid.172 PRT's assumption that leftist parties
fight poverty does not always hold and the right is not always against creating or
expanding social programs.'7 3 Mutsuko (1997) observes that throughout Japanese
history, labor-backed leftist parties were not necessarily proponents of redistribution,
especially for the poor.174 The creation of the post-war public assistance system occurred
years prior to LDP's birth and coincided with a period in which leftist parties were at
their strongest.175 The PRT would predict that the U.S.-led occupation government's
insistence to guarantee the income of all citizens in the aftermath of the war would be
embraced by the newly-elected leftist parties. Instead, the left opposed the idea of
universal, generous social welfare and made every attempt to keep poverty relief at the
bare minimum and strictly based on means-testing.
Moreover, the PRT also has a hard time explaining the LDP's social welfare
policy. In contrast to the assumption of the PRT that conservative parties oppose
redistribution, the LDP was not "conservative" in the social policy arena and often
promoted "big government." As a "catch-all party' (hakatsu seitd), it expanded
numerous social welfare programs (e.g., social security, healthcare, etc), pursued pro-
172 Beyond the realm of the politics of social welfare, a long line of scholarly research has questioned the
validity of exogenous treatment of political actors' preferences. See for example, Andrew Moravcsik,
"Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51
no. 4 (Autumn 1997).
173 Kasza (2006: 65-66) points out that "[t]he notion that only social democratic or Christian democratic
governments vigorously promote public welfare has been disproven so many times that one more
invalidation should not surprise" and that social welfare policies "can be good politics for any ruling party,
whether conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, or social."
174 Takahashi (1997), 81.
175 The aftermath of the war brought two new changes favorable for the left to promote social welfare
policies for the poor. First, for the first time in history, leftist parties were not just only in power, the
conservatives (liberal party) were entirely purged by the occupation government. It had massive poverty,
where a large population was experiencing economic hardship and even starvation (Milly, 1999: 15-16).
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labor policies and intervened on behalf of small-and-medium sized enterprises.176 Why
have the LDP and opposition parties both vigorously supported social welfare programs
for the elderly, the sick, and workers but have done little for the poor? The next literature
I review answers this precise question from the perspective of the electoral rules of
Japanese politics.
Electoral System and Redistribution
Are policymakers' incentives to aid the poor structured by electoral rules?
The poor in all advanced industrialized countries today have the right to vote and
are legally entitled to relief. Although some democracies fully commit to alleviating
poverty, others provide very low levels of assistance. Why don't the poor's votes
translate more uniformly into an effective force for greater social protection? The
answer, according to the structure-based theory of electoral rules, is that the poor's votes
do not automatically translate into political voice because they are filtered through
electoral institutions that enhance or diminish their effectiveness. The institutional terrain
structures political actors' incentives and policy preferences and largely determines who
gets what from government.
The literature on political institutions contends that electoral rules determine the
significance of the poor's votes and the manner in which political actors attempt to secure
their votes via redistribution. Poverty relief measures are not implemented on normative
grounds or because of citizens' demand to cater to the needy. Rather, the literature on
176 Gerald L. Curtis, The Logic ofJapanese Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); T.J.
Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press,
1982).
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electoral system and redistribution narrowly conceive of the poor as voters and political
actors respond to their needs only on the basis of electoral incentives derived from
political institutions.
Empirical testing of the impact of electoral rules on redistributive outcomes
consistently demonstrates that countries that hold elections under proportional
representation (PR) have higher levels of redistribution than those that use single-member
district (SMD). 177 Despite being a serious contender in explaining the generosity of
welfare spending, clarifying the causal mechanism that links electoral rules to
redistribution has proven to be challenging. Thus far, a number of causal claims have
been put forward. Persson and Tabellini (2000) apply a model of broad versus targeted
redistribution and argue that the winner-take-all feature under majoritarian SMD compels
parties to target policy benefits to districts that play a pivotal role in winning elections; in
contrast, under PR, parties have the incentive to cater to a broad range of voters in each
district and, hence, will push for more encompassing national-level policies. 178 Other
scholars suggest that greater redistribution under PR may stem from higher voter turnout,
including low-income voters, which presumably can shift median voter preferences
177 The robustness of the relationship holds up using various measures of redistribution beyond aggregate
social welfare spending (e.g., level of inequality before and after taxes and transfers). See for example,
Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Torben Iversen and David Soskice, "Electoral Institutions and the
Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others," American Political Science
Review 100 no. 2 (2006); Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Markus Crepaz, "Inclusion versus
Exclusion: Political Institutions and the Welfare State," Comparative Politics 31 (1998); Evelyn Huber,
Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and
the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99 no. 3 (1993); Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini,
The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
178 See discussion in chapter 8, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaining
Economic Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
79
leftward.179 Iversen and Soskice (2006) carve out a different causal path as they find that
center-left governments are more common under PR whereas majoritarian systems are
more likely to be dominated by center-right. They trace the partisanship bias to the
"differences in coalitional dynamics associated with particular electoral systems."' 80
Thus, the electoral system approach hypothesizes that countries with SMD are less likely
to redistribute to the poor and those with PR are more likely to redistribute to the poor.
While proponents have shown empirically that institutions matter-and along the
way have identified various causal paths linking redistribution and electoral institutions
the issue of where they come from has remained relatively underexplored.' 8 ' The origins
of electoral institutions, however, are central to the causal story: If a majoritarian system
is associated with less redistribution and a greater chance of center-right governments,
could it be that the system itself was chosen and maintained by conservative elites? Vice
versa, did the left push for PR because it leads to a more favorable welfare spending
pattern as well as greater leftist political representation in government? If the answers to
these questions are "yes," then the underlining causality is partisanship, not electoral
systems--the latter is simply epiphenomenal. A major limitation of arguments based
solely on electoral system is evident from this endogeneity problem. A structure-based
model says little, if anything, about the role of agency in selecting and maintaining the
"rules of the game" in the first place.
179 For articles on the issue on higher turnout, see Robert Franseze, Macroeconomic Policies of Developed
Democracies (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
180 Iversen and Soskice (2006), p. 165.
181 For an overview of various causal mechanisms, see Jonathan A. Rodden, "Back to the Future:
Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics," in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds.,
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure 2"" edition (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); Karen L. Jusko, "The Electoral Foundations of Poverty Relief in Contemporary
Democratic Societies," (Working Paper, 16 September 2009).
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Several new studies on the origins of electoral institutions have begun to address
these issues, but their findings are geographically limited (much of the literature focuses
on electoral choices in Europe around the early twentieth century) and virtually none
address the direct impact on poor relief.1 8 2 The absence of literature on the link between
the origins of electoral institutions and poor relief is understandable in light of a major
caveat: an argument based on the poor's political representation has difficulty explaining
the rise and expansion of poor relief prior to the extension of suffrage to the poor. The
English poor law dates back to the late sixteenth century but universal manhood suffrage
did not occur until 1918; similarly, Japan enacted nation-wide poor relief in 1874 while
the poor obtained votes only after 1945. If the poor in most countries were denied access
to the policymaking process prior to the twentieth century, how can a variable based on
the political representation of voters explain the historical trajectory of poor relief?
The chronology of events surrounding the adoption of proportional representation
also poses a challenge to the electoral system thesis: the emergence of comprehensive
182 On the one hand are findings that suggest that the choice of electoral systems is driven by the political
survival of the ruling parties in the face of the political ascendency of the leftist parties. According to
Rokkan, "[t]he rising working class wanted to gain access to the legislatures, and the most threatened of the
old-established parties demanded PR to protect their position against the new waves of mobilized voters
created by the universal suffrage" (Rokkan, 1970: 157). The key role that the ascendency of leftist parties
(and the threat of working class) plays in promoting PR is also found in the work of Alesina and Glaeser
(2004). Boix (1999) theoretically fortifies the Rokkan hypothesis and formalizes the rational "defensive"
move of ruling parties: if leftist parties are growing in strength and if ruling parties had their own
challenges to keep a unified, coordinated right (due to splits in non-economic issues), ruling parties shifted
from plurality/majority to PR to prevent an electoral shut-out by the left. The strategic calculation by
ruling parties to maintain their political territory was institutionalized as the "electoral arena became stable
and the party system froze along certain cleavages" and political actors "lost interest in modifying the
electoral regime" (Boix, 1999: 609-610). Moving away from the Boix-Rokkan framework, Cusack et al.
(2007) present an alternative explanation that highlights the role of political representation of economic
interests in the choice of electoral systems. Inserting the "varieties of capitalism" grid in the selection
process, they argue that electoral systems are "endogenous to the structure of economic interests." Stein
Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of
Development (New York, NY: McKay, 1970); Caries Boix, "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of
Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, American Political Science Review 93 (September, 1999).
Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral
Systems," A merican Political Science Review 101 no. 3 2007: 388.
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and robust poor relief systems in Europe (the dependent variable) predates the adoption
of proportional representation system that purportedly leads to higher social welfare
spending (the independent variable). Most European countries that adopted proportional
representation did so around 1917 to 1920, well after the expansion of modem poor relief
system, which took place around late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century.183 For
example, Denmark introduced proportional representation on 1918. Yet, its compulsory
1803 Danish Poor Law where local parishes were deemed responsible for the poor shifted
to a more comprehensive and expansive program in 1849 when the Danish constitution
stipulated that individuals are "entitled to receive aid from the state."1 84 This problematic
timing issue suggests a case for fresh research on the link between electoral systems and
redistributive polices.
Setting aside the issue of origins, the dichotomous treatment of electoral systems
in large-N studies makes it difficult to gauge the effects of institutions on poverty policy
outcomes since Japan's old and new electoral institutions are both mixed systems.185
Prior to the 1994 electoral reform, Japan had medium-sized multi-member districts with a
single-non-transferable voting system (MMD/SNTV). This system was semi-
proportional but the smaller district size meant it was clearly distinct from a conventional
proportional representation system. After 1994, the electoral system became a mix of
proportionality and plurality, in which 300 out of 480 Lower House Diet seats are chosen
183 For a longer list on when countries adopted proportional representation, see Amel Ahmed, Engineering
Electoral Dominance: Democratization and Electoral System Choice in the Era of Industrialization (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
184 Sigrun Kahl, "Religious Doctrines and Poor Relief: A Different Causal Pathway," in Religion, Class
Coalitions, and Welfare States, edited by Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 273.
185 This point is also raised in the work of Margarita Estevez-Abe, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar
Japan (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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by single-member district (SMD) plurality and 180 seats through proportional
representation.
Departing from the PR versus SMD distinction, Margarita Estevez-Abe (2008)
applies the institutional model to explain Japan's meager social welfare spending.186 She
argues that Japan's MMD/SNTV system gave policymakers greater incentive to target
redistribution to their constituents by using functionally equivalent programs such as
public works and agricultural subsidies in order to mobilize organized voters within the
district.1 87 Since it is difficult to use orthodox cash transfer-based social security
programs to direct funds to specific geographic areas and occupations, policymakers
favored functional equivalent programs over traditional, more universalistic social
welfare programs. 18 Thus, a more universalistic cash benefits for the poor were less
delivered since the LDP was not able to utilize them to "target" and win votes under the
old electoral system.' 89
Estevez-Abe (2008) offers valuable insights into post-war Japanese social policy
development and her extensive empirical research alone is a major contribution to the
field. As I have discussed previously, one of the striking features of the Japanese
"welfare state" is its unevenness and her work addresses this issue by laying out a
compelling argument about why Japanese policymakers have consistently chosen to use
functional equivalent programs over more universalistic programs. Intuitively, it makes
sense that the highly particularistic electoral rules of the MMD/SNTV would encourage
186 Estevez-Abe (2008) 5-6.
187 Ibid., 30.
188 Ibid., 5.
189 Although Estevez-Abe's arguments also include the strategic goals of the bureaucracy, since she claims
that the LDP was the ultimate veto player, I focus my discussion here on her electoral institutional
argument.
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policymakers to target social policy spending. A long line of research, including the
seminal work by Curtis (1971), has argued that MMD/SNTV compels politicians to
extend pork to cultivate their personal political support base and that the system thrives
on organized voters at the expense of unorganized voters.190
Nevertheless, Estevez-Abe's structure-based model does not fully address several
crucial facts about Japan's efforts to combat poverty. First, the link between district size
and variation in policy instruments is weakened by the fact that when it comes to
assistance for the poor-whether it is in the form of functional equivalent or traditional
social welfare programs-Japan's efforts are limited in comparative terms. Estevez-Abe
argues that the statutory minimum wage is a functionally equivalent income support in
lieu of public assistance programs because it prevents "poverty among low-income
workers."191 International comparison, however, reveals that Japan's minimum wage is
set significantly lower than that of other countries. As Table 1.11 indicates, countries
such as France and Australia have minimum wages that are set twice as high as those
found in Japan and the United States.' 92 Likewise, the after-tax value of hourly minimum
190 The reasoning being that the MMD/SNTV system intensifies intra-party competition which places the
burden of campaign financing cost on individual candidates rather than parties. In addition, the system
compels candidates to target specific groups as candidates must secure a relatively small share of seats to
win. See for example, Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1971); Jean-Marie Bouissou, "Organizing One's Support Base under the SNTV: The
Case of the Japanese Kaenkai," in Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-
Transferable Vote, edited by Bernard Grofman et al. (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2002).
191 Estevez-Abe (2008), 34-35.
192 Japan's gross statutory minimum wages in 2006 (per hour, in US dollars at 2006 market exchange rates
and constant prices) were in the $5 range along with the United States. Relative minimum wage levels--
expressed as the gross earnings of full-time minimum wage workers as a share of gross average wages--
range from as high as 52% in Ireland to a low of 28% in Japan. Countries that do not have minimum wage
laws-such as Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, which have collective wage-bargaining systems-are
omitted from the analysis below.
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wages expressed in U.S. dollars at 2006 purchasing power parity show that the Japan
ranks near the bottom in the $4 dollar range along with the United States. 93
Similarly, other countries have used in-work tax credits as a functional equivalent
program for poverty relief; it allows policymakers to target beneficiaries, both in terms of
income group and occupational status.194 As Table 1.12 indicates, more countries are
joining the "make work pay" bandwagon, yet Japan remains one of the few advanced
industrialized countries that do not provide in-work tax benefits. Japan's minimalist
approach in both functional equivalent and traditional social welfare programs suggests
that politicians' choices over policy instruments are less important than the issue of to
whom to redistribute.
Finally, one of the limitations of Estevez-Abe's work is that it does not address
when, why, and who established the MMD/SNTV system. This issue warrants a careful
examination given that political actors first introduced the MMD/SNTV system in 1925
and then reintroduced it in the post-war era. Inserting the role of agency in selecting and
building a political structure is as important as analyzing the effects on redistribution; this
underscores why it is difficult to explain redistributive policy outcomes from a purely
structural point of view. My dissertation joins a new line of research that examines the
193 The Japanese government revised the minimum wage law for the first time since the 1950s in 2007, but
it did not establish a universal, national level minimum wage. And while the equalization of minimum
wage law to public assistance benefit rate has been pushed further, since the level of public assistance
payment has been decreasing in some localities, the minimum wage level has not risen substantially.
Japan's international position has deteriorated over the last year since the United States increased the
federal minimum wage to $7.25 per hour in 2009 while Japan's minimum wage level has not experienced
any notable changes.
194 These tax credits generally require a certain numbers of hours per week of work in order to quality for
benefits.
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link between the origins of electoral systems and redistribution and pays close attention
to how the process of democratization created the various paths of redistribution.'95
Conclusion: A summary of the limits of existing theoretical lenses
This chapter began by empirically documenting Japan's minimalist public
assistance system despite having poverty rates higher than other advanced industrialized
countries. In order to understand Japan's minimalist poverty relief, I evaluated what
existing theories of redistribution have to say about the Japan case and beyond. Holding
up each theoretical proposition of social policy against the Japanese case revealed a
number of blind spots, which it could not satisfactorily explain. Without discarding
valuable insights from existing theoretical perspectives, below I summarize the causes of
these blind spots and how I plan to address them.
Social division theory points out that racial division-or other salient cleavages
among social groups-may explain why a rich country like the United States might
restrict government transfers to the poor. Contrary to the prediction of social division
theory, however, Japanese ethnic minorities have been given more, not less, government
transfers to ameliorate their socio-economic status. The case of Japan suggests that the
relationship between divided societies and redistribution is open-ended and that political
actors have autonomy over formulating redistributive policies. My research on Japan
serves as a first step towards understanding why the two countries-so different in so
many ways-followed a similar path of constructing a threadbare safety net. A number
of anti-redistribution conditions in Japan may have also contributed to the arrested
development of poor relief in the United States: strong agrarian opposition towards
195 See for example, Thomas R. Cusack et al., "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems,"
American Political Science Review 101 no.3 (August 2007).
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redistribution, the long history of the disenfranchisement of the poor, and the absence of a
centralized labor movement and proportional representation system that purportedly
facilitate redistribution. These similarities suggest that broader causal processes may be
at work in explaining why these two countries nickel and dime the poor.
The historical continuity of Japan's minimalist poverty relief system makes
culture-based arguments intuitively appealing but the arguments do not hold up
empirically. The majority of Japanese poor work and do not conform to the "lazy"
stereotype and yet they receive no aid from the government. For nearly a century,
government officials have acknowledged that family resources fall short of addressing
mass poverty. Nonetheless, the government has justified meager spending on the basis of
retaining a family-centered welfare system. The culture approach's foggy causal
mechanism further weakens its explanatory framework: If the family-welfare does not
work to alleviate poverty why do politicians deliberately hold them up to justify lower
spending? Is it for cultural or strategic reasons? In order to satisfactorily answer this
question, we must examine the redistributive interests of politicians and how they use
their power and resources shape beliefs about poverty. Put simply, this blind spot calls
for a politics-centered approach of social policy.
The economic modernization approach contends that industrialization facilitates
the development of the social welfare system; one crucial fact concerning Japan,
however, directly challenges this assertion. Despite Japan's remarkable economic
progress, the country's public assistance system has remained underfunded and
exceptionally restrictive despite having a high incidence of poverty. This raises an
important issue that the economic modernization approach has yet to address: what
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factors are blocking redistribution towards the poor? Who are the proponents and
opponents of poor relief? In order to better understand the conditions that have prevented
the demands for social protection from materializing, we must focus on the relationship
between the process of industrialization and political contestation.
The civil society approach reminds us that various non-state actors assist the poor
and that their "voice" matters in providing policy-feedback on social welfare affairs.
Indeed, Japan's civic activism towards the poor has always been robust; it has just not
been successful at steering redistribution away from its minimalist path. The Japanese
case highlights that civic activism towards the poor has been seen more as "noise" rather
than an effective "voice" in the parliament. State primacy in the development of poverty
relief stands, which calls for a politics-centered model to better understand who gets what
from government.
The power resources theory posits that a strong left produces generous
redistributive policies. Yet, its ability to explain public assistance programs for the poor
is limited. Japan's organized labor and the main leftist parties have never fought
vigorously to expand public assistance for the poor. This finding suggests that the
problem lies in the theory's faulty assumption that workers and the poor have the same
redistributive policy preferences. If working class preferences toward redistribution are
not fixed, then, where do its preferences come from?
Recent promising work on the link between working class mobilization and
democratization hints at the possibility of the working class playing a decisive role in
shaping the political institutional terrain.' 96 Prior to mass democratization, organized
196 John D. Stephens, "Chapter 2: Democratization and Social Policy Development in Advanced Capitalist
Societies," in Democracy and Social Policy, edited by Yusuf Bangurat (New York, NY: Palgrave
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workers and the poor were disenfranchised and had congruent interests in improving their
socio-economic conditions. Whether or not the poor benefited from political movements
spearheaded by organized labor during the age of democratization is a crucial question,
and the answer will take us closer to explaining the working class impact on
redistribution toward the poor. Hence, in order to gain a better understanding of how and
when the working class mobilization influences a country's safety net we need to (1)
qualify the assumption that equates organized labor with a pro-redistribution stance; (2)
identify the sources of working class preferences toward poor relief; (3) clarify the causal
mechanism by which the labor movement influenced the poor's prospect of political
representation in redistributive politics.
Finally, while electoral system approaches have shown empirically that
institutions matter, the story of agency is conspicuously absent. Examining the historical
evolution of electoral systems and the role agency plays in shaping institutional structure
is critical in assessing how electoral system impacts redistributive outcome. In order to
do so, the analysis of origins of electoral system must be embedded within the broader
framework of democratization and be more analytically sensitive to how votes were
distributed to various groups in society. This entails breaking down-empirically and
analytically-the various stages of democratic transformation and tracing how actors
design, create, change, reshape, and settle into the political structures that surround them.
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Macmillan, 2007), 38; Torben Iversen and David Soskice, "Two Paths to Democracy," Harvard University
Center for European Studies (2007).
Appendix Chapter One
Table 1.1 Number of deaths due to starvation
Year Deaths due to starvation
2008 63
2007 44
2006 56
2005 77
2004 68
2003 93
2002 67
2001 63
2000 87
1999 85
1998 78
1997 70
1996 81
1995 58
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, "Jink6 D6tai Chasa" [Population Vital
Statistics Report] various years.
Figure 1.1 Historical data on suicide due to socio-economic difficulties
Suicide and Economic Hardship
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-+- Suicide due to financial and livelihood difficulty (keizai seikatsu mondai)
Source: National Plice Agency, various years
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Table 1.2 Relative poverty rates after taxes and transfers
Country M
1. Denmark
2. Sweden
3. Austria
4. Norway
5. France
6. Finland
7. Netherlands
8. United Kingdom
9. Switzerland
10. Belgium
11. New Zealand
12. Germany
13. Italy
14. Canada
15. Australia
16. Ireland
17. Japan
18. United States
Source: OECD.STAT, "Dataset:
d-1980s
6
3.3
6.1
6.4
8.3
5.1
14.6
6.2
6.3
10.3
10.7
10.6
12
17.9
Income
Mid-1990s Mi
4.7
3.7
7.4
7.1
7.5
4.9
6.3
10.9
10.8
8.4
8.5
14.2
9.5
11.4
11
13.7
16.7
distribution and Poverty," 2009
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J-2000s
5.3
5.3
6.6
6.8
7.1
7.3
7.7
8.3
8.7
8.8
10.8
11
11.4
12
12.4
14.8
14.9
17.1
I
ofworkers, children, elderly, and lone-parents.'9 7
Country
Netherlands
New Zealand
Sweden
Canada
Austria
Germany
France
Norway
Denmark
United Kingdom
Belgium
Italy
Finland
Switzerland
Japan
U.S.
Ireland
Australia
Country
Norway
Australia
Denmark
United Kingdom
Finland
Sweden
Switzerland
Belgium
Austria
France
Germany
Netherlands
Ireland
Italy
New Zealand
Canada
Japan
United States
Old-Age
Poverty
2
4
6
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
12
13
14
18
21
24
25
27
Working
Poverty
1.70
3.08
3.11
3.12
4.00
4.02
4.20
4.27
4.33
4.78
4.89
5.87
6.56
8.22
8.34
9.14
10.87
12.34
Country
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Switzerland
France
Austria
United Kingdom
Belgium
Italy
Australia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Germany
Canada
Ireland
United States
Japan
Country
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Belgium
Switzerland
France
Netherlands
Germany
Australia
Austria
Canada
Japan
New Zealand
Ireland
Italy
United Kingdom
United States
197 Working poverty: The OECD defines in-work poverty rate as "a percentage of individuals living in households with disposable
income below 50% of the median income, among all individuals living in a given type of household with a head of working-age and at
least one worker." Data from OECD Employment Outlook, "Chapter 3: Does work allow to escape poverty?" 2009. Note:
Switzerland's working poverty rate is from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office which defines the "working poor" as those who have
jobs from ages 20 to 59 but earned income less than the country's poverty line (set at 2,200 francs per month for 2005). Child
poverty: UNICEF defines child poverty as a "percentage of children (0-17) living in homes with equivalent incomes below 50% of the
national median." Data from 2000 are from UNICEF (2007) "Child Poverty in Perspective: An Overview of Child Well-Being in
Rich Countries" Innocenti Research Centre (Report Card 7) Florence, Italy: 2007. Old-age poverty: The OECD defines old-age
poverty as a percentage of households with a head of retirement age (over 65) with income less than 50% of the national median.
Data from mid-2005 from OECD, Growing Unequal? (2008). Lone-parents poverty: The OECD defines lone-parents poverty as the
proportion of single-parent households with children who have less than 50% of the median income. Mid-2005 data from OECD
(2008) <www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database>
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Lone-Parents
Poverty
6.8
7.9
13.3
13.7
18.5
19.3
21.2
23.7
25.1
25.6
38.3
39.0
39.1
41.5
44.7
47.0
47.5
58.7
Child
Poverty
2.4
3.4
3.6
3.6
6.7
6.8
7.3
9
10.9
11.6
13.3
13.6
14.3
14.6
15.7
15.7
16.2
21.7
Table 1. 3 Relative poverty rates
Table 1.4 Measuring decrease in relative
2000s
Country
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Sweden
Denmark
United Kingdom
Norway
Netherlands
Austria
Australia
[A] Pre-tax/benefit
poverty rate
32.7
30.7
33.6
33.8
26.7
23.6
26.3
24
24.7
23.1
28.6
taxes and transfers in mid-
[B] Post-tax/benefit
poverty rate
8.8
7.1
11
11.4
5.3
5.3
8.3
6.8
7.7
6.6
12.4
Difference between
[A] and [B]
23.9
23.6
22.6
22.4
21.4
18.3
18
17.2
17
16.5
16.2
Ireland 30.9 14.8 16.1
New Zealand 26.6 10.8 15.8
Japan 26.9 14.9 12
Canada 23.1 12 11.1
Finland 17.6 7.3 10.3
Switzerland 18 8.7 9.3
United States 26.3 17.1 9.2
Source: OECD.STAT, "Dataset: Income distribution and Poverty," 2009
Table 1.5 Net public transfers to lowest income quintile
A. gross public cash
transfers to lowest quintile
Denmark
Australia
Belgium
Sweden
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Germany
Britain
France
New Zealand
Finland
Austria
Italy
9.2
5.9
7.3
8.5
5.4
5.4
6
4.9
4.6
5.3
4.4
4.7
5.1
3.7
B. direct taxes and social
security from lowest quintile
3.2
0.2
1.5
2.8
0.2
0.8
1.5
0.7
0.4
1.5
0.5
1.2
1.8
0.6
C. Net transfers to
lowest guintil (-B
6.0
5.8
5.8
5.7
5.3
4.5
4.5
4.2
4.1
3.9
3.9
3.5
3.3
3.1
Canada 3.5 0.6 2.9
Japan 3.1 1.2 2.0
United States 2.3 0.4 1.9
Switzerland 4.7 4.5 0.2
Source: OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (2008), p. 116.
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poverty rates due to
Figure 1.2 Total expenditures of means-tested cash benefits as a % of GDP
Total expenditures of means-tested cash benefits in mid-2000
(% of GDP)
9.00 -
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Source: K. Nelson, The Social Assistance & MIPI Dataset (2007)
Table 1.6 The proportion of working-age population on welfare assistance
Social Assistance & Lone Parents Benefit (1999)
New Zealand 4.4
Ireland 4.2
Australia 3.2
France 3.0
United Kingdom 2.8
Belgium 2.4
Germany 2.2
Canada 1.9
United States 1.7
Denmark 1.6
Netherlands 1.2
Sweden 1.1
Austria 0.8
Japan 0.3
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2003: Towards More and Better Jobs (2003), p.
225 (Missing data: Finland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland)
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Table 1.7 Top Ten Public Assistance Caseload Rankings by Prefecture in 1965 and 2004
1965
Fukushima (81.5)
Kochi (72.9)
Nagasaki (55.6)
Kumamoto (51.1)
Kagoshima (47.7)
Aomori (47.7)
Saga (43.6)
Miyazaki (43.3)
Tokushima (40.8)
Ehime (40.2)
2004
Osaka (39.2)
Hokkaido (36.2)
Kochi (35.1)
Aomori (31.2)
Fukuoka (30.6)
Kyoto (29.8)
Okinawa (27.5)
Tokushima (26.6)
Nagasaki (26.5)
Tokyo (24.2)
Table 1.8 Foreign nationals and the public assistance system
Year % of total recipients % of total foreign nationals
1955 7.1 21.4
1960 4.6 11.5
1965 3.3 7.8
1970 2.5 4.7
1975 2.3 4.1
1980 2.5 4.6
1985 2.7 4.6
1990 3.1 2.9
1995 3.2 2.1
2000 3.1 1.9
2005 3.2 2.3
Source: Seikatsu Hogo no Dko Henshi Iinkai (Public Assistance Trends Editorial
Committee) 2008: pp. 64-65.
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Ranking
8
9
10
Table 1.9 Working poverty rates and the share of the working poor among the poor in
mid-2000s
In-work poverty rates" )
1. Norway
2. Australia
3. Denmark
4. United Kingdom
5. Finland
6. Sweden
7. Switzerland
8. Belgium
9. Austria
10. France
11. Germany
12. Netherlands
13. Ireland
14. Italy
15. New Zealand
16. Canada
1.70
3.08
3.11
3.12
4.00
4.02
4.20*
4.27
4.33
4.78
4.89
5.87
6.56
8.22
8.34
9.14
17. Japan 10.87
18. United States 12.34
Share of the working poor among the poor2 )
1. Norway
2. Australia
3. United Kingdom
4. Germany
5. Belgium
6. Ireland
7. Finland
8. Austria
9. France
10. Denmark
11. Netherlands
12. New Zealand
13. Canada
14. Italy
15. United States
16. Sweden
Sources:
(1) OECD Employment Outlook, 2009. *Switzerland's working poverty rate is from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office
which defines the "working poor" as those who have jobs from ages 20 to 59 but earned income less than the country's
poverty line (set at 2,200 francs per month for 2005).
(2) OECD Employment Outlook, 2009. Note: missing data for Switzerland
Figure 1.4 Japan's Total Public Assistance Recipients as a Percentage of National Population
Public Assistance Recipients as
a Percentage of Total Population
3
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Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, "Social Welfare Administrative Report," 2008
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23.01
25.38
33.01
33.57
42.80
44.12
59.65
61.26
62.55
62.58
63.64
63.83
67.49
68.09
71.95
72.85
17. Japan 82.75
Table 1.10 Aggregate Social Welfare Spending
(mid-2000)
Country Aggregate Social Welfare Spending
Sweden 29.4
France 29.2
Austria 27.2
Denmark 27.1
Germany 26.7
Belgium 26.4
Finland 26.1
Italy 25.0
Norway 21.6
Britain 21.3
Netherlands 20.9
Switzerland 20.3
Japan 18.6
New Zealand 18.5
Australia 17.1
Ireland 16.7
Canada 16.5
United States 15.9
versus Net Redistribution to the Poor
CountryNet RedistributiveCountry transfers to lowest quintile
Denmark 6.0
Australia 5.8
Belgium 5.8
Sweden 5.7
Ireland 5.3
Netherlands 4.5
Norway 4.5
Germany 4.2
Britain 4.1
New Zealand 3.9
France 3.9
Finland 3.5
Austria 3.3
Italy 3.1
Canada 2.9
Japan 2.0
United States 1.9
Switzerland 0.2
Source: The aggregate social welfare spending data are extracted from the OECD.Stat.2010 and data on net
redistributive transfers are from OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries
(2008), p. 116.
Table 1.1]. Gross, relative, and post-tax relative wages in 2006
Gross minimum wage Relative Minimum-wage Minimum wage after tax
1. France $ 10.1 1. Ireland 52% 1. France 7.6
2. Britain $ 9.9 2. New Zealand 50% 2. Britain 7.6
3. Netherlands $ 9.9 3. Australia 47% 3. Australia 7.4
4. Ireland $ 9.5 4. France 47% 4. Ireland 7.3
5. Belgium $ 9.3 5. Netherlands 43% 5. Belgium 7.2
6. Australia $ 9.0 6. Belgium 40% 6. Netherlands 7.0
7. Canada $ 6.7 7. Canada 38% 7. New Zealand 5.6
8. New Zealand $ 6.5 8. Britain 35% 8. Canada 5.3
9. Japan $ 5.7 9. United States 33% 9. Japan 4.5
10. United States $ 5.1 10. Japan 28% 10. United States 4.4
Wages 2005-
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*Relative minimum wage is the share of minimum wage of gross average wages.
Source: OECD, Taxing Wages [Special Feature: The Tax Treatment of Minimum
2006] (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006).
Table 1.12. Targeted in-work tax benefits for the poor (various years)
Program name
Australia
Canada
Belgium
Finland
France
Ireland
Netherlands
New Zealand
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Additional Family Payments
Working Income Tax Credit
Low Wage Tax Credit (2002)
Earned income allowance
Prime Pour l'Emploi [Work Premium]
Family Income Supplement
Employed Person's Tax Credit
Working Families Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
Working Tax Credit
Earned Income Tax Credit
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CHAPTER 2
A Conceptual Framework of How Safety Nets Evolve
When and how are safety nets created and maintained over time? This chapter
presents a conceptual model that explains why countries vary in the extent to which they
help the poor. The analysis proceeds in three steps. The first section provides the nuts
and bolts of social protection and identifies the main types of safety nets. Then I discuss
the challenges of the poor attaining social protection. The second section discusses
conditions under which safety nets are more likely to emerge and endure. It identifies the
key social actors, how their preferences towards redistribution are formed, and what
institutional conditions enable or constrain them from exercising their political voice.
The third section explores the major historical turning points in the evolution of poverty
relief system (e.g., the transition from feudalism to modem nation-states, nondemocracies
to democracies, and economic backwardness to a modern economy) and illustrates the
divergent paths of redistribution in comparative terms. This analytical framework is used
as a guide for the subsequent case of Japan.
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I. The conceptual foundations of safety nets
Defining the safety net within a "welfare state"
In the course of our lifetime, we build many things-such as homes, careers, and
networks-and though what each individual decides to build may vary, these assets
provide us with a livelihood and comfort in this otherwise uncertain world. Needless to
say, one could build a fortune and then lose it in the blink of an eye. The moment that
derails one's life is often unforeseeable: an onset of a sudden illness, a tragic accident, or
a disappointing job loss. Moreover, life comes with an expiration date and as we get
older the aging process impairs our mental and physical ability to make a living. Given
these unforeseeable and uncontrollable events, how can we protect ourselves from the
multiple risks to our livelihood?
One way to protect us from these life-course risks is for individuals to buy
products such life and health insurance offered in private markets. 198 While some
individuals may choose to do so, there are a few major drawbacks to relying solely on the
market for income protection. The main constraint is that low-income individuals, who
are at a greater risk of income losses, probably cannot afford them. Market-supplied
protection schemes are also limited in product availability. Since firms are driven to
maximize profits, they are unlikely to provide certain products because they are not
attractive business ventures.
Beyond markets, governments also offer a wide range of social welfare programs;
collectively, they are commonly referred to as the "welfare state." Figure 2.1 illustrates
how social welfare programs act as income maintenance devices for varying life-course
198 While individuals could also seek protection from families, neighbors, and even community
organizations, I assume that these personal network resources are absent or have already depleted.
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events and risks. For example, if a man loses his job, he can still maintain a certain level
of income by receiving unemployment benefits. If an elderly school librarian loses her
paycheck due to retirement, she can receive monthly social security payments to offset
the income loss. Or, upon the birth of a child a family may qualify for an allowance to
offset some of increased expenditures of adding a new member to the family. Some
social protection schemes such as unemployment benefits and social security are based
on an insurance principle where recipients must make prior contributions to the
participating programs in order to receive benefits. In other words, they must pay a
premium to insure themselves against loss of income. On the other hand, other programs,
such as child allowance, are non-contributory.
At the base of the welfare state lies a "safety net" that acts as a last resort aid for
individuals who have fallen into poverty. The safety net function is typically executed
through a public assistance system and delivers cash and in-kind benefits to ensure
citizens a minimum level of income. The recipients of public assistance may be
individuals whose unemployment insurance benefits and own financial resources have
run out. Elsewise they might be an elderly couple that never participated in the social
security system and are living in deplorable conditions or a small shopkeeper who has
declared bankruptcy and is homeless. In contrast to the social insurance programs, the
''safety net" does not require past contributions.
The recipients of public assistance programs must be "poverty-tested" and are
required to undergo a series of income or resource-tests.' 99 Eligibility rules ensure that
the income-maintenance serves only those who have fallen below the poverty line.
199 For an extended discussion on what it means to be "poverty-tested," see Tony Eardley et al., "Social
Assistance in OECD Countries" (Volume I: Synthesis Report), Department of Social Security Research
Report No. 46 (London: HMSO, 1996), 15-16.
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Although the definition of poverty or what constitutes a "decent" standard of living varies
across countries, it generally alludes to some form of material deprivation in basic
necessities such as shelter, food, and clothing. 200 Public assistance programs, therefore,
play a vital role as a last resort lifeline for the indigent population.
Despite the vital functions performed by a public assistance system, a few affluent
democracies, such as Japan, have chosen to limit spending and restrict access. Before we
delve into a theoretical discussion on why countries vary on the extent of social
protection for the poor, let us first categorize different types of safety nets.
Figure 2.1: The safety net within the "welfare state"
Life-course risks and events Social welfare programs
Examples: Examples:
Accidents - Social security
I I
Disability - - Unemployment insurance
I I
Sickness - - Healthcare
Income - Income
Job loss - Loss Maintenance - Disability benefits
I I
Child-birth - - Child allowance
I I
Old-age - - Employment and training
Death Puic weare asistance
safety net for the poor
A safety net typology
Just like the diverse thread counts and patterns of woven fabrics, safety nets come
in different strengths and shapes that political actors choose at some point in time. Figure
200 Prior to the 1945, most countries defined the poverty level on absolute terms (e.g., minimum caloric-
intake required for the body to function), but after 1945, as countries became richer, the concept of relative
poverty (e.g., half of the median income) became more prevalent.
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2.2 presents the three basic types of a safety net: (1) non-existent (2) threadbare (3)
standard. The three categories of safety nets differ in their basic structure, extent of
coverage, objectives, and legal basis for welfare assistance.
Fjgure 2.2 Safety net types
High
Level of
Social Protection
Standard
Threadbare
Non-existent
Low
A non-existent safety net is a national public assistance system that has limited
functionality and barely operates as a social protection device. Access to relief is highly
restricted, the duration of benefits is short, and assistance is meager. It is in a skeletal
form and the government only provides relief with an understanding that it is
discretionary and eschews any notion of obligation in caring for the poor. Keeping the
scope and scale of relief to a bare minimum is meant to instill a sense of self-
responsibility and individuals are compelled to utilize personal resources and their
networks to remedy their state of distress. The state remains reluctant to aid the poor
even when mutual aid has proven to be grossly inadequate to save the poor; this is meant
to discourage citizens from forming an expectation that the government will intervene
when poverty conditions worsen. This type of ultra restrictive national public assistance
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system is destitution-blind and remains unresponsive to the growing demands for social
protection. Japan's pre-war poor relief system, the so-called 1874 Relief Regulations and
its successor, the 1929 Relief Protection Law, serves as an example.
A threadbare system, in contrast, grants the poor the right to relief and operates
on a compulsory basis.20' Since poor relief is an entitlement program and not an optional
public service, it provides wider access points and greater benefits. The act of granting
social rights to citizens, however, does not guarantee that a government will
conscientiously commit to it. Under a threadbare safety net, a derelict government has a
tendency to shirk its responsibility to protect citizens from falling into poverty; as a
result, the poor's right to welfare only exists on paper and the system only offers limited
entitlement. Due in part to negligence, the safety net is under-maintained, static, slow to
respond to new socio-economic risks, and does not accommodate the growing need to
prevent citizens from falling into poverty. The Japanese post-war public assistance
system (the Livelihood Protection) is an example of a safety net based on limited
entitlement.
A standard safety is likewise entitlement-based net but is robust, comprehensive,
and durable; it provides the highest social protection against poverty. The system is
accessible, its benefits are substantial, and it is well funded even during times of fiscal
constraint. The national government confers the right to relief and diligently adheres to
it. The safety net expands and adjusts to new socio-economic challenges and risks.
Standard safety nets are found amongst affluent democracies in Europe (e.g., Sweden and
Denmark) where the incidence of poverty is exceptionally low. Paradoxically, Japan,
201 Generally, the constitution or public assistance law would contain a clause that guarantees a minimum
income for all its citizens.
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which have a greater demand for redistribution due to higher incidence of poverty, offer
only limited entitlement and has a threadbare safety net. This dichotomy presents a
"Robin Hood paradox"-countries with a greater demand for social protection supply
less-and suggests that the varying strengths of safety nets are not simply a function of
needs. 2 02 The next section examines the distinct challenges of building a standard safety
net (hereafter, just "safety net") and specifies the political and economic conditions under
which it is more likely to emerge.
The challenges of building a safety net
The challenges of constructing a safety net are twofold. First, classic theories of
public policymaking suggest that the poor will have difficulty prodding governments to
care for their needs. According to Mancur Olson (1965), the poor are a large,
heterogeneous group that lacks the financial and organizational resources needed to
effectively articulate their collective interests. Consequently, they are "forgotten" in the
public policymaking domain and suffer in "silence." 203 Verba and Schlozman (1995)
similarly argue that the poor are constrained by not having enough resources (e.g., time,
money, or skills) to participate effectively in political activities and therefore, they are
typically underrepresented and flounder rather than excel in the pluralistic system of
bargaining among groups. 204
202 Peter H. Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century,
Volume I: The Story (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
203 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 165-
167.
204 See chapters 10 and 11 in Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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Second, poverty left untreated can impose negative externalities on others by
producing "a public bad," such as the spread of disease, higher crime rates, and social
uprisings that adversely affect everyone. 205 The Aristotelian concern that "poverty is the
parent of revolution and crime" also hints at the externality effect. 206 Nonetheless,
rational self-interested actors who are driven to maximize their benefits from the
government and minimize their tax liabilities would oppose paying for poor relief
because the direct benefits are low and unclear but the cost or the tax burden is certain.207
So how does a diffuse, politically disadvantaged group like the poor ever succeed
in attaining sizable government transfers? If the poor everywhere share similar
constraints in mounting collective action, why do some governments redistribute more to
the poor than others? The next section addresses these questions.
II. Constructing the safety net
Who decides to aid the poor and why? When and how are safety nets created?
The combination of two factors-first, the poor's politically and economically
disadvantaged positions to effectively fight poverty on their own and second, the non-
poor's penchant to minimize tax liabilities-make the poor particularly vulnerable from
being excluded from the redistributive policymaking process. Given these obstacles, the
2 As Hammond and Hammond (1911) noted, "despair might teach bad habits" to the poor and the
"impoverished race might begin to look with ravenous eyes on the lot of those who lived on the spoils and
sinecures of the State." John Lawrence Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer 1760-
1832 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), 122. On the literature that treats poverty as a "public
bad" for producing negative externality, see Richard J. Zeckhauser, "Optimal Mechanisms for Income
Transfer," American Economic Review 61 (1971): 324-334; Waly Wane, "The Optimal Income Tax When
Poverty Is a Public 'Bad,"' Journal of Public Economics 82(2001): 271-299.
206 Aristotle, Aristotle's Politics: Translated by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1908), 70.
2 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 37.
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poor must receive help from other powerful, organizationally capable groups that could
exert influence on redistributive policies.
There are three potential groups that can aid the poor in receiving more transfers.
First, organized labor can absorb the poor (defined here as unorganized working or non-
working poor) into their movement and advocate encompassing interests and generous
redistributive policies. Second, a wealthy patron, such as agrarian landlords and
industrialists can lend a helping hand to the poor and assume the role as the financiers of
a safety net. Third, non-elected public officials, such as bureaucrats, can tackle the issue
of poverty and improve the poor's economic wellbeing by doing so. In essence, the
poor's chances of obtaining government transfers improve if they can tag-a-long with a
the working class movement (labor), find a financial patron (agrarian landlords or
industrialists), and receive protection from the defenders of public interest (bureaucrats).
The prospective helpers must possess sufficient power and interest in order to
play a decisive role in the redistributive policymaking process. Accordingly, two factors
determine the course of redistribution: who has a say in the policymaking process and
what factors shape their incentives to aid the poor.208 Addressing these issues would
require us to set the political and economic context under which redistributive decisions
are made. I content that the redistributive interests of the key social groups are largely
shaped by the timing and nature of industrialization. While the effectiveness of electoral
safeguards (e.g., constitutional provisions that limit the power of the elected assembly)
208 As Peter Lindert notes, in order to fully explain poverty relief outcomes, we must analyze "economic
self-interest" of those who can aid the poor and whether they have enough political voice to advance their
interests. Peter H. Lindert, "Poor Relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780-1880,"
European Review of Economic History: 2 (1998): 132.
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and the carriers of democratization (the agents that successfully advance democratic
reforms) determine who gets to have the final say in redistributive politics.
Thus, the varying patterns of the safety net that we observe today must be
understood as products of divergent experiences in pursuing the paths of democracy and
industrial capitalism. When and how a country pursued industrialization and
democratization determines who gets what from government. As major social groups
(e.g., agrarian landlords, industrialists, and working class) vie for greater economic gains
and political representation they choose the pattern of the safety net that best suits their
broader strategic political and economic interests.
The dominant interest groups that gain political representation (e.g., agrarian
landholders, industrialists, and organized labor), I argue, formulate not just redistributive
policies in the short-run but also the overarching electoral institutions that frame the
context in which redistribution is contested over time. In the course of shaping and
reshaping the electoral terrain, they determine whether to include or exclude the poor
from the policymaking process itself. When key social groups have little incentive to
help the poor, they are more likely to exclude them from the policymaking process. They
do so by instituting stringent voting rules that continue disenfranchising the poor or by
adopting an electoral system that mutes the poor's political voice even after they are
granted suffrage. In other words, when major political groups oppose redistribution, they
are more likely to create an exclusionary democracy that negates the "one person, one
vote" principle in order to shut out the poor from the politics of public expenditures.
Consequently, cross-country variation in the level of poverty relief today is partly
attributable to a particular institutional choice made during democratization, which in
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turn is based on the very question of how much to give to the poor in the form of relief,
votes, or voice. The political structure ultimately reflects the redistributive preferences of
the holders of power and this ensures that the pattern of redistribution is locked in for the
long haul.
III. Setting the historical stage
The analytical historical narrative of the divergent paths of redistribution
In this section, I provide a historical context to my model to illustrate when and
how actors attempt to influence redistributive policies. I focus on three major transitions
to analyze the probabilities of governments creating safety nets: (1) from feudalism to
modem nation-states; (2) economic backwardness to economic modernization; (3) from
nondemocracies to democracies. The analytical narrative shows the main historical
turning points in the evolution of the safety net in comparative terms and how they are
intimately tied to the advancement of democratic institutions and industrial capitalism.
Rather than capturing the process of democratization as a one-shot event, the
analytical narrative is broken down into three phases of democratization, ranging from
limited to universal suffrage, in order to better clarify the causal mechanism at work.
This set up is justified on the grounds that empirically, most advanced industrialized
countries today experienced a gradual transition towards democracy in the pre-1945
period.209
209 As Ziblatt (2006) points out, democratic systems were gradually introduced in Western nations and
developed over time in the pre-1945 period; the same applies to the case of Japan where the Meiji oligarchs
introduced democratic institutions in the late 1880s and suffrage expanded gradually from 1890 to 1925.
He also contends that the gradual movement invited a wide range of elite manipulation: "In addition to
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The broader theoretical points of this section are as follows. First, the shift from
feudalism towards modem nation-states exacerbates poses a number of challenges for the
poor to obtain social protection. Second, the transition towards democratic governance
has an ambiguous effect on the probability of constructing a safety net. The outcome
depends on a number of contextual variables, including the effectiveness of electoral
safeguards and the type of economic strategy a country pursues. Let us now examine
these points closely.
Transitioning from feudalism to a modern nation-state
Prior to the birth of nation-states, poor relief across countries converged around
the practice of rulers engaging in despotic redistribution and employed poor relief as a
means of extraction.2 Economies were largely agrarian and labor mobility was
restricted; this enabled each feudal lord to administer relief with the objective of
maximizing his returns from poor laborers. In essence, rulers provided relief to the
poor-whose labor represented an indispensable source of tax revenue-to increase
productivity and discourage rebellion. Despotic redistribution is analogous to Mancur
Olson's analysis of the "stationary bandit leader," who has an "encompassing interest" to
rules governing who could vote, elites could manipulate civil liberties, reduce the power of national
parliaments, or assert the power of nonelected bodies, all with the aim of combining democratic reform
with institutions or rules that mitigated some of the undesired consequences of reform." His line of work
departs from studies (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) that treat democratization as a dichotomous
outcome-successful versus failed transition to democracy-and pays greater attention on various stages of
democratization. Daniel Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?" World Politics, 58 no. 2 (January 2006),
318.
210 A number of economists conceptualize redistribution as an instrument of extraction. See Dan Usher and
Merwan Engineer, "The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society," Public Choice 54 no. 3 (1987),
261-276; Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh, "Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare,"
Journal of Public Economics 53 no. 1 (1994), 187-204. McGuire and Olson (1996) share the view that
despotic rulers choose redistribution over repression to extract surplus (esp. tax revenue) from the poor.
See Martin McGuire and Mancur Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible
Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature 34 no. 1 (1996): 72-96.
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provide public goods provision and security for subjects within his territory as they "are
for him a source of tax payments."m
Thus, feudal poor relief was administered exclusively on a territorial basis, funded
privately by the rulers (or, in some cases, a particular group was forced to fund it by the
rulers), and done so for private gains. Feudal lords monopolized the power to determine
policies within their respective domains, including taxes, policing, and poor relief. Under
feudalism, therefore, welfare protection was paternalistic and contractual because the
poor belonged to the rulers. While assistance was meager, it was delivered frequently
enough to ensure that the ruler's assets in the form of human resources did not perish.
An extreme form of despotic redistribution was found in the American South
where masters provided slaves with pseudo welfare benefits in order to keep them
productive and repress their urge to rebel, which might disrupt production.2 12 Likewise,
feudal lords in Japan engaged in despotic redistribution by providing quasi-social
protection in cases of extreme poverty to ensure that the peasants, who shouldered most
of the tax burden (paid in the form of rice), were neither "lively nor dead" (ikasazu,
korosazu). In much of Europe, the feudal masters often collaborated with churches to use
the poor to raise revenue. They possessed the authority to tax both the laboring poor and
the rich and controlled their lives (e.g., where and how to live) in exchange for relief;
membership in the church was more often than not involuntary. Most of the funds that
churches collected from donors in the name of helping the needy were expended on the
church's operational and administrative functions. From a purely financial point of view,
211 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 2000).
212 Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics ofAmerican Negro
Slavery (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974).
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the church's revenue collection activities suggest that it needed the "poor" and not the
reverse.
The process of building a modem nation-state elevated the issue of poverty from a
local issue to "a matter of national concern."m Dismantling the feudal system entailed a
number of significant changes, such as land reform, local administrative changes, and
centralization of poor relief activities. States consolidated previously fragmented relief
activities and created a nation-wide public assistance system to oversee and coordinate
relief efforts throughout the country. Authorities established rules of eligibility, benefit
rates, and standardized application procedures to achieve administrative coherence.
These rules and the organizational apparatus of a nation-wide poverty relief system were
the basic materials needed to build a safety net.
Nonetheless, the new institutional framework of poor relief brought a new
problem: who was going to pay for it and how much. Freed from the shackles of
feudalism, the poor became mobile geographically and occupationally. The poor's
increased labor mobility made the logic of despotic redistribution no longer viable. The
transition from feudalism to a modern nation-state, therefore, transformed the provision
of poor relief into a collective action problem. Under feudalism, the "public bad" of
poverty was confined geographically to the territory belonging to each feudal lord; they
paid for poor relief because they reaped private gains but they also contained the "public
bad" by doing so. As the feudal curtain fell, modern societies were confronted by a
major problem: no one wanted to pay for it.
m Gaston V. Rim linger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, A merica, and Russia (New York,
NY: Wiley, 1971), 13.
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Societies confronted the challenges of building safety nets under varying political
and economic conditions. For many, the process of building a nation state accompanied
huge changes--democratization and industrialization-and the prospects of constructing a
safety net hinged on the interplay between the patterns of democratic reforms, on the one
hand, and varying types of industrial development, on the other. The course of
redistribution, therefore, was shaped by how institutions governing democracy and
capitalism coevolved over time.
Early democratization and the prospects of building a safety net
Regardless of why some countries pursued a path of democracy-whether as a
safety valve against rising social discontent or a voluntarily concession to strengthen their
political base-they all experienced, at the very least, some changes in the balance of
214
power among actors. The process of democratization was inherently contentious for
this precise reason. Extension of suffrage allowed new actors to gain political power
while others faced the risk of losing their privileged positions. Democratization, no
matter how limited, therefore, entailed some degree of heightened uncertainty and risk to
the ruling elites. As Lord Derby puts it, granting access to the policymaking process to a
wider populace was like taking a "leap in the dark."m
In order to minimize political uncertainty and maintain a firm grip over the
policymaking process, ruling elites (e.g., oligarchs, hereditary aristocratic class, or
214 As Rustow (1970: p. 345) points out, "democracy is a matter primarily of procedure rather than of
substance" and "there may be many roads to democracy" that involve a wide variety of political groups and
social classes as well as varying political and social issues, conflict, and resolutions. Dankwart A. Rustow,
"Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 no. 3 (April 1970): 337-
363.
215 Lord Derby "saw the 1868 Reform Bill that he and Disraeli brought into being-a substantial extension
of the franchise-as a 'leap in the dark."' Quoted in Blake (1966): p. 474.
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216monarchs) created institutional frameworks to govern interactions among agents.
Some of the institutional structures were foundational. That is, they were meant to be a
permanent fixture of the democratic polity; these included major political organs such as
the parliament and the cabinet. They also erected institutional safeguards against any
unwanted actions by the newly elected representatives. For example, constitutional
provisions that explicitly limited the power of the elected assembly or granted a higher
authority (e.g., a King or Emperor) the right to dissolve the parliament served to prevent
new political actors from dominating the policymaking arena. In addition, actors
designed electoral rules (e.g., election laws and electoral system), which were a legal
formula that determined who could participate in the political process. These electoral
rules were like legal scaffolds that were designed to control democratic competition in the
short-run but were implemented with an understanding that they could easily be removed
or changed as new political dynamics and circumstances arose (e.g., an expansion of
suffrage or change in the electoral system).
During this period, of the three principal aiders of the poor-organized labor,
industrialists, agrarian landlords and bureaucrats-only the last two were applicable. At
the nascent stage of democratization, most countries were largely agrarian-based and the
process of industrial development was still at an embryonic stage. This meant that the
byproducts of industrialization, such as the emergence of an organized labor movement
or the industrialists as a political class, had yet to occur. In the early phase of
democratization, suffrage was limited to the wealthy propertied class who typically
216 Here, I focus on the "rules of the game" consisting of formal legal rules and not informal institutions
such as social norms. For an extended discussion on how institutions govern individual actions, see
Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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represented agrarian interests. The prospects of building a safety net, therefore, were
contingent on the actions of the newly-elected agrarian class (financial patrons) and the
non-elected bureaucrats (defenders of public interest).
Redistributive politics under a despotic ruler was straightforward. Power was
monopolized - and so were the decision-making process and policy output. If a despot
wanted to save the poor, he did. This also applied to an oligarchy if power was
concentrated in the hands of a few (assuming that members of the oligarchy could
collude). Democratic institutions, on the other hand, empowered the elected officials vis-
a-vis non-elected officials (bureaucrats) and the parliament or other forms of
representative body became the epicenter of formulating redistributive policies: any
expansion in poor relief required the consent of the representatives of key economic
interest groups.
However, given that traditional holders of power had the upper-hand in designing
and implementing democratic institutions, their ability to impose their will depended on
the undemocratic electoral safeguards put in place to curb the power of the newly elected
representatives. Democratization in Europe "often entailed and-perhaps required-
combining democratic reforms with microlevel formal and informal undemocratic elite
safeguards," such as undemocratic upper chambers and granting the monarch unilateral
power to dissolve the parliament. 2 17 Likewise, the Japanese Meiji oligarchs instituted a
number of safeguards when they introduced democratic institutions to impose their will
on the elected assembly.
During early democratization, the prospects of creating a safety net were
contingent on, one, whether agrarian elites had an interest in redistribution and, two,
217 Daniel Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?" World Politics 58 no. 2 (January 2006): 313.
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whether electoral safeguards allowed the non-elected officials (e.g., oligarchs and
bureaucrats) to impose a safety net top-down. Countries such as Britain and Germany
managed to build a safety net; Japan, on the other hand, failed to do so and established a
ultra-minimalist relief arrangements that essentially served no one.
In the case of Japan, the Meiji oligarchs prided themselves as being defenders of
the public interest as they commanded the bureaucracies and proposed an expansion of
poor relief in the inaugural session of the Diet in 1890. Although the Meiji oligarchs
instituted a number of electoral safeguards to mute the voice of the elected officials, they
were ineffective because the oligarchs miscalculated how the representatives of agrarian
elites would respond to the structural constraints they established; as it turned out, the
newly-elected officials chose to oppose rather than cooperate with the oligarchy. In
contrast, the effectiveness of undemocratic elite safeguards in Germany, which rendered
its national parliament relatively powerless, help to explain why Bismarck was able to
expand the scope of poor relief at the federal level in 1870.
While the Japanese rural agrarian elites vociferously opposed redistribution
towards the poor, the English agrarian class supported the expansion of poor relief and
acted as patrons for poor relief.218 According to Lindert (1998) and Boyer (1990), they
agreed to provide a safety net for the poor prior to the 1820s in order to retain farm labor
and prevent the flight of agricultural workers to industrial centers such as London.2 19 In
contrast, the Japanese agrarian elites refused to aid the poor given an over supply of farm
218 In the United States, the agrarian class especially in the South opposed redistribution on the grounds that
they wanted to retain the slave economy and also wanted to discourage labor market mobility (i.e., if the
poor are giving social protection by the state, poor agrarian farm laborers may take a risk and switch jobs).
219 Peter H. Lindert, "Poor Relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780-1880,"
European Review of Economic History 2: 101-140; George R. Boyer, An Economic History of the English
Poor Law, 1750-1850 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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laborers in rural areas. In addition, centralization and strengthening of the military
substantially decreased the threat of expropriation by the poor. As a part of the state-
building effort, the new Meiji government amalgamated previously fragmented military
forces at the national level, enforced universal conscription, and used the newly
established centralized tax system to finance upgrading of military technologies. The
greater military capabilities rendered the application of poor relief as a palliative device
obsolete.
Moreover, they feared that expanding poor relief would require a higher tax
burden that would strain their finances. The Japanese agrarian class had an unwavering
stance against tax increases because the Meiji leaders taxed the agrarian class heavily to
generate revenue to finance the development of the modem industrial sector. While the
threat of depopulation faced by European agrarian elites directly stemmed from the
budding industrial development in urban centers, the same phenomenon-
industrialization-created adverse conditions for redistribution in Japan. Thus, the
likelihood of the poor receiving public assistance from the government was contingent
not just on how democratic institutions were set up; the process of industrialization and
the type of strategy government used to spur industrial growth mattered in shaping the
incentive structure of the financial patrons.
Partial democratization in the age of industry
The earliest phase of democratization took place in a mostly agrarian-based
society and voting rights were limited to the wealthy landlords in rural areas. The
transition towards industrialized society, however, created a new class of business leaders
in urban centers who were eager to participate in the political process in order to
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articulate their concerns and demands in the national assembly. The political ascendency
of industrialists was swift and the conversion of economic power into political power
occurred with relative ease. Utilizing their financial and organizational resources, they
spearheaded a democratization movement and successfully gained voting rights for
themselves. The industrialists in Japan, for example, managed to bring about partial
democratization and form a political party in 1900, just a decade after the Diet opened.
The fact that countries industrialized at different points in time and that their
industrial origins emanated from divergent sources, had a profound impact on the
prospects of creating a safety net.220 Broadly speaking, one can identify two patterns of
industrialization. On the one hand, early industrializers like Britain pursued a laissez-
faire approach based on capital accumulation by private entrepreneurs.m On the other
hand, late developers such as the East Asian countries, including Japan, relied heavily on
state guidance and investment to propel industrial growth.
Certainly, latecomers are not destined to pursue a state-led developmental
approach. Nonetheless, as Alexander Gerschenkron's seminal work noted, the more
"backward" the economy, the more likely it would rely on state intervention because it
lacked the technology, scientific knowhow, infrastructure, and other essential ingredients
needed to develop competitive industries.m In order for late developers to "catch-up,"
the government strategically concentrated resources in key industries and provided
220 A good general reference that covers the industrial revolution is: Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great
Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000). The other classical work written on this topic is Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the
Industrial Revolution in England (Dodo Press, 2009).
221 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University, 1962).
222 Alexander Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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technical and financial assistance to privileged firms until they became sufficiently
competitive to succeed on their own.
The mobilization of state resources needed to spur industrial capitalism in late
developers produced difficult conditions for safety nets to emerge. As previously
discussed, early industrializers such as Britain experienced the threat of depopulation in
rural areas as farm laborers began leaving their lands to join the budding industrial
workforce in urban centers; this prompted the agrarian elites to supply poor relief. In the
case of late industrializers, however, the state-led industrial development strategy pitted
agrarian elites and industrialists against redistribution.
For latecomers like Japan, the development of the modern sector was financed by
taxes imposed on the traditional sector. The Meiji government raised capital
domestically through the land-tax and funneled it to develop competitive industries. The
funneling imperative to spark industrial growth not only drained state resources for poor
relief in the short run, it also made agrarian elites overly sensitive about taxes and
predisposed them to oppose any increase in government expenditures, including
expansion of poor relief, under the presumption that it would lead to tax hikes in the
future. On the other hand, the newly enfranchised urban industrialists opposed
redistribution since their primary goal was to stoke industrial growth by pressuring the
state to build infrastructure and a skilled workforce; given this chief objective, the issue
of financing a safety net fell on deaf ears.
In sum, for late-developers, the need to funnel state resources to stoke industrial
growth prevented financial patrons from emerging. Late developers such as Japan were
compelled to keep an ultra-minimalist relief arrangement while early developers
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maintained previously established safety nets. For the poor in late developing countries,
their only hope was to fight their own poverty, which meant participating in the
democratic process by obtaining the right to vote.
The rise of a mass democracy
Prior to the arrival of mass democracy, property and income requirements for
voting prevented the poor from participating in the political process. While agrarian
elites and urban industrialists effectively mobilized and gained voting rights, the poor had
little chance of attaining suffrage on their own because they lacked the basic
organizational and financial resources necessary to mount a nation-wide movement.
Nonetheless, attaining suffrage was the first step towards advancing their redistributive
interests in the policymaking arena. Even if the poor had attained votes, their lack of
unity and resources still would have put them in a disadvantageous position to effectively
exercise their "voice."
The poor's only chance to obtain relief was to ally with organized labor but their
joining forces was not a given. Organized workers expended resources primarily to
provide benefits that were exclusively targeted at union members. The immediate
concerns of the working class were to improve job security, increase wages, gain greater
respect in the workplace, improve working conditions, and expand employment
opportunities. Although they were not opposed to expanding poor relief, constructing a
safety net was not a part of the working class agenda because their primary goals were to
retain employment and attain higher wages.
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The issue of democratization, however, was a whole different matter. The
universal suffrage movement provided a unique historical opportunity in which the poor
(unorganized working or non-working low income individuals) and organized workers
could join forces and demand political rights. 223 Given that organized workers could
seriously disrupt the social and economic order, working class mobilization had the
potential to become a powerful social force that could achieve democratization.2 The
poor, on the other hand, could make up for its lack of resources by supplying "numbers"
to the movement and add manpower and momentum to the democratization movement.
The likelihood of a labor-poor alliance during democratization depended once
again on when and how a nation pursued industrial development. State-led late
development hurt the poor's prospects of allying with organized labor whereas early
development with a laissez-faire approach enabled the poor to benefit from a social
movement spearheaded by the working class. How a country industrialized mattered
because it affected how workers were organized-along centralized or decentralized
lines-and the varying tempo of industrialization defined the nature of working class
actions, redistributive preferences, and the prospects of allying with other social groups
including the poor.
Centralized labor union formation at the industry level, commonly observed in
early developers such as in Britain and Sweden, enabled the poor to join and benefit from
the democratization movement spearheaded by workers. The centralized structure
223 As Lipset notes, restricted voting rules based on property ownership "made it clear to workers that
political power and economic privilege were closely related." See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Radicalism or
Reformism: The Sources of Working-Class Politics," The American Political Science Review 77 no. 1
(March, 1983): 6.
224 John D. Stephens. "Chapter 2: Democratization and Social Policy Development in Advanced Capitalist
Societies," in Democracy and Social Policy, edited by Yusuf Bangurat (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007). Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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amalgamated workers from various backgrounds and this cross-class and cross-skill
configuration permitted the inclusion of the poor into the working class movement. This
broad-based working class mobilization was the key to achieving universal suffrage and
establishing an encompassing "left" that advocated universalistic social welfare
225policies. Since early development was more conducive for the construction of a safety
net in the early stages of democratization, for many European countries, the labor-poor
alliance ensured that previously established safety nets would be well maintained.
In contrast, late industrial development created a number of hurdles for organized
labor to form a centralized, broad-based working class organizational structure that could
forge crosscutting ties and promote encompassing interests. Late development induced
decentralization of the working class movement and hurt chances of poor forging an
alliance with organized labor for the following reasons.
Massive importation of technology under the late development approach imposed
large-scale, fast-paced economic transformation that hindered workers from controlling
skill formation. In addition, the massive changes precluded workers from gradually
fortifying pre-existing organizational platform around which they could centralize their
activities. Comparing the evolution of labor unions in Japan and Britain, Ronald Dore
contended that the former's "catch-up" policy created problems for organized labor while
giving employers the upper hand in monopolizing skill development:
Late developing Japan imported the latest nineteenth century and
twentieth century techniques into a society where traditional artisan skills
resembled those of sixteenth or seventeenth century Europe. Japan had to
make a technological leap-whereas Britain made a shuffling
technological advance. The smooth progression from the artisan skills of
2 2 5As Stephens (2007) notes, organized labor was the "primary force pressing democratization" in Europe
but successful democratic reforms more often resulted from forging alliance with other social actors and
classes. Stephens (2007), 38.
122
the next century is reflected in the continuity of apprenticeship systems
and modes of skill certification throughout the transition from guilds to
unions. New inventions came gradually and in penny packages; the
workmen acquired the new skills they involved as a topping up of their
existing skills, and passed them on to their successors. In Japan there was
little such continuity. In the shipyards, the traditional-style caulkers could
be upgraded to handle new imported techniques, but iron-using
shipwrights had to be trained from scratch-and only the employer could
do it. 2 26
Moreover, trailing behind advanced countries gave government officials and
employers in late developers more room to forestall the development of a centralized
working class mobilization. For example, the Meiji government and employers had
foreknowledge of how working class mobilization emerged in Western Europe;
consequently, they used repression and adopted labor regulations that would suppress the
growth of the working class movement at a relative young age.
Most importantly, however, the dualistic structure of state-led industrial
capitalism made the strongest impact in shaping the contours of working class
organization. The late-development "catch-up" policies created a number of giant
corporations that would lead the nation's industrial development. Mainly due to
government assistance and collusive banking networks, these pace-setting firms had
ample financial resources to provide corporate paternalistic programs and in-company
training to instill corporate loyalty and incentivize workers to organize vertically at the
firm or plant level and forgo horizontally-linked craft or industry unions. Their deep
pockets also enabled major corporations to forge close ties with political parties and
ensured that the government would help institutionalize vertically-structured labor-
management relations.
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226 Dore (1973), 412.
Given these incentives, the powerful unions that formed within the large leading
firms strategically chose brotherhood in the factory over class solidarity; in addition, they
set the trend for the working class movement as a whole by pressuring smaller unions to
follow suit and accelerate the decentralization trend. Plant or firm based unions
encouraged workers to focus on their narrow workplace issues at the expense of pursuing
broad-based political and social welfare reforms. The compartmentalization of the
working class limited the prospects of organized labor forging an alliance with other
social groups such as the poor and created a political "left" that exclusively focused on
the needs of organized labor. Moreover, the decentralized structure provided disincentive
for organized workers to vigorously pursue universal suffrage. Given the weak working
class pressure for democratization, this decreased the chances of the poor obtaining votes
in late developers. Thus, not only did late development hamper the construction of safety
nets in the early phases of democratization and industrialization, it imposed additional
challenges in the age of mass democracy, leaving the most vulnerable segment of the
population that require social protection the most excluded from the democratic process.
Locking in the pattern of redistribution over time
Whether the poor were included in or excluded from working class mobilization
had a profound impact on the poor's political representation in the future. As countries
experienced democratic consolidation over time, the choice of electoral system became a
crucial component of how democracy worked. Electoral system choices reflected the
redistributive concerns of the main social groups. Countries that developed safety nets in
the early rounds of democratization (most likely early developers) were more likely to
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adopt an electoral system that accommodated the encompassing left (labor-poor alliance).
While countries that failed to construct a safety net at every iteration of democratization
(most likely, late developers) were more likely to adopt an electoral system that shut out
the poor while accommodating the narrow left that catered only to the needs of organized
labor.
The choice of electoral system, which was made simultaneously as elites extended
suffrage to a wider electorate, was both a reflection and a source of reifying the existing
societal cleavage. In countries like Japan, the schism between organized labor and the
poor initially deepened because suffrage was extended to the former but not the latter.
The cleavage was further accentuated by adoption of an electoral system that enhanced
the political representation of organized economic interests (e.g., coordination of
employers and employees at the firm level) at the expense of unorganized economic
interests (e.g., working and non-working poor). This was reflected in the development of
intra-welfare state inequality where social policies for workers robustly grew while
programs for the poor remained an afterthought. Once MMD/SNTV was adopted, it
contributed to further decentralization of organized labor by encouraging investments in
firm-specific assets and the system enabled them to cultivate close ties to local
representatives of the ruling party; this in turn entrenched support for the electoral system
itself.
On the other hand, many Western European countries granted the poor the right to
vote and instituted a proportional representation system that was reflective of the grand
coalition of the left built around the mobilization of organized workers.227 It was also a
227 Markus M. L. Crepaz nicely summarizes Arend Lijphart's argument that proportional representation
system encompasses broad-based interests because it is more likely to be led by coalition governments
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system of political representation that would allow non-leftist parties to manage their
228
overlapping interests in coordinating with organized labor. In contrast, in countries
where the left was weak and had limited coordination between business and labor (e.g.,
United States, Britain), political actors saw no incentive to push for PR and maintained a
majoritarian system to stave off the left.229 In these countries, since the early twentieth
century, the poor were included in the development of the "welfare state," one in which
where social insurance systems and the safety net for the poor often grew in concert or
were amalgamated. Thus, the choice of electoral system reinforced the two paths of
redistribution well after the politics of suffrage was settled.
In summary, with the advent of mass democracy, the divergent approaches to
poor relief crystallized based on whether the poor were able to join and benefit from
working class mobilization. On the one hand, more centralized labor formation in
Western European countries facilitated a larger social alliance demanding universal
suffrage and this allowed the poor to gain votes and, later on, a stronger guarantee for
their social rights. On the other hand, ruling elites had more latitude over designing and
shaping the contours of "democracy" in countries with a weaker and decentralized
working class mobilization, such as Japan. Workers were compartmentalized at the firm
while "majoritarian political systems, which are often quite narrow, exclusionary, and in most cases
unrepresentative of a majority of the people, though they may carry legislative majorities." Thus,
proportional representation system is associated with greater social expenditures because its encompassing
institutional structure make governments more accountable to public concerns while majoritarian systems
tend to skew redistribution in favor of the ruling parties. See Markus M. L. Crepaz, "Inclusion versus
Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures," Comparative Politics 31 no. 1 (October, 1998):
66.
228 The mutual interest of employers and workers in promoting social insurance and regulatory systems that
would preserve "the investment in co-specific assets" dictated a particular choice of electoral system that
would permit such cooperation to occur. Thus, both leftist and rightist parties had an incentive to adopt PR
in proto-corporatist countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and Germany) since it allowed coordinated
economic interests to get transposed to the consensual policymaking process under PR. Thomas R. Cusack,
Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems," American
Political Science Review 101 no. 3 (August 2007): 373-391.
229 Ibid.
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and plant levels and, hence, there was less integration and interaction between units. In
these circumstances, the poor were less likely to form an alliance with organized labor.
In Japan, ruling elites accentuated this cleavage in two ways: (1) by granting organized
workers suffrage but denying it to the poor and many unorganized workers; and (2)
adopting a multi-member-district single-non-transferable-voting system that enhanced the
political representation of organized economic interests at the expense of the unorganized
(e.g., working and non-working poor). The unequal representation produced intra-
welfare state inequality, where social policies for organized workers (e.g., social
insurance programs) grew robustly while programs for the poor remained an afterthought.
Conclusion
This chapter presented an analytical framework that explained how safety nets
evolved over time. First, it explained the basic functions and patterns of safety nets
across countries. Second, I delineated the challenges of building a safety net. Third, I
identified the key actors and conditions under which safety nets are created and
maintained over time. The principal theoretical claim is that the construction of a safety
net hinges on the interplay between the patterns of democratic reforms, on the one hand,
and varying types of industrial development, on the other. I argued that the process of
democratization determines who has a political voice while the incentives to aid the poor
are structured by the tempo and nature of industrial development. In addition, I explained
how the course of redistribution persists over time: those who have the power to shape
redistributive policies also have the capacity to design and mold political institutions.
Therefore, they largely decide whether the poor are included or excluded from
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participating in the democratic process itself. When power holders are reluctant to aid
the poor, they are more likely to create an exclusionary democracy that denies the poor
the right to vote or, if they are granted suffrage, choose an electoral system that mutes
their political voice. The fact that democratic institutions ultimately reflect the
redistributive preferences of power holders ensures that the pattern of redistribution is
locked in for the long haul. The analytical framework that I developed in this chapter
would be used a guide for examining subsequent empirical cases.
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Part II. The Politics of Exclusion
CHAPTER 3
A break with the past:
From feudal poor relief to a modern public assistance system
This chapter examines the transition from feudal poor relief to the modem
national public assistance system, as embodied in the so-called 1874 Relief Regulations
(Jukkyfl Kisoku), and analyzes the factors that dramatically reduced the level of poor
relief from feudal times. I compare the basic features of feudal poor relief with the 1874
nation-wide public assistance system in order to evaluate the differences between the
two. This chapter also provides evidence that refutes the cultural argument, which
emphasizes the continuity of Japan's minimalist poverty relief policy. The rise of the
modem nation-state discontinued a fairly robust feudal poor relief practice, which points
to an inaccuracy in the culture approach's portrayal of today's minimalist poor relief
policy as an inheritance from the past.
This chapter begins by laying out the rationale for poor relief during feudalism,
which I show operated on the logic of despotic redistribution, where quasi-safety net was
provided for private gain; each feudal lord was responsible for the wellbeing of the poor
who belonged to him and resided in his territories. Although feudal poor relief was by no
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means generous, the agrarian-based economy prompted rulers to aid the poor for tilling
their lands and generating valuable tax revenue. In times of destitution, often caused by
bad harvests or natural disasters, feudal lords intervened to aid the needy in the hopes of
lowering the incidence of rebellion and increasing agricultural productivity. Hence,
relief-giving activities at the scale of an entire village were not uncommon.
As part of a grand mission to build a modem nation state, Meiji leaders
demolished a host of feudal practices and institutions. Dismantling the feudal system
entailed a number of significant changes, such as land reform, local administrative
changes, and liberalization of the labor market. Freed from the shackles of feudalism, the
poor became mobile geographically and occupationally. Increased labor mobility vitiated
the logic of despotic redistribution since the poor did not belong to any one person or
community. The need to socially protect citizens became visible as the wholesale
changes, especially the opening of Japan's near-autarkic domestic market, entailed large-
scale dislocation and transitional hardships for many ordinary Japanese.
The Meiji oligarchs established the Relief Regulations amidst great demand to
socially protect citizens; nevertheless, they virtually served no one as the Meiji
government reserved scarce government resources for the sole purpose of promoting
national industrial development. Japan's aspirations were to become rich-as quickly as
possible-but this was a daunting task given that it was a latecomer that needed to catch-
up to the more advanced economies in the West with poor factor endowments: scarce
land and capital but abundant in labor. The Meiji oligarchs made a crucial decision that
changed the country's economic fate: it carved out a new path of industrial growth that
defied comparative advantage and pursued a capital-intensive strategy that designated the
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state as the key player to foster industrial growth. Although the new Meiji government
created a centralized tax system to collect revenue efficiently, any funds amassed were
used for the sole purpose of an exceedingly ambitious national industrial development
plan.
In the process of jumpstarting Japan's industrial development, the Meiji
government instituted the Relief Regulations that contained exceptionally restrictive
eligibility rules. For the first time in history, individuals were subjected to a stringent
application process in which they were thoroughly investigated before receiving
assistance. The new eligibility rules were so strict that they basically barred most people
from relief. I argue that the skeletal framework of the new public assistance system was
in part due to the need to mobilize the country's scarce financial resources to promote
industrial development; thisfunneling imperative left virtually nothing for the poor.
I. The prelude to the modern public assistance system
Despotic redistribution under feudalism
The Tokugawa feudal regime (1603-1868) was a "confederation" of feudal lords
(daimyd) that was chiefly ruled by a commanding general (shogun) of the Tokugawa
family.2 3 0 Though it was not a unified nation-state, the Tokugawa shogun directed a
central government (bakufu) that supervised over 260 local domains (han) and exercised
considerable authority over certain issues, such as military affairs, foreign relations, labor
regulation, and religious policy. The daimyo retained their respective domain as a "fief
230 Peter Duus, Feudalism in Japan, Third Edition (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 80.
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from the shogun" and were treated as "direct vassals of the shogun."23' The feudal lords
were given autonomy to rule their estates in exchange for their allegiance to the shogun.
Except for the territories that belonged directly to the Tokugawa shogunate (called tenrydi
or bakuryd), each lord enjoyed fiscal independence in collecting and spending tax
revenues.2 3 2
Feudal lords obtained their power and wealth from their own administration's
fiscal revenue, which was primarily exacted from agricultural production (mostly rice).
Peasants comprised over two-thirds of the population and shouldered most of the tax
burden, being required to give half, if not more, of the annual crop yield to the feudal
lords. Each feudal lord then paid "rice stipends" to "his own army of samurai retainers
and foot-soldiers who lived in the fief's fortified castle town."234 Given the primacy of
importance placed on revenue-extraction from peasants, the restless "spirit of the taxation
system" was captured in a famous analogy that compared peasants to "rape-seeds": "the
more you squeeze them the more you get out of them."235
Although authorities collected taxes even in times of poor harvest, they feared
that extreme destitution among peasants would lead to the destruction of farming villages
and gradually destabilize the regime's fiscal base. Poor relief during feudal times was
based on this fear that overt suppression and negligence of the poor's welfare could either
231 The daimyo were divided into three categories:fudai ("vassal"), tozama ("outside"), and shimpan
("related") daimyo. The varying closeness and the level of "threat" that they posed to the shogun
determined where they were located and how they were treated by the shogun. The least threatening and
most loyal daimyo were calledfudai and they occupied lands that were closest to the capital, Edo (today's
Tokyo). The shimpan daimyo were related to the shogun shogun and enjoyed privileges where as the least
trustworthy daimyo called tozama were located at the outskirts of Japan (Duus,1 969: 80-81).
232 The shogun-controlled territories covered nearly one quarter of Japan.
233 The rates under the tax system (goko gomin) varied because in some localities peasants were forced to
pay 60% or even 80% of their crops in taxes. Textile products were also levied.
234 A smaller portion of the tax revenue came from mines and local industries within a fief. Ronald P. Dore,
Land Reform in Japan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1966), 11.
235 Dore (1966), 12.
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kill them, literally, or, they could turn sour and revolt. Thus, the feudal lords helped the
destitute in times of desperation as they deemed fit. The shogunate also instructed local
authorities to maintain relief funds and encouraged intervention by handing out rice, cash,
and loans in impoverished areas.
Feudal relief-giving practices were not driven by benevolence per se but an
economic rationale: to extract tax revenue from the poor. Rulers of the autocratic regime
adopted a despotic redistribution policy in which relief giving was intended to quench the
thirst for revolts and ensure that subjects were minimally able to generate agricultural or
textile products used to pay taxes in kind.236 The despotic redistributive scheme was
analogous to the pseudo-welfare benefits that plantation owners provided for their slaves
in the American South. According to Fogel and Engerman (1974), the Southern slave
masters provided food, shelter, and even healthcare to the slaves as a deterrent against
uprisings and a booster of labor productivity.237
The regime imposed strict regulations on the geographic and occupational
mobility of peasants and they were de facto enslaved and confined to their respective
fiefs. A permit system obligated peasants to obtain a certificate to travel outside their
hometown and instituted regulations that strictly prohibited them from changing
occupation or even selling or mortgaging arable land.238 In this respect, the feudal lords
treated them as agricultural slaves that needed to be controlled while remaining
236 Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai Hosh5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keis6 Shob6, 1969),
6.
m Their work suggests that the low incidence of rebellion by Southern slaves challenges the common
perception that they were poorly fed and over-exploited by slave masters; see Robert William Fogel and
Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1974).
238 George Sansom, A History ofJapan 1615-1867 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 105.
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productive. The quasi-social protection provided in cases of extreme poverty ensured
that the peasants were "not allowed to die, nor yet to live" (ikasazu, korosazu).2 3 9
In the capital, Edo, the concentration of poor was an ominous threat to the
Tokugawa regime. The shogunate routinely provided direct assistance in the form of rice
(or lowered price of rice), cash, or employment placement to prevent poverty-inspired
riots in the central command center of the regime. In other major cities, such as Osaka
and Kyoto, poorhouses and workhouses provided relief to the homeless and able-bodied
poor. Authorities frequently stipulated, however, that upon receiving aid recipients had
to return to their home villages (hitogaeshi) to diffuse the concentration of poor and for
peasants to be reintegrated into their native land as taxpayers.240
Aside from relief activities undertaken by the feudal lords, every community had
a mutual assistance network that aimed to improve the welfare of its members. The
heavy tax burden on farmers under the Tokugawa reign encouraged peasants to evade
taxes or leave farmland. In order to curtail defection by farmers, the regime created
neighborhood associations (rimpo dantai) called goningumi, comprised of groups of five
households collectively responsible for taxes, providing an incentive for each household
to monitor the others. By default, groups were also responsible for caring for each
other's welfare in times of destitution. 241 In addition, family members were obligated to
pool their resources to combat poverty. If a close or distant family member fell into
poverty, other members had the duty to help.
239 Dore (1966), 12.
240 Inaba Mitsuhiko, Kyflmin Kyfijo Seido no Kenkyni [Research on poor relief] (Tokyo: Keio Tstish in,
1992), 110.
241 Ibid., 104.
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Nonetheless, mutual aid and family resources fell short of ameliorating mass
poverty. Occasionally, persistent drought, natural disasters such as massive flooding, and
chronic poor harvests pushed an entire village to the brink of starvation. Only feudal
lords had the capacity and resources to intervene on such a massive scale. In such cases,
rulers provided relief to the whole village or even an entire region.m
The practice of mass relief giving ended as the feudal curtain fell. The rise of the
modem nation state coincided with the dismantling of the Tokugawa's signature system
of taxation, domains, mobility restrictions, and the despotic redistribution scheme. In the
name of centralization, local officials lost discretionary power in aiding the poor. New
nation-wide poor relief rules were created. They forced applicants to present their case
individually and pass a series of stringent eligibility tests in order to receive assistance.2 4 3
The individual-based application process meant that the new poor relief system abolished
mass relief in times of famine, floods, earthquakes, typhoons, droughts, or any other of
the unexpected systemic events that were common under the feudal regime. This more
restrictive relief arrangement in the post-feudal world merits further discussion since it
became a permanent feature of redistributive policy in Japan.
II. The beginnings of Japan's modern poor relief
Transitioning from feudalism
In the 1850s, Western powers forced Japan to end its isolationist foreign and
commercial policies and triggered an intricate domestic political struggle that eventually
242 Elise K. Tipton, "Defining the Poor in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," Japan Forum 20 no. 3 (2008):
365.
243 While feudal authorities conducted informal background checks on individuals who sought to find
refuge in poorhouses, they did not submit them to standardized and extensive eligibility tests.
135
led to the collapse of the Tokugawa regime.244 The new Meiji government wasted no
time in dismantling the remnants of feudalism and instituting wide-ranging systemic
changes aimed at transforming the country into a modern nation-state. In the years
immediately following the Meiji Restoration (1868), it swiftly introduced, among other
things, a new system of mass education, capital markets, marine transportation, railways,
a standardized language, postal service, and military conscription.
These wholesale changes in the name of modernization were not without costs.
For many ordinary Japanese, the experience entailed transitional hardships. The opening
of Japan's near-autarkic domestic market to foreign trade hurt hitherto protected domestic
industries. 24 In particular, the handicraft industries on which peasants relied struggled as
cheap foreign manufactured goods poured in.246 Opportunities for arbitrage also created
monetary instability. At times the exchange rate for silver to gold was "as low as 6 to 1 in
Japan in contrast to the 15 to 1 ratio" in other countries; since trade treaties allowed the
exportation of specie, "traders dumped silver in Japan and exported gold, producing wild
fluctuation in prices and serious economic dislocations." 247
In addition, urban poverty became visible as workers, freed from the strict
restrictions on labor mobility in effect during the Tokugawa era, flocked to cities in
search of a new life. Many found themselves in precarious conditions, facing
unemployment, homelessness, and hunger as the new city dwellers increasingly joined
244 Ono Masao, Bakuhan Kenryoku Kaitai Katei no Kenkyi [Research on the process of dismantling the
feudal political power] (Tokyo: Kura Shobo, 1993).
245 Ibid., 33-36, 98-106.
246 Dean W. Kinzley, "Japan's Discovery of Poverty: Changing Views on Poverty and Social Welfare in the
Nineteenth Century," Journal of Asian History 22 no. 1 (1988): 12.
247 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 210.
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the ranks of the urban poor.248 Moving away from their rural hometowns they often lost
the support of families and local communities, networks valuable to survival in hard
times. With no one to turn to for assistance, desperate citizens became increasingly
restless in urban centers.
During the Tokugawa era, feudal lords in their respective provincial domains took
care of poor relief under the domain system (han) but it was abolished and then replaced
by a new system organized by prefectures in 1871. The newly established prefectural
officials were at loss on how to deal with the increase in the destitute and sought
guidance from the central government. This prompted the Meiji government to
consolidate and standardize the previously fragmented relief arrangements into a
centrally controlled relief system, known as the Relief Regulations (Jukky Kisoku), in
1874.249 The Relief Regulations continued to serve as Japan's principal poor relief
legislation for a little over half of a century until the Relief and Protection Law
(Kyfigoh5) superseded them in 1929.
The creation of the 1874 Relief Regulations
The Relief Regulations established nation-wide administrative guidelines on relief
and the newly created Home Ministry-the preeminent bureaucracy in pre-war Japan-
provided localities with details on eligibility and benefit rules. 5 The law prioritized
mutual aid (jinmin sogo nojyigi), obliging citizens to offer direct help for the needy
248 Shibuya Tetsu, Teishotokusha e no Shien to Seikatsu Hogo Seido [Low-income aid and the livelihood
protection system] (Gifu: Mirai Co., 2009), 207.
49 Also translated as "Relief Order of 1874" or the "1874 Relief Measure of the Deprived." Koseisho Gojta
Nenshi Henshfi Iinkai, K5seishd Gojalnenshi [A fifty-year annal of the Ministry of Welfare] (Tokyo: Zaidan
H6jin KOsei Mondai KenkyFikai, 1988), 67.
2 The Home Ministry (Naimush6) was perhaps one of the most influential bureaucracies to manage
various affairs of the Empire of Japan from 1873-1947.
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among their family members or neighbors. Individuals were held responsible for their
own poverty, and the Relief Regulations stipulated that personal resources and networks
had to be exhausted before individuals could seek government assistance. Poor relief,
therefore, was limited to single adults and orphans who literally had no one to look after
them (mukoku no kyamin). The status of 'single' with no family had to be proven
through family registration records before applying for assistance.m Individuals who
had no one to look after them only qualified for benefits if they were elderly (over
seventy) and sick or senile, children under the age of thirteen, severely impaired and
unable to work, or facing extreme poverty. The minimum age requirement of over
seventy reflected how restrictive the new rules were since the average life expectancy at
the time was around thirty-eight.
The law stipulated applicants must face extreme poverty (gokuhin) entailing
severe deprivation of basic human needs, such as shelter and food, in order to receive
assistance. The Relief Regulations supplied cash assistance, which was calculated to be
the amount needed to purchase a specified quantity of rice at the local market rate. Local
governments distributed this assistance with a fifty-day limit on the duration of the
benefit.m Unlike England's New Poor Law of 1834, which offered indoor relief at poor-
and workhouses, the Relief Regulations provided only outdoor relief to non-vagrants who
had a verifiable family registry (koseki) that demonstrated permanent residence in the
local community in which the aid was being granted. The government chose outdoor
251 Exceptions to this rule were granted only to those who had family members but they were impoverished
and too old (above the age of seventy) or too young (children under the age of fifteen) to aid the applicant.
252 The Home Ministry directly handled cases that involved more than fifty days of assistance.
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over indoor relief to avoid incurring the additional administrative cost involved in
maintaining facilities.25 3
Under the "watchful eyes" of the Home Ministry, the Relief Regulations acted as
a "linchpin in a dual policy aimed at centrally managing the provision of relief and
minimizing its costs." 25 4 Although they granted discretionary authority to local
governments for relief lasting fewer than fifty days, the Home Ministry requested an
amendment, a "clause on application investigation" (kyn-minjukkyni shinsei chasa kaja),
that ordered local officers to scrutinize all applications closely.2 ss Applicants were not
only required to undergo a thorough examination to prove their eligibility, but also faced
local officials who "devoted considerable efforts to locating relatives who could maintain
the applicant and save the state some money." 256 As Garon (1997: p. 35) notes, "[i]n
several instances, officials compelled an elderly applicant to adopt an unrelated adult as a
son, persuading the younger man to assume responsibility for supporting his new parent."
As welfare rolls increased, the Home Ministry instructed localities to police
individual applications further in order to keep public assistance expenditures low-an
order that local officials heeded assiduously.257 Table 1 demonstrates that despite a
253 In this respect, the settlement-requirement was more akin to poor relief arrangements in continental
Europe. Tada Hidenori, "Kytihin Seido no Hensen," [The transformation of poor relief system] in Nihon
Shakai Hosh5 no Rekishi [The history of Japanese social security], edited by Yokoyama Kazuhiko and
Tada Hidenori (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 1991), 23.
254 Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997), p. 35.
255 The amendment was made in 1875 and put the central government solely in charge of administrative
and financial aspects of Relief Regulations, though it devolved a portion of financial burden to local
governments over the course of years. The "clause on application investigation" was also intended to
eliminate variation in the level of beneficiaries across localities.
256 Garon (1997: 35)
257 An example of the Home Ministry's instruction on tightening eligibility tests can be seen in the "Jukkyl
Kisoku no Kokoroe Dai Hachijo Ikka Soinin Kytijo no Koto" [Understanding of the multi-member family
aid under article 8 of the Relief Regulation] in the March 12 th 1886 Kanpd [official daily newsletter] no.
805. Cited in Yoshida KyFlichi, "Meiji Ishin ni Okeru Hinkon no Henshitsu," [The change in the quality of
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steady increase in relief recipients, from 2,521 in 1876 to 14,245 in 1889, public
assistance reached only a miniscule subset of the population of 35 million.258
[table 1]
A closer examination of the Relief Regulations reveals both elements of
continuity and change from the relief system of the feudal Tokugawa era. The Relief
Regulation preserved the practice of mutual aid for the poor, which prioritized the
mobilization of personal and community resources and reserved state intervention as a
last resort. 25 9 Nonetheless, the new Meiji relief arrangement diverged from feudal
practices in important ways, thus defying the view that it was simply a policy inherited
from the past. Consolidation of the various relief programs "administered by the
shogunate, domains, and big cities" led in practice to "enormous reductions in local relief
programs that had previously assisted whole families, the able-bodied, and other
categories not covered by the Relief Regulations." 260 Unlike feudal authorities, who had
distributed poor relief in times of destitution caused by natural disasters and epidemics,
the Relief Regulations entirely omitted reference to this problem and denied assistance to
calamity-stricken, able-bodied poor. Furthermore, the Meiji government largely stripped
localities of the autonomy to engage the poor as they deemed fit. The significant drop in
the level of relief from feudal times reflected a profound change in the country's
approach towards poverty.
poverty during the Meiji Restoration] in Nihon no Kyflhin Seido [the Japanese poor relief system], Nihon
Shakai Gigyb Daigaku Kyfhin Seido KenkyU Kai (ed.), (Tokyo: Imura Juji, 1976), 87.
258 Recipients as a percentage of total population are reported in Inaba (1992), 167.
259 Inaba Mitsuhiko, Kyflmin Kyijo Seido no Kenkyfi [Research on poor relief] (Tokyo: Kei6 Tsfshin,
1992), 104.
260 For a continued discussion of the curtailment of poor relief at the local level from the early 1870s on,
see Garon (1997), 35.
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New freedom, guns and liberalism
A number of factors led to the termination of the despotic redistribution scheme.
First, the extractive rationale that guided poor relief was no longer relevant after the Meiji
government confiscated the territories of the feudal lords and stripped their exclusive
privilege to levy taxes.26' Second, the geographically targeted redistribution arrangement
ceased to be applicable when the new government lifted all the stringent occupational and
geographic mobility restrictions. Liberalization of the labor market and "freedom to own
and alienate land" emancipated the peasants from feudal ties but they also lost the social
protection that came with the bond. This trade off-the loss of welfare security for the
sake of gaining freedom-resembles the case of American slavery in which slaves in the
South received pseudo-welfare benefits while the freed slaves in the North did not.262
Third, the use of poor relief as a palliative device against uprisings became
obsolete as the Meiji government amassed military capability and authority in a
remarkably short period. New centralized tax system and universal conscription allowed
the regime to build "a veritable brick wall of military strength" against agitators.263
Yamagata Aritomo, a Meiji oligarch known as the "father of militarism," studied and
observed Western military technology and institutions first-hand in the late 1860s. He
helped establish the Imperial Japanese Army in 1871 and instituted universal conscription
based on the Prussian model in 1873, thereby creating an effective organizational means
26 Although the feudal lords gained some concessions-such as governorships, tax revenue allowances,
and new titles under the kazoku peerage system-their autonomy and power to extract and keep tax
revenues were substantially curbed.
262 Fogel and Engerman (1974).
263 Roger W. Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1980), 92.
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of controlling the whole nation.264 In addition, the government acquired leftover rifles
from the American Civil War (1861-1865), imported additional arms from British gun
manufacturers, and began producing its own artillery in 1880.265 According to Bowen
(1980), 674 social disturbances of various types, including rice riots stemming from poor
harvests, took place in the first decade of Meiji, a level that he notes is much higher than
that of virtually any decade under the Tokugawa rule.266 With both manpower and
upgraded armaments, the Meiji government swiftly squashed any uprisings and "rendered
rebellion well-nigh impossible." 267 Hence, relief giving was no longer necessary as the
new administration preferred repression rather than redistribution to address dissension.
Fourth, the prominence of laissez-faire ideology in nineteenth century Europe
acted as a tailwind for a minimalist poor relief policy. Classical economists such as
David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus opposed extensive relief under the Old Poor Law on
the basis that it interfered with economic activities and provided a disincentive to work
and save. Along with other liberal thinkers of the time, they were credited with having
given intellectual support to the tightening of poor relief in the nineteenth century. The
realization that advanced industrialized nations like England were treating the poor
harshly-for example, by imposing the "less eligibility" 268 condition and "workhouse
tests" 2 6 9 that placed recipients in deplorable conditions in order to deter them from
claiming relief- offered solace to Japanese authorities, who too believed in restricting
264 The Japanese Navy was modeled on the British system. The French helped Yamagata build the army,
but after the Germans soundly defeated the French in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Meiji
leaders began emulating the Prussian army.
265 Byron Farwell, The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View
(New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2001), 437.
266 Bowen (1980), 90-91.
267 Ibid., 92.
268 The principle of "less eligibility" was based on the idea that the poor on relief must experience worse
conditions than did the poorest workers who were not receiving aid.
269 The "workhouse test" was a requirement that applicants work at workhouses in exchange for relief.
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access to poor relief.270 Hence, overseas trends reconfirmed that the minimalist Meiji
position was in line with the general trends of the time.
The aforementioned points contributed to the termination of despotic
redistribution but they were not the decisive factor in the creation of an ultra-minimalist
Relief Regulations. Although liberalization of the labor market attenuated the rationale
to provide paternalistic relief, it also increased the demand for social protection as many
peasants flocked into cities and faced a precarious, uncertain future. As previously
discussed, the new migration brought new social problems and this is what prompted
government officials to set up the Relief Regulations in the first place. It certainly does
not explain why the new system was designed to serve virtually no one.
Although the popularity of self-help ideology abroad may have inspired Japanese
officials to limit public assistance, the level of relief during the first half of the Meiji era
was so low that even nineteenth-century English efforts to curtail the flow of relief
appeared generous in comparison. Relief recipients constituted well above 2% of the
English population as compared to only 0.02% of the Japanese. 27 1 The extent to which
the Japanese government restricted poor relief merits further investigation.
Finally, if in fact superior repressive tools enabled the government to quiet
agitators by force rather than through redistribution, the issue of how the state treated the
non-agitating poor remains an open-ended question. Many poor, due to old age, sickness,
disability, or simply being too young, were incapable of revolting in the first place. As I
explain in the next section, the Meiji leaders' decision to deprive funding for a program
270 Koseish6 Goja Nenshi Henshii Iinkai, Kseish5 Gojainenshi [A fifty-year annals of the Ministry of
Welfare] (Tokyo: Zaisan H6jin Kosei Mondai Kenkyakai, 1988), 242.
271 Ikeda Yoshimasa and Ikemoto Miwako, Nihon Fukushishi Kogi [A lecture on Japanese welfare history]
(Osaka: Takasuga Shuppan, 2002), 81.
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that helps these individuals had little to do with its military capability and more to do
with financial capacity. Ironically, it was the new leadership's desire to make Japan
richer that prevented the poor from receiving aid.
III. The hidden cost of building a rich nation
The funneling imperative to jump-start industrial development
Since the Relief Regulations were never publicly debated, the main architect
behind them remains a bit of a mystery. The dominant oligarch of the time, Okubo
Toshimichi, most likely assumed that role.272 The period between 1873 and his
assassination in 1878 is also known as the "Okubo dictatorship" and coincided with the
designing and implementation of the Relief Regulations.27 3 These were under the
jurisdiction of the Home Ministry, which Okubo helped launch in 1873 to oversee public
health, public works, local government, and policing in addition to poor relief.274 Okubo
himself served as the first "Lord" or Minister of the Home Ministry and instructed that
the parameters of assistance under the Relief Regulations needed to be exceptionally
restrictive, with meager benefits in order to deter welfare-dependency. 275
Okubo's rationale for ultra-restrictive poor relief stemmed directly from his
ambitious goal to transform Japan into a "rich nation and strong army" (fukoku kyodhei); a
272 As I discuss in the next section, after his death his prot6g6s, It6 Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo,
carried out his legacy of building a strong, industrialized state.
273 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 79.
274 The Relief Regulations were established on December 8th 1874, a period when Okubo Toshimichi was
the Home Minister. Okubo was the inaugural minister of the Home Ministry in November 1873 and he led
the ministry until February 1874. Then, Kido Takayoshi briefly took over for two months, from February
to April, and Okubo became the Home Minister again from late April until August. Ito Hirobumi took over
from August to November and Okubo once again headed the Home Ministry from late November 1874
until 1878 when he was assassinated.
275 Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai Kylijanen Tsfshi Hensan linkai (ed.), Jizen kara Fukushi e [From
Philanthropy to Welfare] (Tokyo: Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai, 2003), 5.
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slogan first promoted by him and later embraced by his successors. Of the two goals, he
placed primacy on building Japan's economic power because a strong army would
inevitably require greater government spending, whether for weapons acquisition or
feeding soldiers. The young Meiji government's determination to achieve gigantic
economic progress within a short timeframe compelled state leaders to concentrate and
funnel the state's scarce financial and organization resources toward national industrial
development. As I explain shortly, the ability of the government to spend was quite
fixed, meaning that bigger expenditures in one area necessarily meant reductions in the
others, because the Meiji government had serious limits on how much it could borrow.
In essence, thefunneling imperative to meet the initial start-up costs of industrial
development trimmed the Relief Regulations down to the bone. This was also a period
when restoration leaders chose not to invade Korea or engage in any major foreign
276
conflict that might have diverted valuable state resources.
Making Japan richer was a daunting task. In the early years of Meiji, as Sally
Ann Hastings points out, the government was primarily concerned with the issue of
"Japan as a poor nation" rather than "the poor individuals within Japan." 277 Late-
developing Japan was eager to "catch-up" but its factor endowments limited its options.
Its land area, slightly smaller than California, was ninety percent uninhabitable, mostly
due to its mountainous terrain. Japan's capital market was underdeveloped and
dismantling the feudal regime strained the government budget into near bankruptcy. As
Ronald Dore succinctly put it, the young Meiji government "badly needed money":
276 Also, state leaders needed to ensure that there were enough military resources to combat domestic
insurgencies. The Taiwan Expedition of 1874 was an exception. The Meiji government sent soldiers to
attack the Paiwan aborigines responsible for killing 54 Ryakyoan sailors in 1871.
277 Sally Ann Hastings, Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937 (Pittsburgh, PA, University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 19.
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It had to provide compensation for the privileged class of the old regime-
the commutation of feudal stipends into money salaries and eventually
into government bonds, and the redemption of the paper currencies and
other forms of debt accumulated by the old fiefs. The salaries of its new
officials and the expense of creating military forces required to suppress
local rebellions and ensure that Japan did not fall a prey to colonial
Powers were additional heavy claims on its resources.278
The only resource that it had in abundance was labor, around thirty-three million workers
in 1870, but this would only be to its advantage if the government chose a labor-intensive
economic development strategy. Defying its factor endowments and comparative
advantage, the Okubo-led Meiji administration chose a capital-intensive strategy.279
Okubo and Okuma Shigenobu, the then Minister of Finance, rejected the laissez-
faire British free trade model on the grounds that it was unfit for late-developing Japan.28 o
Instead, they selected a state-led mercantilist approach that utilized strategically placed
protectionist policies to nurture infant industries (shokusan kdgyd) and achieve import
substitution.281 As Alexander Gerschenkron's influential work on late-development
would later point out, economically "backward" societies face enormous challenges to
build competitive industries.2 82 To name a few, "late-developers" lack expertise,
technology, machineries, infrastructure, scientific knowledge, and managerial knowhow
278 Ronald P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1966), 15.
279 Rodrik (2001) notes Japan's exceptional path of industrial growth in the late nineteenth century. See
Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of World Economy (New York, NY:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 142-143.
280 As Samuels (2003: 72-73) points out, these two men made critical choices regarding the path of
economic development despite the fact that domestic and international conditions were not necessarily
conducive for it: "Their early choice for economic intervention and technonationalism was made despite
an international trade regime and a still uncertain national consolidation that appeared to make free trade
and openness the more compelling option...the Japanese economy was short on capital and long on
labor... the Japanese elected to pursue capital-intensive economic growth without inviting foreign
investment."
281 Asada Takee and Wakabayashi Yukio, Nihon kindai kelei no yoake: Shokusan kdgy5 seisakuka no
sh6gy6 to keiei [The dawn of modern Japanese economy: the commerce and management of industrial
development policy] (Tokyo: Hakuto Shobou, 1993).
282 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University, 1962).
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essential for industrial development. Because the private sector is unable to mobilize
sufficient resources and concentrate them in key sectors, a heavy dose of state guidance is
required. The difficulty for Japan and other late industrializers is that Japan was woefully
short of capital.
The Meiji government insisted on raising capital domestically in order to finance
industrial development. The Meiji leaders avoided relying on foreign direct investment
or loans from foreign banks because, as Bismarck counseled the oligarchs during their
sojourn to Europe, "industrial autonomy" was necessary to secure economic prosperity
and state sovereignty in the long run.2 83 At the same time, unequal treaties with the West
prevented Japan from raising revenue through import duties, the most important source of
revenue for most states in this epoch. Determined to aid the growth of Japanese industry
financially and technically, Okubo and his associates set their eyes on the agrarian class,
just like in feudal times. Only they wanted to extract resources from it more effectively
through the newly-created centralized tax system. They instituted a massive land reform,
adopted a new private property law, and secured a steady source of government revenue
by imposing a land-tax of three percent.
With a fresh source of domestic capital, the Meiji government helped spur
industrial development in four important ways. First, the Home Ministry's Industrial
Promotion Bureau was responsible for formulating and implementing industrial policy
and it executed various forms of import substitution programs to nurture infant
industries.284 For example, it protected cotton and silk industries from international
competition by restricting the flow of imports through non-tariff barriers and it aided
283
284 For an in-depth account of Japan's national industrial development, see chapter three of Samuels (2003).
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them in the export of goods. The state also assisted in the borrowing of foreign
technology and acquisition of machinery by providing loans on favorable terms. They
also provided subsidies to help firms develop expertise, train engineers, and build a
skilled workforce.285 Second, the Meiji government enabled leading business leaders
such as Iwasaki Yatar6 of Mitsubishi to expand the scope and scale of business activities
by offering them lucrative opportunities for "favored acquisitions." Once the state-run
coalmines, shipyards, and other factories were set up, the government sold them at a
discounted price to the soon-to-be zaibatsu leaders.286
Third, the Meiji government heavily invested in key industries such as steel and
iron to offset the high entry costs of firms in these sectors; these strategic industries
would later create forward linkages to other sectors such as construction and
shipbuilding. 287 Producing basic materials at home had the added benefit of avoiding a
balance-of-payments deficit.2 8 8 Fourth, the Meiji leaders built vital infrastructure, such as
roads, telecommunications, postal services, and public utilities (e.g., electricity) to help
lower transaction costs and facilitate the flow of goods, services, and information.
This is how Japan built "a rich nation": state-guided modernization that was paid
for largely by the traditional sector. Its funneling imperative made Japan richer but
virtually absorbed all the funds that might have been available for redistribution. In
essence, what the Okubo-led government did was to create an artificial oasis in the
285 Sydney Crawcour, "Chapter 8: Industrialization and Technological Change, 1885-1920," in The
Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century Volume 6, edited by John Whitney (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 402-403.
286 As Samuels (2003: 85) notes, the costs of running the state-run enterprises were draining state finances
and the oligarchs needed to unload them as quickly as possible to improve the cash flow.
287 The effectiveness of these policies are definitely not without controversy. A number of economists such
as Paul Krugman are skeptical of the value of import substitution policies and other state-led initiatives for
industrial development.
288 The government targeted these industries not just for economic reasons but also to promote national
defense because it would mean less reliance of resources to build arms. Crawcour (1988): 429-430.
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middle of the desert so that newly created industries could be protected and nourished. At
the same time, the need to sustain such a resource-guzzling project left the poor and the
Relief Regulations malnourished and neglected.
Not only did late-development strategy'sfunneling imperative divert funds away
from poor relief, it also created a new villain in the story of fighting poverty in the
decades to come: the agrarian landlords. The late-development strategy imposed a heavy
tax burden on the agrarian landlords and their dissatisfaction would eventually coalesce
into a democratization movement to ultimately democratize fiscal policy. Ironically, as
Japan became richer and stronger, Okubo's successors would attempt to revise the ultra-
minimalist 1874 Relief Regulations so that the state could show more largesse to the
poor. They failed to steer the course of redistribution away from the minimalist path
because early democratization in Japan enfranchised the agrarian landed elites and gave
them a say in redistributive politics. Overwhelmed by the tax-burden to finance
industrialization, the agrarian landlords aggressively opposed any expansion of poor
relief on the grounds that doing so would impose an additional tax burden. Thus, late-
development strategy not only compelled the government to abolish robust feudal poor
relief practices and establish a new, virtually non-existent poor relief arrangement, but it
also created a new social class that would oppose redistribution in the decades to come.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the transition from feudal poor relief practices to the
creation of the country's first national public assistance system and explained how the
country's late-development industrialization strategy contributed to the dramatic
reduction in poor relief from feudal times. Japan's aspirations were to become richer-as
149
quickly as possible-and that required funneling scarce government resources to foster
industrialization. In order to move Japan from rags to riches, Meiji leaders withheld
funds for poor relief and instituted a new ultra-restrictive national public assistance
system that served virtually no one.
As the country successfully landed on the track of industrialization, however,
Meiji leaders questioned the validity of the extremely minimalist Relief Regulations.
They eventually prepared a proposal to expand the nation's poor relief system and
submitted it during the inaugural session of the Diet. The newly enfranchised agrarian
landlords, however, blocked the initiative on the grounds that greater expenditures for the
poor would increase their tax burden. They argued their burden was already at an
exorbitant level as the agrarian class was being forced to fund the country's nascent
industrial development via the land-tax. Thus, the initial funneling imperative absorbed
funds that might have been used for the poor, but the system was never replenished
because of the strong agrarian opposition. The next chapter explores this topic.
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Appendix Chapter 3
Table 3.1 P
Year
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
Source:
iblic Assistance under the
Total Recipients
2,521
1,187
6,097
4,941
4,758
6,981
6,047
6,402
6,913
11,174
14,659
15,204
14,721
14,240
Nihon no Kyaihin Seido (1
Relief Regulations (1876-1889)
Total Expenditure (yen)
13,426
11,249
6,194
37,178
43,336
53,189
50,501
43,926
34,526
54,937
67,884
68,650
62,411
71,833
976: 87).
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CHAPTER 4
Confronting Democracy and Poverty:
The Rise of Agrarian Elites and the Fall of Meiji Oligarchs
This chapter analyzes how the overlap of two processes-early democratization
and late-development industrial growth-gave rise to a new political class comprised of
agrarian landlords that blocked the oligarchs' proposal to expand poor relief in the latter
part of Meiji period. It examines why the agrarian elites sought political representation,
how they succeeded in obtaining voting rights, and why they were able to use their votes
effectively to advance their redistributive interests in 1890. I show that the newly found
voice of the agrarian class was amplified in the Diet because the Meiji oligarchs made an
error in engineering the country's democratic institutions. The oligarchs initiated
democratization but they simultaneously instituted a number of electoral safeguards to
curb the power of elected assembly in the Diet. The ineffectiveness of these safeguards
gave rise to agrarian-dominated party politics and the subsequent erosion of the
oligarchs' hegemony prevented them from pursuing "catch-up" in the realm of poor
relief.
Comparatively speaking, analyzing Japan's failure to build a safety net at the
nascent stage of democratization suggests two sources of divergence in the level of poor
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relief. First, the existence of patrons that are willing to bear the full cost of providing
relief varied across countries. The agrarian elites in England, for example, had a greater
incentive to provide a safety net because they were eager to retain farm laborers in rural
areas amidst concern of depopulation. Japanese agrarian elites, on the other hand, had
virtually no incentive to do so given that labor was abundant and its central preoccupation
of reducing the land-tax predisposed them to oppose spending for the poor. Second, the
different patterns of democratization and the varying effectiveness of exclusionary
safeguards may have given rise to different patterns of poor relief. The "voice" of
agrarian landed elites in Japan that opposed redistribution was amplified because the
oligarchs made a strategic error in granting the legislature veto power over budgetary
matters and taxation. Although the oligarchs instituted several safeguards to hedge
against the risk of an unruly Diet, newly-elected officials chose to oppose rather than
cooperate with the oligarchy; thereby dashing the oligarchs' expectations of how elected
representatives would respond to structural constraints. The relative success of electoral
safeguards in late-developing Germany may explain why Bismarck was able to construct
a nation-wide safety net while the Meiji oligarchs, who ironically revered Bismarck,
failed to do so.
Theoretically, this chapter calls into question the validity of the argument that
democracy is good for the poor. The Japan case shows that the oligarchs' choice to
pursue the path of democracy stifled redistribution; in fact, if they had chosen a more
undemocratic route, the chances of the poor attaining much-needed relief would have
been greater.
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I. The new villain of poor relief
Fighting poverty round one
As a part of nation-building process, the young Meiji government terminated
feudal poor relief practices and established the country's first nation-wide public
assistance system (the Relief Regulations) in 1874. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the Relief Regulations was ultra-minimalist and its skeletal framework reflected the
government's principal mission to channel scarce government resources to spur industrial
growth. Nonetheless, the 1874 Relief Regulations was so inadequate that the oligarchs
questioned the merits of staying on course with the minimalist policy direction. The
senior oligarch, Yamagata Aritomo, was especially keen on revising the Relief
Regulations to care for the hitherto neglected indigent population. Yamagata and several
senior bureaucrats, along with reform-minded politicians, objected that the minimalist
approach to poor relief was inappropriate for a country that was eagerly embarking on a
mission to catch up with the West.289
Calls to revise the Relief Regulations on the grounds that the program had failed
to stop the rising number of poor materialized just in time for the inaugural session of the
Imperial Diet in 1890.290 The first Diet featured a battle over poor relief, with the ruling
Meiji oligarchs (non-elected officials), on one side, and the agrarian elites (elected
officials), on the other. At this point in time, Japan was entering a new chapter in the
"praxis of politics" with a new constitution, the first nationwide election, and the
289 Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai Hosh5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keis6 Shobo, 1969),
99.
290 The Imperial Diet was established in 1889 when Japan adopted the Meiji Constitution and replaced the
former name, "Imperial Assembly" (teikoku gikai).
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introduction of party politics in the newly created Diet.291 Change was occurring
everywhere and a new and improved poor relief system seemed achievable.
Nonetheless, the combination of early democratization and late-development
industrial capitalism created a new political class of rural agrarian elites that staunchly
opposed redistribution to the poor. Representatives of the rural propertied class
vehemently opposed expanding poor relief on the grounds that it would swell welfare
rolls, strain public finances, and eventually lead to higher taxes on their constituents. The
Meiji oligarchs imposed exorbitantly high land taxes on the agrarian class so that they
could raise revenue to pursue capital-intensive, state-guided national industrial
development.2 92 Dissatisfied with the prevailing taxation without representation, the
agrarian elites organized, mobilized their resources, and called for an expansion of
suffrage to democratize the regime's fiscal policy.
An intra-oligarchic conflict created a window of opportunity to adopt democratic
institutions and enabled the agrarian landlords to achieve voting rights. 293 The ruling
oligarchs made a crucial decision to democratize in the 1880s in response to a deepening
schism between minority and majority factions within the oligarchy. The minority
faction advocated democratization and the majority went along in the hope of keeping the
oligarchy intact and preserving its political power. Nevertheless, they moved forward
291 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 49.
292 As Richard J. Smethurst (1986) notes, the young Meiji government was initially swamped with all the
bills the regime had to pay: "the capitalizing of factories, the importation of technology, the payment of
stipends and bond interest to ex-samurai, the modernizing of the military, the suppression of rebellion, and
the creation of schools." Desperate, the oligarchs proceeded to raise revenue domestically through
imposing a direct land tax on the agrarian class, which accounted fro nearly three-fourths of government
revenue from 1878-1882. Richard J. Smethurst, Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan,
1870-1940 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 48-49.
293 See George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of
Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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cautiously. The oligarchs prided themselves as being the defenders of the public interest
and feared that democratic institutions and processes were vulnerable to capture by
private interests. Consequently, they carefully engineered the political system-from
local governments to national electoral rules-prior to the opening of the Diet in order to
curb the power of the elected representatives. Yet they failed to dominate the
policymaking process and watched bitterly as the agrarian elites managed to penetrate the
heart of national policymaking arena. The oligarchs' worst fears came to life in the
inaugural session of the Diet. The newly enfranchised agrarian landed elites promoted
their parochial interest at the expense of the welfare of the masses by viciously attacking
the oligarch-sponsored poor relief bill. Let us examine the processes and outcomes more
closely.
II. Creating the path of democracy
A prelude to the democratic age
The Meiji era (1868-1912) was chiefly ruled by a small group of statesmen
commonly called the "Meiji oligarchs" (Meiji katd) in English, though the Japanese refer
to them as "domain cliques" (hanbatsu) because they were generally ex-samurai warriors
from powerful feudal domains.294 They came into power largely by virtue of their role in
overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate and aiding the restoration of a centralized
monarchy under Emperor Meiji in 1868. From the onset of oligarchic rule, one of the
most salient political issues involved introducing a representative form of government.
294 The main feudal domains from which the oligarchs originated were Satsuma (present day Kagoshima
prefecture), ChoshFi (Yamaguchi prefecture), Tosa (Kbchi prefecture), and Hizen (Saga prefecture). They
worked in concert with the imperial court nobles to overthrow the Tokugawa regime.
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Although the concept of democracy was unfamiliarly "Western" to the Japanese,
the Meiji oligarchs were more accepting of than terrified by the thought of marching
down the path of democracy one day. They were aware that early democratization in
Western nations involved implementing a number of undemocratic rules that limited
political representation (e.g., restrictive voting rules, non-elected parliamentary chamber)
and safeguards to ensure a more gradual transition and controlled institutional change.
Authors from diverse disciplines agree that democratic reform in Japan was
driven primarily by the ruling elites who, for the most part, did not respond defensively to
societal pressure. Mason and Caiger (2003), for example, demonstrate that the Meiji
leaders had announced that they would introduce a representative national assembly
before social pressure on the issue materialized.295 Similarly, Fairbank et al. (1965)
contend that the ruling elites were attracted to democracy for a variety of reasons:
Demands for the sharing of political power, though a major historical
source of democracy in the West, did not force democratic institutions on
a reluctant government in Meiji Japan.... Rather, democratic institutions
were introduced chiefly because many government leaders felt that Japan
had something to gain from them. They were influenced by prevalent
Western beliefs in the triumph of democracy as part of the inevitable
course of progress. They saw the specter of the French Revolution as the
fate of any too-autocratic regime. They also noted that strong and
advanced countries like Great Britain, France, and the United States based
their national strength on democracy, while democratic ideas had some
currency in all of the more modernized nations... .The introduction of the
democratic institutions, they also felt, would help with the esteem of the
West and bring nearer the day of Japan's acceptance as an equal.296
Based on cartel theory, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995) claim that the oligarchs
"voluntarily agreed to share power with an elected assembly" in order to sustain their
295 On this point, see R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History ofJapan, Revised Edition (Tokyo: Tuttle
Publishing, 2003), 284-287.
296 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 279-280.
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collusive arrangement and preserve their political survival.297 They likewise contend that
the representative legislature was a byproduct of the jostling of power amongst the
oligarchs and not a straightforward reaction to popular demand.298 Junji Banno notes that
intra-oligarchic conflict along feudal lines created pressure for democratization from
"above" and "below;" members of the dominant Choshi clique advocated representative
governance within the regime while the minority Tosa leaders opted to push for
democratization by cultivating grassroots pressure.299
Nevertheless, the top-down process of democratization in Japan by no means
implied that social movement was absent or played no role. Active at the peak of the so-
called Movement for Freedom and Popular Rights (Jiyfl Minken Und6, hereafter, Popular
Rights Movement) that pressed for representative governance, was a set of diverse actors
from different income and occupational groups as well as a handful of self-ostracized
oligarchs. The story of social pressure calling for early democratization merits a detour
as this pressure elevated the prominence of a new political class, the rural agrarian elite,
which prevented the expansion of poor relief during the latter part of the Meiji period.
Calls for election and the rise of landed elites
The chief contestations over democratization rarely dealt with the question as to
whether Japan should democratize or not, rather, they centered mostly on the issues of
timing and the content of reform: when should Japan initiate the process of
democratization? How much power should the ruling elites share with the elected
297 Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in
Imperial Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 28.
298 Ibid.
299 Junji Banno (translated by Andrew Fraser), Democracy in Pre-War Japan: Concepts of Government,
1871-193 7: Collected Essays (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 8.
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representatives, and to whom should the votes shall be extended? What could Japan
learn from the West, and how could it borrow from its ideas, institutions, and
technologies when designing the new political structure?
In search of answers, government officials learned English, toured Europe and the
United States, and hired foreign administrative experts and scholars who specialized in
political and legal studies. 300 In the years immediately following the Meiji restoration,
senior oligarchs such as Okubo Toshimichi and Kido Takayoshi flirted with the idea of
adopting an English-style parliamentary system, which they perceived as capable of
producing the political stability and strength that were vital for accumulating wealth and
power.301 Transition to a parliamentary system appeared imminent in 1875 with the issue
of the Imperial Rescript to establish a constitutional form of government and after the
oligarchs agreed to move forward with the plan at the Osaka Conference earlier that
year.302
Nonetheless, the impetus behind political reform encountered a glitch in the late
1870s when Okubo was assassinated and Kido died of an illness. In addition, one of the
oligarchs, Saigo Takamori (dubbed the "last samurai"), mounted the 1877 Satsuma
Rebellion in southern Japan.303 This event marked the climax of ex-samurai revolts
300 The 1871 Iwakura Mission is one of the best-known diplomatic missions and gave restoration leaders,
such as Okubo, Kido, and lto, first-hand experience of Europe and America. Colegrove (1937: 1031) notes
that during this tour, they "found that parliamentary institutions were as characteristic of modern
civilization as were the telegraph, the railway, the factory, anesthetics in surgery, or the capitalist system
itself." Kenneth Colegrove, "The Japanese Constitution," The American Political Science Review, vol. 31,
no. 6 (December, 1937), 1027-1049.
301 Kido Takayoshi is also called Kido K~in.
302 It also established the Genroin (Chamber of Elders), a quasi-legislative senatorial body assigned to draft
a constitution in 1876 and a council of prefectural governors. In 1880, Ito Hirobumi and Iwakura Tomomi
rejected the draft constitution of the Genr~in as being "too liberal" in its resemblance to the English-style
system. See Colegrove (1937), 1035-1039.
303 Saigo's defection from the oligarchy stemmed largely from the "Debate to conquer Korea" (Seikanron).
He urged the Meiji government to invade Korea in retaliation for the country's refusal to forge diplomatic
ties with Japan and recognize the Meiji Emperor as the head of state. He also viewed attacking Korea as a
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against the oligarchs' restructuring policies and the central government's ever-vigilant
eyes were fixated on the issue. The samurai class, which had once occupied the upper
echelon of feudal Japanese society, had its class privileges stripped by the Meiji
government, which gradually abolished its stipends, dismantled its feudal armies, and in
1876 extended the exclusive rights of its members to bear arms to all men. 30 4 In order to
aid in the transition, the central government established a rehabilitation program for
samurai (shizokujusan), which provided them with public employment training and
placement services, loans for new business opportunities, and allowances to resettle on
new land.3 45 These appeasement initiatives, however, fell short in pacifying dissent.
Whereas Saigo chose to express his political opposition through violence, other
minority oligarchs such as Itagaki Taisuke and Goto Shojir5 from the Tosa domain chose
to voice their political opposition to the mainstream oligarchs in power by calling for
early democratization, which later developed into the Popular Rights Movement. 306 In
anticipation of the country's first parliament, members of the democratic movement
created political parties, such as the Public Party of Patriots (Aikoku Ktd).307 A number
of samurai ventured into journalism and contributed to the Popular Rights Movement by
task for unemployed samurai. The Okubo-led government, however, chose not to invade Korea as it
believed that Japan was not ready to expend valuable resources on such a campaign while being in the
midst of industrial transformation.
304 As a compromise, the government instituted a new social class system that allowed the samurai to attain
a rank of shizoku, which differentiated them from commoners (heimin). The former feudal lords were
incorporated as nobles of the new aristocratic peerage system.
305 For an extended discussion on the government's rationale behind samurai rehabilitation and the state of
samurai poverty and unemployment, see Harry D. Harootunian, "The Economic Rehabilitation of the
Samurai in the Early Meiji Period," The Journal ofAsian Studies, vol. 19 no. 4 (August, 1960): 433-444.
306 As Harootunian (1960) notes, the samurai opposition may have been crushed militarily but it was
transformed into an "enduring form" as the Popular Rights Movement.
307 The party was dissolved in fear of government retaliation as one of its founders, Etd Shimpei, led an
uprising against the Meiji government in the 1874 Saga Rebellion and was later executed for his role in the
uprising. In 1890, Itagaki revived the Aikoku Kto and merged it into Jiyato (Liberal Party), which he
established in 1881.
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disseminating information and building the country's mass media outlets.308 Prominent
intellectuals, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, later joined the movement calling for popular
elections.309
As the Popular Rights Movement expanded to the national level, it incorporated
the peasants' mounting frenzy over the new land tax system. In the early 1870s, Meiji
leaders were scrambling to find new sources of revenue because government
expenditures were projected to soar as the cost of suppressing domestic insurgencies, the
demand for public works spurring industrialization, and the budget for militarization
increased. Although many countries in this era relied on tariffs to raise revenue, foreign
treaties prevented Japanese leaders from using this tactic. Rather than search for revenue
sources abroad (e.g., by borrowing money from foreign banks), Meiji leaders decided to
build a modern centralized fiscal system and thus proceeded to overhaul the land tax
system (chiso kaisei).310 In 1874, they introduced a new land tax that required
landowners to pay an annual tax of 3% of the land value in cash without any exemptions
for crop failures. 31' The disproportionate share of the tax burden placed on peasant
landholders was evident: the land tax "paid for most of Japan's early modernization, and
308 Nakae Chomin and Ueki Emori (both from the Tosa domain) supported the Popular Rights Movement
through journalism. Nakae popularized the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's egalitarian
doctrine and helped create the Oriental Free Press (Toyd Jiyl Shimbun) in 1881. Ueki wrote a number of
important pieces on the constitution and civic disobedience.
309 The leading intellectual of the period, Fukuzawa Yukichi, wore many hats. He was the best-selling
author of several books (e.g., Kokkairon [Discourse on the national assembly]), established a major
newspaper, the Jiji Press, and the founded Keio University.
310 In order to reform the land tax system, the government lifted feudal restrictions on the sale of private
land in 1872 and conducted a nation-wide property value assessment; Rekishigaku Kenkyiikai, K3za
Nihonshi 5 [Seminar on Japanese history vol. 5] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1970), 187.
311 The annual tax rate was set at 4 percent of the agricultural land assessment: one percent for local and
three percent for national taxes. See Smethurst (1986), 49.
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was the largest single source of revenue until the turn of the century," accounting for
roughly 78% of general revenue from 1868-1881 and 50% in 1890.12
Outraged by the high land tax, peasants, especially wealthier ones, voiced their
discontent to local officials and fought back by refusing to comply with the tax system.
They eventually defended their non-compliance by invoking the popular rights rhetoric
that they had the right to refuse unjust policies.m Hoping to gain leverage, they solicited
help from Itagaki and other leaders of the democratic movement in order to lower taxes-
a move that united the ex-samurai with agrarian landed elites. 31 5
Trailing behind, poor peasants also joined the Popular Rights Movement in the
early 1880s. Due to the fiscal austerity program initiated by the Finance Minister
Matsukata Masayoshi in order to curb rampant inflation in 1881, the price of agricultural
products plummeted, pushing small landholders toward financial distress. Kinzley
(1988) summarizes the poor's political mobilization precipitated by the "Matsukata
deflation":
Motivated in some cases by desperate poverty and by a growing
consciousness of their "rights," peasants also organized poor people's
political parties (hinminto, konmint6) and debtor's parties (shakkinto) in
the early 1880's. In Fukushima, Nara, Nagasaki, Yamanashi and other
prefectures peasants launched vigorous movements to bring about an
equalization of wealth.316
A series of poor peasant uprisings gained increasing visibility from 1882 to 1886-
including the 1884 Chichibu incident, in which heavily indebted poor peasants attacked
312 Mason and Caiger (2003), 277.
313 Stephen Vlastos, "Chapter 6: Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885," in The Cambridge
History ofJapan: Volume 5 The Nineteenth Century (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989):
374-376.
1 Ibid., 377.3 15Ibid.
316 Dean W. Kinzley, "Japan's Discovery of Poverty: Changing Views on Poverty and Social Welfare in the
Nineteenth Century," Journal of Asian History, 22 no. 1 (1988): 10.
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banks and municipal buildings-but they were all suppressed by the military and local
police forces.
The growing political activism among poor peasants focused on the issue of
lowering taxes and debt moratoriums; it had virtually nothing to say about expanding
public assistance under the Relief Regulations.317 Reports of poor peasants committing
suicide and facing near starvation were rampant, but they primarily blamed the enormous
tax burden, not meager poor relief, for these problems. In many cases, the tax burden
was "35 percent of the crop, and rents paid to landowners usually took another 50
percent."318 Poor peasants, therefore, sought political representation to equalize wealth,
not through more redistribution, but through lessening their tax burden.
In the grand scheme of things, the poor peasants joining the Popular Rights
Movement made little impact since its leaders were primarily concerned with the political
representation of the upper class and remained bound to wealthy, not poor, peasants.319
Alas, leaders of the democratization movement needed money to finance their activities
and the wealthy peasants eagerly assumed the role. Hence, the marriage between the ex-
samurai-led Popular Rights Movement and the rural agrarian elites was one of
convenience. The ex-samurai supplied the leadership and organizational skills that they
had acquired during feudalism; the wealthy landed peasants acted as financial patrons for
the Popular Rights Movement and funded efforts to increase visibility, disseminate
information, and help organize at the national level. Together, they managed to reduce
317 Ibid., 16.
318 Harold R. Kerbo and John A. McKinstry, Who Rules Japan? The Inner Circles of Economic and
Political Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 13.
319 Matsuo (1989) demonstrates that most of the proposals for democratization put forward by civil society
actors from the late 1870s to early 1880s included an income requirement that excluded the poor from the
vote. See Matsuo Takayoshi, Futsi Senkyo Seido Seiritsushi no Kenkyfi [Analyzing the history of
establishing the general election system] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), 4-7.
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the land-tax by a half-a-percentage point to 2.5% in 1877 and to grant calamity-stricken
farmers more time and potential deductions in their payments.
Nonetheless, once the agrarian elites were granted suffrage in 1890, the union
began to crumble. The national electoral rules at the time over-represented the interests
of the agrarian elites, and their dominant political position left little room for
accommodating the ex-warrior class. What led to the ascendency of the landed elites on
the national political stage in the face of politics dominated by the oligarchs? Answering
this question satisfactorily requires a deeper examination of the origins of the country's
democratic institutions and the voices of opposition against poor relief that they
amplified.
Setting the stage for early democratization
Against the backdrop of the growing democratic movement, an intra-oligarchic
conflict that had been brewing since the early 1870s compelled the oligarchs to resolve
the issue of the timing of democratization in 1881.320 Since the late 1860s, the oligarchy
had exhibited signs of schism along feudal lines.3 2' Members from the feudal domains of
Satsuma and Ch6shni dominated the oligarchy, and the minority members not affiliated
with the two domains criticized the Meiji government as a "Sat-cho clique" or a "Sat-cho
oligarchy."322 In the late 1870s, a senior oligarch from Hizen domain, Okuma
Shigenobu, became the "central figure in Japanese politics" and proceeded to "crush the
320 For an extended discussion of the complex and often competitive relationships among the oligarchs, see
Chapter 2 of Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995).
321 The internal rift among the oligarchs contributed to the early defection of some of the non-Satch6
oligarchs, such as Itagaki Taisuke who spearheaded the Popular Rights Movement. The agreement to draft
a constitution at the 1875 Osaka Conference was also intended to appease non-Sat-Cho oligarchs such as
Itagaki who withdrew from the regime.
322 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1965), 288.
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backbone" of Sat-cho rule by gradually replacing the Sat-cho officials in the government
with members of his own faction." 323
Although Councillor Okuma increasingly clashed with the other oligarchs--
especially in opposing the sale of government properties in Hokkaido to Sat-ch6
businessmen--it was his proposal to speed up democratization that ruffled feathers within
the oligarchy. 4 In 1881, in response to a survey sent out by the Emperor on the issue of
political reform, he proposed that Japan should hold a national election the following year
and share decision-making authority with elected political parties within the next two
325years. Most government officials at the time still favored the gradualist, cautious
approach to democratization and were appalled by what they thought was a reckless
move by Okuma.326
The "political crisis" that Okuma precipitated forced him to resign, but he took
with him Inukai Tsuyoshi and nearly a dozen other political allies to join Itagaki's
Popular Rights Movement. 327 The oligarchs who were ostracized from the Meiji regime
used the Popular Rights Movement as a platform to attack the government, which posed
serious concern for the ruling oligarchs as it prolonged and exacerbated infighting. 328
Seeing the deepening schism over the timing of democratization within the oligarchy, Ito
132 Kaju Nakamura, Prince Ito: The Man and Statesman (New York, NY: Anraku Publishing Co., 1910), 37.
324 Okuma also held the minority view that Japan should emulate the English political system.
325 Takii Kazuhiro, Itd Hirobumi (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2010), 87.
326 For an extended discussion on the crisis of 1881, see chapter 3 in George Akita, Foundations of
Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1967).
327 Nakamura Kikuo, It5 Hirobumi [Ito Hirobumi] (Tokyo: Jiji Ts~ishinsha, 1958), 82.
328 As Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995) point out, the Popular Rights Movement served as an escape route
for the ostracized oligarchs who wished to avoid punishment for defecting.
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and other oligarchs agreed that the issue needed to be addressed head on.329 In the fall of
1881, the Meiji Emperor issued an imperial edict that the government must draft and
implement the constitution by 1890. It assigned Ito as the project manager for this task,
330
paving the way for the construction of a new political structure.
The main architects behind the construction of the new political structure were
two heavyweight oligarchs: Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo.m3 3 Ito was in charge of
shaping national institutions: the constitution, the executive branch, bureaucracy, and
national electoral rules. Yamagata, on the other hand, took the lead in building the lower
levels of political structure: local governments, policing, and regulations to contain
grassroots political activism. Both men were driven by the need to maintain a firm grip
on the political process and its outcomes while sharing power with an elected assembly.
As detailed in the next section, the structural impediments that the duo-led
oligarchy erected to curb the power of the elected representatives were wide-ranging:
sovereignty had to rest in the hands of the Emperor, not the Imperial Diet; cabinet
members were not to be chosen by or made to serve the Diet; the Privy Council was to
serve as a guardian of the "rules of the game" (e.g., the constitution and electoral rules);
the House of Peers was to act as a bulwark against the House of Representatives; the
bureaucracy was to be autonomous and non-partisan; the military was to be independent
of civilian control; and the franchise was to represent solely of the upper class. In
addition, the oligarchs upgraded the legal and organizational instruments of repression,
329 The rivalry between Okuma and the younger but formidable It also contributed to the departure of
Okuma from the government. See Watanabe Eizabur6, It6 Hirobumi: Meji Kanryd no Shdz5 [Ito
Hirobumi: A portrait of a Meiji official] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob6, 1966), 98-99.
330 t6 was chosen because he proactively arranged the official announcement that promised a constitution
and an elected assembly.
331 Both men were from the dominant Ch6shGi domain.
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subordinated local government to the national government, impaired the embryonic
political parties prior to the national election, and filled key government posts with
oligarchic supporters for the inaugural session of the Imperial Diet.
Under the circumstances, the oligarchs appeared to be sure winners over elected
representatives in formulating public policy, whether on economic, military, or social
welfare issues. Nevertheless, despite their painstaking efforts to design a political
structure to mute the voice of the popularly elected representatives, their plan backfired.
As we will now examine, the oligarchs made a number of tactical errors in shaping
political institutions that ended up eroding their political hegemony as well as costing
them their battle against poverty.
III. The oligarchs' political engineering
Preparatory measures and the installation of the structural beams
In order to learn how ruling elites abroad had coped with the challenges of early
democratization, Ito Hirobumi and his colleagues left for Europe in March of 1882, while
Yamagata stayed behind and managed governmental affairs. Attracted to the strong state
apparatus of the imperialist Austro-Germano-Prussian model, the Japanese delegation
stayed mostly in Berlin and Vienna, where they were tutored by two German politico-
legal experts, jurist Rudolf von Gneist and Professor Lorenz von Stein of the University
of Vienna.3 3 2 Conversations with Bismarck and other government officials and
especially the teachings of Stein strengthened Ito's conviction that it was best to frame
m Gneist's protegd, Albert Mosse, translated and explained the Prussian constitution to the Japanese
delegation.
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politics top-down.3 3 3 The Germans provided the theoretical justification of and practical
knowledge on how to maximize the power of the ruling elites and minimize pressure
from below.3 3 4 In particular, they warned the Japanese not to give the elected assembly a
final say over government spending and claimed that doing so would lead to a budgetary
impasse. This turned out to be a particular piece of advice that the oligarchs would
eventually regret not heeding.3 3 5
Upon returning to Japan in August 1883, It began making preparations for
drafting the constitution and opening the Diet. To begin with, the Peerage Act (kazoku)
was enacted in July 1884 to prepare for the establishment of the House of Peers. It re-
classified the aristocratic class according to five ranks of nobility--prince, marquis, count,
viscount, and baron-and expanded its members twofold by appointing 505 new peers. 33 6
Although the classification was based on the largely hereditary German and British
peerage system, the Japanese liberally awarded titles to non-hereditary individuals who
had made outstanding contributions to the nation. 337 A number of oligarchs, including ItM
and Yamagata-both originally from the lower class-helped themselves to the title of
count in order to gain access to the House of Peers.33 8 This was a savvy move
considering that Ito, for example, would later serve as the first president of the House of
333 For more details on It6's reactions to what he learned in Germany, see Watanabe (1966), 109-116.
3 Their suggestions on how to curb the power of political parties included the creation of the House of
Peers as a bulwark against elected representatives and the formation of a cabinet in which members were
appointed rather than chosen by elected officials. Sakamoto Kazuto, "Ito Hirobumi to Yamagata Aritomo,"
[Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo] in Ito Takashi (ed.) Yamagata Aritomo to Kindai Nippon [Yamagata
Aritomo and modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2008), 132.
m Ibid.
336 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995), 32.
337 Harold R. Kerbo and John A. McKinstry, Who Rules Japan? The Inner Circles of Economic and
Political Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 47.
338 The oligarchs also used the peerage system to appease and co-opt opposition leaders, such as Itagaki
Taisuke, by offering them the title of count.
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Peers. 339 More significantly, the ruling political class's move to restructure social class in
order to strengthen its power base was a clever tactic with long-run implications. After
the Meiji period, capitalists, most notably members of the financial conglomerates known
as the zaibatsu, were plugged into the peerage system so that they could directly voice
their economic interests in redistributive policies through the House of Peers.
In December 1885, the oligarchs established a western-style cabinet system as the
central decision-making body, superseding the Grand Council of State System (Dajkan),
which had been in operation as the executive organ since the Restoration. 1t assumed
the role as the first Prime Minister of the cabinet to push through additional reforms.
He proceeded to transform the bureaucracy in order to boost its immunity from party
politics. At the top level, the Emperor was to appoint the ministers of bureaucratic
agencies (implicitly, with oligarchic input), and the soon-to-be created Imperial Diet was
to have no authority over the appointment of officials or operation of the bureaucracy. At
the administrative level, It6 saw the need to produce meritocratic bureaucrats with non-
partisan identities. To do so, he established the Imperial University (Teikoku Daigaku) in
1886 as a training ground for government officials in order to hone their expertise and
introduced a German-style civil service examination system in 1887 to strengthen
meritocracy. With minor exceptions, bureaucrats were proponents of expansionary poor
relief throughout the pre-war period.
339 Not surprisingly, the majority of new peers (52 out of 100 members) were from the Sat-Cho clique. See
Uchida Kenzo, Kinbara Samon, and Furuya Tetsuo, Nihon Gikai Shi Roku (1) [The history of
parliamentary government in Japan (volume 1)] (Tokyo: Daiichi Hoki Shuppan, 1990), 30.
340 Most of the members of the new cabinet were former Dajbkan officials.
341 One of the exceptions is ideologue Inoue Tomoichi, who advocated an ultra-minimalist approach to
poverty through scholarship and his tenure at the Home Ministry in the latter part of Meiji period.
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Ita completed his draft of the constitution on April 27, 1888 with the help of a
small group of legal experts that included Inoue Kowashi as well as the German foreign
advisors, Hermann Roesler and Albert Mosse (Gneist's leading pupil). 3 4 2 On April 30,
immediately after Ito's submission of the drafted constitution to the Emperor, the
oligarchs established the Privy Council (Saimitsu-in).3  The Privy Council functioned as
the Emperor's highest advisory body, with the task of reviewing and approving the
drafted constitution and the laws associated with it. To ensure that the final products
were to his liking, It6 left his post as Prime Minister to take on the role as first president
of the Privy Council and appointed his supporters as secretaries. 34 4 In the future, any
motion to change the constitution, revise a law, or sign a treaty was to require screening
by the council. 34 5 Samuels (2005: p. 57) sums up Ito's strategic decision to create the
Privy Council as well as its historical significance:
He made sure that none of its deliberations, and none of the "advice" it
proffered to the emperor, would be made public. He kept the Privy
Council outside the formal structure of government. It was to become a
"watchdog" (bannin) to protect oligarchic power from popular
encroachment, and de facto the most powerful organ of the Japanese state
until the end of the Pacific War.
The fact that the Privy Council functioned as a supra-cabinet assembly (saikd kaigi)
generated criticism from the public, which contended that the council was simply
"another cabinet created on top of the existing cabinet." 346
342 Ito Miyoji and Kaneko Kentaro also participated in the drafting of the constitution. Albert Mosse was in
Japan from 1886 to 1890. Hermann Roesler worked for the Japanese government from 1884 until the late
1880s. Roesler was a professor of economics and law at the University of Rostock from the early 1960s to
the late 1870s. See Johannes Siemes, Hermann Roesler and the Making of the Meii State (Rutland, VT:
Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1968).
343 The Privy Council was also heavily represented by officials from Sat-Cho clique.
344 Nakamura (1958), 90.
345 See Article 56 of the Meiji Constitution on the official role of the Privy Council.
346 Watanabe (1966), 136.
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As It6 was taking measures to mute the voice of elected assembly, Yamagata
secured his own castle-the military-by establishing armed forces independent of
politics. Based on the Prussian general staff system (Generalstab), Yamagata established
the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office (sanbo honbu) under the directorship of
the Emperor in 1878 and became the first commander in chief.347 This arrangement was
further institutionalized by the 1889 Meiji Constitution, which made the military
independent from civilian control. According to Article 11, the military was to be the
personal "claws and fangs" (saga) of the Emperor, not of the cabinet, Prime Minister, or
any other. 348
In addition, military schools and training facilities were to produce non-partisan
military officials and soldiers, and police were to be banned from engaging in any
political activities. 34 9 Placing the military altogether out of the reach of party politics and
public opinion had far-reaching consequences. Long after oligarchic rule ended, it
facilitated the death of democracy, converted the nation's many poor into soldiers, and
eventually led the entire nation down a path of destruction.
With the help of Albert Mosse, Yamagata shaped the electoral terrain of local
governments-which were already under the supervision of the Home Ministry-before
the constitution was implemented in order to reassert national control over local rule.
347 He was "one of only four 'direct advisors' to the emperor and the only one who, with the emperor's
'permission,' could give orders to the armed forces;" Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders
and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 59.
348 Fujimura Michio, Yamagata Aritomo [Yamagata Aritomo] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1961), 104-
105.
349 For more details on Yamagata's efforts to disassociate the military from politics, see Samuels (2003), 59.
350 Albert Mosse gained the title of "father of the local government system" after he helped draft the local
government law based on the Prussian model. Mosse and Yamagata agreed that the local government
system must be created before the promulgation of the constitution. This partly explains why the
constitution says virtually nothing about local government. For more details on Mosse's work for the
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The Meiji government established elective prefectural assemblies in 1878 and restricted
voting eligibility to the very wealthy (most likely members of the propertied class) who
-had paid five yen or more in taxes. The assembly was limited to discussing taxes and
budgetary issues, and the power structure of local governments became "hierarchical and
authoritarian" as the Home Ministry appointed prefectural governors and these in turn
appointed mayors. 3 5 The prefectural governors had the power to "initiate all legislation,
to veto the assembly's decisions, and to dissolve it." A similar system was set up for local
town and villages.3 5 2
Yamagata explained that the restrictions on who could participate in local politics
were designed to produce powerful local leaders with economic prestige and erudition
who could "clear away" any subversive activities at the local level. Such experienced
local leaders were likely one day to become national representatives and to contribute to
building the nation's wealth and "eternally secur[e] the empire's peace and order."353
Indeed, as Yamagata hoped, the system did produce strong local leaders, many of whom
moved from the local to the national political stage. Contrary to his expectation,
however, the new representatives remained agents of "local" interests and showed little
enthusiasm for achieving the national goals offukoku kydihei ("enriching the country,
strengthening the army") or addressing nation-wide poverty.
Japanese government, see Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 108-110.
3 The city's elected assembly provided a list of candidates for the mayor's position, which the prefectural
governor appointed. All appointments required the emperor's official nomination (Fairbank, Reischauer,
and Craig (1965), p. 295. For more information on the election rules for towns, villages, and cities, see Ito
(2009), 228-229; Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
1965): 43-44.
352 The 1888 Municipal Code and the Town and Village Code instituted a Prussian-style class voting
system (tokkya senkyo) in which eligibility for voting was determined by how much tax was paid. Those
eligible could also run for office, but the income class they fell into played a decisive role in winning.
Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1965), 283.
353 It (2009), 229-230.
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Tightening the valve of societal pressure
Perceiving that structural impediments alone were insufficient to secure the
oligarchs' political dominance, Yamagata extended the heavy hand of central government
down to the level of local villages in order to contain popular pressure in two notable
ways. First, he upgraded the tools of repression. The Popular Rights Movement
expanded its scope of activities in anticipation of the opening of the Diet by establishing
political parties, holding political meetings, and demonstrating against the government's
stance, especially in the areas of foreign policy and taxation. In 1880, Yamagata
responded by passing regulations that restricted public meetings (shfikaijdrei),
heightened censorship of printed materials, and clamped down on public speaking.3 54
While at the helm of the Home Ministry from 1883 to the late 1880s, Yamagata took a
major step toward restructuring the police system to monitor grassroots activities.m He
hired German police instructors and established police training facilities throughout the
country to improve the quality of officers. In addition, he developed a centrally managed
but locally entrenched police network that would effectively monitor and systematically
regulate political groups and activities throughout the entire archipelago.356 For example,
the police conducted one of the first censuses of the poor in Japan in order to monitor
their activities. Furthermore, Yamagata pushed through a number of regulations on the
preservation of public order and security-including the 1887 Peace Preservation Law
354 For example, he prohibited prefectural assemblymen from communicating and meeting, and thus
prevented local governments from uniting in opposition against the central government.
5 Samuels (2005: 52-53) summarizes the power of the police in regulating political activities: "All
associations were required to submit membership lists and charters for official review. Permits had to be
obtained before all public meetings, and uniformed police were empowered to monitor meetings and
intervene if, in their judgment, the discussion became seditious."
356 Fujimura (1961), 114-115.
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(hoanfjdrei)-- thereby strengthening the institutionalization of state violence against civic
political participation. 357 Like a lingering shadow, the "peace preservation" laws were
revamped each time the country approached mass suffrage, minting repression as the flip
side of the coin of democratization.
Second, as Yamagata applied external pressure to contain popular uprisings, he
also attempted to destroy nascent popular parties from the inside by pitting party
members against each another. In 1882, Yamagata organized a European tour for Itagaki
Taisuke and Goto Shajiro, who were then leaders of the Liberal Party (Jiytd6). 358
Yamagata misled them into believing that the government paid for the trip when in reality
the funds came from the Mitsui zaibatsu. Poorer members of the democratic movement
interpreted this as their leaders being bought off by the government and the rich. This
caused an internal rift that led to an exodus of supporters. In addition, Yamagata publicly
announced that Okuma Shigenobu's Constitutional Reform Party (Rikken Kaishintd) was
linked to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. This led the two main parties to bicker, each side
accusing the other of corruption. The conflict between the two major parties prevented
them from unifying at a critical stage in the country's political development. The
oligarchy managed to dissolve the Popular Rights Movement by 1884, creating
conditions favorable for introducing the Meiji constitution.359
The Meiji constitution and electoral rules
357 For more details on the peace preservation law, see 1to Yukio, Yamagata Aritomo: Guchoku na
Kenryokusha no Shgai [Yamagata Aritomo: The lifetime of a simple and honest ruler] (Tokyo: Bunshun
Shinsho, 2009), 224-225.
358 Fujimura (1961), 112-113.
359 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1992), 13.
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The Meiji constitution was promulgated on February 11 th 1889 (and implemented
in 1890), and formally established the Imperial Diet (teikoku gikai), a bicameral
legislature consisting of the House of Peers (kizoku-in) and House of Representatives
(shigi-in). The constitution clearly restricted the power of the parliament. Sovereignty
now rested exclusively with the emperor (Article 4), and the Diet had "no share in the
sovereign power" but was limited to "deliberat[ing] upon laws, but none [sic] to
determin[ing] them." 360 The emperor appointed the cabinet members-comprised of the
prime minister as well as ministers of bureaucracies-who served him and not the
parliament.3 6 1 The Imperial Diet was to be in session for only three months out of the
year (Article 42), "leaving most of the real governance of the country to the national
bureaucracy and to the less representative cabinet." 362
The accompanying election laws limited parliamentary representation to the upper
class as was the practice in the early democracies of Western Europe and the Unites
States. According to the 1889 General Election Law, only one percent of the population
(453,000) was eligible to vote. Franchise was restricted to males over 25 years of age,
who annually paid over 15 yen in national land taxes (in the case of income tax, for three
years) and who had to pass a litany of other tests (e.g., a residency requirement, and
inspections of criminal records, religious and military affiliations, and mental
360 Hirobumi Ito, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 3rd edition (translated by
Miyoji Ito), (Tokyo: Chti-6 Daigaku, 1931), 62. However, the constitution contains clauses that contradict
Ito's assertions: Article 5 states that the emperor's power must be exercised with the "consent of the
Imperial Diet" and Article 37 says that all laws require "the consent of the Imperial Diet." It6 Hirobumi
followed up by commenting on the relationship between the Diet and emperor as follows: "The Emperor
will cause the Cabinet to make drafts of laws, or the Diet may initiate projects of laws; and after the
concurrence of both Houses of the Diet had been obtained thereto, the Emperor will give them His sanction,
and then such drafts or projects shall become law." Ita (1931), 9.
361 As Samuels (2003: 55) notes, "It5 was determined to make the emperor even stronger than his German
advisors proposed-and went beyond historical precedent to endow the emperor with formal authority.
Social harmony could be preserved if Ito and his colleagues could control imperial prerogative."
362 T.J. Pempel, "Political Parties and Representation: The Case of Japan," PS: Political Science and
Politics, vol. 25, no. I (March, 1992): 13.
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aptitude). 363 Needless to say, voting rules favored the rural propertied class. Most taxes
were land-based, and the relatively shorter period of the land-tax payment required for
voting-one year, as opposed to three consecutive years for income tax-stacked the
deck in favor of the rural propertied class.364 On the flip side, as Suehiro (2009) notes,
the high tax premium on voting rights was designed to exclude the well-educated but
property-less ex-samurai in urban centers who formed the nucleus of the democratic
movement. 365 The one-year voter registration and residency requirement also
discriminated against mobile urban dwellers. 366 In any case, apart from urban centers
like Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, the country was still primarily rural and agrarian.
The choice of electoral system was not of critical importance to the oligarchs
since the restrictive voting eligibility rules virtually limited the pool of voters to the rural
propertied class. 367 The government adopted a small constituency of 300 seats: the
Lower House was comprised of 214 single-member and 43 two-member districts. 368 The
district magnitude amounted to roughly 120,000 people per seat. In allocating seats, the
oligarchs chose a total population figure rather than the number of eligible voters because
363 Eligibility rules for candidates were similar to those of voters except that the minimum age was set
higher, at 30. More details on the eligibility rules are outlined in the "qualifications of electors" in the 1889
Law of Election of the Members of the House of Representatives.
364 Soma Masao, Nihon Senkyo Seidoshi [The history of Japanese electoral system] (Fukuoka: Kyushu
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 18-19.
365 Suetake Yoshiya, "Senkyoku Seido to Kitai Sareta Daigishi Z6: Senzenki Nihon no Ba-ai" [The
constituency system and the expected image of the representative in Japan before World War II], Senkyo
Kenkya (Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies) vol. 25, no. 2 (2009): 57
366 Eligible voters only amounted to 0.37% of Tokyo residents as opposed to 2.32% in the more rural Shiga
prefecture. Matsuo Takayoshi, Futsfl Senkyo Seido Seiritsushi no Kenkyfi [Analyzing the history of
establishing the general election system] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), 10.
367 Gneist and Mosse both advised the Japanese to adopt an indirect election system (kansetsu senkyo sei)
in which voters are ranked (nitokyn/nikaiky0). On this point, see Matsuo (1989), 4-7. Hermann Roesler,
on the other hand, advocated direct election through universal suffrage (with the exception of the poor on
public or private relief). See Siemes, (1968), 32.
368 In addition, according to article 40 of the Election Law, a French-style "scrutin de liste" method was
employed for districts with two seats (ninin renki sei/kanzen renki sei). Article 38 stipulated non-secret
voting: voters were required to sign their names, indicate residence, and stamp their seals on the ballot.
176
they believed that those elected should represent the entire population and not simply
voters within their districts ("hiroku kokumin wo daihy6 suru kara").369 The scarcity of
public documentation on the issue suggests that the oligarchs reached a decision on the
electoral system without the diligence with which they had consistently handled other
issues; it also helps explain why the oligarchs overhauled the electoral system merely a
decade later. 3 70
In contrast to the popularly elected House of Representatives, membership in the
House of Peers was largely hereditary and by appointment. Peers were drawn from
among the imperial family, princes, and marquises while counts, viscounts, and barons
were selected by peer-voting. The highest taxpayers from each prefecture and
metropolitan areas were also given seats upon receiving nomination from the emperor.371
According to Ito, the House of Peers functioned "to restrain the undue influence of
political parties" and defend the status quo; this was ensured by Article 37 which
stipulated that all laws must pass both Houses.372
Although the oligarchs limited the power and representation of the Diet, they
made an exception for matters related to government spending and revenue. The
constitution required the consent of the Imperial Diet on bills covering expenditures
(Article 64) and taxation (Article 62). In addition, the House of Representatives had
priority over deliberating budget-related bills (Article 65). It argued that requiring the
approval of the Diet on budgetary matters was essentially a consolation prize that
369 Soma (1986), 18. In addition, It noted that members of the Parliament in Europe were ignorant of their
"proper duties" as representatives since they often "were devoted to the interests of particular districts, and
neglected their public duty of taking a general view of the interests of the country" (1to, 1931: 67-68).
370 Soma (1986), 41.
371 The fifteen highest taxpayers in each prefecture elected one representative for the House of Peers. For
more details, see Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Peers (Articles 1-7).
372 lt6 (1931), 66.
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demonstrated no real power since he did not regard "budget" as "law" but an
administrative matter secondary to a "law." 373 Ito, however, was mindful of the fact that
the government, "like an individual" was "liable to be prodigal and extravagant" and he
therefore envisioned a functional purpose for having the Diet oversee the budget. 374
Just as their colleagues back in Germany had advised the Japanese delegation in
the early 1880s, so too Mosse and Roesler, who were hired by the Meiji government to
draft the constitution, counseled the Japanese not to give the representative assembly a
final say over government spending and financing.375 Subjecting government spending to
the Diet's approval, they claimed, was potentially fatal to the government's future plans.
Roesler recommended that the Japanese insert a clause limiting the power of the Diet and
"establish an undisputable legal base" upon which the government could resolve a
budgetary impasse. 376 His advice was based on the difficulties that Bismarck had faced
in pursuing his "blood and iron" policy in the 1860s.377 The Landtag had refused to
approve Bismarck's proposal to increase military spending, but he had prevailed by
obtaining approval from King Wilhelm I and had thus unilaterally implemented the
budget without the legislature's consent in the following four years. 378
373 Ito (1931: 121-122) explains: "There is one thing that demands explanation in this place, and that is the
fact that in most countries a Budget is regarded as a law. A Budget is simply a sort of gauge to be observed
by the administrative officials for a current year. Thus a Budget requires that consent of the Diet on
account of its special character and is not properly speaking a law. Therefore law has precedence over a
Budget, which has no power to change a law."
374 Ito (1931), 123.
m For details on the debate between the German advisors and the oligarchs (especially Viscount Inoue
Kowashi who was in charge of drafting this section of the constitution), see Sasaki Takashi, Hanbatsu Seifu
to Rikken Seiji [Domain cliques and constitutional government] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1992), 31-
47.
376 Siemes (1968), 34-35.
377 Ito (1931: 136-137) commented: "In a certain country, might was once allowed to decide in such cases,
and the Government carried out its financial measures at its pleasure, in spite of the sentiments of the
legislative assembly (as was the case in Prussia from 1862 to 1866). Such a practice, however, is
anomalous and is not proper from a constitutional point of view."
378 Uchida et al. (1990), 78-79.
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The oligarchs heeded the advice but they were over confident that their
concessions to the representative assembly on this matter would not pose any serious
threat as long as they included several safeguards. First, if the Diet failed to pass the
budget, the previous year's budget was to be adopted (Article 71).379 They applied the
same rule to taxes: the previous year's rate was to apply in case the tax bill was not
enacted (Article 63).380 Second, the Diet had to approve the government spending
necessary to implement a law and could not reduce or reject legally-fixed expenditures
without the government's consent (Article 67). Prior to the promulgation of the
constitution, the oligarchs had passed a number of bills, including several regarding
military expenditure and taxation, so the constitution already guaranteed a sizable
government purse that was acceptable to the oligarchs. Third, Article 70 created another
loophole. It allowed the cabinet to "take all necessary financial measures" to maintain
public safety by issuing an Imperial Ordinance when the Diet was not in session. Finally,
as a last resort measure, the Emperor could unilaterally prorogue or dissolve the
parliament (Article 7) if the oligarchs faced an unruly Diet. This was a blunt instrument
that provided strong incentive for elected officials in the House of Representatives to be
in sync with the oligarchs since dissolution entailed a huge financial penalty: it would
force them to go through another round of campaign financing in order to get re-elected
while the House of Peers would be prorogued (Article 44).
379 Ito believed that failing to pass a budget could potentially paralyze the "machinery of administration,"
which he demonstrates by citing the example of the United States in 1877, when Congress failed to pass a
budget for the army and consequentially failed to pay soldiers for months; Ito (1931), pp. 136-137.
380 The oligarchs passed a number of bills, including one on taxes, prior to the opening of the Diet in order
to guarantee that their preferred tax policy was in effect before the newly-elected representatives had
entered politics.
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Little did the oligarchs know at the time that the Germans' forewarnings would
prove correct and that they would be frustrated by the legislatures' uncooperative stance
on various government bills, including the one to expand poor relief. The fact that the
new political agents were unfazed by the threat of dissolution and, later on, by the actual
rounds of dissolution, took the oligarchs by surprise. They had clearly miscalculated how
the new political agents would react to the structural constraints facing them.38 '
This story of how the newly elected individuals unexpectedly acquired control
over the policymaking process despite all the structural impediments created by the
oligarchs is even more remarkable, given that the oligarchs had absolute control over the
selection of agency. In order to silence the elected assembly, the oligarchs filled key
government positions in the inaugural session of the Diet with their closest allies,
proteges, and even members from the non-Sat-Cho clique so as to mend the intra-
oligarchy division.382 Yamagata and It6 both took top positions, as Prime Minister and
President of the House of Peers, respectively. This is all the more astonishing given that
the oligarchs coached government officials on how to handle elected officials before the
Diet session began. When the new constitution came to life, one of the oligarchs, Kuroda
Kiyotaka-with It5 and Yamagata's blessing-established the official policy toward
party politics. Guided by the "principle of transcendental body" (chdzen shugi),
government officials were to be detached from party politics and rule from above with a
"nonparty mind."3 83 The oligarchs' explicit instruction on how to handle the new
38' The complex and often open-ended relationship between agency and structure is discussed in the work
of Samuels (2003).
382 A few of the non-Sat-Ch6 members were: Oki Takato (president of the privy council), Yoshikawa
Kensei (Minister of Education), and Mutsu Munemitsu (Minister of Agriculture and Commerce).
383 Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First
Attempt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1953), 153.
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popularly-elected parties recapitulated their efforts to create a "sham assembly." 384 Soon
afterwards, the oligarchs were to learn that not only had the elected assembly stood on its
own feet and formed a formidable opposition against the government, but they too, would
need to descend from the pedestal to play in the game of party politics. 3 85
The oligarch's thorough transformation of the country's political institutions
deeply affected the course of redistribution in Japan. Some of their choices affected poor
relief for years to come. For instance, designating the Diet as the locus of redistributive
policymaking prevented the non-elected oligarchs from unilaterally constructing a safety
net for the poor. Others had a more immediate, direct impact. As we shall examine in
the next section, the inaugural session of the Diet featured an oligarchy-sponsored poor
relief bill that would have moved the country closer to providing a safety net for the poor.
Nonetheless, the newly-elected representatives of the landed agrarian elites staunchly
opposed government efforts to increase redistribution to the poor.
IV. The new balance of power
Catching up in the realm ofpoverty relief
As the oligarchs diligently constructed a new political order in the 1880s, the day-
to-day lives of ordinary citizens came under duress. A government-sponsored survey
taken in 1883 indicated that nearly fifty-seven percent of the population was classified as
belonging to the poor stratum of the society (kat5 kyaimin s5). 386 Poverty-born riots
384 Fujimura (1961: p. 103) notes that Yamagata strove to create a "sham assembly" (misekake no gikai).
385 As a matter of fact, a few oligarchs such as Inoue Kaoru anticipated that structural impediments alone
would not be sufficient to allow oligarchs to dominate the policymaking process, and worked on organizing
and supporting political parties backstage. See Junji Banno, The Establishment of the Japanese
Constitutional System (translated by J.A.A. Stockwin) (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992): 9-11.
386 Yoshida (1976): 7-8.
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(hinmin bod5) and crimes were becoming increasingly prevalent across the country as
social turmoil accompanied rapid industrialization.38 7 Various newspaper organizations
(e.g., Choya Shimbun and Jiji Shimp6) published series of articles documenting the rise
of urban slums (hinmin kutsu).388 One editor wrote: as "the rich become richer and the
poor poorer there is a widening gulf between social groups, a condition that will
ultimately lead to the creation of socialist and nihilist political parties." 389 Beset by a bad
harvest, high taxes, and the "Matsukata deflation" of the early 1880s, rural areas also
experienced a rise in poverty. Reacting to poor farmers' plight, politically active
journalists such as Ueki Emori and Nakae Chimin claimed that individuals were not at
fault for their poverty.390 Despite the prevalence of poverty and an increase in related
problems, the Relief Regulations provided assistance to only 10,000 people (out of a total
national population of 35 million).
The senior oligarch, Yamagata, was also increasingly wary of the situation. The
"policing network" that he created in the mid- 1 880s was put to use when the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department conducted the "Survey of the Poor in Tokyo"
(Tokydfuka Kyamin Chosa) in 1890. The police's involvement implied that the survey
was a form of surveillance to maintain social order and was conducted for security rather
than welfare reasons.391 The fact that Yamagata felt the heightened threat of poverty
stemmed partly from his second visit to Europe from December 1888 to October 1889,
when he witnessed the wrath of disgruntled citizens first hand. In France, he observed
387 For example, see Tokyo Akebono Shimbun (May 13, 1880). Inaba (1992), 166.
388 For example, Choya Shimbun ran articles on "The Truth of Tokyo's Poor" (Tckydfu ka hinmin no
shinkyd) from March 24, 1886. See Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 70-71.
389 KinZley (1988), 12.
390 Ibid. Kinzley notes that in 1884, Fukuzawa Yukichi lamented that for the most part, "wealth breeds
wealth and poverty brings about further impoverishment."
391 Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 71.
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and learned from an anti-governmental populist bread riot and a coup threat.392 In Berlin,
his much-anticipated meeting with Gneist was eclipsed by the growth of socialism and
the spread of labor unrest throughout the country. The image of Europe from his sojourn
twenty years previously was that of strength and stability; this time around, however, he
witnessed uncertainty and vulnerability. 393
As the constitution was being drafted in 1887, Hermann Roesler suggested the use
of social policy to mitigate the negative consequences of class conflict exacerbated by
industrialization. 394 He pointed out the "most urgent task of the state [was] to maintain
impartially the welfare of the whole and a harmonious social balance by means of social
legislation and an active administrative policy that works for the physical and spiritual
welfare of the lower classes." 395 Yamagata concurred with Roesler's view that
deteriorating social conditions, if left untreated, could divide the country. He believed
that unlike many Western nations that suffered from divisive social cleavages along the
lines of religion, race, or class, Japan was blessed with "social unity." Accordingly, he
valued Japan's social harmony as a resource that the country could tap to build a strong
state.
The country was making enormous progress in the catch-up game and the
funneling imperative that gave birth to an ultra restrictive 1874 Relief Regulations
became less salient by 1890 as the oligarchs had already built the foundation for the
country's industrial development. Yamagata perceived that it was time to loosen the
392 "Bread Riots in France," Poverty Bay Herald, Vol. XVI, Issue 5361, 11 January 1889, 4.
393 Given Yamagata's history of infatuation with the ironclad German Empire, the turn of events in Europe
was an eye-opener as the suppressive laws against socialism did not prevent them; Fujimura (1961), 123-
124.
394 Siemes (1968), 37-38.
395 Lorenz von Stein, from whose work Yamagata drew inspiration, was likewise an advocate of strategic
social policy. Kenneth B. Pyle, "Advantages of Fellowship: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats,
1890-1925," Journal ofJapanese Studies, I no. I (Autumn, 1974): 138.
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restrictions on public assistance. The oligarchs were also eager to present a new Japan-
no longer isolated, backwards, and reticent-that was ready to debut in the precarious
world of international politics and foreign affairs. People were the key building block for
a strong imperial democracy.396 A poor, unhealthy, and unhappy populace was incapable
of producing strong, loyal soldiers and dedicated workers who would be willing to
sacrifice their lives for the nation. The realization amongst the oligarchs that that the
"poor problem" could hinder the emergence of a strong state gave them an additional
incentive to address the issue of poverty in the inaugural session of the Imperial Diet.
The 1890 Poor Aid Bill
On December 6 th 1890, the Yamagata cabinet presented the Poor Aid Bill3 97
(Ky fmin kyfijo h5an) to the first session of the Imperial Diet. Yamagata indicated that he
was afraid that the 1874 Relief Regulations were insufficient and too restrictive to meet
the reality of growing poverty, and thus signaled to the legislature that this was a "very
important" (kinyd) matter.398 The 1890 bill, drafted by the Home Ministry, proposed to
expand the scope of assistance significantly. In addition to food, assistance was to be
provided for shelter, clothing, medical care, funeral expenses, and employment training
for poor children. In contrast to the 1874 Relief Regulations, aid was now to be extended
to the starving, able-bodied poor who were victims of calamities that prevented them
396 As Gneist lecture to Ito Hirobumi emphasized, building a strong state required a strong relationship
between the leaders and their subjects. "Providing assistance to the poor" would create an "outward
appearance" of the state protecting its citizens and was complementary to building a strong imperial
democracy because that requires shoring up support from the populace. Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no
Shakai Hosh5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keis6 Shob6, 1969), 99.
397 Also translated as the "Destitute Persons' Relief Law."
398 Ogawa (1969), 25.
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from providing for themselves. 399 The 1890 Poor Aid bill was a follow-up to the 1888
City, Town, and Village System reform. The proposed bill was based on a Prussian local
government-led poor relief system (Gesetz iber die Verpflichtung zur Armenpflege 1842,
later revised in 1870 to Gesetz uber den Unterstutzungswohnsitz), which placed most
administrative and financial responsibility on localities.4 40
Yamagata's associate, Shirane Senichi, was the vice minister of the Home
Ministry in charge of explaining the details of the bill to the Imperial Diet.40' Speeches
made by Shirane and his colleagues emphasized the "assumption that the time had come
for thoroughgoing state and municipal intervention, either because the problem of
pauperism had grown too big to be left to private individuals or else because the
achievements of a previous age in this respect were no longer acceptable." 402 In addition,
Shirane pointed out that revision was necessary to close the wide disparity in the level of
assistance across localities. In 1881, for example, Okayama prefecture had 705 recipients
403
as opposed to only two in the Miyagi prefecture. The new bill mandated an expansion
of poor relief across localities in a more uniform and standard way.
Only a handful of elected representatives supported the Poor Aid bill, among
them Dr. Suzuki Manjir6 and Imai Isoichir6 from the Liberal Party. They reasoned that
providing relief to the poor would benefit industrial production and the prevention of
399 Under the bill, able-bodied poor had to work, and once they were engaged in gainful employment, were
required to pay back to the best of their abilities the amount of assistance they had received.
400 The 1874 Relief Regulations was financed by the central government while the 1890 Poor Aid Bill
proposed to shift most of the financial responsibility to localities. In exchange, local governments were
allowed to collect funds raised for private charities and apply them to municipal relief programs, and the
national government would provide subsidies to each locality at a level that was equivalent to the
expenditure given under the Relief Regulation; Inaba (1992), 179.
401 The Home Minister was Saig6 Tsugumichi.
402 R.H.P. Mason, "The Debate on Poor Relief in the First Meiji Diet," The Journal of the Oriental Society
ofAustralia, 3 no. I (January 1965): 10.
403 Ogawa (1969), 18.
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diseases and crimes.40 4 Suzuki argued that many people were unjustifiably dying of
starvation and that the government did not belong simply to a few powerful, rich men,
but also to the poor.40 5
The main critiques of the bill centered on two issues: (1) financing and taxation
and (2) local autonomy. Opponents of the Poor Aid bill feared that giving an inch to the
poor would allow them to take a mile: poor relief expansion would imply that the
government was responsible for the wellbeing of the poor and thus foster a sense of
entitlement to those receiving relief and encourage the indolent poor to demand more
relief. This would place financial strain on municipalities and eventually on taxpayers.40 6
Opponents also viewed the Poor Aid bill as yet another "policy of interference and legal
dictation from the centre." 40 7 While both sides agreed that the 1874 Relief Regulations
were insufficient to address poverty, the opposition triumphed by rejecting the second
reading of the bill before it was put up for a roll call.
The Japanese experience in comparative perspective
The sound defeat of the 1890 Poor Aid bill demonstrated that the oligarchs were
far from being in control of the policymaking process despite their efforts to set the rules
of the game to their advantage. The causes of the defeat of the Poor Aid bill merit a
closer review: who were the relevant political actors and what were their strategic
interests in poor relief? How much leverage did they have in pursuing these interests?
404 Yoshida (1976), 99.
405 Nonetheless, advocates insisted that the revision would entail expanded relief activities solely on the
basis of the state's moral obligation rather than its legal duty. They argued that monitoring and screening
recipients would signal that the poor were not entitled to relief and would thus manage to keep relief
expenses under control; Elise K. Tipton, "Defining the Poor in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," Japan
Forum, 20 no.3 (2008), 365.
406 Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 100.
4 0 7 Ogawa (1969), 14-15.
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What does Japan's failure to expand poor relief tell us about the successful cases in
Europe?
The Yamagata cabinet was primarily interested in expanding poor relief to
contain the negative externality of poverty such as social unrests and incidence of
violence. Its strongholds were the cabinet, Privy Council, bureaucracy, and the House of
Peers, each of which had veto power over legislation passed by the House of
Representatives. None of these institutions, however, possessed any real power to make
the House of Representatives say "yes."
The oligarchs faced a hostile House of Representatives for the inaugural session.
The defunct Popular Rights Movement was revived just in time to take majority seats in
the Diet. Together, the Liberal Party and Progressive Party obtained a total of 171 out of
300 seats.408 While some Liberal Party members like Dr. Suzuki Manjir6 and Amaharu
Bumpei were in favor of the Poor Aid bill, most opposed it. Some of the pro-government
Taisei-kai members likewise opposed the bill. There was therefore no clear-cut partisan
line that divided supporters from opponents. What united the opposition was its
constituents' common interest in retrenching the size of government and loosening
national control over local governance.
In accordance with the oligarchs' design, electoral rules overrepresented rural
agrarian elites and the prior development of local assemblies helped local politicians
migrate to the national stage. An average of 54% of elected representatives "were
classified as having agricultural occupations" as opposed to 14% with a business and
408 Banno (1992), 204. Another source classifies as follows: Liberal Party (131), Progressive Party (43),
Taiseikai (85), and Independents (41). Sasaki (1992), 31-47.
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commercial background.40 9 Out of 300 members, 270 represented rural constituencies
and the majority were prominent local figures (chihW meiboka) with first-hand experience
in local politics; around 160 had previously held positions in prefectural assemblies. 4 10
The Poor Aid bill essentially dictated that localities were responsible for aiding the poor.
Passing the financial burden to localities enraged rural agrarian elites already burdened
by high taxes imposed by the oligarchs to siphon off funds in order to spur
industrialization in urban centers and develop a strong army.
The representatives of the rural propertied class became "determined to do all in
[their] power to reduce taxation" and, therefore, were inclined to oppose any "increases
in administrative costs, no matter whether these would be met out of national or local
taxes, no matter how worthwhile the general objective, and no matter how marginal the
total amount of money involved."4 1' Furthermore, as Mason (1965) points out, elected
officials placed a higher premium on local politics than on national welfare concerns:
Members were sensitive to anything likely to curtail the authority or add to
the obligations of the rural municipalities not only because of their own
provincial backgrounds and election pledges, but also because most of
them possessed first-hand experience of the problems and responsibilities
connected with local government.... It is only to be expected, therefore,
that they and their compeers in the gentry class, whose votes had sustained
them in the successive stages of their public careers, would have felt a
measure of personal commitment to the general idea of at least preserving
intact the rather limited freedom of action allowed to municipalities by the
Town and Village Code of 1888.42
409 Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, Politics in Japan (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co.,
1984), 20-21.
414 Mason (1965: 20-2 1) adds: "Many of these had sat in town or village assemblies before making the
prefectural grade. Other members had held the post of headman of a town or village. Some had achieved
preferment of three kinds, so to speak; that is, they had belonged to a town or village assembly, they had
been elected to prefectural assembly, and they had done duty as a local headman."
411 Mason (1965), 16.
412 Mason (1965), 20-2 1.
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Beyond the general interest in reducing government spending and its control over
local governance, the agrarian class saw no selective incentive in providing relief to the
poor at the national level. The contrast with England, where the landed aristocracy,
which enjoyed parliamentary dominance, favored a robust localized poor relief, is
marked. Lindert (1998) and Boyer (1990) point out that the expansion of poor relief prior
to the 1820s was politically supported and financially sponsored by the landlords who
tried to use it to retain farm labor in their respective localities; it was a means of
preventing the depopulation of rural areas in the face of growing industrial centers such
as London that were draining agricultural workers."' Thus, two factors-local-based
relief arrangement and the existence of selective benefits--most likely allowed English
agrarian elites to cooperate and maintain a robust poor relief.
The Japanese, on the other hand, faced an abundance of labor and actively
attempted to send poor farmers abroad. Mountainous terrain rendered 90% of Japan's
land area uninhabitable. The steady growth in population (34.8 million in 1872, 37.3
million in 1882, 40.5 million by 1892) and rising poverty amid the constant shortage of
land made emigration attractive. Beginning in the mid- 1 880s, the Japanese government
began authorizing outbound migrations of poor farm laborers to various locations: first
Hawaii, then California, Peru, Brazil, and other parts of South America and, finally,
decades later, the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea. The number was initially only
several hundred, but grew to several thousand by the early twentieth century.
Furthermore, judging from the outcome, the "safeguards" that the oligarchs
implemented to coax the elected assembly to cooperate rather than oppose the
4 Peter H. Lindert, "Poor Relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780-1880,"
European Review of Economic History, 2 no. 2 (1998): 101-140; George R. Boyer, An Economic History of
the English Poor Law, 1750-1850 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
189
government clearly did not work. The oligarchs' chief trump card, the threat of
dissolving the Diet, "turned out to be almost valueless."414 The oligarchs did dissolve the
Diet five times in its first decade alone, but with few political consequences. Moreover,
the provision that the previous year's budget could be used in case the Diet did not
approve the budget was meaningless because the oligarchs were typically seeking to
expand government spending, not maintaining it at its current level.
The effectiveness of these "safeguards" in shaping redistributive outcomes is
typically overlooked in comparative studies. Nevertheless, this issue may offer an
important clue as to why the late-developing Germany managed to steer redistribution
towards an expansionary path while the Meiji oligarchs failed to do so. Ziblatt (2006)
highlights the importance of electoral safeguards in studying the pattern of
democratization:
Democratization in Europe, like elsewhere, did not simply represent the
wholesale replacement of one regime for another but often entailed and-
perhaps required--combining democratic reforms with microlevel formal
and informal undemocratic elite safeguards, including undemocratic upper
chambers, gerrymandered electoral districts, clientelism, and corrupt
voting registration rules. As in contemporary cases of regime change,
such safeguards had unintended and contradictory consequences.4 "
The findings from this chapter suggest that the effectiveness of "undemocratic elite
safeguards" in Germany, which made its national parliament relatively "powerless," help
explain why Bismarck was able to expand poor relief at the national level while the Meiji
oligarchs failed to do so.4 16
The fact that the Diet won the battle over poor relief was not the only
disappointment for the oligarchs. Throughout the 1890s, the representatives were to
414 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig (1965), 299.
41 Daniel Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?" World Politics 58 no. 2 (January 2006), 313.
416 Ibid., 312.
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frustrate the oligarchs on other issues, such as military expenditures, industrial policy,
and even salaries for public officials. Nevertheless, the oligarchs were not ready to give
up without a fight. They went on the offensive against the Diet by pursuing another
round of electoral reform a decade later. The proponents of poor relief did not rest their
case either. The oligarchs, Home Ministry bureaucrats, and even some reform-minded
politicians continued pushing for poor relief. The following chapter explores round two
of the oligarchs' battle against party politics. It demonstrates that restructuring political
institutions to accommodate urban industrialists' interests in the Diet ended up pushing
poor relief down a retrenchment path. Indeed, the industrialist opposition was so strong
that it ultimately almost wiped out the Relief Regulations itself.
Conclusion
This chapter examined how early democratization merged with the formation of
late-development industrial capitalism to give rise to a new political class of agrarian
landed elites that successfully opposed redistribution towards the poor. The Meiji
government raised capital domestically through the land-tax and funneled it to develop
competitive industries; the agrarian elites, dissatisfied with the existing taxation without
representation, marshaled their resources to pressure the oligarchs to democratize fiscal
policy. An internal schism within the oligarchy and the pressure from the agrarian
landlords paved the path of democratization.
As the Meiji oligarchs built the foundations of Japanese democracy and the
national industry, they began to question the validity of the minimalist approach to
poverty. Consequently, the oligarchs introduced a bill in the inaugural session of the Diet
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that would have significantly expanded the level of relief. For the Meiji oligarchs, the
task of laying the foundation to build a safety net for the poor seemed straightforward and
attainable. The oligarchs prided themselves as being the defenders of the public interest
and feared that democratic institutions and processes were vulnerable to capture by
private interests. They carefully engineered the political system-from local
governments to national electoral rules-prior to the opening of the Diet in order to curb
the power of the elected representatives and maintain a firm grip over the decision-
making process.
Despite all their efforts to define the rules of the game to their advantage,
however, the Meiji oligarchs failed to check the power of agrarian elites. The funneling
imperative to spark industrial growth compelled agrarian elites to oppose any increase in
government expenditures, including expansion of poor relief, under the presumption that
it would lead to higher taxes in the future. The new constitution left the allocation of
power over public finances ambiguous, as neither the elected assembly nor the cabinet
possessed sufficient power to wrestle the other into total submission. In order to stack the
deck in their favor, however, the oligarchs instituted a number of safeguards to dominate
the decision-making process, but these were of little or no value when party politics went
live.
Since the opening of the Diet, the bureaucrats (and the oligarchs that commanded
the bureaucracy) advocated creating a safety net, but they failed to implement one
because the Meiji oligarchs mistakenly made democracy work: the Diet became the
epicenter of formulating redistributive policies and any expansion in poor relief required
the consent of the representatives of key economic interest groups. In the end, the
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oligarchs not only lost the battle to expand poor relief, they sowed the seeds of their own
destruction as party politics took root and obliterated their monopolistic control over
Japan's political system.
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CHAPTER 5
Partial Democratization for the Age of Industry:
The Rise of the Industrialists and the Path of Retrenchment
"If God asked in which country one wanted to be born,
only a few would answer Japan."
- The chief of the Social Bureau, Tago Ichimin. 417
This chapter analyzes how the political ascendency of the urban industrialists
shaped redistributive policies and covers the events of three decades, from 1890 to the
late 191 Os. The findings from this chapter confirm the limits of the economic
modernization approach, which contends that the demand and supply for public
assistance increase as countries become more industrialized. I show that the central issue
concerning redistribution is not whether a country is industrializing, but rather, how they
pursue industrialization. The Japan case shows that the nature of industrialization matters
in the development of social welfare policy; for latecomers, the need to stoke industrial
growth pitted the industrialists against redistribution.
417 Tago lamented that Japan neglected its numerous poor in the early part of twentieth century. Tago
Ichimin, Tago Ichimin (Tokyo: Tago Ichimin Hensankai, 1970), 152.
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This chapter begins by analyzing how the inaugural session of the Imperial Diet
marked the beginning of the parliamentary battle over the size of the government. The
oligarchs pressed for higher expenditures and taxes to fund national industrial
development and military expansion while the elected representatives of mostly agrarian
landholders resisted. The agrarian elites, united against the high land tax, and the
budding urban industrialists, fixated on channeling government funds to increase
economic yield, both opposed diverting scarce government funds to help the destitute.
Thus, early rounds of democratization in Japan, which coincided with rapid, state-led
industrial economic development, created a political environment that was hostile to poor
relief.
Throughout the 1890s bureaucrats and a handful of politicians urged the national
government to create a comprehensive public assistance system that would protect
citizens from the new risks that rapid industrialization posed. In addition, they contended
that overhauling the prevailing ultra-minimalist 1874 Relief Regulations would be the
first step towards catching up to the West in the realm of public assistance and, at one
point, even proposed establishing a new poor relief tax.
From 1890 to the early 1900s, four proposals for expanding poor relief surfaced,
but the hostile political environment in the House of Representatives induced multiple
miscarriages of expansionary bills. The proposed expansions were defeated without any
deliberation as the agrarian-dominated Diet continued to turn a deaf ear to the matter
because they already felt unfairly burdened by financing Japan's modernization through
the high land tax. Indeed, agrarian elites were facing an imminent threat of increased
taxation as the Diet debated how to raise funds for the government's swelling
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expenditures. The minority industrialists, desiring more government funds to stimulate
industrial growth, supported a land-tax hike; the agrarian landholders, shouldering the
bulk of the tax-burden, held back.
This conflict of interest between the two groups created a schism within the
oligarchy as well as the main political parties, a rift that eventually led to change the
electoral institutional environment. On the one hand, the pro-industrialist camp pressed
to dramatically increase suffrage and redistrict to favor urban areas. On the other, rural-
based agrarian groups resisted drastic institutional change in order to preserve their
dominant position. In the end, the two camps compromised on a middle ground, but the
voice of the industrialists was unmistakably augmented in the Diet.
The reconfiguration of political institutions in 1900 facilitated greater government
spending to fuel industrial growth. Augmenting the political representation of the urban
industrialists, however, was lethal to the growth of social assistance for the poor. As a
country pursuing a classic "late developer" economic growth strategy, funding from the
state was indispensable for the nurturing of Japan's industrial capitalism. The
industrialists aggressively sought to stoke of industrial growth and successfully lobbied
the Meiji oligarchs to channel funds to build key industries, infrastructure, and a skilled
workforce. Diverting resources to aid the poor, whether they were sick, elderly, children,
or working, generated marginal economic gains and, therefore, was a policy industrialists
would not consider.
In sum, the battle over taxes, especially to finance economic modernization,
largely set the parameters for redistributive polices during the first two decades of
Japan's newly established parliament. The national goal of accelerating industrial
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capitalism defined the debate over fiscal policy and left little room for caring the needy.
In fact, the agrarian-industrialist dominated Diet would not only refuse to pay for the
ultra minimalist Relief Regulations itself, it would attempt to abolish the program itself
by refusing to fork over funds and through mobilizing civil society actors.
I. Tumultuous politics, churning economy
The parliamentary battles
In the first decade after the creation of the Diet, the leaders of the House of
Representative refused to take orders from the oligarchy-led cabinet and steadfastly
opposed its repeated requests to expand the budget and raise taxes. Throughout the
1890s, the elected assembly that the oligarchs had created would time and again cast a
vote of non-confidence for what it perceived as a lack of cabinet leadership and sound
judgment in domestic and foreign affairs.
From a structural point of view, the battle between the popularly-elected parties
and oligarchs was not entirely predictable. The new constitution left the allocation of
power over public expenditures and finance ambiguous, as neither the elected assembly
nor the cabinet possessed sufficient power to wrestle the other into total submission. In
order to stack the deck in their favor, however, the oligarchs instituted a number of
safeguards to dominate the decision-making process, but these were of little or no value
when party politics went live. In particular, the constitution allowed the previous year's
budget to be applied in case of a parliamentary impasse. This wild card turned out to be
worthless since the oligarchs were perpetually seeking to inflate the budget in order to
finance the country's military and economic expansion. Moreover, the weapon of last
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resort, the power to dissolve the assembly, not only proved ineffective in coaxing
opponents, it was also disruptive. In the 1890s alone, Japan experienced a total of five
dissolutions coupled with several resignation-induced reorganizations of the cabinet.
When invoked frequently, it raised questions over the legitimacy and efficacy of the
political system itself.
The oligarchs chose not to suspend representative governance entirely because
they had a vested interest in maintaining the political structures that they had created. In
particular, It6 Hirobumi, the heavyweight oligarch and the main author behind the
Japanese imperial democracy, was "eager to demonstrate, both to his countrymen and to
Westerners, that his constitution was wise and this first experiment in parliamentary
institutions a success." 418 Western nations' dominance in world politics was felt strongly
at home. Alas, Japan was still bound by unequal treaties imposed by Western powers in
the 1850s, which restricted the government from exercising its sovereign authority over a
number of issues, especially with respect to trade and immigration policies.4 19 It was
imperative for Japanese leaders to showcase that the country was more than capable of
pursuing difficult domestic political reforms and sticking to them.42 Equally important
was the way in which leaders understood the historical significance of the matter. They
were mindful that Japan was the first non-white, non-Christian country to adopt a western
form of representative government; quitting on this grand project was a sign of weakness
418 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 300.
419 The unequal treaties were gradually lifted mostly after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), which helped increase Japan's reputation in the international community.
420 t Yukio, Yamagata Aritomo: Guchoku na Kenryokusha no Shogai [Yamagata Aritomo: The lifetime
of a simple and honest ruler] (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2009), 255-256.
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and certainly not an option for a country eager to become equal partners with the
democracies of the West.42
Nonetheless, the oligarchs did not idly watch the young tree of party politics
grow. At the outset, they prepared a deadly concoction of repressive measures to achieve
electoral dominance against the newly elected officials. The 1892-second general
election, for example, was the bloodiest one in Japanese history.42  The Home Minister,
Shinagawa Yajiro, orchestrated vicious attacks against populist parties, deploying police
to arrest candidates and voters who were deemed anti-governmental (mostly supporters
of the Liberal Party). Thugs were hired to intimidate voters at the polls and disrupt
candidates' campaign activities and, in Kochi prefecture, the ballot box was blatantly
stolen.423 In this instance, casualties included twenty-five dead and nearly four hundred
wounded but the "naked use of government's coercive powers" did not produce desired
424
results for the perpetrators.
Interfering in the election backfired and the parties in favor of the oligarchs failed
to gain majority seats and faced bellicose anti-governmental representatives. 42 5 The
populist parties condemned the government's excessive use of force and refused to pass
421 Bribing elected officials was another tactic that the oligarchs pursued.
422 Facing difficulty in taming the members of the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Yamagata
Aritomo resigned and handed over the leadership to the veteran Finance Minister, Matsukata Masayoshi,
who then took office on 6 May 1891. When the House of Representatives defiantly cut the budget, Prime
Minister Matsukata dissolved the Diet for the first time since the introduction of the new constitution. The
use of force to achieve desired election results was Yamagata's decision and not Ito's. It6 Yukio (2009),
260-264.
423 On the second general election, see Sasaki Takashi, Hanbatsu Seifu to Rikken Sei [Domain cliques and
constitutional government] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1992), pp. 200-235. See also Siniawer's work
on the general topic of democracy and violence. Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists:
The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
424 Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1971), 151-152.
425 The Liberal Party and the Rikken Kaishinto and their affiliates, maintained their majority in the House
of Representatives, winning 132 seats as opposed to 124 for pro-government candidates (81 seats for Chi6
Club, 31 seats for Dokuritsu Club, 12 seats for Kinki Club), and 44 independents.
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426the government's supplementary budget, instead cutting it by a third. In response, the
House of Peers attempted to reinstate the original budget, prompting the Privy Council to
issue an imperial edict that granted the "House of Peers the right to reinsert items of the
government budget stricken by the Lower House" in June 1892.42
In the end, the repercussions of the egregious election interference proved fatal to
Matsukata's tenure and he was forced to resign on 8 August 1892. Matsukata's
resignation was particularly noteworthy because, under the constitution, the Diet had no
power to appoint or change the Prime Minister or any cabinet post; in theory, this insured
the "unequal relationship" between the non-elected oligarchs and elected members.428
Subsequently, an informal "customary practice" developed in which the "loss of Diet
confidence [in the cabinet]" either induced dissolution of the Diet or the resignation of
the Prime Minister. 42 9 Thus, the voice of the elected officials was enhanced by the
acquisition of the informal power to approve or disapprove executive leadership posts,
which were held by the non-elected oligarchs.43 0
In the wake of Matsukata's exit, Ito Hirobumi, the most powerful oligarch at the
time, took the helm of the government. Itd inherited a difficult political situation where
pro-government parties that supported him did not have enough seats to achieve a
426 The Home Minister, Shinagawa, was forced to resign. Members of the House of Peers and oligarchs
such as Mutsu Munemitsu, and Goto Sh6jir6 condemned the government's excessive use of force during
the second general election. The fact that the some of the oligarchs disproved the egregious election
interference weakened support for the Matsukata administration. See Nakamura Kikuo, It6 Hirobumi [Ito
Hirobumi] (Tokyo: Jiji TsFashinsha, 1958), 112-113.
427 Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in
Imperial Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35.
428 Hackett (1971), 149.
429 Taichiro Mitani, "Chapter 2: The Establishment of Party Cabinets, 1898-1932" (translated by Peter
Duus), in The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century (volume 6), edited by John Whitney
Hall (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 56.
430 As I explain in a later section, around 1892, the oligarchs (hanbatsu) were referred to as the "elderly
statesmen" (genr5). To maintain consistency, I will continue to use the term "oligarchs" to describe non-
elected leaders such as Ito and Yamagata.
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majority in the Lower House. The politically savvy Ito used his close relationship with
the Emperor to entice elected officials to cooperate with his administration. 43 ' He scored
some points with the Diet members for successfully negotiating the revision of the
unequal treaty with Britain in July 1894. The following month, Japan declared war
against China, which served as a windfall for It6 since Diet members, united in the name
of victory, passed military-related expenditures.432 When the war ended, so did the
temporary truce but the parliament remained imbued with tension especially over fiscal
policy.
While Japan's new political scene remained testy, its nascent industrial capitalism
was causing problems of its own. It was during these early but tumultuous years of
representative government when reports of social distress prominently surfaced. The
takeoff of industrial capitalism in the 1890s left many workers stranded in poverty with
little prospect of escaping it. Similar to the experiences of economic modernization in
Europe and United States, Japanese society was "discovering poverty" amidst economic
progress at the turn of the nineteenth century. 43 3 Politicians in Japan, however, did
everything but confront the issue.
431 For example, Ito "had the emperor admonish the disputants to compose their differences and
undermined opposition to the budget by having the emperor surrender some of his own income and order
his civil and military officials to follow suit. This invoking of the imperial name and the voluntary
reduction of a part of the budget in this dramatic way won enough votes to carry the rest of the budget"
(Fairbank et al., pp. 30 1-302).
43 Kaju Nakamura, Prince 1tD: The Man andStatesman (New York, NY: Anraku Publishing Co., 1910),
48-49.
433 Dean W. Kinzley, "Japan's Discovery of Poverty: Changing Views on Poverty and Social Welfare in the
Nineteenth Century," Journal ofAsian History, 22 no. 1 (1988); Ikeda Yoshimasa and Ikemoto Miwako,
Nihon Fukushishi K6gi [A lecture on Japanese welfare history] (Osaka: Takasuga Shuppan, 2002), 70-72.
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Poverty amidst economic progress
The country's economic transformation experienced a hiccup as the first modem
recession hit Japan in 1890. A world wide economic slowdown and poor harvest the
previous year led to an economic contraction in which company earnings fell and the
price of goods fluctuated dramatically. In the countryside, the high land tax imposed on
the peasantry since the mid-i 870s was widening the gap between the haves and the have-
nots. Small farmers struggling to make ends meet were forced to default on their
mortgage payments and their foreclosed lands were increasingly absorbed by "parasitic
landlords" (kiseijinushi) who neither cultivated nor resided on their own land.43  Those
who exited farming communities and migrated to urban centers encountered equally
harsh living conditions.
The deteriorating social conditions of urban centers in the 1890s were captured in
writing. In particular, two journalists, Matsubara Iwagora and Yokoyama Gennosuke,
transformed the day-to-day toil of the urban poor into a "social problem" (shakai
mondai). In 1893, Matsubara published Extreme Darkness of Tokyo (Sai Ankoku no
Tdkyd) based on his hands-on experience of living in the slums of Tokyo, which was
compiled from his articles published by Kokumin Shimbun the previous year.43 5 In a
similar fashion, Yokoyama, a reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun, began documenting
urban poverty in 1894. Inspired by the British pioneer of poverty research, Charles
Booth, his work surveyed urban labor conditions and highlighted the strong presence of
434 Dimitri Vanoverbeke, Community and State in the Japanese Farm Village (Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 2004), 38.
435 Matsubara Iwagoro, Sai Ankoku no Tky& [The extreme darkness of Tokyo] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1988).
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working poverty in major cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. 436 Yokoyama suggested that
the new urban working poverty was a byproduct of Meiji industrialization and
urbanization and his work was later assembled in the 1899 bestselling book, the Japanese
Underclass Society (Nihon no Kasa Shakai).437 Similar to the effect that Booth's work
had on enhancing social awareness of poverty at the turn of the 19th century in England,
Yokoyama's work is credited as a pioneer in surveying social conditions.438
Even as the journalists put the spotlight on the issue, the poor themselves
remained voiceless in their own fight against poverty. Ordinary citizens at the time felt
"remote" from the new Meiji constitution and were largely disconnected from politics
altogether. 4 39 Newspaper readership was limited to the better-off and the ruling oligarchs
purposely dissociated the political realm from the day-to-day lives of ordinary citizens.
A few months prior to the opening of the Imperial Diet, the Meiji Emperor signed the
1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (ky5iku ni kansuru chokugo), which defined the
rules and objectives of education in the country. 440 Although compulsory elementary
education taught basic skills such as literacy and competency in mathematics, the bulk of
436 A team of researchers, headed by Charles Booth, surveyed the state of poverty in London and found that
many were living in abject poverty. The survey results, compiled in the volumes of the Life and Labour of
the People in London, are widely accredited as the one of the most influential work in the field of social
policy. See Charles Booth (assisted by Jesse Argyle et al.), Life and Labour of the People in London (New
York: Macmillan and co., 1902). General William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, is also
credited to have increased awareness of poverty in Britain in the late 19th century. His book, In Darkest
England and the Way Out, published in 1890 contended that the awfully harsh life of the "darkest Africa"
also existed in the "darkest England," where economic modernization has not eradicated destitution and the
misery of the poor. See William Booth, In Darkest England and the Way Out (Boston, MA:
IndyPublish.com, 2011), 6.
43 Yokoyama Gennosuke, Nihon no Kas6 Shakai [The Japanese under class] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1985).
438 "Shakai fukushi no senkaku" (a pioneer in social welfare) is inscribed in Yokoyama's tomb.
439 Gluck (1985), 48.
440 For an extended discussion on the history of education policy in Japan, see Herbert Passin, Society and
Education in Japan (New York, NY: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965).
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the curriculum, was designed to teach the virtues of loyalty, discipline, and harmony. 44 1
The nationwide education policy explicitly prohibited the teaching of democratic ideals at
schools-for example, no texts on elections or civic participation in political life-and
morally instructed citizens to become adherents of the constitution.442 This was
consistent with the German practice of "thought guidance" which used educational
institutions as a means of socializing and inculcating values that legitimized the existing
political and social order.
Despite the poor's detachment from the political process, calls for the government
to take action against poverty sprang from the inner-circles of political power.
Throughout the 1890s bureaucrats were the primary force behind expanding poor relief
and sought support among elected officials. The next section discusses a series of
abortive attempts to expand poor relief. The fact that these efforts were put to rest even
before any meaningful legislative debate took place strongly testified to the dominance of
agrarian interests in opposing redistribution. Yet, dismissing the outcome as simply a
ddji vu moment conceals vital information about the new political developments that
were unfolding. The newly established democratic institutions were functioning so well
that the oligarchy was crumbling and elected officials more vigorously pursued pork
barrel policies to secure electoral support from their constituents. These new
developments that emanated from early democratization proved difficult for the
bureaucrats to influence redistributive policies. While the bureaucrats presented several
44' Sydney Crawcour, "Chapter 8: Industrialization and Technological Change, 1885-1920," in The
Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century Volume 6, edited by John Whitney (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 402.
442 Inada Masatsugu, Kydiku Chokugo Seiritsu Katei no Kenkyfl [Research on the process of establishing
the imperial rescript on education] (Tokyo: KOdansha, 1971).
204
proposals to expand poor relief, they failed to gain support from elected assemblymen;
one was left to expire and others perished before reaching the Diet floor.
1I. The intransigent Diet
The failed attempts
In 1895, one of the most venerable statesmen in pre-war Japan, Got6 Shinpei,
revealed his grandiose plan to create a comprehensive poor relief system. As the chief of
the Home Ministry's Public Health Bureau, Gota advocated a German-style social
insurance system with a heavy layer of public assistance programs for the poor. While he
was a medical student in Germany (1890-1892), he learned of Bismarck's innovative use
of social policies to build a strong and unified empire that concomitantly functioned to
diffuse the rising threat of socialism. Eager to import German social policy to Japan,
Got6 proposed the establishment of various social welfare initiatives aimed at protecting
diverse segments of the population. He contended that Japan's economic transformation
was no different from what many of the European countries had already undergone.
Learning how Western nations coped with the pernicious effects of industrialization was
critical for the country's future progress. 44 3
The proposed plan emulated the 1871 British Local Government Board in which a
centralized system oversaw a wide range of social services. In order to secure funding
for his ambitious plan, he proposed to funnel ten percent of the reparations (around 30
million yen) from the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) to the imperial household account;
this fund would be used to establish a Meiji Relief Endowment (Meiji Jukkyi Kikin). The
443 Yoshida Kynichi, "Meiji Ishin ni Okeru Hinkon no Henshitsu," [The change in the quality of poverty
during the Meiji Restoration] in Nihon no Kyfihin Seido [the Japanese poor relief system], Nihon Shakai
Gigy6 Daigaku KyFihin Seido KenkyU Kai (ed.), (Tokyo: Imura Juji, 1976), 97.
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funds from the endowment would be earmarked to establish a variety of social programs
and facilities: hospitals, sickness and health insurance for workers, regional poor relief
operation, schools for poor children, and aid for military personnel's families.444 Goto
pitched the financial arrangement to Prime Minister It6 Hirobumi and explained that it
was meant to showcase the benevolence of the imperial throne to the needy and
strengthen the populace's devotion toward the Emperor.4 4
Goto believed the proposed social welfare system was a win-win venture. It was
a policy that complemented the oligarchs' overarching goal of "enriching the country,
strengthening the military," since the programs would protect citizens, especially workers
and soldiers, who play vital roles in making Japan richer and stronger. The proposed
system was also believed to be politically viable because it would be financed primarily
from the purse of the Imperial Household instead by imposing a poor relief tax on
localities. Although the issue of how much the central government would annually
subsidize the programs was unclear, the funding scheme was designed in part to diffuse
the anti-redistribution sentiment among the agrarian elites. Goto's proposal, however,
failed to be endorsed by the cabinet.
Although Japan's victory over China called for a celebration, Prime Minister It6
was under fire in the Diet for caving into the pressure from the Triple Alliance (e.g.,
Germany Russia, and France) to rescind the acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula from
China.446 House of Representatives officials were about to submit a vote of no
444 Tsurumi Yisuke, Goto Shinpei Dai Ikkan [Goto Shimpei volume one] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1965), 757.
445 Tsurumi YiUsuke, Seiden Got5 Shinpei Dai Ni [An authentic biography of Goto Shimpei 2] (Tokyo:
Fujiwara Shoten, 2004), 419-420.
446 Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese government acquired the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan,
and the Penghu islands, access to four ports, and reparations worth 200,000,000 Kuping taels. However,
the Triple Alliance intervened and pressured Japan to retrocede the Liaodong Peninsula. The conflict over
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confidence and It6 himself was on the verge of resigning or dissolving the Diet.447 The
cabinet's uncertain political future, coupled with the need to prepare for the next war-
most likely with Russia-ended Goto's run. The reparations from China were to be re-
invested to build up its military and economic capacities in order to pursue its ambitions
overseas; diverting funds to create a new welfare system was simply not a part of the
plan.
Unable to grab a portion of the reparations, Goto turned his attention to the Diet.
He marketed his plan to elected officials hoping to secure funding via the legislature.448
At the time, the post-war economic slowdown coupled with a poor harvest in 1896 led to
a spike in the price of rice, providing an incentive to formulate programs that would
socially protect citizens from income shortfalls. Despite the fact that the Meiji
government sent directives in January 1897 to partially ease the restrictions on the Relief
Regulations, the system remained largely inaccessible, as only 16,000 or about 0.04% of
the population received aid that year.449
In February of 1897, Otake Kan'ichi and Suzuki Shigetoo of the Progressive
Party (Shimpoto), Motoda Hajime of Citizens Club (Kokumin Kydkai), and Ebara Soroku
of the Liberal Party (Jiyuta) submitted the Relief Protection bill (Jukkyii Hdan) and the
Poor Relief Tax bill (Kyfihin Zei H5) to the national assembly. Determining the rationale
for expanding poor relief is difficult since proponents came from markedly different
backgrounds across party lines. Otake Kan-ichi was a former prefectural assemblyman
the Liaodong played key role triggering the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as the Russian government
leased the area from the Qing Dynasty after Japan agreed not to acquire the territory. Nakamura (1910), 49.
447 Tsurumi (2004), 425.
448 Ibid.
449 Ogawa Masaaki, "Sangyo Shihon Kakuritsu Ki no Kyahin Taisei," [The poor relief system of the period
of building industry] in Nihon no Kyilhin Seido [the Japanese poor relief system], Nihon Shakai Gigyo
Daigaku KyGhin Seido KenkyFJ Kai (ed.), (Tokyo: Imura Juji, 1976), 102.
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who dedicated his political career promoting public works to improve waterways. Ebara
Soroku, on the other hand, was an educator and a devout Christian. Motoda Hajime was
closely associated with the parties that supported the oligarchs. Suzuki Shigetoo was a
right-leaning politician and member of the foreign policy group that promoted Japan's
military ambitions abroad. In addition, it remains unknown if they had any personal
connections or professional dealings with Got6 Shimpei himself and how effective he
was as a social policy entrepreneur.45
The proposed bill eased eligibility restrictions on the age limit (by reducing the
age eligibility from seventy to sixty) and permitted the poor who were injured or sick to
be eligible for assistance despite the existence of family members.45 Under this Relief
Regulations, the annual expenditures amounted only to around 100,000 yen; the proposed
plan would have increased the level to around 3 million yen.452 The advocates argued
that the bills were motivated by the expansion of urban slums alongside industrialization,
growing perception of inequality, and acknowledgement of clear limitations of the
existing Relief Regulations.45
The accompanying Poor Relief Tax bill specified a variety of sources for funding:
the nobility would be taxed equivalent to the amount they owe for their income tax,
ordinary tax payers would be levied half of their income tax amount, and a portion of the
450 Opposition parties (4 members from Jiyit6 and 23 from Shimpoto) and pro-government parties (4
members from Kokumin kyokai and 2 Mushozoku).
451 Unlike the 1890 proposal, however, the 1897 bill did not extend aid to the able-bodied poor, which was
more in line with the Relief Regulations.
452 This was also a significant increase from the 1890 Poor Aid bill (600,000 yen). Ikemoto Miwako,
"Waga Kuni ni Okeru Kokyo KyFisai to wa Nanika," [What public relief means for our country] Nihon
Fukushi Daigaku Shakai Fukushi Ronshi no. 103 (August 2008), 110.
453Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai Hosh5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1969),
29-30.
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profits from the Bank of Japan transactions would be taxed.45 The crucial point here is
that the poor relief tax was not pegged to the land tax, which comprised around 40% of
the general tax revenue, but to ordinary income taxes, which accounted for only 2% of
government revenue. 455
These bills were never thoroughly deliberated in the Diet so we will never know
why they lacked political support. Although the new poor relief bill was designed to
dampen agrarian opposition to redistribution, it would have likely failed to gain support
for the following reasons. First, by mid-i 890s the economic activities of the agrarian
elites were diversifying. Absentee landlords had increased in numbers and many were
pursuing commercial interests in urban areas. This meant that some agrarian elites would
face higher income taxes and, therefore, would raise objections to expanding poor relief.
In addition, as the tempo of industrialization accelerated, the voice of the urban
industrialists on redistributive issues (though still overshadowed by the agrarian elites)
was becoming louder. They were equally sensitive to the tax issue since holding the rate
of the land tax constant meant that firms might face a higher tax burden. The urban
industrialists were also primarily motivated to lobby for continued public investment in
Japan's industrial development. Dedicating government funds to rescue those who were
peripheral to industrial production-such as the sick and the elderly-was far from the
investment in human capital that industrialists desired, especially when the poor relief tax
was structured to come directly from their own pocket.
What is certain is that the two bills were endorsed by merely one-tenth of the Diet
members, thirty-three to be exact. At the time, the other ninety percent of the political
454 In addition, funds raised from private charity would be funneled to pay for the relief expense.
45 Ogawa (1976), 107.
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class were engrossed in pork barrel politics. As Tsurumi notes, the majority of the Diet
members were intensely engaged in the practice of passing a bunch of "souvenir bills"
(omiyage an) that benefited their core electoral constituents back home. 456 Bills that
yielded little economic benefits to hometown supporters were deliberately postponed and
not listed on the agenda until the very last day of the session so that they could be hastily
discarded as the legislative session conveniently ran out of time.457 In the same fashion,
the 1897 poor relief bills were submitted to the Diet on February 24th but only appeared
on the agenda on March 23rd, a day before the last day of the session; they expired
without deliberation as the assembly closed.458
A decade prior, the German advisor who helped the oligarchs design Japan's
electoral institutions, Herman Roessler, warned the oligarchs that single-member district
system had a propensity to elevate parochial local politics onto the national stage and
could potentially turn the Imperial Diet into an assortment of "local egos." 459 Roessler's
intuition could not have been more right. The fate of the poor relief bills captured a
crucial dimension in the changing nature of politics at the time. In the first few years of
the Diet, elected members defensively guarded both the expenditure and revenue side of
the government purse, striving to retrench both taxes and spending. As years went by
and they gained political experience, they acquired an endless appetite for "pork" to be
distributed to their constituents back home; the construction of roads, bridges and other
public goods and services were sought after in the hope of securing local support for re-
456 Tsurumi (2004), 43 1-432.
45 Ibid.
458 Ogawa (1976), 107.
459 Suetake Yoshiya, "Senkyoku Seido to Kitai Sareta Daigishi Z6: Senzenki Nihon no Ba-ai" [The
constituency system and the expected image of the representative in Japan before World War II], Senkyo
Kenkyfl (Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies) vol. 25, no. 2 (2009), 58.
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election.460 The development of party politics meant cultivation of well-organized
electoral base (jiban).
The widespread rent-seeking by elected officials, however, faced a major
obstacle: everyone wanted something from the government but no one wanted to pay for
it. With growing military and administrative costs, government expenditures tripled,
from 66 million yen in 1890 to 183 million in 1900.461 Yet, the agrarian-dominated
legislature steadfastly opposed any increase in the land-tax despite splurging on the
expenditure side, offering no compromised remedies for the swollen national debt. The
daunting task of balancing the budget fell heavy on the hands of the oligarchs. In the
spring of 1898, Ito and Yamagata mustered their political resources to advance a bill that
would raise the land tax. Despite their joint effort, they fell short of securing a majority
in the Lower House and failed to pass the bill. Facing intransigent parties opposing tax
hikes 1t6 felt compelled to dissolve the Diet in June.462
Beginning with the inaugural session of the Diet, the politics of public
expenditure and taxation had consumed every ounce of the oligarchs' energy. This time
around they reached the conclusion that something had to change. Their next move was
to exit and allow the opposition parties to assume executive leadership. The decision was
ingenious: stick opposition party leaders with the backbreaking task of overseeing the
government's purse.
Another missed opportunity in the context ofpolitical change
460 Pork-barrel politics intensified especially after the Sino-Japanese War.
461 The expenditure swelled to 338 million by 1910. Figures from Gluck (1985), 30.
62n 1897, Its predecessor, Prime Minister Matsukata, also failed to increase the land-tax by 60% (from
2.5% to 4%).
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As the oligarchs vacated from the executive posts, they scrambled to regroup and
re-strategize their next move. One of the proposals was to create a new pro-government
party that It6 could lead, which he had been eager to do since the early 1890s. 4 63 This
option had the least support among the oligarchs who still clung to the hope that they
could contain party politics from the sidelines. One of the oligarchs, Inoue Kaoru,
contended that creating a political party could be a losing proposition as opposition
parties already held majority seats in the Diet.464 Moreover, allowing opposition party
leaders to form a cabinet was of little cost to the oligarchs as they had "no base of power
outside the Diet" and had "limited ability to centralize control over the government."46 5
The oligarchs controlled vital political organs, such as the House of Peers and the supra-
cabinet Privy Council, which restricted the authority of the House of Representatives.
Under these circumstances, Inoue predicted that the party cabinet "would soon
disintegrate" and dig its own grave by addressing fiscal policy. 4 66 Thus, the oligarchs
decided to relinquish executive leadership to the main party leaders, Itagaki Taisuke and
Okuma Shigenobu.
The oligarchs' decision to step down voluntarily was historically significant
because it established the first party cabinet. This event, however, did not signal a regime
463 The fact that popular parties were amalgamating to enhance their position vis-A-vis the oligarchs also
compelled Ito to create his own party in the Diet that he could lead.
464 Prior to the opening of the Diet, Inoue Kaoru and Mutsu Munemitsu questioned if the transcendental
approach was the best strategy to control the political process. Inoue argued that "in the field of practical
politics, ultimately governed by power relationships, there was a limit to how far the Constitution and the
law, however strictly administered, could control any situation" (Banno, 1992: 14). Although Inoue
proceeded to organize a party called the Jichito (Self-Government Party) that would be comprised of the
landed elites and provincial officials in the 1880s, its lack of endorsement by the other oligarchs proved
fatal. In the late 1890s, however, Inoue voiced his reservation against Ito's plan to establish his own party
because he believed that it would be difficult for him to gain support from elected officials when the main
popular parties enjoyed comfortable majority in the Diet. Junji Banno, The Establishment of the Japanese
Constitutional System (translated by J.A.A. Stockwin) (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 14.
465 Mitani, 68
466 Ibid.
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change. The relationship between the oligarchs and Okuma-Itagaki duo was
complicated. The oligarchs had known Itagaki and Okuma for nearly three decades,
initially as their colleagues and later as opponents as they exited the clique to promote the
democratic movement from below. Since then, the oligarchs had enticed them by giving
key cabinet posts: Okuma was appointed as the Foreign Minister in 1888 and 1897
whereas Itagaki served as the Home Minister in 1896. The backgrounds of these two
were not entirely reflective of the typical agrarian-based representatives: Itagaki, for
example, was from the samurai class. Two months prior to the sixth general election, the
two leaders united their political parties-the Liberal Party, led by Itagaki, and Okuma's
Progressive Party-to create the Constitutional Party (Kenseito). Although parties that
supported the Okuma-Itagaki cabinet won 244 seats out of 300, they were never able to
capitalize on their victory in the Diet. Neither was it able to submit a poor relief bill that
would have laid the foundation for the country's safety net.
Another economic slump in the 1890s and poor harvest prompted the Home
Minister Itagaki Taisuke to revive Yamagata's 1890 Poor Aid bill.467 Rebranded as the
1898 Poor Relief bill (Kyfimin Hoan), it promised to establish indoor relief facilities in
local areas that would provide a variety of services for the poor, including employment
placement, medical care, and child care.468 Similar to the 1890 bill, it extended relief to
467 During this period, the government passed a series of narrowly targeted programs that may have played
a minor, indirect role in alleviating poverty. These targeted relief legislations include the 1897 Law of
Prevention of Contagious Disease (Densenbyd Yoboh5), 1899 Treatment of Sick or Dead Travelers (Kdryo
Byonin Oyobi Koryo Shibonin Toriatsukai H5), and the 1899 Disaster Relief Fund (Risai Kyuljo Kikin H5).
In addition, the Act for the Protection of Former Natives in Hokkaido (Hokkaido kyidojin hogoha) was
enacted in 1899.
468 As poverty was becoming more prevalent among the working class, Got6 Shimpei ratcheted up pressure
to pass social programs that would protect workers. He believed that social insurance programs were
important to protect workers who were capable of disrupting the social order and economic production.
Thus, the mandatory social insurance scheme (kydsei hoken) and other new services under the 1898 bill
also originated from Goto's proposals.
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the calamity-stricken, abled-bodied poor who were temporarily unable to provide for
themselves. During the late 1890s, the Home Ministry had a number of officials who
promoted expansionary poor relief, including Kanai Noboru, who, like Gota, insisted that
Japan needed to catch up with the West in the realm of social policy. Though the Home
Ministry completed drafting the 1898 Poor Relief bill, it never surfaced on the national
assembly floor.
Undeniably, the strong agrarian opposition to redistribution in the Diet would
have been fatal to the 1898 Poor Relief bill, but its premature death was facilitated by the
collapse of the first partisan cabinet even before the Diet session began. Notwithstanding
its historic significance, the Okuma-Itagaki administration was in complete disarray from
the start and lasted only four months (June 30 - November 8, 1898). As Inoue Kaoru had
predicted, key units of the government, especially the bureaucracy and the military, were
wary of the party cabinet members and gave them the cold shoulder.
In addition to the hostile political environment, internal fragmentation plagued the
party cabinet from the time of its inception. Ironically, while the tax issue initially
brought party leaders together to contest the oligarchic cabinet, it turned into a divisive
subject that prevented the parties from truly uniting. Itagaki and Okuma's efforts to
merge their parties into the Constitutional Government Party failed within two months.
Internal fighting over the issues of the land tax and appointment of cabinet posts beset the
party and, just days prior to the sixth general election, it splintered along the old party
lines. The old Liberal Party members retained the name Constitutional Government
Party whereas the old Progressive Party members differentiated themselves by calling
themselves the Real Constitutional Government Party (Kenseihont6).
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The collapse of the party cabinet reflected the changing dynamics within popular
parties. The rise of the pro-industrialist bloc was one such change. For instance, within
the old Liberal Party, a well-known advocate of urban interests, Hoshi Thru, asserted the
dominance of "railroad politics" over "land-tax politics." 469 Hoshi was an affiliate of the
Tokyo municipal assembly and Tokyo Municipal Council and believed that the party
should make greater efforts to solicit the support of urban industrialists. 470 Business
leaders across the country were also beginning to rally around an increase in the land tax
in order to prevent a scenario in which corporate taxes would be raised as an alternative
way to raise revenue. 47 1 Prominent entrepreneur, Shibusawa Eiichi, established the
Board of Alliance for Increase in Land-Tax (Chiso Zdchd Kisei Do-meikai) and held a
meeting at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel in early December with top businessmen from all
the four major cities in Japan.472
Catering to the enthusiasm of the urban industrialists, Hoshi and other Diet
members expressed support for a land-tax hike in exchange for greater representation of
party members in the cabinet, further extension of suffrage, restructuring local
governments, revision of the land-valuation system, and continued support for
industrialization-related public expenditures. 473 A heavyweight oligarch, Yamagata
(again taking the Prime Minister post in November), saw a window of opportunity in the
growing schism within the popular parties over the land-tax issue. Yamagata's primary
motivation for raising the land-tax was to generate revenue to fund growing military
469 Since the mid-I 890s, the Liberal Party had demonstrated its willingness to accommodate government
investment in railways, ship-building, and other projects that would benefit national industrial development.
470 Hoshi was the ambassador to the United States in 1896 where he learned about the importance of party
platforms and public works projects. See Arizumi Sadao, Hoshi Tnru (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1983);
Mitani (1988), 69.
471 Banno (1992), 92.
47 Tsuchiya Takao, Shibusawa Efichi Den [The life of Shibusawa Eiichi] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1931).
473 There were also other requests, such as a raise in the salary of Lower House members.
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expenditures but he also recognized that industrial development was imperative if Japan
were to pursue its foreign ambition abroad.4 74 With the support of pro-industrialist
Kenseito members and by bribing officials, Yamagata finally succeeded in raising the
land tax from 2.5% to 3.3%, albeit with a five-year expiration date.475 In return for the
passage of the land-tax, he rewarded proponents (and compensated the opponents) by
increasing their salaries from eight hundred to two thousand yen.476
Just as popular parties were internally divided along a politico-geographic fault
line-rural-based agrarian landholders, on the one hand, and the urban-based
industrialists on the other-a similar internal cleavage had began to form within the
oligarchy.477 Although disagreements among the oligarchs were more common than not,
the growing schism between It6 and Yamagata in the late 1890s was a different matter.
Ito, without the consent of other oligarchs, unilaterally chose to be a major advocate for
augmenting urban industrial interests in the Diet. He not only fought to expand the
franchise and reconfigure electoral rules to favor urban districts, he would later establish
a political party that catered to urban business leaders. Ito's breakaway move would
further advance democratization. This was the direction of institutional change that the
oligarchs had united to block just a decade ago.
Furthermore, the rift was forming while the oligarchy was graying. By the late
1890s, most of the oligarchs were in their late forties at a time when the national average
474 Fujimura Michio, Yamagata Aritomo [Yamagata Aritomo] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kabunkan, 1961), 194,
198.
475 Fujimura (1961), 195. The tax-rate for urban areas increased to five percent. Yamagata's initial bill
proposed to raise the land-tax to four percent but he later compromised by agreeing to 3.3%.
476 Quoting a passage from the diary of Hara Kei, Fujimura (1961: 195-196) notes that Yamagata withdrew
the bulk of the funds to bribe officials from the financial account of the Ministry of Imperial Household.
477 It6 Takashi (ed) points out an additional reason behind the It6-Yamagata split in the 1890s, which he
attributes to a shift in the balance of power within the feudal clique (i.e., decline of Satsuma), which caused
an internal power struggle among the Ch6shni clan. See It6 Takashi (ed.) Yamagata Aritomo to Kindai
Nippon [Yamagata Aritomo and modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 2008), 130-131.
216
life expectancy of men was around thirty-eight. In addition, Inoue Kowashi, It's close
ally who assisted him in drafting the constitution, succumbed to tuberculosis in 1895.
Foreseeing retirement in the not so distant future, the oligarchs preemptively arranged an
informal extra-legal advisory council called the Genra (elder statesmen) in 1892. This
new arrangement would enable them to serve as close advisors to the Emperor on
important political decisions such as the selection of the Prime Minister. But rather than
accept emeritus positions and wield political influence from behind the scenes, both
Yamagata and Ito chose to hold key government posts. Consequently, the divergent
views of Ito and Yamagata on what Japanese politics ought to be-for the former, the
strengthening of party politics and advancing democratic reforms to substantially expand
the suffrage, for the latter, the restraining of party politics and extension of franchise
collided in the Diet.478
Just as in the 1880s, intra-oligarchy conflict served as the strongest impetus
behind the advancement of democratic reforms in the late 1890s. The second wave of
democratization in 1900 ushered in greater representation of the urban industrialists,
serving as a significant step forward for the development of industrial capitalism but not
of a safety net. The next section analyzes how the rise of the "political merchants" was
lethal to the poor. 4 79 Not only did they join the agrarian elites in opposing redistribution,
they would eventually block the inclusion of the poor into the Japanese democracy in the
1920s.
47848Ita (2009).
479 The financial conglomerates, the zaibatsu, were referred to as the "political merchants" by Hidemasa,
Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan (Tokyo: Tokyo University
Press, 1992).
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III. Redefining the rules of politics for the age of industry
The rise of the political merchants
Compared to many Western European countries, where the democratic transition
phase was often gradual and stretched over a long time horizon, democratization in Japan
occurred at a much faster pace. Japan experienced a second wave of democratization
within a decade since the founding of the Diet. In the electoral reform of 1900, voting
rules were relaxed and the prevailing electoral system, which over-represented the
agrarian landed elites, was revised. The reconfiguration of the political structure was
designed to invite more new players, particularly, the urban industrialists, to the game of
politics. The pathways of democratization and industrialization converged in part due to
the political entrepreneurship of financial industrial conglomerates, entities which blurred
the boundaries of the state and market.
The strong presence of large, family-controlled wealthy financial cliques called
the zaibatsu had been one of the hallmarks of the Japanese economy. A few powerful
business groups were created during the Tokugawa era but the majority of them were
established after feudalism with substantial support from the Meiji oligarchs in the late
1800s. The Japanese feudal four-tier social class system placed the merchant class at the
lowest level of the hierarchy and subjected them to strict restrictions, especially with
respect to foreign trade and commerce. 480 Although the centralized feudal system
imposed draconian social control over the entire archipelago, commerce in domestic
480 The Japanese feudal social pyramid consisted of four classes (in order of importance): the samurai
(warrior), peasants, artisans, and the merchant class.
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markets flourished in the late Tokugawa period. 481 Several family-owned financial
enterprises, especially in large cities such as Osaka and Tokyo, managed to accumulate
wealth and power by acting as a lender to feudal authorities. Though social mobility was
strictly prohibited, prominent financiers strategically arranged marriages of their
offspring with higher-ranking officials to improve their social status.
Only a handful of proto-zaibatsu enterprises survived the collapse of feudalism,
notably, the Sumitomo and Mitsui conglomerates. Nevertheless, the earlier practice of
merchants forming political ties to further their economic interests endured. The Meiji
oligarchs, such as Okubo Toshimichi, and, later, Okuma Shigenobu, took the initiative
and "nurtured private capitalists, such as Shibusawa Eiichi and Iwasaki Yatar6, who
would use the relationship to create some of the world's greatest corporate empires." 482
Shibusawa, dubbed "the father of Japanese capitalism," wore many hats, but some of his
notable contributions included building hundreds of joint stock corporations as well as
483the country's modern banking system. Another distinguished pioneer in Japanese
industrial development, Iwasaki, built the Mitsubishi conglomerate by diversifying its
core shipping business to coal-mining, banking, insurance, paper, and aircraft.
Men like Iwasaki and Shibusawa were successful on their own but they also
profited tremendously from their close relationship with government officials.484 As
discussed in chapter three, in order to lay the foundation for Japan's modem industrial
48 For an extended discussion on the debate surrounding the state of Japanese economic development prior
to the Meiji restoration, see chapter two of David Flath, The Japanese Economy (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
482 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 80.
483 Otani Makoto, Fukushi ni Ikiru (1/): Shibusawa Eiichi [Living for welfare: Shibusawa Eiichi] (Tokyo:
Ozorasha, 1998), 9.
484 In addition, a few like Shibusawa were former bureaucrats so they were in advantageous positions to
build their political ties.
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development, the oligarchs provided guidance and much-needed capital and concentrated
it in the hands of the politically-privileged merchants (seish5) like Iwasaki and
Shibusawa.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the state's helping-hand for national
industrial development, however, came with a hefty price. In addition to the funds
earmarked for public works projects, the government provided nearly forty percent of all
the capital investment in Japan prior to World War I and the funds were largely raised
domestically.485 The peasantry shouldered the bulk of the tax burden while corporations
paid only a fraction of the sum. In the 1880s, nearly seventy percent of all government
revenue (both national and local) came from rural agrarian households though this share
decreased steadily to around thirty percent by the 1920s.4 86 The traditional sector,
therefore, made an enormous financial contribution to the development of the modern
sector in pre-war Japan. Understandably, the agrarian class had extreme aversion
towards the proposal to raise the land tax.487
Although the agrarian elites' anti-land-tax crusade was initially a success, its
mission came to a sudden halt in late 1898 when the budding pro-industrialists in the
Diet, who wanted to expand public spending to accelerate industrialization, allied with
the oligarchs to raise the land tax. When the land-tax battle was over, the industrialists'
next mission was to gain greater political representation in the Diet. The following year,
Shibusawa organized and acted as the president of the League to Revise the House of
Representatives Election Law to promote further extension of suffrage for industrialists
485 World War One ignited a capital investment boom, decreasing the share of public investment. See
Crawcour (1988), 429-430.
486 Ibid., 413.
487 As noted in chapter three, the agrarian class fought for suffrage to decrease the tax burden.
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and redraw the electoral districts to favor urban areas.488 Business leaders across major
cities rallied around the cause and approached the senior oligarch, Ito Hirobumi, who had
been fighting to extend suffrage to the urban industrialists before they were even
organized.4 89 As in the first wave of democratization in the late 1880s, therefore, societal
actors joined the movement after one of the holders of political power had decided to
extend suffrage. Nevertheless, as the pressure to advance democratization emanated
from multiple sources-the business leaders, oligarchy, and parties-and converged in
490the late 1890s, the time to reform the political structure came sooner rather than later.
The causes and consequences of partial democratization in 1900 merit further
analysis because restructuring political institutions to augment the representation of
zaibatsu-led capitalist class had redistributive consequences. In the short run, it led to a
cutback in welfare benefits in the early 1900s despite the fact that the prevailing public
assistance system was already operating within a residual framework. Furthermore, since
the political environment in the Diet became so hostile to the idea of channeling
government funds to the poor, proponents of poor relief, like bureaucrats in the mid-
1890s, began to scout for alternatives to alleviate poverty. In the long run, a Diet
composed largely of agrarian and industrial interests would eventually restructure
488 Shibusawa was also active in charitable contributions, a topic, which will be discussed in chapter six.
489 t Yukio, Itt Hirobumi: Kindai Nihon wo Tsukutta Otoko [Ita Hirobumi: The man who made modern
Japan] (Tokyo: Kadansha, 2010), p. 399.
490 The main parties-the Liberal Party and Progressive Party--had placed electoral reform on the
backburner because the agrarian landed elites were ambivalent about changing the composition of the Diet.
For them, democratization was a double-edged sword. Further extension of suffrage would likely
strengthen the powerbase of the elected officials vis-i-vis non-elected members (i.e., the oligarchs and the
members of the House of Peers) but it could shift the axis of power away from the agrarian elites. They
preferred to extend suffrage but only under the condition that the electoral system itself would remain
advantageous for rural districts. Nevertheless, by late 1898, the pro-industrialist camp led by Hoshi had
increased in strength and created a viable faction within the leading party and generated pressure for
democratic reforms inside the party.
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political institutions to entirely shut out the poor from the public policymaking process
during the critical moment of democratic consolidation in the 1920s.
Re-engineering of the electoral terrain and the growth ofparty politics
Within a decade of the inception of a new parliamentary system, It6 Hirobumi,
the main author behind the constitution and once a preacher of the anti-party
transcendental governance, had a change of heart. Ita aggressively pursued democratic
reforms in the late 1890s for several reasons. First, he believed that permitting more
voters from urban areas would help break the land-tax deadlock, which he perceived as
stifling Japan's modernization by blocking the transfer of funds from traditional to
modem sectors. In his eyes, partial democratization was necessary to make further
advancements in national industrial development: more industrialists in the Diet meant
more capital to build the country's wealth.4 9 1 Second, he perceived that accommodating
the economic interests of the urban industrialists in the Diet would further facilitate the
growth of industrial capitalism and improve long-run political stability .492 Third, years of
dealing with the unruly Diet convinced him that the oligarchs had to establish their own
party to engage rather than alienate elected officials. His vision was to create and lead a
new party that would accommodate the interests of the urban industrialists.
During his third tenure as a Prime Minister (May 1898), Ita submitted a bill that
would revise the election law of the House of Representatives. Existing voting eligibility
rules stipulated that one must annually pay at least fifteen yen in land tax or income tax
491 It6 Yukio, IU5 Hirobumi: Kindai Nihon wo Tsukutta Otoko [It6 Hirobumi: The man who made modern
Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2010), 399.
492 Uchida Kenzo, Kinbara Samon, Furuya Tetsuo, Nihon Gikai Shi Roku (1) [The history of parliamentary
government in Japan (volume 1)] (Tokyo: Daiichi Hoki Shuppan, 1990), 226.
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(in the case of the latter, consecutively for three years) to be eligible for voting. The
proposed bill would cut the required land tax down to five yen or, for those paying
corporate or individual income taxes, to three yen (with a two-year instead of three-year
requirement). Ito also proposed to alter the electoral system itself, from a mostly single-
member district to multi-member large district system with a modification that would
favor urban districts. Under his plan, a rural district would receive one seat per 100,000
people whereas urban districts would get one seat per 50,000 people; at least one seat
would be given to cities with a population of less than 50,000. The proposed change
would increase the total Lower House members from 300 to 472; 113 seats would
represent urban districts, which meant that representatives from urban areas would
increase from 5.7% to 24% of total Diet members.493 Moreover, in order to weaken
paternalistic voting style in rural areas, the new law would abolish non-secret voting
under Article 38 and implement an anonymous single-entry ballot system.494
It's bold move to initiate a major political reform met resistance upfront. The
agrarian-dominated House of Representatives established a special committee to study
the revision of the election law. It inserted clauses that would favor rural districts and,
under their amended proposal, only 39 seats out of 440 members would be from urban
districts.495 While the committee's amendments were approved in the House of
Representatives on June 1898, the deliberation in the House of Peers was cut short
because the Diet rejected It6's proposal to raise the land-tax and he retaliated by
proroguing and then dissolving the Diet.
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493It (2009), 310.
494 Uchida et al., (1990): 225-226.
495 Ibid., 227.
In February 1899, Yamagata submitted an electoral reform bill that was similar to
It's. Though Yamagata briefly allied with the pro-industrialist faction in the Diet to
raise the land-tax, he remained unenthusiastic about giving the industrialists a larger
political role. His ambivalence towards extension of suffrage stemmed from his fear that
it would increase the power of political parties vis-d-vis the non-elected oligarchs and
aristocrats in the House of Peers. Nonetheless, Yamagata submitted a pro-urban
industrialist electoral reform bill based on three strategic objectives. Firstly, he
recognized that the existing landholding-biased electoral system gave too much voice to
the agrarian elites and this interfered with his goal of expanding government spending to
support military expansion. Secondly, according to Uchida et al. (1990: 242), Yamagata
incorporated 1t6's vision of political reform to mend their increasingly fragile relationship
and as a gesture that the rivalry between the two was still amicable. Thirdly, Yamagata
was certain that the agrarian-dominated House of Peers would modify the content of the
496
bill to guarantee an incremental, rather than drastic, institutional change.
Yamagata's prediction was right on the mark. The House of Peers made
significant modifications to the bill that the House of Representatives had already
passed.497 The special committee set up in the House of Peers revised the original bill by
raising the eligibility requirements for the land-tax from five to ten yen, income tax from
three to seven yen, and allocating only 60 seats out of the total of 419 to urban districts,
in effect, slashing the ratio of urban districts from 22% under Yamagata's bill to 14%.498
Despite pressure from t6 and the pro-industrialist members of the Kenseito such as
496 l (2009), 310-311.
497 The House of Representatives only made minor changes to the original bill.
498 Uchida et al. (1990), 244-245.
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Itagaki and Hoshi, the Diet session ended before the two Houses could reach a sensible
agreement.
Though the pro-industrialist forces were unable to change the national-level
electoral rules, they succeeded at the local level. Since the opening of the Diet, popular
parties had been interested in restructuring local governments but the opportunity
presented itself only in 1898 when Yamagata, keen on building a land-tax-hike coalition,
agreed to push through local government reform. 4 99 After successfully raising the land-
tax, Yamagata followed up on his side of the bargain with the Kenseito and submitted a
bill that would dilute the representation of wealthy farmers in local politics. The 1899
law abolished an indirect voting system (fukusensei) in which the county and prefectural
assembly members were elected from the members of the city, town, and village
councils. 50 0 The city, town, and village councils were dominated by large landholders
since members were elected on the basis of a Prussian-style three-class voting system that
heavily weighted the votes of the highest tax payers.5 0' The new law enabled direct
voting by ordinary citizens who met the eligibility requirements. One such requirement
was a payment of more than three yen in annual national taxes. 0 2 In addition, the
provision that allocated one-third of the county assembly seats to the wealthiest
landowners who voted within their own ranks was also discontinued. The concessions
made to the pro-industrialist Kenseito were consistent with Yamagata's objective to make
499M (2009), 309.
500 Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), 47-48.
501 However, the Kenseito did not succeed in abolishing the three-class voting system because the House of
Peers outright rejected it. The system would last until the early 1920s.
502 Descriptions of the1899 Regulations Governing the Organization of Prefectures and Rural Districts are
in chapter two ("Public Law") of Wilhelm Rbhl, ed., History of Law in Japan since 1868 (Netherlands: Bill
Academic Publishing, 2005), 118-119.
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the Diet more conducive to expanding the military budget for the impending war against
Russia.503
Later that year, Yamagata once again attempted to re-engineer the national
electoral terrain by submitting an electoral reform bill that was mostly identical to the one
in the spring. This time around, the Lower House members agreed to compromise by
lowering the ratio of urban districts. Their proposal reduced it from 21.4% (under
Yamagata's second proposal) to 16.1% in hopes of making the bill more palatable to the
members of the Upper House.504 The two leading parties, however, inserted a
modification that would retain the single-member electoral system for districts in the
countryside.505
As in the previous round of negotiations, the House of Peers argued for a more
restrictive franchise requirement and insisted on the large multi-member districts in the
original proposal. Upon a joint meeting between the two Houses in late February 1900,
the following new electoral rules were agreed upon. The Election Law of 1900 doubled
eligible voters from one percent to 2.2% of the population (450,852 to 982,868). Under
the new law, voters had to be male, twenty-five years or above, who had fulfilled the one-
year residency requirement and annually paid ten yen in national taxes (land or income
tax, and, for the latter, paid consecutively for two years).5 06 The pro-Yamagata groups in
the House of Peers clearly won on the issue of suffrage.
503 I (2009), 309.
504 For an extended discussion on the content of the revision, see Uchida et al. (1990), 25 8-260.
505 Kenseito, Kenseihonto, and Teikokuto were deeply divided over the choice of electoral system. No
consensus was reached among the parties since Kenseito members were split between large (with multiple-
entry ballot system) and small district size, whereas Teikokuto pressed for a medium-sized district and,
Kenseihonto was in favor of a small district. Uchida et al., (1990), 258-260.
506 The previous requirement of family register (honseki) was eliminated.
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On the final choice of electoral system, however, the House of Peers agreed to the
industrialists' demand of designating separate urban-electoral districts for cities with
more than a population of 30,000 people and would receive at least one seat. The rest of
the rural countryside was to be arranged as prefecture-sized large, multi-member districts.
One seat would be allocated per 130,000 people. Out of a total of 369 Diet seats, 61
(16.5%) were to be chosen from urban districts. In addition, a new secret ballot system,
consisting of a single non-transferable voting was instituted.507
Yamagata insisted on the large, multi-member district because he detected half-a-
century before Maurice Duverger that single-member districts seemed more
advantageous for large parties and would likely result in a two party system by
eliminating smaller parties.508 Yamagata hoped to create a "triangular party system"
comprised of the two existing main parties (e.g., Kenseit6 and Kenseihonto) and a new
pro-oligarchic party that would hold the decisive vote between the two; he believed that
the large, multi-member district system would help achieve this result.509 He would find
out years later, however, that the new configuration of the electoral system had little
effect on the party system, as two large parties would eventually dominate the political
scenery.
507 Accordingly, a total of 97 districts emerged: 46 single member district, 3 two-member district, 2 three-
member district, 5 four-member district, 12 five-member district, 10 six-member district, 5 seven-member
district, 3 eight-member district, 4 nine-member district, 3 ten-member district, 3 eleven-member district,
and I thirteen-member district. Soma Masao, Nihon Senkyo Seidoshi [The history of Japanese electoral
system] (Fukuoka: Kyiish0 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 20.
508 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995: 45). Maurice Duverger, a French jurist and sociologist, discovered a
link between electoral system and party system (often referred to as the Duverger's law or principle). He
contended that a plurality system tends to eliminate smaller parties and results in the emergence of a two-
party system while a proportional representation system tends foster the growth of political parties and
eventually leads to the development of a multi-party system.
5 Yamagata designated the Teikokuto (the Imperial Party) as the rising third party. Ito who had been
interested in creating his own party, may have had a similar rationale for choosing the large, multi-member
district system over the single-member district (Fujimura, 1961: 198-199). See also Peter Duus, Party
Rivalry and Political Change in Taish6 Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 150.
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Reminiscent of the first round of democratic reforms in the late 1880s, the
extension of franchise in 1900 was accompanied by installation of safeguards against the
penetration of elected officials into other organs of the government.5 10 Firstly, in
anticipation of the electoral reform, Yamagata issued the 1899 Civil Service Appointment
Ordinance (bunkan ninydrei) to block leading parties from introducing patronage politics
into the bureaucracy. 5 1 The revised law stipulated that vice ministers and secretary
generals (chokuninkan) had to be selected among career bureaucrats, such as the sectional
chiefs (seninkan), who had passed the civil service exam.5 12 Secondly, Yamagata
promulgated the Public Order Police Law (Chian keisatsu h5) on 10 March 1900 to
suppress any social movements that might challenge the prevailing political order. The
law was particularly intended to cripple the organized labor movement before it was able
to threaten the state and banned strikes and activities deemed disruptive by the police.5 13
Thirdly, on 19 May 1900, Yamagata restructured the Ministries of Army and Navy to
further isolate the military from the Diet. Foreseeing the strengthening of political parties
in the future, Yamagata created a new rule stipulating that the Ministers and Vice
Ministers must be chosen from a pool of active-duty, high-ranking officers.5 14 Each of
the measures that Yamagata used-against the bureaucracy, military, and the organized
510 Beyond these measures, Yamagata also augmented the power of the Privy Council in 1900 as an
additional safeguard against Diet control.
511 Yamagata proceeded with the 1899 civil service reform without discussing the matters with Kenseito.
Chapter six of this dissertation contains an in-depth examination of the civil service reforms and their
impacts on social policy outcomes.
m Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995), 183.
513 According to Mitani (1988: 72) the "Yamagata government is said to have modeled its draft on a bill
that failed in the German Reichstag in May 1899 owing to the opposition of the German Social Democratic
Party." He adds that there was no debate on the bill whatsoever in the Diet and in 1901, "the Japanese
Social Democratic Party was organized on the model of the German party, but the government immediately
prohibited it."
514 A civilian appointment for high-ranking military positions had never been made prior to the enactment
of the new policy. It Yukio (2009), 321.
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labor movement--are analyzed at greater length in chapters four through six, which also
evaluates what, if any, were the redistributive consequences.
While Yamagata was building barriers against the growth of party politics, Ita
chose to do the opposite.5 15 On September 1900, Ita founded the Friends of
Constitutional Government Association (Rikken Seiynkai).516 In order to attract
members from the urban commercial and industrial class, Ltd purposely used a more
inviting and approachable word, kai (association), instead of the conventional word for a
party, to. 517 Despite Lt6's extensive efforts to recruit urban businessmen to his party,
many, including Iwasaki Yanosuke of Mitsubishi zaibatsu (brother of Yatard), chose not
to join. Iwasaki did not join the Seiyikai because of his preexisting relationship with
Okuma Shigenobu.518 The reluctance of others stemmed from a fear of economic
repercussions; a number of bankers (including the Sumitomo and Mitsui zaibatsu)
politely declined Lt6's invitation citing that their business interests (e.g., having clients
from another party) prevented them from choosing sides. Thus, facing difficulty
recruiting the urban mercantile class, the Seiytikai was comprised mostly of members
from the old Hoshi-led Kenseitd (old Liberal Party), which dissolved to merge with the
Seiynikai.
Ironically, It6, who played the decisive role in advancing suffrage for the
commercial and industrial class, was unable to truly form an alliance with men whose
515 It6 has decided to form a party as early as 1891 and divulged his intention to Yamagata, which further
fragmented the oligarchy. George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan
1868-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 96.
516 As Uchida et al. (1990: 279-280) and It6 Yukio (2009: 441-442) note, the bulk of the funding to start-up
the Seiyflkai came from the Ministry of Imperial Household and Ito Hirobumi proudly (and openly) shared
with his colleagues that the Meiji Emperor supported his party.
517 In addition, he eliminated the word "party" in order to differentiate itself from the long-established
parties. Takii Kazuhiro, Ita Hirobumi [Ito Hirobumi] (Tokyo: ChQo Koron Shinsha, 2010), 176-178, 186-
187.
518 Takii (2010), 170-174.
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status he had helped to enhance. Years after Ito's assassination in 1909, the members of
the zaibatsu would excel at wielding influence over the policymaking process by
diversifying their source of power. 519 The two leading parties would each be backed by a
zaibatsu and the members of the conglomerates would possess a large number of seats in
the House of Peers. In pursuit of higher revenue, these men made Japan richer, but the
cost of affluence was born by those who were left behind.
Although the land-tax comprised nearly three-quarters of government revenue in
the early years of Meiji, the proportion gradually decreased over time, to around 20% in
1902 and by 1940, it was around 3 percent.5 20 The tax issue became less contentious and
salient over time because they shifted the burden towards the lower and middle income.
As Gluck (1985, 31) notes,
[1]ocal taxes also increased twelvefold between 1890 and 1912, with the
household tax (kosfiwari) at the lead. As a result, the combined national
and local tax burden of each taxpaying household more than tripled
between 1897 and 1912 alone. Inflationary price rises further worsened
the situation. Lower-income strata, whether worker or tenant, were
particularly hard hit. Despite controversy among economists over whether
or not real earnings rose in Meiji Japan, contemporary sources make it
clear that a fair number of Japanese felt that they were worse off in 1911
than they had been earlier. Too pressed to afford the luxury of the longer
view, they felt that "the world belongs to the producers (seisansha)." For
despite the growing excess of production, laborers were out of work, "and
even in the good years people starved," which was like suffering from lack
of water in the middle of Lake Biwa."
While the ruling elites settled the tax issue by shifting the tax burden down the income
ladder, they also began assaulting the Relief Regulations itself. The next section explains
519 A Korean nationalist, An Jung-geun, who opposed the annexation of Korea, assassinated lto while
visiting Manchuria.
520 Ronald P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1966), 15.
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how the agrarian-industrialist dominated Diet denied funds from the ultra minimalist
Relief Regulations and attempted to abolish it.
IV. Denying the claim to relief
The game of avoidance
In the early 1900s, party politics became "accepted as an inevitable part of the
political process" and a premium was placed on "the careful cultivation of strategic
political connections and the building of strong electoral base (jiban)."m Redistributive
politics entered a new phase in which the newly-enfranchised urban industrialists joined
the anti-redistribution force with the agrarian elites; these two were fatal and they dug
their heels in saying no to redistribution towards the poor. On the other hand, the ruling
elites also attempted to mobilize civil society groups to rescue the growing number of
poor. Yet, just a decade later, government officials would come to terms that civil
society groups were not equipped to handle the massive dislocation that markets inflicted
in the age of industry.
Sparing nothing: the new politics of retrenchment
The first general election after the electoral reform of 1900 took place in the
summer of 1902. A few months prior to the election, a couple of politicians made last-
minute effort to revive the 1890's poor relief bill. This would be the last attempt to
expand general poor relief in the Diet until the arrival of the Great Depression.522 The
economic downturn that began in 1900 depressed wages and increased unemployment.
521 Duus (1968), 8.
522 In 1912, Rikken Kokuminto's Fukumoto Makoto submitted the Aid for the Elderly (Ydr5 Han). It
proposed to provide government aid for low-income elderly above seventy years of age who did not
possess any assets. This bill was also dismissed without any meaningful deliberation in the Diet.
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Though the economic slump itself did not hit the nation hard, it was becoming more
evident to public officials that the 1874 Relief Regulations was simply too restrictive.
Alas, the 1874 Relief Regulations was created by the oligarchs during the transition from
feudalism and was never intended to be a permanent fixture of Japanese society. Around
1902, 150,000-160,000 poor orphans who had no one to turn to (mukoku no kylimin) were
eligible for assistance under the Relief Regulations but were not receiving aid.m
Similarly, a 1902 survey in Miyagi prefecture showed that less than thirty out of 8,000
poor households were receiving public assistance. 524
Three members of the Diet, including And6 Kametar6 of the Rikken Seiyikai,
submitted a resolution urging the government to deliver relief to those in need. 2  The
majority of Diet members agreed that the existing Relief Regulations was inadequate and
passed a proposition on February 25 calling for the problem to be addressed. On March
5th,, And6 and his colleagues followed up by submitting the 1902 Poor Relief bill (kyi-hin
hdan), which extended coverage to the new class of working poor in factories and tenant
farming. While the 1902 bill had a slightly altered name from the 1898 Poor Relief bill
(kyfihin instead of kyfimin), its content was largely the same.526 Aside from improving
the take-up rate, they explained that the expansion of poor relief was necessary to address
523 Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 98.
524 Inoue Tomoichi, Kyilsai Seido Ydgi [Outline of relief giving system] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentaa,
1995), pp. 193-194.
525 The proposition was called "Rescuing Poor Workers and Tenant Farmers" (Hinmin Kyntjo Radesha
Oyobi Shakuchinin Hogo ni Kansuru Kengian). See Kaseish6 Goj6 Nenshi HenshO linkai, Kdseish5
Gojalnenshi [Annals of fifty years of the Ministry of the Welfare] (Tokyo: Zaisan Hojin Kosei Mondai
Kenkyakai, 1988), 78.
526 One of the few differences between the two bills is that the 1902 version deleted the clause that
stipulated recipients to return the benefits they received once they were off welfare. Ando never explained
the origins of the bill but Ogawa (1976) speculates that the bill was essentially a near copy (with minor
revisions) of the Okuma-Itagaki 1898 KyFihin Hoan that was originally drafted by the Home Ministry.
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the rising incidence of vagrancy and crimes committed by the impoverished.5 27 They
also pointed out that relying on civil society groups to fight poverty was unsuitable
because it could proliferate the indolent population (damin).
Though Ando was a member of the Rikken Seiytikai, the rest of its members
certainly did not share his enthusiasm for the poor relief bill. The social reform-minded
Ando was an outcast who submitted a number of politically unviable bills in the early
1900s, including one to repeal the death penalty. Remarkably, the majority of Diet
members agreed that Japan's public assistance was too meager; this is the reason why
they recommended action on the issue. As before, the central issue was not about the
merits or demerits of poor relief per se, but who was going to pay for it. 528 When the
proposal to expand public expenditures to aid the poor surfaced, none of the political
groups stepped forward to pick up the tab.
The agrarian-industrialist dominated Diet refused to fork over funds for the poor
and allowed a vociferous opponent of poor relief named Inoue Tomoichi, a senior
bureaucrat from the Home Ministry, to shred the 1902 Poor Relief bill into pieces. Inoue
scorned at the bill on the grounds that it was based on a fundamentally flawed premise
that the government should be responsible for helping the destitute. 29 Unlike the earlier
bureaucrats, like Goto Shimpei (who was at this time in charge of civil affairs at the
527 Ogawa (1976), 117.
528 At a broader level, Sheldon Garon elegantly recapitulates how redistributive policy was framed by the
ruling political elites in pre-war Japan: "The chief areas of contention rarely revolved around whether the
authorities should or should not be responsible for social welfare. As in the early modern era, most
Japanese officials believed that the central state (as successor to the shogun and daimyo) bore responsibility
for mobilizing the resources of the nation, at all levels, to assist the destitute. The questions that most
divided officials and politicians before 1945, however, were to what extent the state should impose central
control over the provision of relief, and how the financial burden would be allocated among the state, local
governments, communities, and families." Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in
Everyday Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 32-33.
5 Inoue was the head of the Home Ministry's Prefectural Section or the Bureau of Local Affairs.
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Taiwan Governor's Office), who advocated government intervention during the 1890s,
Inoue believed that poor relief should be undertaken mostly by families and private
charities, not the government. Knowledgeable of social welfare developments abroad,
Inoue warned that expanding relief would multiply the indolent poor and drain state
finances. 530 If there was one lesson Inoue wanted others to learn about the European
experience, it was to never make public relief an "obligation" of the national or local
governments or grant the poor the "right to relief."5 3 Pointing to the occasional donation
made by the imperial household as an appropriate method of demonstrating state
generosity, he adamantly opposed overhauling the existing ultra-minimalist poor relief
system. Given its feeble political support base, Inoue's strong anti-redistribution stance
single-handedly put the 1902 poor relief bill to rest.
Throughout the 1890s, the Home Ministry was home to the proponents, not
opponents, of government aid to the needy, prompting one to ask: what led to this
change? Democratic reforms in the late 1880s and 1900 were accompanied by civil
service reforms intended to insulate the bureaucracy from the expanding influence of
political parties. Nonetheless, in reality, political parties managed to inject patronage
politics into the bureaucracy and exerted influence in the promotion of officials. Inoue
already had strong ties with the urban industrialists and he would later pursue amakudari
(descent from heaven) where civil servants migrate to other high-profile government
posts or private sector positions. He would help build alternative modes of poor relief in
the next decade that centered on the largess of business leaders such as Shibusawa and
530 Garon (1997), 40.
531 For Inoue's discussion on how the Japanese poor relief system diverged from the western relief systems,
see Inoue (1995: 185-186).
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the imperial family; he would later use the close relationship that he built during those
years to become the governor of Tokyo in 1915.m
Attempts to mobilize civil society
The minimalist approach held a hegemonic position in the political debates,
hence, the state redirected its attention to play a greater role as an arranger, nurturer, and
ultimately manager of privately-run relief activities organized mostly around civil society
actors. The specific instruments the state chose to nurture private relief activities took
various forms. First, government officials provided a more permissive environment for
religious groups to aid the needy, including the poor, directly.5 3 3 The three main
religions during Meiji Japan-Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity-all promoted
beliefs conducive to philanthropic work: the Confucian value of compassion (jikei),
Buddhist emphasis on mercy (jihi), and the Christian focus on charity (jizen).
Christians and Buddhists in particular excelled in providing a variety of social services
such as orphanages, shelters, and almshouses that also benefited the poor. In the case of
Christianity, being freed from the oppressive Tokugawa regime meant that they could
start off afresh and re-establish themselves; charity work was an excellent venue to
establish their roots in Japanese society. Buddhists also gravitated towards social work to
repair their tarnished image, one of corruption and scandals that were widespread in the
feudal past. By providing a variety of social services, followers could demonstrate the
virtues and good deeds of Buddhist practices and help others in need along the way.
m He was also in charge of running the Meiji Jingu Shrine (a Shinto shrine dedicated to the Emperor
Meiji) in 1915.
533 Article 34 of the Civil Code of 1896 allowed the establishment of religious, charity, and other groups
that served the greater public good (koeki).
5 Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 72.
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When the Christian-affiliated Salvation Army was established in 1895, authorities
were initially wary, as it was perceived as being a socialist organization. 5 However, by
1900, they were embracing the crews' efforts; the Salvation Army's charity pot, women's
rescue centers, shelters for workers, and other services that they provided were all
welcomed. In fact, when General William Booth, the founder of Salvation Army, visited
Japan in 1907, he was greeted by prominent industrialists, Kiyoura Keigo and Shibusawa
Eiichi, and was even granted an audience with the Emperor. 536
For the state, nurturing the civic activism of religious groups in caring for the
poor was like killing two birds with one stone. From one perspective, private charity and
other social services supplied by religious groups substituted for public relief. In many
cases, they collected funds from members and communities to provide basic services
such as food, shelter, and medical care for those in need. Even if the state partially
subsidized their efforts, the hard work of religious groups meant less work for the
government. Home Ministry official, Shiba Junrokur6, channeled Karl Marx's famous
dictum that religion served to opiate the suffering of the masses and commented on the
unique role of religion in pacifying dissension and calming the minds of the disgruntled:
"We do not know when a miner who has been working his whole life with much hope
will explode from despair and desperation. It is imperative that such a man obtain
spiritual solace, which only religion can provide."5 37 The state recognized religion's
complementary role and granted independence to religious groups such as Tenrikyo,
5 Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai Kyijtinen Tsashi Hensan linkai (ed.), Jizen kara Fukushi e [From
Philanthropy to Welfare], (Tokyo: Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai, 2003), 14.
536 Ibid., 14-15.
m Karl Marx famously commented that religion is the "opium of the people" as it creates illusion and gives
solace to their existing misery. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Collected Works (New York, NY:
International Publishers, 1976), 175. Rekishigaku Kenkyokai, Koza Nihonshi 5 [Seminar on Japanese
history vol. 5], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1970), 157-158.
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which promoted "Joyous Life" in 1908. Moreover, in an effort to coordinate with
religious groups, state officials also organized meetings with representatives of religious
groups (e.g., Sankyd Kaidd, a meeting of Shinto, Buddhist, and Christians). 538
Second, the government gradually took over privately run reformatory centers in
1900s. In the early decades of Meiji, philanthropists across the country established
reformatory, youth custody centers (kankain) to educate and guide delinquents. Ministers
and monks also initiated a number of them. The state saw potential in this line of
privately-run reformatory work and began encroaching into their activities. Reforming
the troubled minds of the next generation of young Japanese-loners from eight to
sixteen years of age-in the hopes of steering them away from begging, crimes, and even
radicalism appealed to political leaders. Thus, in 1900, the Japanese government enacted
the Reformatory Law (kankahd), which urged local governments to establish, run, and
fund reformatory centers. The law's recommendation was unheeded, subsequently, the
revision of the Reformatory Law in 1908 required each locality to establish these
facilities but stipulated that the central government would subsidize the management
cost. 539 In the same year, the government organized a national seminar on reformatory
work (kanka kyasai gigy5 kshikai). At the seminar, one official praised the work of
civil society actors in providing social services and revealed that the state would
538 The Home Ministry official who initiated this was Tokonami Takejiro. He was a career Home Ministry
bureaucrat but joined the Seiyakai in 1913. Garon (1987: 5) notes that "Tokonami vigorously supported
the formation of cooperatives among farmers during the Local Improvement Movement (1906-12). As vice
minister in 1912, he similarly sponsored the 'Assembly of the Three Religions' (Sankyo Kaido), an attempt
to mobilize Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian clergy behind social-work projects and a national campaign
against political radicalism."
539 Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi KyOgikai Kynjfinen Tsishi Hensan Iinkai (2003), 10.
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"cultivate champions" among voluntary social reformist groups; religious charity groups
were also a part of this grand state strategy to manage civic activities.540
Third, the state provided funds for private charity activities to flourish. Only
twenty established charity organizations (jizenjigy5 shisetsu) existed prior 1877 but there
were 251 and 547 by 1902 and 1911, respectively.54' Starting from around 1900, the
government actively began encouraging the nascent civic activism by subsidizing private
charity works.542 Most of the time, subsidies came in the form of an "imperial gift" from
the Emperor to emphasize his "benevolence," "foster popular loyalty to the state," and
"discourage the Japanese people from developing a consciousness of the 'right' to receive
relief."5 4 3 Got6 Shimpei, who failed to push for greater poor relief in the 1890s, finally
realized one of his goals when he returned to the Home Ministry in 1910 and established
the Royal Gift to Save People's Lives Foundation (Onshi Zaidan Saisei Kai), the
equivalent of the Meiji Relief Fund that he proposed in the 1890s.544 Furthermore, to
supplement imperial donation, the government poured efforts to compel wealthy
individuals to donate to private charity groups as well as establish their own.545
The combination of mobilizing civil society groups and strong agrarian-
industrialist opposition to poor relief in the Diet paved the path of retrenchment in the
early twentieth century. As table one demonstrates (appendix p. 43), only 15,211 people
540 Rekishigaku KenkyFakai (1970), 157.
541 Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 112.
542 Moreover, the government created a new organization and venue called the zenkoku jizen jigyo domei
taikai to strengthen charity networks.
543 Garon (1997), 49.
44 This changes name in 1952 to Shakai Fukushi Hjin.
5 The government also permitted philanthropists to take active stance on caring for the poor. Coinciding
with the "discovery" of poverty in urban areas, in 1891, Alice Pettee Adams established the Okayama
Hakuai Kai, the first settlement house in Japan, and in 1897, Katayama Sen established the Kingusurei
Kaikan. See Koseisho GojO Nenshi Henshti linkai (1988), 266.
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were receiving aid under the Relief Regulation in 1900 (out of a population of nearly
forty five million), and this figure steadily declined to a mere 2,402 in 1912.
V. The limits of civil society and the demands for state intervention
Mounting discontent
The Diet's decision to severely restrict poor relief and rely on non-governmental
organizations and resources to combat poverty since the 1890s faced scrutiny in the wake
of the rice riots of 1918. Public discontent erupted in a dramatic fashion over a nation-
wide shortage of rice during the summer, which triggered an avalanche of unrests as
wage-strikes in coalmines and small tenancy disputes arouse in chorus. The explosive
and mass-scale protest against depravity of basic food source was a turning point as it
thrust the issue of poverty relief back on the political agenda. Moreover, the rice riots
added momentum to the democratization movement, which opened the possibility for the
poor to gain the right to vote and secure their social rights through the ballot box. This is
a path of change, however, that does not come into fruition.
The rice riots and the welfare-deficit
The 1918 rice riots originated from a peaceful protest over scarcity of rice in a
fishing village in Toyama prefecture, but it quickly spread to other areas and escalated to
violence.546 The economic boom during World War One was accompanied by a
population growth, which led to higher demand for rice especially in large cities. Unable
546 The 1918 rice riots originally began on July 22nd in the fishing town of Toyama prefecture when a
group of housewives protested against rice merchants over their decisions to transfer stock of rice to other
domestic markets at a time when the local communities were suffering from severe shortage of rice.
Disputes over rice in other localities spread like a wildfire, in part due to an extensive media coverage on
the issue. Although the government imposed rules banning merchants from hoarding their stock of rice and
allowing trading companies such as Mitsui Bussan to import foreign rice, the measures were futile at
keeping prices under control. For an in-depth discussion on how the rice riots spread throughout Japan, see
Inoue Kiyoshi and Watanabe Toru (eds.), Kome Sdd no Kenkyal (Tokyo: Ythikaku, 1961).
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to keep up with the growing demand, the price of rice began to soar, which coincided
with lingering inflation from the wartime economic boom.5 4 7 Real wages steadily fell
from the mid-1910s, making it more difficult for ordinary citizens to buy consumer goods
and pay rents. 548 Working poverty had been a prominent feature of wage-laborers in
major cities since the late 1890s and spike in food prices in 1918 added more hurdles to
their plight. Although the census of the poor conducted by the police were unscientific
and therefore, statistically unreliable, it reported that incidence of abject poverty nearly
doubled from 1917 to 1918 in urban centers and a similar upward trend was observed in
rural areas. 549 As desperate citizens demanded rice in the streets, they also railed at
government officials for exclusively protecting and promoting the interests of the
privileged few.
The scope and scale of rice riots were unprecedented in modem Japanese history
and the ruling elites were in "profound shock" over the anti-status-quo energy released
from the explosive and contagious protests.5 50 The riots lasted for roughly two months, a
period in which more than six hundred incidents were recorded across thirty-seven
prefectures, all of the three urban centers (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto), and hundreds of towns
547 R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History ofJapan: Revised Edition (Boston, MA: Tuttle Publishing,
1997), 325.
548 Hoarding by rice merchants and the military marshaling food supply for the Siberian expedition
exacerbated the situation. Japan was preparing to intervene on the Soviet revolution and was planning to
send troops to Siberia in order to expand its sphere of influence in the northern part of Manchuria. On this
point, see Arai Shinichi and Harada Katsumasa, "Rekishi Kyoiku no Mondai ten (12)," [issues in history
education, no. 12] Rekishi Hy5ron no. 104 (April, 1959): 72.
549 Prior to 1945, data on poverty collected by the Home Ministry are not reliable as censuses were
undertaken with limited knowledge of statistical applications (e.g., sampling, measurements), and therefore,
the estimates considerably vary. For example, figures from the national government suggest that there
were roughly 500,000 (1% of the population) who were in dire poverty around 1918. While another census
suggested that 80-90% of the population were unable to pay the national income tax and deemed poor. See
Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 152. The census of the poor (saimin chosa) undertaken by the police was
intended keep a check on the poor with the aim of preventing poverty-born riots and crimes. Thus, the pre-
1945 poverty data lack accuracy since the main objective was for surveillance purpose and not for any
meaningful study or research on the poor.
550 Ogawa (1976), 176.
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and villages.5 5' In areas where violent protests, vandalizing, and looting occurred, the
military was deployed to restore peace and order. Nearly one million participated in the
riots and nearly 25,000 were arrested.
The mass protest was a wake-up call for state leaders who had been monopolizing
the formulation and execution of public policy since the inception of the Diet in 1890.
The riots, though triggered by the disequilibrium of supply and demand for rice, reflected
a broader issue of the country lacking a "safety net" for the general population in times of
distress. As Takahashi (1997: 39) notes, in the post-riot phase, government leaders came
to recognize the "imbalance" between the country's extraordinary advances in economic
development and its arrested development in the realm of social welfare. In particular,
local and national officials acknowledged that the prevailing ultra-minimalist 1874 Relief
Regulations and its substitutive non-governmental relief arrangements (e.g., families,
communities, and private charity) were inadequate at meeting the social needs of the
time.
Ruling elites were aware that poverty and hunger could foster dangerous and
divisive class-consciousness among poor commoners. This aspect was more alarming
given that upsurge in organized labor disputes that began during World War One. The
growth of slums and widespread working poverty in cities, and the day-to-day struggles
551 It also triggered riots in the Japanese colony of Korea.
552 Takahashi (1997), 39.
553 Arizuka Masakatsu, "Shakai Jigy6 no Seiritsu to Kyagoho no Seitei," [Establishing social work and the
enactment of the Relief Aid Law], Gekkan Fukushi 92, no. 10 (September, 2009): 43.
5 Even prior to the rice riots, the government was concerned about the rising labor unrests, spread of
socialism, and the intensifying pressure for democratization. In 25 June 1918, the government established
the Relief Work Research Division (Kyfisai Jigy5 Chdsakai) within the Home Ministry (chokurei, no, 623).
The committee agreed to study an assortment of issues, ranging from child protection services to labor
policy. This research division transformed into the Shakai Gigyd Chdsakai in 1921 and eventually
amalgamated into the social division of the Imperial Economic Council (taikoku keizai kaigi). After 1926,
the division was once again transferred back to the Home Ministry. See Ikeda and Ikemoto (2002), 153-
154.
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of small tenant farmers were all pointing to the difficulties ordinary citizens faced in
securing one's livelihood (seikatsu mondai). Workers objected over the deteriorating
social conditions and heightened economic insecurity and their demands extended
beyond improving wages and working conditions at job sites and included their rights to
"live" (seizon-ken or seikatsu-ken) and vote. 5 Implicit in the working class pressure for
democratization was that existing political inequality must be amended first in order to
ameliorate the socio-economic inequality.
Political leaders were mindful that repressive measures were short-term solution
to quell dissension and the broader "social problems" (shakai mondai) required a long-
term remedy. In the wake of the riots, they swiftly respond first and foremost by
overhauling the executive leadership. Given the flared temper over the government's
retort to the uprisings, the Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake was compelled to resign
and the Elder Statesmen nominated to replace him with Hara Takashi, the leader of the
majority party, the Seiytikai.sse The decision was historically unprecedented since no
popularly elected politician, let alone the president of the major party, had ever been
appointed as a prime minister. Hara was chosen in part because he had a "commoner"
image that was more palatable to the anti-aristocratic public. His past experiences in the
5 Ogawa (1976), 176. During this period, academics and journalists also joined the bandwagon calling for
universal political and social rights. For an extended discussion on their roles, see Ikeda and Ikemoto
(2002), 147.
556 The Terauchi government was roundly criticized for its lackluster effort to ameliorate the situation and
public pressure calling for his resignation intensified. Although the government announced that it would
intervene by orchestrating a massive rice-selloff at a below-market price, it quickly rescinded the scale of
the operation. In addition, the Terauchi government, though acknowledging the urgency, only allocated
35,000 yen for the government subsidies for relief activities (kyfisaijigy5 sharei kin). Terauchi resigned in
the fall of 1918 when the memories of the rice riots were still fresh. His resignation was symbolic in the
sense that the executive leadership had always been an appointee rather than an elected member of the
House of Representatives. The elder statesman, Yamagata Aritomo, recognizing the growing public
discontent recommended the appointment of Prince Saionji Kimmochi. Saionji believed that Hara would
be a better fit to lead the nation in times of popular discontent. The selection of Hara is also noteworthy on
the grounds that he was a party-centered politician who advocated the dismantling of the clique-based
politics.
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bureaucracy and journalism, and his key role in the development of the Seiykai, made
his repertoire standout; it was the more impressive given that he refused the coveted
aristocratic titles to maintain his popular party-centered identity.
Nonetheless, Hara's political position did not fundamentally deviate from his
predecessor's. Those who took part in his appointment, such as the Elder Statesman (and
the former oligarch) Yamagata Aritomo, sought after his leadership skills primarily to
quell public dissension and maintain the status-quo.5 57 Hara was a crusader of bourgeois
democracy, devoted to promoting the interests of his constituency, the wealthy landlords
and industrialists. His staunch opposition to universal suffrage was a key asset for the
aristocratic class at a time when the threat of a full-blown class conflict at home was
accentuated by an international trend towards democratic consolidation, either by
revolutionary forces or elite concession. In the aftermath of World War I, a number of
Western European countries including Britain and Weimer Germany granted universal
suffrage. In addition, the dramatic collapse of the Tsarist regime in the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution and its ensuing democratic consolidation alerted the Japanese authority that a
lack of bread and unwavering aristocratic rule could strengthen subversive forces. The
marriage of poverty and labor movement was a dangerous union since destitution made
left-wing revolutionary ideas appealing and organized labor had the means to halt the
production system and destabilize the entire politico-economic order.558
Faced with mounting discontent, Hara, being the quintessential anti-redistribution
leaders that he had been, refused to consider a social-welfare solution to the "social
m R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History ofJapan: Revised Edition (Boston, MA: Tuttle Publishing,
1997), 328.
558 Tipton (2008), 367.
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problem" and denied "the poor to a stable livelihood." 5 9 He would steadfastly maintain
his anti-redistribution stance until his untimely death in the fall of 1921 .560 Since joining
the Seiyn-kai in 1900, he opposed expansion of poor relief along with his fellow
representatives of the agrarian and industrialist interests in the Diet. Like his peers, Hara
believed that the real menace behind the domestic crisis of 1918 was organized labor, not
poverty. The rest of the rioters, the disgruntled housewives and those who were on the
brink of starvation, were weak and perceived as nuisance that could be hastily dismissed
or repressed. Resolving the "social problem," therefore, entailed taming the strongest
among the social groups.
In confronting the labor problem, Hara believed that a heavy dose of repression,
which his predecessors chose, could intensify labor conflict and increase pressure for
democratization. His method to contain the working class mobilization, instead, was
"candy and whip" (ame to muchi), the Japanese version of the "carrot and stick"
approach. While radical groups continued to be a target of repression, a more permissive
environment was provided for cooperative workers and a quasi-governmental
organization, the Harmonization Society (Ky6ch6kai) was created literally to
"harmonize" labor-management relations. At the same time, he preemptively initiated
partial democratization in 1919 to dampen pressure for democratization. He granted
suffrage to the petite bourgeoisie, comprised of small shop owners and well-paid
professionals, in order to prevent them from forging an alliance with the laboring class;
voting rights were also extended to the smaller landholders to further strengthen the
559 Sheldon Garon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley, CA; University of California Press,
1987), 65.560 Oka (1986), 118.
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Seiynkai's rural stronghold. On the topic of democratization, this was how far Hara was
willing to go.
Not all government officials agreed with Hara's position, however. Seiyiika's
rivals, the minority conservative parties, the Kenseikai and Kokuminto, were in favor of
more "carrots" and less "sticks." They promoted labor union law and various social
welfare legislations such as unemployment relief and sickness insurance on the basis that
"society as a whole is obligated to help those living in poverty.",61 More so than ever,
the opposition parties pushed to expand suffrage. The issue of democratization had been
a divisive issue among the elites since representative form of government was first
introduced to the country in the late nineteenth century. Pressure to advance democratic
reforms generally came from minority political groups, who were more willing to take
the risk and expand franchise in the hopes to change the balance of power in the Diet.
The Seiyaikai's rivals had been championing universal manhood suffrage for years and
did not see organized labor as an eminent political threat; their main foes were the Hara-
led Seiyfikai and the aristocratic members of the House of Peers. The working class
signified a potential bloc of voters in urban areas that the minority parties could tap into
to counter the rural-based Seiyikai.
The intra-elite conflict created a "pro-democratization" force; this was a necessary
but not sufficient condition. As the previous rounds of partial democratization had
shown, the other key condition for suffrage expansion was societal pressure from one of
the main social groups, such as the agrarian landholders (1890) or the urban industrialists
(1900). The prospects for universal suffrage in the aftermath of rice riots appeared
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561 Garon (1987), 56.
promising as organized labor was gaining in strength and they formed the pressure for
democratization from below.
Nevertheless, despite the fertile grounds for suffrage expansion, just a few years
after the rice riots, organized labor took a nose-dive-turn and entirely withdrew its
support for democratization. Comparatively speaking, the Japanese organized workers'
withdrawal from the democratization movement is an oddity. In much of the Western
world, the working class pressure for democratization played a crucial role in democratic
consolidation. In order to better understand how working class mobilization impacted
redistributive policy outcome in Japan, the next chapter presents a brief overview of its
origins and subsequent transformation, and analyzes the causes and consequences of the
failed alliance between organized labor and the unorganized unemployed and working
poor.
Conclusion
At the turn of the twentieth century, the representatives of agrarian landholders
and industrialists deflected every attempt to expand poor relief. The national goal of
making Japan richer and stronger, and the key was to do it as fast as possible, prioritized
government funds for industrial development and military expansion. As the previous
chapter has shown, the central issue in pursuing such an ambitious, late-development
strategy-and the most contentious one that deeply divided the elites--was about which
group would bear its cost. Diet members clashed over how to raise and spend revenue in
pursuit of maximizing their constituents' economic gains while minimizing their tax
liabilities in order to win re-election. On the revenue end, the agrarian elites, resenting
having to shoulder the bulk of financing the development of modern sectors opposed
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raising the land tax, which the pro-industrialist camp in the Diet aggressively pursued.
On the expenditure side, both groups had voracious appetite for a variety of patronage
projects, such as construction of roads, bridges, schools, and subsidies for businesses;
however, neither of them demonstrated any willingness to pay for it.
The embroiling tax impasse and pork barrel politics set the context under which
redistributive policy was made. Bureaucrats and a few politicians proposed expanding
poor relief, but they failed to even make a case for it in the Diet. Most of the elected
members agreed that the 1874 Relief Regulations was too restrictive and minimalist to
accommodate the growing need to aid the destitute. Yet, when presented with an
opportunity to make concrete decisions over how to finance a new poor relief system, the
majority of elected officials, refused to divert modicum of state resources to aid the poor
on the premise that it would drive up government expenses that their constituents would
end up having to foot the bill. Accordingly, despite the growing demand to protect
citizens who were aversely affected or, were left behind from industrial takeoff, the
majority of the Diet members who were driven to secure re-election chose not to catch-up
to its Western peers in the realm of social welfare.
Intra-elite conflict over fiscal policy led to partial democratization in 1900, which
further augmented the representation of urban industrialists and fortified the stronghold
against redistribution towards the poor. As Diet members turned away from helping the
destitute and paved the way for a welfare retrenchment in the age of industry. Senior
bureaucrats who opposed expansionary poor relief were promoted to prominent positions
and were encouraged to construct alternatives to public relief. They created a new poor
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relief arrangement that was funded mostly by private charity and the imperial household
and organized civil society groups as the first line of defense against poverty.
Nevertheless, relying on non-governmental actors and resources would prove
inadequate at protecting citizens over the long haul as they barely covered the needs of
those living in abject poverty. Paradoxically, the issue of saving the poor fell by the
wayside in the Diet when the country was becoming richer, stronger, and more
democratic. In other words, Japan made enormous progress in catching-up with its
Western peers in political, economic, and military terms except in the realm of social
policy.
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Appendix Chapter 5
Table 5.1 Public Assistance under the Relief Regulations (1890-1917)
Year Total Recipients Total Expenditure (yen)
1890 17,487 128,872
1891 18,291 116,188
1892 18,545 127,504
1893 18,146 121,427
1894 18,089 146,950
1895 16,715 141,450
1896 15,826 144,780
1897 16,040 173,273
1898 18,415 239,506
1899 16,103 159,985
1900 15,211 183,006
1901 14,575 179,353
1902 14,096 177,444
1903 15,097 212,597
1904 15,285 201,398
1905 14,183 192,840
1906 13,885 208,936
1907 13,106 216,907
1908 9,335 193,863
1909 3,753 62,979
1910 2,877 37,864
1911 2,718 41,511
1912 2,402 49,565
1913 7,629 135,093
1914 7,982 147,008
1915 7,247 134,583
1916 7,229 135,891
1917 7,355 163,520
Source: K6seish6, Kdseishd Gojalnenshi Shirydhen (May 1988).
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CHAPTER 6
Building an exclusionary democracy and a welfare state without a safety net:
The failed alliance between labor and poor
This chapter is divided into two parts The first part traces the evolution of
working class movement from its inception in the late nineteenth century to the
subsequent maturation in the 1920s and explains how late industrial development
prevented the poor from joining or benefiting from social movement spearheaded by
organized labor. The second part analyzes the consequences of the failed alliance
between labor and poor on the development of political and social welfare institutions.
The chapter begins by testing the validity of the power resources theory's main
claims that organized labor advocates democratization and greater redistribution and that
a strong left is critical for the advancement of democratic and social welfare reforms. An
in-depth examination of the origins of Japanese labor unions reveals that the relationship
between the ascendency of organized labor, on the one hand, and democratization and
greater redistribution, on the other, is tenuous. Industrial workers-who were mostly
poor at the nascent stage-did not pressure the government to expand poor relief. In fact,
while the Diet refused to consider revising the ultra-restrictive 1874 Relief Regulations at
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the turn of the century, labor organizers were exclusively focusing on gaining higher
wages and better treatment in the workplace.
Moreover, I show that as organized workers gained strength and became more
assertive, they withdrew from the quest to achieve universal suffrage in order to focus on
improving their employment conditions and wages at the level of the individual factory
or firm. The dualistic structure of late industrial capitalism induced decentralization of
the working class movement to the plant level and encouraged workers to focus on their
narrow workplace issues at the expense of pursuing broad-based political and social
welfare reforms.
As I explain below, Japan's late-development "catch-up" policies conferred
certain advantages to a handful of Tokyo-based capital-intensive firms to mount an
aggressive campaign to mold the working class movement at a relatively nascent stage.
They had ample financial and organizational resources to institute corporate paternalistic
programs and provide in-company training to entice workers. Honing corporate loyalty
and establishing a firm-based skill formation incentivized workers to organize vertically
at the firm or plant level and forgo horizontally-linked craft or industry unions. Their
deep pockets also enabled major corporations to forge close ties with political parties and
ensured that the government would help institutionalize a vertically-structured labor-
management relations. The powerful unions that formed within the gigantic corporations
not only chose brotherhood in the factory over class solidarity, they also set the pace for
the working class movement as a whole and were responsible for pressuring other unions
to leave the democratization movement.
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More broadly, the findings from this chapter show that how a country builds its
wealth matters in redistributive outcome because it structures how workers are organized,
which in turn defines the parameters of their actions, demands, and the beneficiaries of
the working class mobilization. The largely unorganized employed, unemployed, and
non-employable (i.e., too sick, old, or young to participate in the labor market) poor were
excluded from the movement spearheaded by organized labor and, as a result, they
remained vulnerable to political and social exclusion in the years to come.
In the latter part of the chapter, I analyze the consequences of the failed alliance
between labor and poor on the content of social welfare and democratic reforms. Weak
working class pressure for democratization and redistribution enabled the ruling elites,
comprised largely of agrarian landlords and industrialists, to exclude the poor from the
democratic process and social welfare advancement. They constructed an Asian version
of the Bismarckian social insurance system in order to coopt the emerging labor
aristocracy while they staunchly refused to construct a safety net for the unorganized
working and non-working poor. In building democracy, they extended voting rights to
the working class but inserted latent voting rules that prevented the poor from voting.
Thus, the failed alliance between labor and the poor hurt the prospects of the latter
gaining political and social rights.
I. Working class pressure for political and social change
The evolution of labor movement: A snapshot
One of the prevailing theories in the social welfare literature, the power resources
theory (PRT), contends that working class mobilization plays a central role in the
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562development of democracy and the welfare state. The PRT attributes the positive
correlation between democratic consolidation and generous redistributive policies in
European countries such as Sweden and Norway to the strength of organized labor in
pushing for political and social change. The underlying premise is that organized
workers (i.e., labor unions) and the poor (i.e., unorganized employed, unemployed, or
non-unemployable individuals with low income) share a pro-redistribution stance
because they do not have ample financial resources to protect themselves privately from
income losses due to economic shocks, illness, accidents, and other forms of adverse
events.563 In order to effectively prod governments to increase social welfare protection,
however, the political representation of working class was critical; it first and foremost
required expansion of franchise to the masses. Strong working class pressure for
democratization, therefore, increased the prospects of building democracy and a welfare
state. Examining the transformation of Japanese organized labor casts doubt on the
validity of PRT's core arguments because organized workers never advocated expansion
of poor relief and their drive for democratization diminished over time.
The evolution of the Japanese labor movement prior to 1945 can be broadly
categorized into three stages. In the nascent stage (1880-1911) industrial workers
engaged in unorganized disputes and struggled to mount collective action. Japan's
virtually non-existent guild and craft tradition and late-development position enabled the
government to adopt various anticipatory containment measures that prevented workers
562 On the working class role in democratization see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber, and John D.
Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). For
the link between working class mobilization, social policy development and democratization, see John D.
Stephens, "Democratization and Social Policy Development in Japan," in Democracy and Social Policy,
edited by Yusuf Bangura (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
563 Walter Korpi, "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States
and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists," World Politics, 58 no. 2 (January,
2006): 167-206.
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from organizing. The new class of industrial workers experienced destitution and
deplorable employment and living conditions but they exhibited no interest in pressuring
the government to revise the ultra-minimalist 1874 public assistance system. Workers,
however, advocated expansion of suffrage to the poor on the basis that the existing
economic inequality could not be ameliorated if political representation remained limited
and unequal. Government officials muted the workers' demands for political
representation by sheer force.
Despite the enormous constraints on workers to organize and articulate their
collective interests, they managed to form the country's first national labor federation, the
Yaaikai (Friendly Society) in 1912, marking the next stage of the working class
movement. In the second stage (1912-1910), organized labor enjoyed unprecedented
growth and transformation. Nearly two hundred labor unions were created throughout
the country and the national labor federation orchestrated a social movement calling for
broad, sweeping changes, including democratization and legal and social protection for
workers (but not poor relief). Energized by the nation-wide rice riots of 1918, the
working class pressure for democratization peaked and so did labor militancy.
The robust growth of working class movement, however, took a sharp turn away
from the democratization movement in the early 1920s. The drastic course correction
signaled the third and final stage of working class transformation as its organizational
structure crystallized. The workers of powerful corporations in Tokyo withdrew from the
democratization movement and encouraged others to leave the political space in order to
focus on their respective workplace issues. The dualistic industrial structure of late-
development capitalism gave employers enormous resources to entice workers to
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organize at the plant or firm level and sever horizontal linkages at the industry level. The
enticements included paternalistic programs as well as in-firm training; in the face of
such attractive offers, workers made a strategic decision to forge ties with management,
embrace corporate loyalty, and abandon class solidarity. Other smaller unions followed
suit and accelerated the proliferation of plant- or firm-based unions and decentralized the
labor movement completely. Let us now turn to the details of the causes and
consequences of the working class decentralization on democratization and redistributive
outcomes.
Stage I. The nascent labor movement: The "voice" of the underclass (1880-1911)
The takeoff of industrial capitalism at the turn of the century gave birth to a new
class of industrial workers in urban centers. In the 1890s, the number of factory workers
was estimated to be around 400,000 and it more than doubled to 950,000 by 1914.564
Workers at the time were largely unorganized and many faced difficulty in adjusting to a
new industrial environment.565 The plight of a typical factory worker was no different
from those living in abject poverty. The average wages of factory workers were low,
around twenty yen per month, "which was officially defined as the poverty level in
Tokyo in 1911.,,566 The growing presence of working poor in major cities prompted
journalists such as Matsubara Iwagor6 and Yokoyama Gennosuke to document the ordeal
of the "underclass society" (kaso shakai) that was forming amidst economic progress.567
564 The number of privately owned factory workers increased to 1,612,000 by 1919. Sheldon Garon, The
State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley, CA; University of California Press, 1987), 40.
565 The liberal labor market milieu was largely in part to the dismantling of feudal economy and strict
occupational and mobility restrictions.
566 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meii Period (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 175.
567 As previously discussed in chapter four, Matsubara Iwagoro and Yokoyama Gennosuke were the two
most prominent journalists that increased visibility of urban poverty at the turn of the century.
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Workers were "practicing new and little known skills in places full of dirt, crowded
together in slums (called 'caves' and 'islands') with scavengers, pickpockets, street
entertainers, rickshaw men, carters, ditch cleaners, navies, and the traditional outcast
group, the eta."5 68 They were treated as "near outcasts" in their communities with little
569prospect of escaping their misery.
Workers' welfare, however, was not solely dependent on their employment.
Government policies, specifically, social welfare and tax policies, had direct and indirect
impacts on the well-being of the less privileged. For example, social welfare programs
could supplement the wages of the working poor through cash transfers or in-kind
benefits. Yet, as explained in the previous chapter, the representatives of the
industrialists and agrarian landlords in the newly-established Diet steadfastly refused to
divert funds to create a comprehensive social assistance system. Instead, the ruling elites,
keen on providing the ever-increasing expenditures needed for militarization and national
industrial development, proceeded to extract revenue from lower income groups. They
imposed taxes on consumer goods (e.g., salt, sugar, oil, textile and soy sauce) and
transportation (e.g., streetcar fares) that further strained the day-to-day lives of ordinary
workers and their families. 570
According to Albert 0. Hirschman, individual or group responses to deteriorating
conditions or dissatisfactory outcomes can be categorized into two types.m In dealing
with their employers, for example, workers could either exit from the firm and seek
568 Thomas C. Smith, "The Right to Benevolence: Dignity and Japanese Workers, 1890-1920,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26 no. 4 (October 1984): 591.
569 Ibid., 589.
570 It Yukio, Taishd Demokurashii: Minshfi no T6jd [Taisho democracy: the emergence of popular mass]
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 9-10.
571 Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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another job or voice their grievances directly to their employers in the hope of improving
their working conditions. A similar classification of reactions applies to government
policies. Workers could immigrate to another country (exit) or articulate their interests
through formal or informal means (i.e., ballot box, public protests, lobbying) to provide
feedback (voice).572
Up until the first two decades of the twentieth century, workers responded to their
dissatisfaction at the workplace largely through the "exit" option. At the time, employee
loyalty was weak, resulting in a high labor turnover. The average duration of
employment was less than two years and the majority of them were day laborers. 573 The
"exit" trend among workers and the underlying liberal labor market condition was a
complete break from the feudal past. Under the Tokugawa regime, a set of regulations
and a caste system restricted the occupational and geographic mobility of the populace.5 7 4
When the feudal system was disbanded in the 1860s, the Meiji oligarchs deregulated the
labor market and encouraged individuals, especially the former samurai, to find a new
home and career.
What is striking about the Meiji era labor market flexibility is that it bore no
resemblance to post-1945 industrial relations, which are commonly described as the
lifetime employment model. Numerous scholars have attributed Japanese firms'
572 Although Hirschman introduces a third concept called "loyalty," like Brian Barry (1974) and Leonard
Schoppa (2006), I subsume that "loyalty" is a feature-rather than an alternative response-that increases
the probability of voice over exit ceteris paribus. Leonard J. Schoppa, Racefor the Exits: The Unraveling
ofJapan 's System of Social Protection (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Brian Barry, "Review:
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Reponses to Decline in Firms, Organization, and States by Albert 0. Hirschman,"
British Journal of Political Science, 4. no. 1 (January 1974): 79-107.
573 Workers' average length of employment increased to twenty-two months by 1914 (Gluck: 1985: 175).
5 The feudal four-tiered class system grouped individuals with similar occupations and economic status
and restricted inter-class mobility. The groups were hierarchically structured, in the order of importance,
they were: the samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants. The feudal lords and imperial family were
positioned above class system and the outcasts (burakumin) were occupied the very bottom.
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competitive strength to their exceptionally devoted workers who endure long hours and
are often committed for life.575 The general lack of loyalty among workers to their
employers during the Meiji period occurred in part because the practice of corporate
paternalism-employers offering a variety of welfare services and benefits such as
healthcare and funeral allowances to their employees to entice them to stay--had not
taken hold. Though paternalistic, family-style employment relations were not uncommon
in smaller workshops, they were virtually non-existent in the large, modem factories
where employers and employees hardly knew each other. 576 Among large companies,
corporate paternalism was first adopted by the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company in 1896;
others gradually followed suit (e.g., National Railways in 1906, and Oji Paper Company
in 1910).577 The widespread application of paternalistic programs took place only after
1920.
575 For an extended analysis of this point, see Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm:
Sources of Competitive Strength (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.),
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
576 Ronald Dore makes reference to Kaneko Kentar6's observation that the paternalism was "by no means
natural of Japan but also something which Japan had to learn from the West." Kaneko suggested that the
paternalistic practice also prevailed in some part of Europe, and cited an example of a "one-factory town
not far from Manchester" where workers were mostly "third-generation employees" that enjoyed a very
strong relationship with owners. Ronald P. Dore, "The Modernizer as a Special Case: Japanese Factory
Legislation, 1882-1911," Comparative Studies in Society and History 11 no. 4 (October, 1969): 442.
This observation calls into question the famed anthropologist Nakane Chie's argument that contemporary
Japanese corporate practices resulted from a historically-rooted social structure that "vertically" framed the
relations between employers and employees. See Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1970).
577 According to Samuels (2003: 127), the President of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, Muto Sanji, is
credit to have introduced and propagated corporate paternalism in Japan. Samuels concurs with Dore's
observation that corporate paternalism was not entirely made in Japan. He notes that "Muto picked up
elements of 'familism' and warm-heartedness from studying the practices of Krupp in Germany and NCR
in the United States, but he insisted that he was infusing them with traditional Japanese values." Muto
believed that the corporate paternalism "could be used to combat both unionization and state intervention."
For an extended discussion on the origins of corporate paternalism, see Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's
Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003),
126-129.
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Though rare, some workers pursued "voice" to generate change from within the
organization. In 1987, thirty-two disputes were recorded and they mostly concerned
better pay, status and working hours. The "dispute tradition" grew out of workers'
actions in the modem sector such as printing, railways, arsenal, and shipbuilding; they
arouse independently from the actions of traditional artisans and resembled peasant
protests of the earlier generations. 578 According to Gordon (1991), these disputes were
confined to "work group and workplace, rarely involving all the workers at an enterprise,
and almost never led by unions."5 79 Meiji socialist leaders such as Kotoku Shasui and
Katayama Sen helped establish a few unions, such as the Association for the Foundation
of a Labour Union (Rod6 Kumiai Kiseikai), amongst ironworkers in the late 1890s, but
they were all short-lived in the face of hostile employers and state repression.580
From the start workers faced enormous challenges in creating a formal,
organizational apparatus that could unite workers of diverse backgrounds. A weak craft
tradition prevented workers from controlling the supply of skill and hurt their prospects
for collective bargaining. As Sheldon Garon notes, the feudal era "guild system had
virtually collapsed by 1800 as rural craftsmen, who were not covered by guild
regulations, decimated the wage rates of urban artisans.",5 8 1 Furthermore, in the 1870s,
the Meiji leaders strictly prohibited the formation of guilds.
578 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1991), 67-68, 78.
579 Gordon (1991: 68) adds: "In railroads, heavy industry, and printing, a few key worksites or companies
were home to several disputes each, and these places served as centers where workers built a dispute
tradition."
580 Some of the earliest labor unions formed among iron and railway workers. Katoku Shasui was ajournalist, socialist, and anarchist, who co-founded the Heimin Shimbun (Common People's Newspaper)
and helped translate and introduce The Communist Manfesto to Japan. Katayama Sen co-founded the
Japan Communist Party in 1922 and was an influential player in building Japanese socialist movement.
Garon (1987), 17-18.
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Compounding the problem, the Meiji oligarchs' late-development
industrialization policy brought fast-paced, massive changes that impeded the formation
of a robust labor movement. In contrast to the strong craft tradition found in Western
Europe, the Japanese laboring class did not inherit an organizational platform that
workers could use to push their demands onto the negotiating table. In order to "catch-
up" to the West, the Meiji oligarchs initiated a large-scale transplantation of new
technologies and machines from the West, which "created entirely new trades" and
hindered organized labor's efforts "to impose traditional group control over the footloose
first generation of skilled workers."58 2 On a similar note, Ronald Dore recapitulates how
the country's Meiji "catch-up" policy posed a major setback for organized labor by
giving employers the upper hand:
Late developing Japan imported the latest nineteenth century and
twentieth century techniques into a society where traditional artisan skills
resembled those of sixteenth or seventeenth century Europe. Japan had to
make a technological leap-whereas Britain made a shuffling
technological advance. The smooth progression from the artisan skills of
the next century is reflected in the continuity of apprenticeship systems
and modes of skill certification throughout the transition from guilds to
unions. New inventions came gradually and in penny packages; the
workmen acquired the new skills they involved as a topping up of their
existing skills, and passed them on to their successors. In Japan there was
little such continuity. In the shipyards, the traditional-style caulkers could
be upgraded to handle new imported techniques, but iron-using
shipwrights had to be trained from scratch-and only the employer could
do it. 583
Andrew Gordon makes the slightly different point that a unified working class movement
was difficult to achieve during its infancy stage because the skilled masters (oyakata)
"were pushed by changing technology and management strategies to secure their own
positions at the expense of building a movement" and this predicament "led them to side
582 Ibid., 18.
583 Dore (1973), 412.
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with employers in some cases and to seek independent status as small factory owners in
others."5 84
Japan's late-industrializer status posed an additional hurdle for working class
mobilization because it enabled government authorities to learn from early industrializers
in the West that labor unrest generally increased as industrialization deepened. This
foreknowledge empowered Japanese government officials to pursue an anticipatory
containment of the left. The Meiji leaders learned through their frequent diplomatic
missions abroad and ongoing research surveys of the trends in Europe and the United
States that class conflict would intensify if left unchecked. The fear among the elites,
abroad or at home, was that the "voice" of workers contained a threat of disorder, chaos,
expropriation and, worst, revolution. Japan's status as a "follower" (kashinkoku), trailing
behind the advanced countries (seishinkoku), gave Japanese officials "the chance to
forestall" the problems and challenges that industrialization created and they were
determined to "avoid their mistakes."5 85
In anticipation of the birth of the working class, Japanese authorities primarily
took two measures to prevent collective action among workers: repression and regulation.
In the late nineteenth century, Yamagata, the heavyweight oligarch, saw firsthand during
his sojourn in Europe how labor unrest could spread like wildfire and destabilize the
political order. He utilized the police system that he created to monitor workers'
organizational activities. He also enacted the Public Order Police Law (Chian keisatsu
h5) in 1900 to demolish the nascent working class movement. Article 17 of the law
prohibited strikes and organized meetings that were deemed to be a threat to public
584 Gordon (1991), 81.
585 See Dore (1969), 439.
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order. 586 Armed with Article 17, Yamagata defiantly warned Katayama Sen, the socialist
leader, that "the labor movement was just sentenced to death."5 87 The chilling warning
by the oligarch was not an empty threat. In the aftermath of the Public Order Police
Law-aptly referred to then as "the labor union death sentence law" (rddi kumiai shikei
h5)-the resulting paralysis of the working class movement resulted in a handful of labor
disputes, averaging only around ten per year.5 88
In addition to repression, officials attempted to silence the "voice" of workers by
eliminating the source of dissatisfaction itself. One such example was the 1911 Factory
Law, the country's first national labor protection law. At the turn of the century, urban
poverty was increasingly "understood in relation to the poor working condition of factory
workers" and officials attempted to regulate the working environment before class
struggle escalated. 589 The bill itself was originally drafted by the Industrial Bureau of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, which had been researching overseas factory
laws since the 1880s. What the bureaucrats learned from Western countries was that they
586 According to Mitani (1988: 72) the "Yamagata government is said to have modeled its draft on a bill
that failed in the German Reichstag in May 1899 owing to the opposition of the German Social Democratic
Party." He adds that there was no debate on the bill whatsoever in the Diet and in 1901, "the Japanese
Social Democratic Party was organized on the model of the German party, but the government immediately
prohibited it." Taichiro Mitani, "Chapter 2: The Establishment of Party Cabinets, 1898-1932" (translated
by Peter Duus), in The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century (volume 6), edited by John
Whitney Hall (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 72.
587 Fujimura Michio, Yamagata Aritomo [Yamagata Aritomo] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kabunkan, 1961), 199.
588 Kobayashi Tango points out that the application of repressive measures during the nascent stage of
working class mobilization was certainly not unique to Japan. European governments also attempted to
discourage workers from forming unions by legislating anti-unions laws a century prior. England, for
example, banned labor unions at the turn of nineteenth century. The difference, however, was that
repressive measures in Japan largely muted the "voice" of workers whereas in Europe, the "voice"
intensified and workers were able to force governments to eventually repeal the anti-union laws.
Repressive measures had more debilitating effects in Japan because, as previously discussed, Japanese
workers did not inherit a strong organizational apparatus from feudal guilds or craft associations. Citing
Kobayashi Tango, Nihon Rodo Kumiai Undoshi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986) in Rekishi Kyokasho Kyozai
Kenkytikai (ed.), Dai Kyikan: Taisho Demokurashii to Shakai Undo no Gekika [Taisho democracy and
strengthening social movement, volume 9] (Tokyo: Gakk6 Tosho Shuppan, 2001), 135.
589 The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce conducted a survey of factory working conditions (shokko
jij3) in 1903. See Mutsuko Takahashi, The Emergence of Welfare Society in Japan (Vermont, Avebury:
1997), 36.
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had not proactively regulated the deteriorating factory environment in the early phases of
industrialization, which inadvertently drove workers to organize in order to improve their
working conditions.590 According to Gregory Kasza, the precautious Japanese officials
adopted the Factory Law "at a relatively early stage of economic development" as its
GDP per capita was only half of the level when countries such as Britain, Netherlands,
and Denmark instituted their employer responsibility for industrial accidents.591 The
1911 Factory Law had weak enforcement capacity and was limited in its scope as most of
the rules concerned the employment conditions of women and children and applied only
to firms with more than fifteen workers. 592 Nevertheless, the scope of its application
expanded overtime, further attesting to the government's continued insistence on
preventing the "voice" of workers from materializing in the first place.
The government and employers also established mutual aid societies that were
intended to protect workers from injuries, illness, and disabilities and ultimately assuage
labor-management conflict.593 Nearly two dozen mutual aid societies were created
between 1890 to 1904 in the private sector and they were commonly funded jointly by
employer subsidies and employee contributions. 594 At the initial stage of
industrialization, paternalism had yet to be institutionalized in the mainstream corporate
culture, but these initiatives hinted at employers' strategic interests in offering services
590 Health concern was also one of rationales behind the Factory Law. The officials wanted to assure that
workers' (especially women and children) were not in a deplorable condition where they could contract and
spread diseases. See Dore (1969), 438-439.
591 Gregory J. Kasza, One World of Welfare: Japan in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006), 15-16.
592 The 1911 Factory Law was enforced in 1916.
593 Toshimitsu Shinkawa, "Democratization and Social Policy Development in J4pan," in Democracy and
Social Policy, edited by Yusuf Bangura (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63.
594 Ibid.
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(in this case, a form of social insurance) to nurture workers' loyalty and assuage labor-
management conflict.
Muffling the "voice" of workers against employers was one matter. Suppressing
political dissent, however, was another. The authorities paid special heed to the workers'
use of "voice" against government policy. In contrast to the dominance of the "exit"
strategy in the labor-management relationship, workers' response towards government
policies took a different form. According to Hirschman (1970: 61), Japan's geographic
isolation made it a "no-exit polity," since for most Japanese, "only one place has ever
been home." In contrast, an Argentinean "could slip across the river to Montevideo and
still find himself a home."5 95 Likewise, the "voice" option to improve government
policies through the formal political process was not available because the laboring class
lacked the right to vote. Around 1900, just a little above two percent of the population
was eligible to vote, a group comprised mostly of large landholders and wealthy urban
industrialists.
Since the laboring class was unable to exercise "voice" within the political
system, they instead applied external pressure to mend policies in three notable ways.
Firstly, they formed the "crowd," commonly at Hibiya Park located in the heart of Tokyo,
demonstrating against government policies, especially on matters of taxation (e.g.,
transportation or consumer goods), which directly hurt the livelihoods of workers.596
Secondly, they expressed their dissatisfaction in writing. Prominent socialists such as
Kbtoku Shusui and Sakai Toshihiko founded the socialist newspaper, Heimin Shimbun
595 Hirschman quotes Dore on this point. See Ronald P. Dore, "Latin America and Japan Compared," in
Continuity and Change in Latin America, edited by John J. Johnson (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1964: 238);
596 Gordon (1991), 51.
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(The Commoner's Newspaper), in 1903 and served as editors.597 It offered a critical
assessment of a wide range of government policies. For example, the newspaper
criticized the government's continued refusal to expand general poor relief in the midst of
growing military expenditures.598
Thirdly, Sakai and others established the Social Democratic Party (Shakai
Minshuto) in 1901. The party manifesto demanded the elimination of the gap between
the rich and poor through equitable and just redistribution of wealth, but it spared the
details on how to achieve these objectives. Action speaks louder than words and, as
discussed in the previous chapter, while the Home Ministry bureaucrats were fighting to
expand poor relief in the late 1890s, organized labor leaders remained silent on the issue
of revising the ultra-minimalist 1874 Relief Regulations. The general lack of interest in
poor relief was not solely based on the fact that the public assistance system did not
provide benefits to the working poor. As discussed in chapter five, a couple of the poor
relief bills that the bureaucrats drafted proposed compulsory workers' insurance
programs. According to Ogawa Masaaki, most socialist leaders focused on improving
workers' benefits and remained apathetic towards expanding poor relief.599 In addition,
industrial workers sought to augment their political "voice" by associating themselves
with the middle class, not with individuals who were weak and powerless at the lower
597 A few years prior, Katayama Sen served as the editor of the first labor publication, a bimonthly
magazine called the Labor World (Rod5 Sekai).
598 For example, see 21 February 1904 Heimin Shimbun article that criticizes the government for de facto
conditioning poor relief to contribution in military services. Article quoted in Yoshida Kyaichi, "Meiji
Ishin ni Okeru Hinkon no Henshitsu," [The change in the quality of poverty during the Meiji Restoration]
in Nihon no Kyfihin Seido [the Japanese Poor Relief System], edited by Nihon Shakai Gigy5 Daigaku
Kyihin Seido Kenkyfl Kai (Tokyo: Imura Juji, 1976), 137.
599 The only exception was Abe Isoo who introduced the British poor relief system through his publications,
(Shakai Mondai Kaishaku H6 [Analyzing social issues], and advocated that the government should be
responsible for poor relief and that the poor are entitled to relief. Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai
Hoshe5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keis6 Shob6, 1969), 106.
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stratum of society. Building a political party and shoring up electoral support required
significant organizational and financial resources and perhaps the new working class,
who was aspiring to ally with the professionals and the better off, saw little value in
aiding the poor. From the collective action perspective, the general lack of interest in
changing the country's ultra-minimalist public assistance system was understandable
given that labor leaders' activities during the nascent stage centered on workplace
disputes and precluded the national-level collective action needed to effect national
policy change.
Although the organizers of the Social Democratic Party demonstrated no interest
in poor relief, they insisted on equal access to political power and that voting rights be
universal and extended to the lowest stratum of society.600 The socialist leaders
acknowledged early on that democratization would not be a straightforward transition.
The poor who would be given votes were more likely to lack knowledge and information
and thus be vulnerable to bribery and coercive persuasion. 0 ' Nonetheless, they viewed
these problems as neither insurmountable nor a good justification to continue denying the
poor the right to vote. One of their proposed solutions was for the government to provide
greater access to free public education and training in order to help build responsible,
informed, and conscientious voters.602
600 The Socialist Democratic Party grew out of the Society for the Study of Socialism (Shakai Shugi
Kenkyukai) that formed in 1896 by leftist leaders such as Kotoku, Katayama and Abe. The party served as
a first step towards participating in the parliamentary system, just like they had learned that German Social
Democratic Party had done decades ago in representing working class interests in the Diet. Mitani Taichir6,
"Taish6 Shakai Shugisha no 'Seiji' Kan" [Attitudes of Taisho era socialists towards politics] in Nenpo Se/i
Gaku: Nihon no Shakai Shugi [The annals of the Japanese Political Science Association: Socialism in
Japan], edited by The Japanese Political Science Association (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968).
601 Even from the early years, the socialists were envisioning the working class movement not as a poor
people's movement but one that would be led by the middle class (chnikyni shakai). Mitani (1968), 72.
602 Matsuzawa Hiroaki, "Meiji Shakai Shugi no Shis6," [Socialism in Japan: Meiji socialist thought," in
Nenpo Seii Gaku: Nihon no Shakai Shugi [The annals of the Japanese Political Science Association:
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Officials proceeded to swiftly mute these three types of external "voices" as part
of their anticipatory response to workers' discontent. The police broke up the Hibiya
Park protestors, especially when they turned violent. Authorities shut down the socialist
newspaper, Heimin Shimbun, in 1905 and confiscated The Communist Manfesto.603 The
Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshut5) was ordered to dissolve within two days of
its formation. 604 The hallmark event that reflected government's zero tolerance policy for
the political mobilization of the left was the High Treason Incident (Taigyaku Jiken).
During this incident, which lasted from 1910 to 1911, more than 1,000 individuals were
arrested and prominent socialists such as Kotoku were executed for allegedly plotting to
assassinate the Emperor.605 The consistent and systematic suppression of the "voice" of
workers with sheer force exposed the paradox of voting and violence. 60 6 Every step
taken towards democratization was accompanied by more repressive measures to control
the new political undercurrent and deter new groups from gaining representation. In
preparation for partial democratization in 1890 and 1900, the Meiji leaders refined their
tools of repression and enacted "public order" laws that limited the range of civic protest.
Socialism in Japan], edited by The Japanese Political Science Association (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968),
31.
603 Kotku, hoping to spread Marxism and bring the change that it desires, also undertook the translation
and publication of The Communist Manifesto.
604 Likewise, Japan Socialist Party formed by the founders of the Social Democratic Party in 1906 but
collapsed in 1908 amidst myriads of restrictions on their activities that the 1900 Public Order Police Law
imposed and due to internal ramblings between the moderates and radicals in deciding the future direction
of the party.
605 Twenty-six were prosecuted and a dozen, including Kotoku was executed for cultivating socialism.
Although some of the defendants like Kotoku had no connection to the plot to assassinate the emperor, he
was deemed as a threat to the state for believing and preaching subversive ideologies.
606 This point resonates with the work of Jack L. Snyder, which shows that transition towards
democratization does not guarantee peace or stability. Through a series of historical cases, Snyder shows
that under certain conditions, introduction of free elections can result in intense conflict and war. The
implication of "voting to violence" for Japan slightly differs from Snyder's point in the sense that gradual
transition towards democratization accompanied strengthening of institutions that sanction/permit violence
against the populace. The common observation here is that in any country, whether they are prone to
ethnic conflicts or not, the ruling elites would place primacy on self-preservation of their political authority,
which could result in more violence and less peace. See Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence:
Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000).
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For the Japanese labor movement, which was very much in its infancy stage, the heavy
dose of suppression was near fatal.
Although the leftist movement was forced to lay dormant after the High Treason
Incident, a few of the leaders continued searching for a more durable and effective way to
"voice" their demands. Enduring multiple constraints and suppression, workers
eventually managed to form hundreds of unions and organize thousands of strikes, albeit
at a price. The dualistic structure of late-industrial capitalism incentivized workers to
pursue a more powerful "voice" in the workplace by choosing corporate loyalty over
class solidarity. Subsequently, they focused narrowly on workplace issues and
abandoned building a mass democratization movement to improve the lives of the
working class as a whole. This course correction dashed the hopes of the unorganized
working or non-working poor from gaining political representation and social protection
through a social movement spearheaded by organized labor.
Stage I. In pursuit of building a "social" movement (1912-1920)
The working class movement had a weak "voice" during the infancy stage and its
interests were narrowly conceived and articulated largely within the confines of a
particular workplace. A few years after the 1910 High Treason Incident, the "voice"
strengthened and projected a more encompassing tone. The switch that sparked the
change was the development of the country's first national labor federation. In 1912,
Suzuki Bunji, a devout Christian and social reformer, founded the Yiaikai (Friendly
Society). Modeled after the British Friendly Society, the creation of the Yfiaikai marked
a new chapter in the development of organized labor as the leaders fought to break free
from the unorganized dispute tradition that limited workers' activities to the workplace.
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Knowledgeable about the development of labor organization in the United States and
Europe, Suzuki believed that horizontal linkages among workers of different
backgrounds were paramount to building a strong labor movement. He defined "unions
as associations of workers united by their industry" and organized local chapters along
industry lines to reflect the organization's emphasis on horizontal ties among workers.607
The organizers also assisted in the formation of industrial unions (sangy5 kumiai) to
discourage workers from forging vertical ties through company or enterprise unions.
The organization's overarching goal was to build a mass movement with the
working class at the nucleus, attracting a broad range of civil society actors who shared a
similar interest in transforming Japanese society. Suzuki envisioned himself as a church
leader who bridged workers from different sectors and regions, and provided them with a
forum where they could engage in a dialogue.6 0 8 The organization's meetings were
aimed to better inform and educate workers by inviting lecturers on a wide-range of
issues, including the topic of foreign labor trends and expansion of suffrage. By striving
to create horizontal linkages among workers, the Yiiaikai framed the "labor issue" (radd
mondai) within a broader societal context. In essence, it sought to transform the "labor
movement" (radd und5) into a "social movement" (shakai und5).609
As the name suggests, the Yiaikai maintained a "friendly" posture towards
authorities and avoided the topic of "class conflict." Prominent industrialist, Shibusawa
Eiichi, served in the advisory board and its organizational transparency and apparently
benign position convinced wary officials that it was not propagating radical socialism,
607 Sally A. Hasting, Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937 (Pittsburgh, PA, University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 135.
608
609 Suzuki Bunji, Rod6 Und5 Ninen [Twenty years of labor movement] (Tokyo: S~domei Gojtinenshi
Kank6 linkai, 1966).
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communism, anarchism, or any other subversive ideologies. 610 Its diplomatic,
cooperative stance (ky5ch shugi) enabled it to increase its membership and many
workers saw the organization as an asset that could leverage their bargaining position vis-
a-vis management. 61' By 1918, the Ytaikai had amassed nearly 20,000 members. Its
growing presence also encouraged labor unions to form. The number of unions jumped
from just five in 1912 to around two hundred in 1919.
Several domestic and international events stimulated Japanese working class
action. The economic boom during World War I led to the expansion of heavy
industries, which in turn caused a shortage of skills and gave industrial workers greater
leverage to demand higher wages and shorter hours. Furthermore, the Japanese learned
through the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the German Revolution of 1918 that the
working class could play a prominent role in regime change. The nation-wide rice riots
of 1918 bolstered workers' confidence as the "voice" of the masses turned into a
deafening roar that authorities had to address.612 The establishment of the International
Labour Organization under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles gave the Japanese labor
movement a hitherto missing international legitimacy. Inspired and energized by these
events, the number of disputes skyrocketed, from an average of fifty annually prior to
1916 to over four hundred in 1918.613
610 Eventually, the Yfiaikai opened its doors to socialist leaders but they continued maintaining an arms-
length relationship.
611 Gordon (1991: p. 89) notes that thousands of regular workers supported the Yiaikai because they "felt
themselves to be wage earners in the direct employ of large companies, rather than apprentices or
journeymen serving oyakata masters" and they increasingly resented management for their inferior
treatment and pay.
612 Some of the members of the Yaaikai participated in rice riots but the organization itself did not officially
support the popular unrest fearing retribution by the state. Amaike Seiji, Yflaikai, Sodomei Undoshi:
Genryfl wo Tazunete [The history of the Friendly Society and General Labor Federation: Revisiting the
origins] (Tokyo: Minshato Kyosen Kyoku, 1990), 72.
613 Rekishi Kyokasho Kyazai Kenkyikai (2001), 146.
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Although the Yniaikai was increasingly acting as a premier national labor
federation and actively mediated disputes, it remained committed to promoting the
interests of non-members as well. Its stance of promoting encompassing interests was
best exemplified by its ever-increasing calls for social and employment protections as
well as democratization. It declared the "Four Rights of Workers"-the right to live, the
right to organize, the right to strike, and the right to vote-and urged the Diet to secure
these rights.614 At its annual meeting in August, the Yfiaikai elaborated on these rights
and announced its twenty principal demands (figure 5.1) of the government. The
demands covered a wide range of issues, anti-unemployment measures, a minimum wage
system, and equal pay among the sexes, which all testified to the organization's
continued efforts to enhance the welfare of the laboring population as a whole, regardless
of occupation, skill-level, income status, or gender. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
the Yuaikai's demands did not include expansion of the public assistance system, which
is consistent with the premise that organized labor was not an avid proponent of poor
relief.
Figure 5.1 The twenty principal demands of the Yidaikai 615
1. The principle that "labor is not a commodity"
2. Freedom for labor unions
3. Abolish child labor for those under fourteen years of age
4. Establish a minimum wage system
5. Equal pay among sexes
6. A weekly day off (Sunday)
7. Eight-hour working day or 48 hours per week
8. Prohibit night shifts
9. Set up a supervisory post for female workers
614 The Y~iaikai's assertion of workers' "rights" was inspired by the discussion of legal protection for
workers during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which Suzuki himself attended. Umeda Kinji, "Roshi
Kyochoka, KaikyQ Thsoka," [Union-management cooperation or, class struggle], Ekonomisuto vol. 46 no.
13 (2 April 1968): 138-139.
615 Translated from Amaike (1990): 78-79.
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10. Enact a labor insurance law
11. Promulgate a labor dispute arbitration law
12. Prevent unemployment
13. Equal pay for equal work
14. Reform public housing projects for workers
15. Establish a workers' compensation system
16. Improve conditions of sideline work
17. Abolish contract work
18. Universal suffrage
19. Revise the Public Order Police Law
20. Imperial democratization (minponka) of public education
The most important demand of workers was universal suffrage, as "labor's needs
would be unheeded unless the 'awakened masses' found a political mechanism for
making their wants known."616 Suzuki noted that democratization was not an academic
but practical issue that "must be carried out as speedily as possible." 61 7 Previously, the
issue of taxation without representation had prompted the agrarian landlords and urban
industrialists to fight for their votes. The initial impetus behind working class calls for
democratization shared a similar rationale. The introduction of new taxes to finance the
war with Russia in 1905, the 1906 hike in streetcar fares, another tax hike in 1908, and
the volatile fluctuation of the price of rice adversely affected the working population as a
whole and motivated popular calls to democratize fiscal policy. 618
In 1919, the Yfiaikai energetically organized conferences, meetings, and
demonstrations on the issue of suffrage across the country. 619 As the organization fought
616 Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taish& Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968), 127.
617 Ibid.
618 Gordon (1991: 51) contends that "the anti-tax movement, focusing mainly on the business tax and
various retail sales taxes had greatest relevance for businessmen and merchants, who stood to lose most if
taxes discouraged sales, but these sales taxes, as well as the unpopular travel tax, an imposition of one sen
per ride on all streetcar, ferry, and trail travel, directly affected the populace as a whole. Prices, on the
other hand, were primarily the concern of the poor and working-class population."
619 See for example, the "Conference on Establishing Universal Suffrage" (Futsfi Senkyo Kisei Taikai) in
Tokyo on February 9th 1919 and a similar gathering held in the Kansai region (Futsfi Senkyo Kisei Kansai
R6d Renmei) in December 1919.
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for democratization, it shed its signature "cooperative" stance (kydchi shugi) for a new
"combative" posture (tesd shugi). In line with its more assertive posture, it changed its
name to the Labor Federation of the Great Empire of Japan Yfiaikai (Dai Nippon R6d5
S6d6mei Yaaikai, hereafter, Sod6mei).62 o The organization more aggressively used their
newsletters and publication materials to apprise readers of their positions on various
621issues. More than ever, it enthusiastically supported universal suffrage demonstrations
that were organized by students, lawyers, and journalists.622 Just as the leaders of the
Ytiaikai had envisioned years prior, the working class "voice" was becoming louder yet
still in consonance with the pro-democratic tune of the popular mass movement (taishai
und5).
The upsurge in labor unrests and calls for universal suffrage compelled the
government and employers to reformulate their strategies. In the aftermath of the rice
riots, the Hara cabinet chose the carrot-and-stick approach to ameliorate workers'
dissatisfaction towards employers instead of primarily using repressive measures as his
predecessors had done. On the one hand, the Home Minister Tokonami Takejiro
established a right-wing political organization called the Dai Nippon Kokusui-kai
(National Essence Society) in 1919 to act as "an auxiliary body" to the police force used
in suppressing socialism and independent unions.623 On the other hand, government
620 The following year on 1920, they dropped the "Dai" (Great Empire) for its imperialist connotation and
the "Yiiaikai" at the end of the title and reestablished itself as the Nihon Rodo Soddmei (Japan Labor
Federation). The name was officially changed to Sodomei in 1921.
621 For an extended discussion on how the content of the Yciaikai publication materials (e.g., newsletters,
pamphlets, etc) changed over time, see Sodomei Gojiinenshi Kanko linkai Jimukyoku (ed), Rodd Kumiai
Sddomei Gojinenshi Kanko Shiryd Dai Isshi [The fifty-year history of the General Federation of Labor,
volume 1] (Tokyo: Kanko linkai Jimukyoku, 1963).
622 These demonstrations were organized by the League of Establishing Universal Suffrage (Futsii Senkyo
Kisei Domeikai), comprised mostly of lawyers and journalists. Ito (1992), 32-33.
623 Ehud Harari, The Politics of Labor Legislation in Japan (Berkeley, CA: California University Press,
1973), 20-21.
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officials joined forces with the urban business leaders to facilitate cooperation between
management and labor (r6shi kych). 624 On December 1919, Tokonami arranged the
creation of the Harmonization Society (Kynchdkai), an organization that would conduct
research, provide policy recommendations to the government, and mediate labor disputes
when necessary.625 More than half of its ten-million-yen endowment came from funds
contributed by the leading industrialists and the rest from a government subsidy.626
Sensing the growing militancy and independence of the Sodomei, the business
tycoon, Shibusawa Eiichi, approached Suzuki Bunji to join the Harmonization Society. 62 7
Suzuki rejected the overture on the premise that the industrialist-financed agency was
trying to replace labor unions and, therefore, could not stand on neutral grounds as it
promised to do. 628 The lukewarm reception by organized labor and the fact that some
employers opposed the Harmonization Society diminished its role as a peacemaker for
industrial relations. The existence of the Harmonization Society, however, underscored
an important directional change amongst political and economic elites. They began to
see the merits of cooperation over conflict and were more willing to listen to workers'
"voice" in an institutionalized format. Owners perceived that labor contestation was
inhibiting the build-up of a skilled workforce and conflict resolution was necessary to
reduce labor turnover. They might have opposed the compulsory nature of government
624 In addition, the government began sorting the good and bad unions. It became more accommodating to
the needs of "patriotic unions" (e.g., Seamen's Union) and provided a permissive environment for them to
"engage in collective bargaining" while the more radical, independent unions were discriminated (Samuels,
2003: 130).
625 In addition to the Harmonization Society, Tokonami-led Home Ministry attempted to create works
councils in firms with more than fifty employees but the due to strong employer opposition, the Hara
cabinet chose not to endorse it.
626 Harari (1973), 20.
627 Ueki (1968), 140.
628 Suzuki's relationship with Shibusawa was irreparably broken thereafter (Amaike, 1990: 81-82).
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regulations or programs but they recognized the benefits of a more permanent,
institutionalized process of managing industrial disputes.
While government officials were leaning towards a more accommodating
approach to the "labor problem," the issue of universal suffrage was one on which the
Hara cabinet had no intention of compromising. Like the Elder Statesman Yamagata,
Hara believed that democratization must proceed gradually and cautiously because
extending suffrage to the lower stratum of society could be "dangerous" and Japan was
certainly not "ready for it." 629 His diary records reveal that his main concern was that
"from ancient times, revolutions have occurred in capital cities, and if manhood suffrage
were to take place suddenly, Tokyo would be rocked by riots and disorder." 630
Hara initiated partial democratization and changed the electoral system in 1919 in
order to secure a larger share of Seiynikai seats in the Diet. The new voting qualification
lowered the previous ten-yen tax requirement to three yen and increased the size of the
electorate from 2.2% to a little above five percent of the population. The eligibility rules
were eased enough to accommodate the urban petite bourgeoisie and small farmers in
rural areas who were more likely to vote for the Seiynikai but restricted enough to exclude
the working class population from voting.
The new election law also re-instated the old small district system in which
representatives were chosen from "295 single-member districts, 63 two-member districts,
and 11 three-member districts." 63' Hara's rationale for the single-member-district was
629 Tetsuo Najita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise 1905-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1967), 23.
630 Hara Kei Nikki: V. p. 200 21 October 1920. This citation is from Yoshitake Oka (translated by Andrew
Fraser and Patricia Murray), Five Political Leaders of Modern Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,
1986), 116.
631 Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in
Imperial Japan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 47.
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fairly straightforward: it was more advantageous for a large party like the Seiynkai.632
He explained privately to Yamagata that the multi-member-district system "offered a
greater chance for candidates to seek election by putting forward extremist views" and,
given the recent upsurge in socialist activities, he noted that "single-seat constituency was
the best way to keep subversive ideas in check."633 Moreover, Hara detested the large
multi-member district on the grounds that the Seiyikai frequently had to field multiple
candidates who competed against each other, making victory difficult to achieve. 634 In
the aftermath of the electoral reform, Hara dissolved the Diet to prevent his rivals from
submitting a universal suffrage bill and was confident that his party would win a majority
in the post-electoral reform election.635 Hara scored a bull's eye in the May 1920
election. The Seiyiikai won 278 seats out of 464, increasing its seats in the Diet from
42.5% to 60.6%.
Seiyiikai's victory slowed down the budding universal suffrage movement, but
not for long.6 36 The Kenseikai and other minority parties continued to support universal
suffrage and presented another bill the following year. Nearly three dozen universal
632 Previously, Hara attempted to expand suffrage and return to the single member district since 1912. The
bill passed the House of Representative but the House of Peers soundly defeated the bill. The House of
Peers' rejection of the bill reflected "Yamagata's belief that the triangular balance between the Seiy0kai,
Kokumint6, and lesser groups that had emerged under the multiseat constituency system provided a good
way to control the parties" (Oka, 1986: 98-99). Thus, the non-elected members of the House of Peers (pro-
oligarchic camp) were mindful that single member districts would strengthen party politics and weaken
their position vis-i-vis the elected members.
633 Oka (1986), 98.
634 Ibid.
635 Hara dissolved the Diet in order to avoid its rivals, the Kenseikai and Kokuminto, from submitting a
universal suffrage bill and announced that the ensuing election would serve as a referendum of the issue of
democratization. However, given the new electoral system in place, he was confident to gain absolute
majority in the snap election. In addition to the new small district system, Hara gerrymandered the districts
favorable to the Seiyukai. The apportionment of the seats was based on 150,000 persons per seat.
However, as Peter Duus (1968: 151) notes, "the principle of distribution was altered in crucial localities to
give the Seiyfkai and advantage" so that in localities were Seiytikai was traditionally weak, the "single
district returned two or three members" to give Seiylkai a "chance at winning an extra seat with a
successful runner-up."
636 It6 (1992), 35.
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suffrage demonstrations spearheaded by students, journalists, and lawyers took place
across the country in 1922. The pro-suffrage movement finally spread from cities to rural
areas and gained popularity among tenant farmers.637 The international trend at the time,
in which labor-backed parties were becoming a permanent feature of the politics of
advanced industrialized nations, boded well for the working class gaining political
representation in Japan.
Despite the favorable conditions to build a strong pressure for democratization,
organized labor receded from the quest to expand suffrage. The biggest challenge for the
General Labor Federation came from within. Its members, especially those from large-
scale heavy industries in Tokyo, pressed organizers to focus exclusively on members-
only benefits and abort the mission to attain collective benefits, such as the right to vote.
The growing demand to direct the working class "voice" from its encompassing tone to a
new narrow base was a course-correction that stemmed largely from structural forces.
As I explain in the next section, the large-scale enterprises born out of the country's late-
development policy exerted centrifugal pressure on the labor movement and
decentralized organized labor to the point that their "voice" was essentially confined to
the workspace. As a result, working class action in the political sphere diminished and
this gave the ruling conservative elites a virtual free pass to shape political and social
welfare institutions in the years to come and increased the likelihood of the poor would
be politically and socially excluded.
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637 Ilbid., 44-45.
Stage II. Back to the workplace: The egotistical "voice" of labor (1921-1924)
The project of transforming Japanese labor movement--from its meek, fragmented
existence during the Meiji period to a robust, centralized formation-came to a halt in
1921. The broad-based "voice" of workers advancing encompassing interests, a
characteristic that the Yiiaikai conscientiously projected, vanished at a time when
organized labor was evidently gaining in strength. The number of labor unions, for
example, had impressively climbed from around one hundred in 1918 to three hundred in
1921. Upon reassessing their priorities, however, the General Labor Federation leaders
decided to focus largely on workplace issues (e.g., working hours, wages, and conditions)
instead of pursuing political and social reforms. 638 Thus, the organization's goal of
achieving collective benefits for the working class as a whole, such as voting rights,
disappeared from its mission statement around 1921. The major shift in the trajectory of
Japan's working class movement raises a number of questions surrounding the causes and
consequences of such directional change: Which group was responsible for steering the
labor movement towards this new path? What strategic factors drove the labor federation
to focus on members-only benefits? What impact did organized labor receding from
politics have in the construction of the country's democracy and the safety net?
Pressure on the labor federation to diminish its role in the democratization
movement came from external and internal sources. Although the Ytiaikai-Sdamei had
kept an arms length relationship with radical intellectuals, the organization was initially
sympathetic to their plight. Marxist and socialist intellectuals and anarcho-syndicalists
disagreed on their overarching goals (for the former, replacing the state, for the latter,
638 One issue that organized labor never stopped advocating for was the repeal of the Article 17 of the 1900
Public Order Police Law that granted the state carte blanche to repress workers.
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abolishing it), but they both viewed "democracy" as inherently corrupt and meaningless
as long as capitalist-backed parties were in control of the parliament. Their mission was
to bring about revolutionary change, not incremental change by participating in what they
perceived as a rigged parliamentary process. By 1920, their patience was wearing thin as
authorities constantly called their political activities out of bounds.639
Given the hostile state response, the radical wing of the labor movement chose
direct action (chokusetsu keddha) in the workplace over the parliamentary route
(gikaiha).4 0 Some of the groups opted for strikes while others destroyed plants,
machinery and even assaulted managers. Sodomei organizers initially saw the merits of
direct action but soon voiced concern that extremists' actions were more destructive than
constructive. They pressured disaffected workers to "go back to the unions" ("rWdd
kumiai e kaere") and urged them to cede violent actions. 64 1 Eventually the Sodimei also
642Thdistanced itself from radical groups to avoid being the target of state repression. The
growing schism between the radicals and Sad6mei certainly undercut the unity behind the
fight for suffrage and fragmented the power resources of the left to effect policy change.
Nonetheless, the most influential voice against Sdomei's mission to gain
parliamentary representation came from its core members: the labor unions in powerful,
639 For example, Sakai Toshihiko and Yamakawa Hitoshi organized the Japan Socialist League (Nihon
Shakai Shugi Domei) in 1920 but, as always, state officials responded by disbanding the first meeting and
forcing the organization to dissolve the following year.
640 Amaike, 1990: pp, 89-90.
641 Amaike, 1990; p. 92.
642 In 1922, the government enacted the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan (Kageki Shkai
Undo Torishimari Haanan) to curb the spread of socialism and communism. These repressive measures
made the Sodomei cut off and dissociate themselves from the more radical, leftist groups. See Ueda Kotaro,
Saddmei Higyd no Kenkyfl [Research on the General Labor Federation strikes] (Tokyo: Bunka Gakkai
Shuppanbu, 1923).
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large corporations in Tokyo.64 3 Labor representatives from the Kanto region (mainly the
metropolitan Tokyo and Yokohama area) vociferously pressed the Sodomei to drop
universal suffrage from its organizational platform. The Kant5 delegates mostly
represented large-scale, heavy, extractive and chemical industries. 644 They made a
strategic decision to withdraw from political activities and focus on "voice" in the
workplace and primarily engage in plant-level strikes to effect change.645 Sodomei
members from the Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe) initially disagreed and kept
suffrage expansion as one of their core missions. The Tokyo delegates, however, set the
pace and the Kansai delegates followed suit and announced that they would also support
64
a retreat from the universal suffrage movement. 46 The S~dmei officially deleted
"universal suffrage" from their mission statement on January 1921.647
The strategic decision of the Kanto delegation was shaped largely by how their
employers had responded to "exit" and "voice" by workers, that is, the increase in labor
unrests and high labor turnover amidst concern over a shortage of skilled workers.
Initially, the business community lacked a central organization that could coordinate and
articulate employers' collective interests. The upsurge in industrial disputes during
643 Though I make a clear distinction here between radicals and Kanto unions, some of the militant,
direction action groups (k6ddha) were also unions from the Kanto region.
644 Examples include the Tokyo Iron and Steel union and the National General League of Mine Workers
(Zen Nihon Kofu S5 Reng5 Kai). See Gordon (1991), 133.
645 Unlike the radical intellectuals and anarcho-syndicalists, the Kanto unions did not view democratization
as inherently evil or unworkable. Instead, their rationale for dropping democratization as one of organized
labor's goals was based on a reassessment of priorities; the "voice" in the workplace was perceived as more
effective way to bring about change.
646 Rekishi Ky6kasho Kyozai Kenkyiikai (2001), 212. Dore (1973: 416) discusses how large firms were
"pace-setters" and it seems safe to argue that labor unions in large firms also set the pace for the working
class movement.
647 Some scholars such as Peter Duus (1986: 16) write that the suffrage was officially eliminated from the
S~domei's program in 1922, however, Japanese labor historians commonly cite 1921 as the year when the
S6domei rescinded its bid on democratization.
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World War I prompted a number of employers' associations to emerge."4 The Japan
Industrial Club (Nihon Kdgy5 Kurabu) formed in 1917 was regarded as the "central
power" representing the interests of industrialists and financiers on the "labor
problem."649 Headquartered in Tokyo, the Japan Industrial Club was comprised largely
of individuals and firms in the heavy, extractive, and chemical industries (e.g.,
shipbuilding, mining, and military arsenals) as well as manufacturing (e.g., paper, textile)
and banking. Under the leadership of Baron Dan Takuma, the Director-General of the
Mitsui Zaibatsu, the Japan Industrial Club became the "single most important voice in
industrial management in the 1920's."650
From the employers' perspective, the ascendency of organized workers since
1917 was problematic on two grounds. First, workers' exercise of "exit" induced high
turnover and prevented owners from building a skilled workforce; in addition, the
poaching of skilled men by competitors drove up their wages. Second, workers' use of
"voice" in the form of general strikes was costly and their disruptive and sometimes
violent nature exacerbated, rather than abated conflict. If workers were to "voice" their
dissatisfaction towards employers, businesses preferred to negotiate at the plant or firm
level rather than enter into an industry-wide collective bargaining arrangement to
minimize the scale of negotiation and the numbers of actors that would be involved.
Confronting these problems, the Japan Industrial Club put forward a solution:
corporate paternalism. Rather than import western institutions such as industry or craft
based unions, the Japan Industrial Club argued that refurbished paternalistic relations
648 Garon (1987), 44.
649 Janet Hunter, Japanese Economic History 1930-1960: Volume 5 Industrial Labour in Japan (London:
Routledge, 2000), 82.
6so Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite,
1868-1941 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 80.
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unique to Japan's "beautiful customs of antiquity" could be revived to resolve the labor
problem.651 Ever since the feudal era, paternalistic relations had been prevalent in farms
and small shops, but not in modem day, large-scale factories. Seizing the opportunity to
transform industrial relations, the affiliates of the Japan Industrial Club borrowed
paternalism from the past to produce a potent repellant against labor turnover and
strikes.6 52 Coinciding with the growing assertiveness of organized labor around 1918,
Japan Industrial Club members extended semiannual bonuses and company-level welfare
programs such as housing, clinics, and funeral allowances as well as intra-firm
educational programs for workers.653 In essence, employers were nurturing corporate
loyalty among workers to weaken class solidarity in the hopes of decreasing worker
"exit" or "voice" by joining unions and strike.654
In addition to refurbished corporate paternalism, the Japan Industrial Club sought
to reshape the "voice" of workers by offering two alternatives to horizontal-linked
industry or craft-based unions. The first alternative was to create "vertical unions,"
where workers organized at the plant or enterprise level; the second was to form factory
councils (k6jdiin kai) aimed at resolving issues between management and employees
within the firm.65 5 Both measures were intended to encourage workers to sever the
651 Marshall (1967), 82.
652 1 contrast, Shibusawa Eiichi, the prominent industrialist, believed that "[fjactories had grown too large
for paternalism to function effectively" and that the "philosophy of familism or onjo shugi was no longer
adequate." Moreover, Shibusawa and the Kyochokai were leaning towards treating organized labor as
legitimate entity that are equals in the negotiation table with the management side. Marshall (1967), 81.
653 Other measures to decrease labor turnover included measures to enhance greater employment security,
such as severance pay, periodic raises, and factory committees (Smith, 1984: 587).
654 More so than ever, Muto Sanji, the textile mogul who first promoted paternalism in the late Meiji period
committed his personal time to propagate the practice of paternalism in Japanese firms. See Marshall
(1967), 86.
655 As Garon (1987: 54) notes, works council in Japan was imported from the "American innovations to
remold labor policy" but the German works council and British Whitley Councils all worked differently
from Japan's because in the case of Japan, the works councils were introduced as substitutes for labor
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relationship between workers in different factories (horizontal ties), while concomitantly
strengthening workers' solidarity within a factory (vertical ties).
Workers fell in line with employer's paternalistic, vertical-union approach
without much resistance; they chose "loyalty" over "exit" and began exercising "voice"
largely within the confines of a particular plant without coordinating with outsiders. The
horizontal linkages that the founders of the Sodomei worked so hard to create were
largely chipped away by the mid-1920s. The organization's appearance as a major organ
of the national labor movement belied its structural hollowness, since it was comprised
mostly of company or factory unions. The factory unions placed primacy on brotherhood
of a single factory (the plant to which they belonged) and downplayed the solidarity of
workers across firms, industry, or craft line.656 The end result was fragmentation and
decentralization of the working class movement, which halted the Sodomei's national-
level political activities, including its fight for suffrage.
Moreover, decentralization of the working class movement induced a change in
the quality of "voice," from a class-based encompassing to a much narrower factory-
based tune. As I have shown, the General Labor Federation prior to the 1920s promoted
policies such as eliminating contract jobs, the minimum wage system, and insurance
programs that would benefit working class population as a whole. Since labor unions
began narrowly focusing on attaining higher wages, greater respect, and better treatment
at their individual worksites, by 1923, the Sodomei dropped most of the demands listed in
unions. The factory councils were also introduced to discourage labor militancy and lower the incidence of
strikes.
656 Gordon (1991: 156) provides a firm-level account of this in the "founding manifesto of the Machine
Labor Union Federation, a loose grouping of factory unions at the Japan Rolling Stock Company, the Train
Manufacturing Company, and four other Tokyo-area firms." It stated that "[w]e will continue to progress,
linking hands at the same factory, advancing on solid ground with strength, bravery, and courage." As
"one sympathetic observer of the strife at the Train Manufacturing Company noted, 'Laborers who work in
a single factory are brothers.' Few of these groups were captive or 'yellow unions' (Gordon, 1991: 156)."
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its 1919 declaration that would have improved the welfare of unorganized workers with
irregular, contract-based jobs, or, who were unemployed. The Sdmei instead focused
on the objectives of obtaining the right to organize, the repeal of repressive measures, and
better pay and hours.657 In sum, organized labor terminated the mission to enhance the
welfare of all workers and withdrew its "voice" from politics.
Pinpointing the causal factors underlying the decentralization of the working class
movement, therefore, is crucial because the change in the quality of "voice" that it
induced among organized labor would become permanent as the decentralization trend
accelerated and crystallize in the 1920s. As I explain shortly, the decentralization of the
working class movement hurt the prospects of the unorganized working or unemployed
poor from attaining greater redistributive transfers in the short as well as the long run.
Hence, before analyzing the immediate redistributive consequences of organized labor's
retreat from politics, it is imperative to examine first the causes and consequences of
decentralization.
11. Decentralization of working class: an extended discussion of its causes
The late-development structured labor formation
The dualistic structure underlying the country's late-development industrial
capitalism conferred size and timing advantages to a few privileged firms to mold
working class movement at a relatively nascent stage. First, the government's late-
development "catch-up" policies concentrated economic power into the hands of a few
657 Around 1923, the Sodomei pared down its mission statement and listed only a few organizational
objectives, including the repeal of the Peace Police Law and improving labor regulations on wages and
hours. See Naimusho Shakaikyoku Dai Ichibu, Taish5 Jaininen Rodd Unda Gaikyd [Taisho 12 the general
outlook of labor movement].
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capital-intensive, large-scale companies. Second, these economic giants possessed
superior organizational and financial resources due to their size that they used to
coordinate their interests and forge strong ties with political parties to carry out their
interests. The size advantage also enabled them to produce innovation in employment
practices (e.g., corporate paternalism) and provide in-company training (i.e., decentralize
skill formation to the firm-level). Third, corporate paternalism and in-company skill
development incentivized workers to act collectively at the level of the firm rather than
craft or industry and this led to the formation of company or plant unions. Fourth, the
privileged employers and government officials were able to mold the working class
movement early on because of a timing advantage inherent in being a late developer.
Knowledgeable of the development of working class movement in the more advanced
economics of the West, Japanese employers and government officials moved
preemptively to block undesirable trajectory of the working class. Finally,
decentralization of the labor movement became permanent because workers responded by
synching rather than resisting the trend. Thus, the devolution of the working class action
was not imposed but achieved through cooperation. Let me briefly explain each of these
points in turn.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan's industrial dualism was based on a
great divide between very large and small firms, a structure that the Meiji oligarchs
foresaw as foundational to building the country's wealth. The government utilized
regulatory and fiscal policies to assist in the creation of capital-intensive large
corporations (the zaibatsu being the cream of the crop) in the arsenals, heavy, chemical,
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machinery, and extractive industries, to name a few. ss Located mostly in Tokyo, they
enjoyed protection from international competition and thrived in oligopolistic markets.
The late-development policy concentrated economic power into a few hands. In 1919,
the largest firms with more than five million yen in capital accounted for only 1.4% of all
firms, yet they accounted for more than fifty percent (53.7%) of capital. 659 The trend
accelerated over time as their share of capital steadily increased to 62.2% in 1924 and
65.1% in 1929.660 Industrial workers too were concentrated, as the largest factories (over
100 employees) accounted for 55% of all factory workers, the figure steadily climbed to
59.2% by 1924.661
Large firms employed their size advantage to set the agenda and resolutions for
what they perceived as the pernicious byproduct of industrialization: the labor problem.
Unlike smaller firms in Osaka and Kyoto, big corporations in Tokyo were better
organized and their interests were effectively represented by the Japan Industrial Club.
The Osaka Industrial Association, for example, was comprised mostly of small and
medium-size firms and lacked the resources to tame labor unions and provide company
welfare programs. Early on, they were compelled to make concessions to workers. Not
only were they more willing to recognize labor unions, they also supported social
658 For example, in the early I 880s, the government sold struggling state-owned plants at a discount rate
and only the zaibatsu were able to "take advantage of the bargain and wield enough power through political
connections to secure this highly desirable entre into industrial activities." Kozo Yamamura, "The Japanese
Economy, 1911-1930: Concentration, Conflicts and Crises)," in The Interwar Economy ofJapan:
Colonialism, Depression, and Recovery, 1910: 1940 edited by Michael Smitka (New York: Routledge,
1998), 225
659 Small firms (capitalized at 100,000 yen or less) accounted for nearly 67.5% of all firms in Japan in, yet
they only held around 4.5% of total capital. Kozo Yamamura, "The Japanese Economy, 1911-1930:
Concentration, Conflicts, and Crises," in Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho Democracy, edited by Bernard
S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1974), 310.
660 Ibid.
661 Kozo Yamamura (1974), 311.
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insurance programs to protect workers from accidents, unemployment, and sickness. 662
In contrast, the more powerful Japan Industrial Club opposed social welfare programs
such as unemployment insurance because it believed that it could undermine vertical ties
between employers and employees by encouraging labor turnover and facilitating
mobility. 663 Given the superior organizational and financial capacity of large enterprises,
the Japan Industrial Club's vision triumphed. In addition to successfully propagating
factory unions and councils, the Japan Industrial Club blocked the development of
unemployment insurance and social assistance programs in the 1920s.
Nevertheless, the economic power of the zaibatsu and other large enterprises
alone was not sufficient to bring about a durable transformation of working class
mobilization. The Japan Industrial Club members converted their economic resources
into political power by aggressively forging ties with the dominant political parties
through campaign contributions and arranging marriages between their daughters and
heavyweight politicians. The Seiyikai received substantial funding from urban
industrialists in Tokyo and was most closely affiliated with the Mitsui zaibatsu, which
was managed by none other than Baron Dan Takuma, the President of the Japan
Industrial Club. Although the opposition party, the Kenseikai, received political support
from small and medium sized firms, the influence of large companies was evident as
Kato Takaaki, the president of the party, was the son-in law of Iwasaki Yatar5, the
founder of Mitsubishi zaibatsu.664 The deep pockets of large firms allowed them to
penetrate the political process by advancing their economic interests through multiple
parties. In line with the preference of the Japan Industrial Club, the Seiyukai-led
662 Garon: 1987: 45-46.
663 Garon (1987), 45.
664 David Flath, The Japanese Economy, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 54.
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government actively encouraged the creation of vertical company unions or councils, the
application of corporate paternalism, and blocked the formation of horizontal unions.665
Furthermore, from the mid-1910s on, the zaibatsu representation in the aristocratic House
of Peers steadily increased through arranged marriages and conferrals of peerage titles to
zaibatsu family members, which further ensured that their policy preferences were
advanced in the Diet.666
The size advantage was also critical in setting up the incentives for organized
workers to follow the path of decentralization. Corporate paternalism and devolution of
skill formation to the firm level were possible precisely because these firms possessed the
financial capacity and enjoyed oligopolistic market positions to provide in-company
welfare programs and training. The abundant capital of the state or the zaibatsu-affiliated
banks enabled them to adopt practices that were based on long-term goals rather concern
for immediate profits.667 The buildup of company-specific skills, coupled with company
loyalty, served as a powerful anchor to retain workers and encouraged them to exercise
"voice" at their workplaces.
The size advantage of large firms proved effective at shaping industrial relations
but it was enhanced in part because they were also empowered with a timing advantage.
The country's late development position allowed employers to learn from the "mistakes"
of the more advanced western nations in providing a permissive environment for
665 The government was by no means entirely captured by economic interests and bureaucratic officials
proposed several legislations that employers opposed. Without the consent of the employers, however, the
government sponsored bills either failed to pass the Diet or were weakly enforced given the lack of
compliance by employers. For example, the Works Council bill of 1919 mandated the creation of works
councils comprised of workers and managers in large companies (more than fifty employees). Although
Japan Industrial Club members in theory agreed that this was a sound idea, they opposed the bill for its
compulsory nature and forced the Hara cabinet to withdraw the bill (Gordon, 1991: 128).
666 Harold R. Kerbo and John A. McKinstry, Who Rules Japan? The Inner Circles of Economic and
Political Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 43-47.
667 Dore (1973), 414.
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organized labor to grow and eventually make demands which had to be addressed.
Employers in Japan proactively sought to shape working class mobilization while it was
still at an adolescent stage. Although they initially used various repressive and regulatory
measures to attempt to kill the movement, by the time the International Labour
Organization was established, Japanese employers saw "the writing more clearly on the
wall" and accepted the fate that workers would always organize and strike. 668 While
labor-management relations remained "fluid," Japanese employers "were able to adjust to
that future prospect by institutional innovations before the unions became so strong that
their options were foreclosed" and while they still enjoyed "a large measure of control
over the situation."669
Despite the size and timing advantages conferred to pace-setting firms, workers
choosing to organize at the plant-level on their own volition made it easier for the
decentralization trend to stick over the long run. No doubt, the employers provided the
incentives to make the decentralization of the working class movement attractive, but the
process was bidirectional. This point needs to be highlighted here to clarify the
relationship between the relative strength of workers and how they mobilized their
resources. Workers were not compelled to organize at the plant level because they were
weak; rather, their choices were conceived as an optimum strategy to improve workers'
welfare given Japan's dualistic structure of industrial capitalism.670 Gordon (1991: 157)
contends that although the country lacked "vigorous trade traditions," the "huge
worksites" born-out of late-development industrial capitalism became the epicenter of
668 Dore (1973), 410.
669 Ibid.
670 I need to explore more fully whether the size advantage of large firms empowered unions in these firms
and enabled them to act as leaders of the labor movement.
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skill development and for workers, "the factory was the natural unit of organization and
object of identification." 671
This line of causality becomes more apparent after 1945 when the working class
movement reached a hitherto unseen strength on par with European countries. As I
discuss in more detail in the next chapter, in the aftermath of World War II, the strength
of the left peaked, with a socialist party in power for the first time in history and the
unionization rate around fifty percent. Yet, workers still chose to organize at the
plant/firm level. Due to another round of "catch-up" policy in the aftermath of the war,
the dualistic structure of industrial capitalism reemerged and the path of least resistance
for workers was to negotiate at the plant-level. Thus, workers synching rather than
resisting the fragmentation of the working class further added durability and permanency
to the decentralization trend.
III. Structuring political and social welfare institutions exclusive of poor
The prototype of a social insurance-based welfare state
671 Andrew Gordon provides an insightful account of workers' strategic decision to organize at the plant
level from a comparative perspective. He writes: "From a broader perspective, the strategic wisdom of
factory unions, and the dominance of a spirit of brotherhood in the factory, seems to reflect a more
fundamental dynamic of capitalist development in Japan. Relatively late development meant the
precocious emergence of highly capitalized, large enterprises at the cutting edge of the economy, indirectly
nurtured, and on occasion directly managed, by the state. Compared to the experience of workers in
Western Europe or even North America, a relatively small pool of skilled laborers with relatively shallow
independent traditions of skill acquisition or organization emerged prior to, or independently of, the
creation by monopoly capital and the state of these huge worksites. As heavy industries began sustained
growth around the turn of the century, the organization and training of these skilled workers increasingly
took place under the direct control of management in the large-scale sector. Managers were loathe to loose
relatively scarce skilled men, and they experimented with a wide array of policies to slow their mobility.
Workers in such plants derived a fair degree of strength from this situation; quite naturally, both earlier
labor disputes and many of the varied working-class initiatives of the post-Word War I era centered on
precisely these enterprises.... If late development gave such men the power to contest their bosses, it also
focused their actions on the factory. The men in both the shipbuilding and the machine divisions at
Ishikawajima had united effectively within their divisions prior to creating a factory union... But without
vigorous trade traditions, the factory was the natural unit of organization and object of identification.
Organizers groping for effective strategies willy-nilly came to recognize this" (Gordon, 1991: p. 157).
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In the early 1920s, organized workers withdrew from the fight for universal
suffrage and social welfare reform in order to augment their bargaining position in the
workplace. Without any input from labor, the task of advancing political and social
welfare reforms was left entirely in the hands of the ruling elites. The two main political
parties, the Seiynkai and Kenseikai, were both mindful that the need to provide social
protection for workers would not simply decline overtime. Business leaders did not prod
the government to adopt social welfare measures in order to quell labor dissension, but
their strong influence in the Diet ensured that the general welfare policy directionfit the
emerging industrial relations. This meant that the social welfare programs that employers
detested or believed had no merit--such as unemployment insurance, public employment
training, and public assistance-were rendered politically unviable. For example,
employers had always opposed unemployment insurance on the grounds that it would
encourage labor mobility and undermine the retention of skilled workforce that corporate
paternalistic programs were designed to create.672 Similarly, the industrialists did not
endorse the expansion of public employment training since they had already been
providing skill upgrades and training within the firm. In addition, business leaders'
strong opposition against social spending for the poor guaranteed that any expansionary
policy measure would not survive.
Mindful of employers' preferences, the Seiyikai and Kenseikai agreed to
establish the country's first national health insurance law in order to co-opt the emerging
672 The company welfare programs, such as retirement allowances, was originally instituted by employers
to prevent "exit" by skilled labour, but as years went by, it became "a substitute for unemployment
insurance. See Toshimitsu Shinkawa, "Democratization and Social Policy Development in Japan," in
Democracy and Social Policy, edited by Yusuf Bangura (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 64.
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673labor aristocracy. The Kenseikai argued that the existing medical benefits under the
Factory Law were limited in scope and that the state needed to protect workers who were
like the "jewel of the country." 674 In addition, it contended that creating an oriental
version of Bismarck's social insurance system would be beneficial to declaw further the
working class movement. 675 The ruling party, Seiyikai, added that the health insurance
law as a form of human capital investment that could raise labor productivity. Given the
bipartisan support, it successfully passed the country's first national health insurance law
(Kenki Hoken Hdan) in 1922.676 The fact that the Seiyikai-led government passed the
Law to Curb Radical Movement (Kageki Shakai Und5 Torishimari Hdan) the same year
signified the continuation of its carrot-and-stick approach: cooperative workers would be
given greater social protection while extremists and unruly workers would be
repressed.677
The health insurance law covered workers from illness, death, accidents, and
childbirth; however, it fell short of providing coverage for their family members. The
health insurance bill complemented corporate paternalistic practices and employers were
largely receptive towards it because firms of more than 500 workers were required to
"form in-house insurance associations to administer the system (kumiai kansh5), while
those of 300-499 workers had the option to do so." 678 The coverage only applied to
673 The government rationalized the bill on the grounds that workers were demanding social protection and
the program would improve labor productivity; the bill would ultimately help crystallize the labor-capital
harmonization (rdshi kydch6). Uchida Kenz6, Kinbara Samon, and Furuya Tetsuo (eds.), Nihon Gikai
Shiroku 2 [The history of parliamentary government in Japan 2] (Tokyo: Daiichi H~ki Shuppan, 1990), 295.
674 Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai Hosh [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1969),
62.
675 bd. 63-64.
676 The law was implemented in 1927. Shikawa (2007), 65.
677 Ogawa (1969), 63-64.
678 The government was in charge of administering the system for smaller companies. Kasza, (2006), 15-
17.
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companies with ten or more workers (though this number was reduced to five in 1934)
and they had to be employed for over two months to receive benefits. Thus, the health
insurance targeted workers who were already enjoying greater employment protection
and better prospects of higher wages while the unemployed and working poor, who
needed social protection, were excluded from the coverage. 679
The inegalitarian content of the health insurance law holds clue to why Japan's
welfare state today reinforces rather than ameliorates existing inequality. As Kasza
(2006: 17) insightfully notes, Japan's present day social insurance-based welfare state
originated from the 1922 Workers' Health Insurance Law:
Many enduring features of Japan's welfare system originated with this
law, including the preference for policies based on social insurance, the
state's supplementary contribution from general revenues (despite the
violation of insurance principles), the joint contributions of employers and
employees, the ability of insured groups to choose the physicians that
served them, and the administration of essentially public programs by
insurance associations within large private companies.
The passage of the health insurance bill marked a new milestone for Japan, as it was first
non-western country to adopt a social insurance law. Its historical significance, however,
was tainted by the fact that the most vulnerable segment of the population received
680nothing. As the ruling elites began constructing an uneven welfare state, it also
proceeded to build an exclusionary democracy that completely shut out the poor.
A complete electoral shutout
679 The state's willingness to offer social welfare benefits for organized workers was equally matched by its
initiative to secure greater employment protection for them. Around the mid-1920s, 89 percent of the
largest firms (more than 1,000 employees) offered retirement allowances while only one percent of smaller
companies (less than 50 employees) did. According to Shinkawa (2007: 64), "[l]arger firms with 200
employees or more provided a lump sum dismissal fee equal to between 542 and 714 days wages for
employees with 20-25 years service, while smaller firms paid less than half that amount." Retirement
allowances do not become compulsory by law until 1936.
680 Kasza (2006), 15.
293
The working class no longer posed a serious threat to the ruling class but there
was infighting among elites that posed a serious threat to their political survival. Broadly
speaking, three types of intra-elite conflicts became salient in the 1920s and generated
pressure for democratization. First, intense competition between the two dominant
parties, the Seiynkai and Kenseikai, compelled the latter to push for drastic suffrage
expansion in order to topple the Seiynkai. Second, growing tension within the Seiynikai
along factional lines heightened the electoral insecurity of its members since the
impending rupture of the party meant that they would no longer enjoy majority status;
this fear drove some members to advocate democratization to prevent being politically
marginalized. Third, elected officials in the House of Representatives confronted the
members of the aristocratic House of Peers and proposed a peerage reform to curb its
power. The intra-elite conflicts heightened the need for elected officials to secure and
lengthen their political longevity, which helped pave the road for a drastic suffrage
expansion in the mid-i 920s.
Nonetheless, without strong working class pressure, the fate of the poor receiving
votes rested exclusively in the hands of the elites, who eventually agreed to extend
suffrage to the working class but not the poor. Starting in the late 191 Os, the Japanese
political landscape was increasingly becoming a two-party system as the smaller parties
in the Diet joined forces against the rising Seiyakai to form the Kenseikai (Constitutional
Party). 681 The 1919 electoral reform that entailed a switch from a large to small district
681 In response to the rising Seiy~kai dominance in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Katsura
Tara formed the Rikken D6shikai (Constitutional Association of Friends) by amalgamating the members of
the opposition parties in 1913. The further strengthening of the Seiyikai in 1916 prompted the Rikken
Doshikai led by Kato Takaaki to merge with smaller minority parties such as the Chfseikai led by Ozaki
Yukio to form the Kenseikai (Constitutional Party). According to Ozaki Yukio, the genealogy of the two
parties could be traced back to the JiyFito (Liberal Party) for the Seiyokai and the Kaishinto (Progressive
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size system deepened the two-party rivalry. The new single member district combined
with gerrymandered districts in 1920 helped the Seiylkai achieve an imposing election
682
victory. Frustrated by the Seiynkai's dominance in the House of Representatives, the
Kenseikai began taking more extreme positions to drum up support from those
dissatisfied with the Seiyiikai-led government. As Peter Duus notes, while the Seiynlkai
pushed for expansionary fiscal policy to fund public works projects, the Kenseikai
advocated fiscal discipline and retrenchment to alleviate the tax burden on the lower-
middle classes; the Seiyikai's reluctance to acknowledge labor rights contrasted with the
Kenseikai's support for legal recognition of labor unions.683 Both parties advocated
suffrage expansion in order to shift the balance of power in the Diet away from the non-
elected aristocratic members, but they vehemently disagreed on the issue of how much.
While the Kenseikai insisted on adopting universal manhood suffrage, the Seiynkai
preferred to lower, not eliminate the tax qualifications. 684
While both parties received financial support from the zaibatsu, the Kenseikai
began recruiting organized labor to their electoral base in local elections in the early
Party) for the Kenseikai. Yukio Ozaki, The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: The Struggle for Constitutional
Government in Japan (translated by Fujiko Hara), (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2001), 333.
682 Garon (1987) presents a different explanation to the Kenseikai's support for democratization, social
welfare, and labor unions. He argues that Kenseika's positions were not merely products of electoral
strategies but stemmed from the strong presence of former bureaucrats and liberals in the party. Former
bureaucrats like Egi Tasuku, Wakatsuki Reijir6, and Hamaguchi Osachi were eager advance political and
social welfare reform to catch up with the West and they also held prominent positions in the party.
Moreover, the old liberals such as Ozaki Yukio and Shimada Sabur6, as well as young generation liberals
such as Nagai Rytitara and Tomita Kojir6 argued in favor of liberal, democratic reforms. The correlation
between the backgrounds of party members and party positions may be strong but this explanation needs to
be tested for the direction of causality. Since the Doshikai era, the Kenseikai had an "opposition" identity
that compelled the party to take a different stance from the Seiyikai. It may well be that the "opposition"
position was so firm that the party recruited and placed former bureaucrats or liberals who were more
willing to take extreme positions against the Seiyokai within the higher ranks of the party.
683 Duus (1968), 147.
684 For examples, the Seiy~ikai attempted to expand suffrage in 1902 and submitted a bill again in 1911. It
passed the House of Representatives but not the House of Peers. The tax qualifications were lowered but
never eliminated.
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1920s. Their more drastic approach to democratization reflected their desire to capture
urban working class votes.685 Up to that point, the Kenseikai was reluctant to eliminate
the "disqualifying clause" that barred poor individuals who did not "earn an independent
livelihood" (dokuritsu seikei) from voting.68 6 In 1921, the duel between the Kenseikai
and Seiynlkai intensified and the former took a bold step and proposed extending suffrage
to the poor. Smaller minority parties such as Kokuminto agreed to eliminate the
"independent livelihood" clause and allied with the Kenseiskai to topple the Seiyukai
domination.687
On February 1922, the Kenseikai submitted the controversial universal manhood
suffrage bill that extended voting rights to the poor, but the Seiynkai immediately struck
it down. In addition, Kenseikai's own core constituents, like Mitsubishi, disapproved the
bill. 88 Given the weak working class pressure for democratization and opposition from
employers, the Kenseikai conceded to reinserting the latent eligibility rule that
disqualified the poor from voting.689 Hereafter, all the dominant interest groups accepted
the exclusionary characteristic of Japanese democracy. Organized workers did not object
to the fact that the poor were excluded from suffrage expansion: they were getting the
right to vote. In the aftermath of the Great Kanto earthquake in 1923, the labor
federation, Sodomei, "began unprecedented cooperation" with state officials and gingerly
685 The national-level labor federation remained reluctant to form a partnership with the Kenseikai as they
perceived the party to be more pro-business than pro-labor. Sheldon Garon, The State and Labor in
Modern Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), .60.
686 Ozaki (2001), 347.
687 Duus (1968): 173-174. The Kenseikai was also encouraged by the world trend in which most western
nations by then had already granted universal suffrage.
688 Duus (1968): 153.
689 See Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyfjo [Ohara Institute for Social Research], ed. Nihon R~d Nenkan
[Japan labor yearbook] (Tokyo: HWsei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1932), 448-449.
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restated its interest in parliamentary affairs. 690 It welcomed the short-lived Yamamoto
cabinet's support for universal manhood suffrage and overlooked the fact that cabinet
support for democratization was premised on the understanding that the working or non-
working poor would continue to be ineligible to vote.
Two new developments solidified the adoption of universal manhood suffrage:
the breakup of the Seiynkai and the escalating tension between the two chambers of the
Diet. The Seiyn-kai's impressive growth since the 1900s came to a halt in 1924. Hara
succeeded in expanding the Seiyfikai and adeptly maintained party unity. His untimely
death in 1921 created a power vacuum that became a source of internal turmoil and the
party collapsed along factional lines in 1924.69 1 The Seiynikai split into two parties. A
minority faction kept the same name and joined the pro-suffrage coalition formed by the
Kenseikai and Kakushin Club.692 The rest agreed to launch a new party, branded as the
"authentic" Seiyikai (Seiynihonto) and aligned with the House of Peers in resisting
democratization.
In order to improve the chances of passing the suffrage bill in the Diet, the pro-
suffrage tripartite coalition-Kat6 Takaaki's Kenseikai, Takahashi Korekiyo's Seiyikai,
and Inukai Tsuyoshi's Kakushin Club-proposed a peerage reform to pare down the
influence of the House of Peers vis-i-vis the House of Representatives. 69 3 The House of
690 According to Gordon (1991: 139), "Suzuki Bunji took a post in the Provisional Office for Earthquake
Relief, and his union functioned as a semi-official job exchange, providing relief work to its members. In
October the Yamamoto cabinet announced support for universal manhood suffrage bill. In February 1924,
as organized labor in Nankatsu began to revive, the new Kiyoura cabinet announced that henceforth the
'labor representative' to the ILO would indeed be chosen by workers."
691 After Hara's death, the rivalry between two factions-one, led by Takahashi Korekiyo, and the other, by
Tokonami Takejir6-intensified and the party eventually split along these factional lines.
692 After the impressive victory by the three-party coalition, the Elder Statesman, Saionji Kimmochi,
authorized Kato to lead the country.
693 The last impetus for democratization came from elected officials' growing concern over the revival of
the transcendental government and their corresponding desire to curb the power of the non-elected
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Peers was the last obstacle that prevented the passage of the universal manhood suffrage
bill in the Diet.694 Given the deepening schism among the elites on the issue of
democratization, the House of Peers acquiesced to the passage of the universal manhood
suffrage law with a few conditions. First, implicit in the House of Peers' cooperation in
passing the universal manhood suffrage bill was that the House of Representatives would
agree to weaken its efforts to undertake peerage reform. Second, the advancement of
democratic reforms must accompany the Peace Preservation Law that would revamp
repressive measures against radicalism and ensure an orderly, controlled institutional
change.695 Third, in order to prevent the migratory, working poor from voting the House
of Peers insisted that the pre-existing six-month residency requirement for voter
registration be extended to one year.
aristocratic peers. From 1922 to 1924, the Elder Statesmen appointed a non-elected official (e.g., Kat6
Tomosabur6 , Yamamoto Gonnohy6e, and Kiyoura Keigo) for the prime minister post. In particular,
elected officials criticized the Kiyoura cabinet for being the "government of the privileged" and tripartite
coalition joined forces to promote the "second movement to protect constitutional government" (dai nei
goken undd). They saw the non-elected aristocratic cabinet as the "common enemy" (kydtsfi no teki) and
proposed suffrage expansion and peerage reform to curb the power of the House of Peers. Arai Shinichi
and Harada Katsumasa, "Rekishi Ky6iku no Mondai ten (12)," [Issues in history education, no. 12] Rekishi
Hydron no. 104 (April, 1959): 75.
694 The House of Peers consistently opposed expansion of suffrage since the early 1900s. Frustrated by the
House of Peer's veto power, Hara Kei initiated the move to curb the power of the House of Peers and
proposed peerage reform in order to dilute the influence of wealthy peasants in local politics that were
closely aligned with the oligarchic Yamagata faction within the House of Peers. Hara, as a head of the
Home Ministry, tried to abolish the gun (county) system that formed the base of the oligarchic power.
Mitani (77-78) summarizes Hara's tactic: "The gun was an administrative unit that directly supervised the
gowns (machi) and villages (mura) at the lowest level of the local government system. Home Minister
Yamagata established it in 1890 on the model of the Prussian kreis, the self-governing unit of the Junker
class. Although the gun occupied an intermediate position between the local communities and the
prefecture, it was not in fact a self-governing unit; rather, it was the lowest level of the Home Ministry
bureaucracy. During the last years of the Meiji period, the county chief (gunch5) was appointed by the
Home Minister. Politically the gun was the provincial base of the Yamagata faction which enjoyed
enormous influence in the home ministry after the establishment of the local government system in the
1880s. By proposing to establish the gun as an administrative unit, Hara was attempting to free the town
and villages, the provincial bases of political party power, from the influence of the Home Ministry and to
increase the position and authority of the local officials, especially the local mayors."
695 Arai Shinichi and Harada Katsumasa, "Rekishi Ky6iku no Mondai ten (12)," [Issues in history
education, no. 12] Rekishi Hydron no. 104 (April, 1959): 76.
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The universal manhood suffrage bill passed on March 1925 and, as Prime
Minister Kato Takaaki put it, Japan took a "leap in the dark." 696 The electorate increased
from three million to a little over twelve million; around twenty percent of the total
population became enfranchised. The bill eliminated the tax qualification and extended
votes to adult males above twenty-five years of age. The law, however, contained a
latent clause that disqualified the poor from voting. The tripartite coalition submitted a
bill that disqualified "people who received assistance for their livelihood from public
expense" (k6hi no kynjo) from voting. The Privy Council, however, amended it to
individuals who were receiving "both public and private aid (koshi no kyFjo).697 The
House of Peers added that individuals who were receiving any assistance (fujo), even
from family members, were not eligible to vote.698 In the end, all relevant parties agreed
upon the working that individuals who were "receiving public or private aid on the
account of poverty" were ineligible to vote.699 The final decision to insert the word
"poverty" in the disqualification clause of the new general election law reflected the
ruling elites' perception that those receiving institutionalized aid were a "nuisance"
(yakkai mono) to the state while workers receiving social insurance benefits were eligible
to vote.700
696 Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 170.
697 The actual wording of this particular clause was amended by the Privy Council first and later by the
House of Peers. Uchida et al. (1990), 364-365.
698 Ibid., 366. See also, Richard H. Mitchell, "Japan's Peace Preservation Law of 1925: Its Origins and
Significance," Monumenta Nipponica 28 no. 3 (Autumn, 1973): 317-345.
699 Although the actual wording of the disqualifying clause went through a number of intense negotiations
among the members of the Privy Council, House f Peers and the House of Representatives, they all agreed
that the poor on public assistance should not gain voting rights. The point of contention revolved around
whether private aid (e.g., family and charitable organizations) could also be considered a form of welfare
assistance.
700 Individuals who were temporarily receiving benefits due to natural disasters or as a part of the military
aid were eligible to vote. Tomie Naoko, Kyihin no Naka no Nihon Kindai [Poor relief in modern Japan]
(Kyoto, Minerva Shob6, 2007), 64-67.
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The passage of the 1925 universal manhood suffrage law gave birth to policies
that were more favorable for labor, including the abolition of Article 17 (the labor union
"death sentence" clause of the Public Peace Police Law) and the enactment of the Labor
Disputes Mediation Law. Moreover, the national health insurance law came into effect
and workers "who were willing to work within the parliamentary framework" were
offered a more permissive environment for their activities while repressive measures
were targeted toward radical extremists.70 1
Once organized labor gained the right to vote it aspired to become a "middle
class" movement and distance itself from traditional leftist political parties.702 In the
sixteenth general election, the first since the passage of the universal manhood suffrage
law, an overwhelming majority of newly enfranchised workers voted in favor of the
dominant conservative parties. Of 466 seats, Seiy-kai won 218 and Minseit6 gained 217
seats, whereas the Socialist People Party only gained 2 seats. Post-1925 "leftist" parties
internally fragmented and ever since "they have been fighting one another instead of
cooperating against their common foe." 70 3
In conjunction with the 1925 universal suffrage bill, the ruling parties agreed to
change the electoral system, from a single-member-district to a multi-member-district
single-non-transferable-voting system (MMD/SNTV). The Seiynkai preferred the
existing single member district until its breakup because it was disadvantageous to
smaller, minority parties (e.g., oligarchic party and socialists). Since losing the majority
status in the Diet, however, it had become more ambivalent about the choice of electoral
701 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 575.
702 Amaike (1990), 142-143.
703 Tai Sekiguchi, "Political Conditions in Japan after the Application of Manhood Suffrage," Pacific
Affairs 3 no. 10 (October, 1930): 909 (907-922).
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system. 70 4 In contrast, the Kenseikai had always opposed the single member district and
instead preferred the old large district system in order to prevent the reunion of Seiyiikai
and Seiyiihont6 and allow smaller parties to survive. The MMD/SNTV (three to five
seats) was chosen as a compromise between the two opposite views.70 5
Politicians would soon learn that the MMD/SNTV system enhanced the political
representation of organized economic interests since it increased the importance of local
support networks for winning elections. The U.S. Occupation changed the MMD/SNTV
to a large district system in 1945 in order to destroy the pre-existing political machines.
Conservative politicians, with the consent of the socialists, however, re-adopted the
MMD/SNTV system in 1947 in order to prevent unorganized groups from gaining
representation. 706 The re-selection of MMD/SNTV by the ruling political class shut out
the poor from redistributive politics even after they gained suffrage in 1945. Agrarian,
industrialist, and labor interests dominated under the MMD/SNTV system, which led to
an increase in lucrative farm subsidies, agricultural protection, industrial policies,
employment protection, and the expansion of social insurance programs. 707 The
institutional choices made during the country's transition towards mass democracy in the
1920s, therefore, reinforced the dominance of organized economic interests in shaping
the welfare state and, as a result, the needs of the unorganized working or non-working
poor continued to fall by the wayside.
7 0 4 Duus, 1986: 151.
705 ibid., 200.
706
706 The MMD/SNTV was also seen as disadvantageous for women to run for office. The conservatives
preferred a single member district to a MMD/SNTV system. Soma Masao, Nihon Senkyo Seidoshi [The
history of Japanese electoral system] (Fukuoka: Kyushu Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 242-245. See also,
Rei Shiratori, "The Politics of Electoral Reform in Japan," International Political Science Review 16 no. 1
(1995): 79-94.
707 Estevez-Abe argues that the MMD/SNTV compelled politicians to "target" social welfare policies to
specific groups in exchange for their electoral support. See Margarita Estevez-Abe, Welfare and
Capitalism in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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A safety net that was never constructed
While organized labor gave approval to the ruling class, the reform-minded
welfare bureaucrats advocated the overhaul of the archaic 1874 Relief Regulations and
the disqualification clause that barred the poor from voting. After the rice riots, senior
bureaucrats, such as Goto Shimpei, who had proposed a comprehensive social welfare in
the 1890s, joined the democratization movement and attempted to dramatically change
the political landscape. Got6 hoped that the pressure for universal suffrage would
materialize soon so that the country could truly unify (kyokoku icchi no kokumin
naikaku).708 When he was reinstated as the Home Minister in 1923 under the second
Yamamoto cabinet, amidst the chaos of the Great Kant6 Earthquake, Goto stressed the
importance of universal suffrage and ordered Home Ministry officials to draft the bill on
the revision of the election law.709 Nonetheless, Goto's political influence was limited
and his vision of creating a more inclusionary democracy failed to gain political support
from the Diet.7 1 0
In order to promote social welfare policies, Goto arranged for mid-level
bureaucrats, such as Tago Kazutami, to travel and study social welfare developments
abroad. Tago's sojourn abroad was crucial in strengthening his conviction to build a
robust social welfare system in Japan. He believed that Japan was making enormous
progress politically, militarily, and economically, but lagged considerably in the realm of
708 Citing Yamamoto Shir6, Nihonshi (8) [The history of Japan (8)] (Tokyo: Yihikaku, 1977) in Rekishi
Kyokasho Kyozai Kenky~kai (ed), Dai Kyflkan: Taish6 Demokurashii to Shakai Und5 no Gekika [Taisho
democracy and strengthening social movement, volume 9] (Tokyo: Gakko Tosho Shuppan, 2001), 304.
709 Ibid.
710 According to Ozaki Yukio, despite Goto's experience as the head of civilian affairs of Taiwan and
mayor of Tokyo, his political influence was limited and was known among the politicians as a "big talker."
See Ozaki (2001), 352.
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social policy and that the country needed to do more to ameliorate existing inequality.7 '"
He also maintained that individuals should not be responsible for escaping poverty on
their own and that the government was responsible for aiding the poor.712 As Tomie
(2007: 88) notes, Tago and other bureaucrats who were inspired by social welfare
developments abroad became the new "spokes person for the poor relief system" in the
1920s. The officials' social welfare advocacy stance did not help them advance their
careers as they were typecast as "eccentric" (kawari mono) and "trend-seekers" (atarashi
gariya). 3
In August 1926, the Home Ministry's Shakai Jigy6 Chosakai member, Tomita
Aijir5, reported in "The General Conditions of Poor Relief System" (kyahin seido gaikyd)
that Japan must move away from privately-run, charity-based relief (onkei) to state-
administrated poor relief based on social rights (kenri).714 He maintained that the
prevailing 1874 Relief Regulations was utterly inadequate because access to assistance
was extremely restricted and the level of funding was too low to operate effectively.
Ogawa (1960: 213) notes that Tomita's report was particularly important because it
revealed that the bureaucrats were willing to fight poverty; they fought to overhaul the
Relief Regulations, create a new compulsory-based public assistance system, and were
willing to grant the poor the right to public assistance.15
71" Tago (1970), 152-153. Tago was also very sympathetic to the labor movement. He believed that "labor
movement is a movement about workers' rights, to put it another way, it is about the rightful claimants'
assertion of their rights." Tago Ichimin's quote cited in Tomie Naoko, "Seizon no gimu" [The
responsibility of life], in Tokushfl: Kazoku, Gendaa to Shakai Seisaku [Special: Family, gender, and social
policy] edited by Shakai Seisaku Kenkyfl 2 (Tokyo: Toshindo, 2001), 130.
2Ibid, 131.
713 On this point, see Tago (1970), 161.
714 Tomita (2007), 84.
715 Another officer in the Social Bureau, Yamazaki lwao, who was involved in drafting the 1929 Relief and
Protection Law, believed that the British 1918 universal suffrage law, which eliminated the disqualification
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Bureaucratic pressure to revise the Relief Regulations materialized on March
1929 when the Home Ministry submitted the Relief and Protection Law (Kyngo Hoan).
Despite the efforts by mid-level welfare bureaucrats to radically change the public
assistance system, most of the progressive elements in earlier drafts (e.g., granting the
poor political and social rights) were deleted and the draft submitted to the Diet reflected
the anti-redistribution stance of ruling elected officials. Home Minister, Michizuki
Keisuke, stated that it was imperative for the government to intervene and aid those who
could not help themselves, especially individuals who were sick, orphaned, and
physically incapacitated.716 Constructing a safety net for the poor, he argued, would also
prevent the destitute from converting into dangerous radicals. The main rationale behind
the revision of the Relief Regulations was that families and mutual aid associations were
inadequate to address the complex, large-scale poverty in the era of industrialization."
The Diet passed the Relief and Protection Law on the grounds that it did not depart from
the minimalist policy direction and they refused to appropriate a budget and delayed
implementation for nearly three years.
Similar to the Relief Regulations, the new eligibility rules prohibited most poor
individuals from receiving aid. It stipulated that those who had the capacity to work (i.e.,
working or unemployed poor) were barred from applying for aid.718 The rise of the
unemployment problem after WWI led the Home Ministry to establish public
clause (i.e., individuals on poor relief were not able to vote), was the policy direction that was worth
emulating. He was skeptical that families and mutual aid are sufficient to combat poverty.
716 For an extended discussion on the Diet deliberations and how the progressive elements of the draft
proposals were deleted, see Terawaki Takao, Kyfigoh& no Seiritsu to Shik5 Jdtai no Kenkyfi [Research on
the passage and implementation of the relief protection law] (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 2007).
717 The Ministry of Finance opposed expansion of poor relief and argued that mutual aid should take
precedence over government aid and local, rather than national, level should be responsible for the bulk of
relief efforts.
718 The government also rejected any responsibilities to train or provide employment for the working or
unemployed poor as it would be an administrative and financial burden to the state. See Tipton (2008), 374.
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employment placement services (shokugy5 shakai) and "back-to-the-land" programs that
facilitated the movement of poor laborers from urban to rural areas. The government
never created an unemployment insurance program and the 1929 Relief and Protection
Law disregarded the needs of the unemployed poor.7 19 Recipients who were temporarily
incapable of working were required to repay a portion or all of the money to the state
once they rejoined the workforce." 720
Likewise, the restrictive eligibility rules of the Relief Regulations persisted.
Those who were eligible had to be above sixty-five or less than thirteen years of age, and
they had to be pregnant, disabled, sick or injured. Applicants with relatives, families, or
any individuals who could assist them, were disqualified. In order to keep expenses low,
the system predominantly relied on outdoor relief and the scope of assistance was limited
to covering food, housing, medical and childbirth-related expenses. Similar to the Relief
Regulations, individuals were not entitled to relief and had no legal basis to appeal
decisions concerning aid.72' Since the poor were not eligible to vote once they received
aid, the Relief and Protection Law maintained the punitive practice of stripping the poor
of their dignity and status. 2 As Tipton notes, "the poor became further defined,
categorized and marginalized as the most destitute, yet potentially dangerous, people at
the bottom of Japanese society." 723 The poor were labeled as part of the "card class,"
719 Uno Masamichi, "Senzen Nihon ni Okeru Kateki Kyisai Rippo," [Pre-war public relief legislation]
Kikan Shakai Hosh5 Kenkyn (The quarterly journal of social security research), vol. 18, no. 2, (Autumn,
1982): 177-178.
720 Tipton (2008), 373.
721 Uno (1982), 174.
722 Ogawa Masaaki, Kenri to Shite no Shakai Hosh5 [Social security as rights] (Tokyo: Keiso Shob6, 1969),
17.
723 Elise K. Tipton, "Defining the Poor in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," Japan Forum 20 no.3 (2008):
372.
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which further reinforced their inferior status and applying for assistance subjected their
724
personal lives to public investigation.
In order to keep administrative expenses to a bare minimum, unpaid "relief
agents" (kyigoiin) or "district commissioners" (Homen-iin) were deployed as the primary
agents of the new public assistance system in lieu of professional social workers.7 2 5
National government funding was set at 3,000,000 yen, of which 760,000 yen were
allocated for administrative expenses. The 3,000,000 yen were raised by reallocating the
existing budget and creating a new revenue source that did not involve a tax hike:
1,200,000 yen came from the "excess funds" that accrued as a result of reducing the rate
of national government subsidy for Tokyo and Osaka's policing budget; 1,000,000 yen
came from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry based on new revenue generated by
deregulating the horse racing industry; and the Finance Ministry contributed the rest
(800,000 yen), mostly by transferring surpluses that resulted from administrative
streamlining.726
When the Relief and Protection Law was implemented in 1932 during the Great
Depression, it only extended aid to 157,564 people (0.2% of the population). According
to Ikeda (1986: 697-698), only a quarter or third of the people whom district welfare
commissioners registered as people needing relief received some from of aid. In
724 Tipton (2008), 375.
725 The Homen-iin pressured the Emperor to intervene in order to prod the government to implement the
Relief and Protection Law. In the midst of the Great Depression, the representatives of the national
Homen-iin issued a statement calling for a speedy implementation of the Relief and Protection Law. They
wrote that the situation was dire and that the "children of the emperor" were facing dire conditions ("heika
no akago ga gashi seshimuru ni shinobizu") and urged the Diet to secure funding for the new public
assistance system. The Diet remained dismissive and avoided debating the issue of growing poverty in the
early 1930s. The district commissioners met over fifty times in Tokyo alone and organized hundreds of
meetings across the country since 1930 to prompt the Diet to allocate funding for poor relief. Ohara Shakai
Mondai Kenkyfijo (1932), 662-663. Tomie (2007: 25) notes that Japan's modern poor relief system was "a
product of joint state-society collaboration" because unpaid social workers willingly cooperated with the
state to keep a minimalist public assistance system.
726 Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkynjo (1932), 663.
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preparation for the implementation of the new law, the income thresholds used to
determine eligibility in some localities such as Tokyo were lowered in order to prevent
low-income families from qualifying for aid.727 Even as Japan adopted universal
manhood suffrage and began constructing a prototype of the country's social-insurance
based welfare state in the 1920s, the poor were explicitly denied the rights to vote and
receive public assistance mostly because the main economic interest groups chose to
exclude the poor from the development of the country's political and social welfare
institutions.
Conclusion
The findings from this chapter challenge the central thesis of the power resources
theory that organized labor plays the key role in expanding suffrage and redistribution.
Not only was labor disinterested in the politics of poor relief, it also eventually seceded
from the democratization movement. In comparative terms, the trajectory of Japan's
political and social welfare development further diverged from its European counterparts.
Japan opted to take an alternative causal pathway towards democratization and social
policymaking. Europe witnessed the growth of a working class that eventually advocated
suffrage expansion and universal social welfare programs. Strong working class pressure
played a crucial role in building a universalistic democracy and inclusive social welfare
system.
On the other hand, Japan's late-industrializer status eliminated "labor" from the
political equation and gave the ruling elites absolute power to shape the country's
political and social welfare institutions. Contrary to the expectation outlined in the power
727 Tipton (2008), 373-374.
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resources theory, the working class withdrawal from the democratization movement did
not halt social welfare and democratic reforms in Japan. The ruling elites exhibited keen
interest in building democracy and social welfare institutions as long as they embodied
exclusionary rules that prevented the poor from voting or receiving government transfers.
In essence, the country's path-breaking transition towards economic modernity and
democratization gave rise to an uneven welfare state that comprised of a heavy layer of
social insurance programs but with a distinctively threadbare safety net for the poor.
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CONCLUSION
My research seeks to shed light on some of the enduring puzzles in the study of
affluent democracies today: Why does political inequality persist in a democratic system
that operates on a "one person, one vote" principle? If the poor in all advanced
industrialized countries have the right to vote and are entitled to relief, why do some
democracies shirk, whereas others fully commit to alleviating poverty? Why does the
welfare state in some countries reinforce rather than ameliorate existing inequality? An
in-depth examination of the origins of Japanese democracy, capitalism, and social policy
illuminates these puzzles and contradictions.
Comparatively and historically, Japan has had one of the highest post-tax/transfer
poverty rates among advanced industrialized nations, which belies the common
perception of the country as a "90% middle class" society. Yet, the government extracts
more from the poor in taxes and gives them less than in other countries. Its public
assistance system has exceptionally restrictive eligibility rules and access and spending
levels are significantly lower than its peers. The Japanese safety net for the poor is so
threadbare that at least one person dies of starvation every week and nearly a dozen
people commit suicide daily due to economic hardship.
This harsher, darker reality in Japan contradicts the country's profile as a rich,
democratic welfare state, which strongly suggests it should have a robust safety net for
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the poor. A long line of research claims that democracy empowers the poor with votes
that they can use to pressure public officials to secure the economic wellbeing of
citizens.728 Japan's impressive economic achievements over the last century, some
contend, have been a boon for the poor as the government's organizational and financial
capacities to care for the needy have considerably expanded over time.729 Moreover,
Japan is the only Asian county considered to be a "welfare state" as it spends a
considerable portion of its GDP on social welfare programs. As Gregory Kasza has
convincingly shown, the Japanese welfare state is "no more unique than the other
advanced welfare states but sits comfortably within the general parameters of the
species."730
In light of these basic facts, Japan's meager assistance to the poor raises three
important questions: If Japan is a democracy with free and fair elections, why haven't
the poor's votes translated into more redistribution? If the country has amassed
enormous wealth over time and the government can afford to lift individuals out of
poverty, why does it spend so little on the poor? If Japan has a massive social welfare
system that aims to protect citizens from harm, why do the poor, who need social
protection the most, get the least? These questions converge to form the central puzzle of
my dissertation: why does Japan, a rich, democratic welfare state, nickel and dime the
poor?
728 For an overview of the literature on the relationship between democracy and redistribution, see Michael
Ross, "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" American Journal of Political Science, 50 no. 4 (October, 2006):
860-874.
729 Harold Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1958); Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
730 Gregory J. Kasza, One World of Welfare: Japan in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2006), 140.
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The central contention of my dissertation is that when and how Japan built
democracy and wealth mattered deeply in the development of a safety net for the poor.
The country's path-breaking transition towards economic modernity and democratization
gave rise to an uneven welfare state that comprised of a heavy layer of social insurance
programs at the top but with a distinctively threadbare safety net for the poor at the
bottom. At critical moments of the nation building process, its drive to catch up to the
West in the realm of political and economic development, paradoxically, posed obstacles
to catch up in the realm of poor relief.
In order to illuminate the causal factors and temporal dynamics at work, I present
an analytical framework that shows how a particular pattern of democratic reforms and
industrialization shapes redistributive outcome. I utilize Japan's distinctively minimalist
course of redistribution to identify new variables and processes that are overlooked or
downplayed in existing models. Its main objective, therefore, is to demonstrate an
alternative causal path, which I shall explain below, entails analyzing the "co-evolution"
of the safety net, democracy, and capitalism.7 3 '
Broadly speaking, two issues determine the course of redistribution: who has a
say in the policymaking process and what are their incentive to aid the poor. I argue that
the pattern of democratization defines who has a political voice while the incentives to
aid the poor are structured by the pattern of industrialization. I identify two key elements
of democratic reforms that determine who gets to make redistributive choices: the
varying effectiveness of electoral safeguards (e.g., constitutional provisions that limit the
power of the elected assembly) and "carriers of democratization" (the agents that
731 My work resonates with the current book project of Torben Iversen and David Soskice (see "Two Paths
to Democracy," Open Forum, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2010) that conceptualizes
the welfare state as co-evolving along side the development of political and economic institutions.
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successfully advance democratic reforms). While the redistributive interests of key social
groups (e.g., agrarian landlords, industrialists, and working class) are mainly shaped by
the varying tempo and nature of industrial development.
In addition, those who have the power to shape redistributive policies also have
the capacity to design and mold political institutions. Therefore, they largely decide
whether the poor are included or excluded from participating in the democratic process
itself. When power holders are reluctant to aid the poor, they are more likely to create an
exclusionary democracy that denies the poor the right to vote or, if they are granted
suffrage, choose an electoral system that mutes their political voice. The fact that
democratic institutions ultimately reflect the redistributive preferences of power holders
ensures that the pattern of redistribution is locked in for the long haul.
Applying this framework to the historical evolution of the safety net in Japan
reveals that the interplay between two factors-its late developer status paired with state-
led national industrial development and the elite-driven process of democratization
combined with ineffective electoral safeguards--led the government to consistently
choose a minimalist course of redistribution. On the one hand, the country's state-led
industrial capitalism structured the incentives of the main social groups (e.g., agrarian
landlords, industrialists, and organized labor) in ways that hurt the prospects of building a
safety net. On the other hand, the political voice of these groups was amplified because
the traditional holders of power introduced democratic institutions with ineffective
electoral safeguards to curb the power of the elected assembly. As a result, the gradual
transition towards democratization hampered the development of a robust safety net as
expanding suffrage to key groups-agrarian landholders in 1890, industrialists in 1900,
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and organized labor in 1925-each in turn voiced opposition to expand poor relief in
order to pursue their narrow economic interests. Moreover, these groups eventually
agreed to institute an electoral system that enhanced the political representation of
organized economic interests at the expense of the unorganized; this shut out the poor
from redistributive politics even after universal suffrage was attained.
My four empirical chapters demonstrate that the poor were systematically
excluded from participating in or benefiting from the country's political, economic, and
social welfare achievements. The first empirical chapter shows that, contrary to the
cultural approach, Japan's ultra-minimalist policy toward poverty was not simply
inherited from past tradition. Prior to the birth of the nation-state, feudal lords engaged in
despotic redistribution and provided a pseudo-safety net for poor peasants in order to
extract tax revenue in the form of agricultural products. The rise of the modem nation-
state led to a dramatic decrease in the level of poor relief as deregulation of the labor
market and the dismantling of feudal institutions vitiated the logic of despotic
redistribution. The new Meiji government, however, instituted an ultra-minimalist public
assistance system, the 1874 Relief Regulations, in order to deter most individuals from
receiving aid. The oligarch's grand mission to move Japan from rags to riches through a
capital-intensive state-led industrial growth strategy drained state resources for poor
relief.
The second empirical chapter reveals that the funneling imperative to spark
industrial growth compelled agrarian elites to oppose any increase in government
expenditures, including expansion of poor relief, under the presumption that it would lead
to higher taxes in the future. The Meiji government raised capital domestically through
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the land-tax and funneled it to develop competitive industries; the agrarian elites,
dissatisfied with the existing taxation without representation, marshaled their resources to
pressure the oligarchs to democratize fiscal policy. An internal schism within the
oligarchy and the pressure from the agrarian landlords paved the path of democratization.
For the Meiji oligarchs, undoubtedly the most powerful figures in the history of modern
Japan, the task of laying the foundation to build a safety net for the poor seemed
straightforward and attainable. The oligarchs prided themselves as being the defenders of
the public interest and feared that democratic institutions and processes were vulnerable
to capture by private interests. They carefully engineered the political system-from
local governments to national electoral rules-prior to the opening of the Diet in order to
curb the power of the elected representatives and maintain a firm grip over the decision-
making process.
The consequences of introducing democratic institutions in Japan were far from
what the oligarchs desired or expected. The new constitution left the allocation of power
over public finances ambiguous, as neither the elected assembly nor the cabinet
possessed sufficient power to wrestle the other into total submission. In order to stack the
deck in their favor, however, the oligarchs instituted a number of safeguards to dominate
the decision-making process, but these were of little or no value when party politics went
live. Since the opening of the Diet, the bureaucrats (and the oligarchs that commanded
the bureaucracy) advocated creating a safety net, but they failed to implement one
because the Meiji oligarchs mistakenly made democracy work: the Diet became the
epicenter of formulating redistributive policies and any expansion in poor relief required
the consent of the representatives of key economic interest groups.
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The third empirical chapter explains how the newly enfranchised urban
industrialists attempted to abolish public assistance altogether. The state-led industrial
development strategy provided incentives for industrialists to advocate expansion of
suffrage: they needed more government funds to stoke industrial growth and this required
greater political representation in the Diet. After they gained suffrage, the urban
industrialists joined the agrarian elites in opposing redistribution towards the poor. While
welfare bureaucrats and a handful of rogue politicians attempted to expand poor relief,
the Diet refused to even deliberate on the matter. The industrialists were keen on
channeling government funds for what they deemed productive, such as public goods
provision and infrastructural development, but not for the needy.
Theoretically, the findings from this chapter confirm the limits of the economic
modernization approach. The central issue concerning redistribution is not whether a
country is industrializing, but rather, how they pursue industrialization. The Japan case
shows that the nature of industrialization matters in the development of social welfare
policy; for latecomers, the need to stoke industrial growth pitted powerful interest groups
such as agrarian landlords and industrialists against redistribution.
The final empirical chapter shows how decentralization of the working class
movement facilitated the creation of an exclusionary democracy and an uneven welfare
state. The findings from this chapter cast doubt on the validity of power resources
theory's core premise that organized labor is pro-redistribution and pro-democratization.
The evolution of the Japanese working class movement shows that workers never
advocated expansion of poor relief and their interest in democratization diminished over
time. Being a late developer empowered the ruling elites to preemptively strike against
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labor through repressive and regulatory means. In addition, the state-led industrial
development strategy provided employers with varying tools-such as the patient capital
needed for employers to monopolize skills and the institutionalization of corporate
paternalistic programs in the larger, state-protected firms-that were critical to
incentivize workers to form plant- or firm-level unions. The fragmentation and
decentralization of the working class movement compelled organized workers to focus on
their individual workplace issues at the plant- or firm-level and abandon efforts to
promote encompassing political and social welfare reforms that benefited the poor. As a
result, the decentralization of labor movement encouraged workers to withdraw from the
democratization movement as their locus of collective action was anchored at the firm or
plant level and not at the national political stage.
The fact the impetus for democratization in Japan did not emanate from the
working class enabled the ruling elites to design an exclusionary democracy that
prevented the groups that they deemed antithetical to their economic interests, such as the
poor, from attaining political representation in the Diet. The political exclusion of the
poor-either by denying the right to vote (pre-1945) or muting their political voice by
instituting an electoral system that was disadvantageous for unorganized groups (post-
1945)-hurt the chances of a robust safety net emerging over the long run. In sum, in
building Japanese democracy, the poor were excluded, first, by being denied the right to
vote and later by instituting an electoral system that disadvantaged the poor.
Given the exclusionary character of Japanese democracy and the constant
economic rationale to dampen redistribution, the country's "welfare state" developed
unevenly, largely shaped by political elites that were backed by strong, well-organized
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interest groups such as organized labor unions and industrialists. The pattern of
exclusion that was see in the distant past has persisted to the present day and my
dissertation shows that the reproductive cycle of the politics of exclusion originated at a
critical moment of the country's nation building process.
The findings from this dissertation engage the growing body of literature on
redistribution and the origins of democratic institutions. Numerous scholars contend that
democracy is positively correlated with redistribution because, in the most basic sense, it
empowers the poor with votes that they can use to obtain government transfers.732 Yet,
skeptics have also voiced concerns that the enfranchisement of the poor has not changed
the fundamental characteristics of redistribution. Schattschneider astutely observed that
the "flaw in the pluralist heaven" is that the "heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent." 733 Gerhard Lenski similarly noted: the "peculiar character of so much of
the political life of modern democracies" is that "the rhetoric of politicians is frequently
egalitarian in character, but the legislation more often aristocratic."73  More recently,
Michael Ross contended that "[d]emocracy unquestionably produces non-economic
benefits for people in poverty, endowing them with political rights and liberties," but for
the poor, "these political rights produce few if any improvements in their material well-
being." 735
732 See for example, Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981); Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf,1999); Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of
Political Economy, 89 no. 5 (Oct., 1981): 914-927.
733 Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960),
35.
734 Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory ofSocial Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1966), 342.
7 Ross (2008), 28.
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Examining why Japan, a country that is often touted as a successful case of
democratic consolidation, has yet to provide adequate social services for the poor takes us
a step closer towards understanding this apparent discrepancy in whether democracy
benefits the poor. "Democracy's unresolved dilemma" of unequal participation and
persistent inegalitarian feature stems directly from the predicament that elites face in
making democracy: the ruling elites pursue democratization and concede to sharing
power in order to lengthen their political longevity but they simultaneously resist sharing
the government's purse with the newly enfranchised.736 Analyzing the origins of
democratic institutions in Japan reveals that all democracies were not created equal and
that under certain conditions, organized economic interests and the ruling elites can
create electoral institutions that limit the representation of unorganized, poor voters. The
"inconsistent and often contradictory process" of democratization, where exclusionary
measures are commonly applied in conjunction with inclusionary reforms, can inject
distortion in the democratic process and undermine the attainment of political equality
and democratic ideals.737 Thus, the basic questions of why, when, how, and who created
democracy are central to our understanding of the institutional context under which
redistributive policies are made.
In examining the relationship between democracy and redistribution, my
dissertation also highlights the importance of how the development of markets produces
736 Arend Lijphart, "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma," The American Political
Science Review, 91 no. 1 (Mar., 1997): 1-14.
737 Ahmed (forthcoming) rejects the teleological view of the makings of democracy and argues that while
the more blatant undemocratic measures have disappeared over time, "the very institutions of democracy"
(i.e., the electoral system itself) can act as an exclusionary safeguard in the new democratic order. See
Amel Ahmed, Engineering Electoral Dominance: Democratization and Electoral System Choice in the Era
of Industrialization (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 1. The importance of
exclusionary safeguards is emphasized in the work of Daniel Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?"
World Politics, 5 8 no. 2 (January 2006).
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both the carriers of democratization and the heroes and villains of poor relief. As a late
developer, the need to funnel scarce government resources to spark industrial growth
pitted powerful interest groups such as agrarian landlords and industrialists against
redistribution. In contrast, for the most part, the welfare bureaucrats (and the oligarchs
that commanded the bureaucracy) were intent on saving the poor as they recognized the
downside of rapid industrialization and sought a means of helping those who were
stranded in poverty with little prospect of escaping it.
The battle between the proponents and opponents of poor relief resulted always in
a win for the latter because successive democratic reforms made the Diet, not the
bureaucracy, the principal organ managing redistributive affairs. The voice of the
opponents was augmented because the late-development strategy compelled them to act
as carriers of democratization in order to seek more funds to accelerate industrialization
(in the case of industrialists) or to raise objection against the financing of modern sector
by the traditional sector (in the case of agrarian elites). Moreover, late-development
industrial capitalism encouraged the working class to withdraw from the democratization
movement, leaving the poor to fend for themselves. Hence, my dissertation underscores
the importance of economic interests in shaping democracy and the course of
redistribution: the big bang of the birth of democracy and capitalism created the universe
of the welfare state that we observe today.738
738 The importance of economic interest in advancing democratic reforms is also highlighted in the work of
Torben Iversen and David Soskice, Politics and Capitalism (book manuscript), 24.
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